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PRESIDENT WILBER S. ATEN

Nebraska State Bar Association
Meeting of the House of Delegates
OCTOBER 17, 1956
The House of Delegates was called to order at Hotel Paxton,
Omaha, Nebraska, at 9:30 A.M. by Chairman Hale McCown of
Beatrice.
HALE McCOWN: Gentlemen, the House will please come to
order.
I will ask the Secretary to call the roll.
(Roll call by Secretary George H. Turner.)
HALE McCOWN: Gentlemen, a quorum being present, I think
the first order of business is the approval of the calendar.
I will entertain a motion that the printed agenda as printed
in your program be adopted as the agenda of the House. Do I hear
such a motion?
HARRY B. COHEN: I so move.
HALE McCOWN: Moved by Mr. Cohen. Is there a second?
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: All in favor say "aye."
Opposed, the same sign.
The agenda is adopted.
At this time I would like to announce the appointment of the
Committee on Hearings on Resolutions. The chairman is Robert
Van Pelt; members, Charles Adams, Richard Hunter, Frank Mattoon, Joe Votava, and Hans Holtorf.
If anyone has any resolutions which they wish to present which
are not presented on the floor this morning at the scheduled time
for the resolution presentation, if you will see that some member
of that committee receives them prior to 1:30; that committee will
hold its hearings at 1:30 P.M.
The report of that committee is the final item of business
on the agenda for this afternoon.
At this time we have the statement by the president of our
Association, Wilber Aten.
WILBER ATEN: Mr. McCown and gentlemen, actually this is
the place where we are supposed to report any unfinished business
from the Executive Council to the House of Delegates. There is
no unfinished business at this time; however that does not mean
that there will not be at the time we get to the last session of the

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

House on Friday afternoon. At this time there is no unfinished
business.
I am very happy that so many are here, and I am sure the
business of the Association will go along very well.
HALE McCOWN: May I express my appreciation to each of
you for your willingness to act as members of this House of Delegates.
In the same connection, may I add a suggestion to start the
matter off with, shall we say, the wrong approach, to call your
attention to the fact that on Friday at 4:00 P.M. this House meets
again to consider the reports of the various sections and to conclude
the final business of this House of Delegates.
I call that to your attention specifically because of our experience of last year; if you will recall, those of you who were here,
we had a difficult time in finding a quorum; we had to adjourn and
wait and call to get enough people here to have that business
presented.
I would therefore suggest that each of you kindly mark on
your calendar now and note it in your program the meeting of this
House again at 4:00 o'clock, Friday afternoon, at this same place
immediately following the final session.
At this time we have the report of the Secretary-Treasurer,
Mr. Turner.
GEORGE H. TURNER: Mr. Chairman and members of the
House.
The books of the Association have been audited by the firm of
Martin and Martin of Lincoln.
They have submitted a report which I will at least summarize.
A copy will be lodged with the Executive Council.
The report of cash receipts during the year, $43,269.92, and the
disbursements, $41,230.17, leaving an excess of receipts over disbursements of $2,039.75.
This figure is reflected in the increase in the cash balance
from $3,307.77 a year ago on the 24th of September to $5,347.52 on
September 30, 1956.
Principal items of cash receipts, of course, are dues collected
from members, of the active members $37,630.00, inactive members,
$4,960.00.
The major disbursements throughout the year have been salaries and payroll taxes of $6,253.90; that is substantially less than
the same item of a year ago because during this year we have not
had a paid public relations representative. What work has been
done in that field has been done on a piece-work basis. If we
wanted something prepared for publication, an individual would
be hired to do it for so much for the particular job.
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A year ago we had had a full-time public relations man with
a salary of $5,000.00.
The expense of the Executive Council meetings during the year
amounted to $1,002.65; the expense of officers, $1,186.07; office supplies and expenses are $1,316.10; Family Law Institute, $1,097.77;
and the institute on real property law which was held last spring,
$1,243.46.
The publication of the Nebraska Law Review, $4,330.06. I think
most of you are familiar with our arrangement on that. The Law
Review is published jointly by the Association and by the Nebraska
University College of Law. The Association pays one-third of the
expense of three of the issues. We pay the full expense of the
January issue which contains the proceedings of the annual
meeting.
The next item of expense is postage and express, $1,180.93; expense of the three delegates to the House of Delegates to the American Bar Association, $1,936.82; spent on the test case brought
to determine the validity of the judicial retirement act, total,
$1,724.43; the purchase of bonds, which many of you will recall
was authorized by the House of Delegates a year ago upon the
recommendation of the Committee on Budget and Finance, $2,000.00.
The total expense of all public-service activity, $4,999.72; the expense of the 1955 annual meeting, $4,310.05; the expense of the
annual December Tax Institute, $2,461.53.
And I might say that actually this report of the auditor does
not really, in my judgment, fully reflect the cash situation. They
have treated the purchase of those bonds as an expenditure. We
have the bonds, so in addition to the slightly over $5,000.00 cash
fund which we had at the close of this audit we also have the
$2,000.00 in bonds, so, while they treated this as an expense, I treat
it as a capital item, and I think I am correct in that.
Actually the Association is in excellent financial condition as
of the close of this audit.
HALE McCOWN: Are there any questions as to the Secretary's
report?
(There was no response.)
HALE McCOWN: Any discussion? What will you do with the
report?
MR. MATTSON: I move the approval of the report.
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: It has been moved and seconded that the
report be approved and placed on file.
All those in favor please say "aye."
Opposed, same sign.
Motion carried.
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HALE McCOWN: The next item of business is the introduction
of resolutions. Are there any resolutions which any member of
this House has for introduction at this time?
MR. VOTAVA: Mr. Chairman.
HALE McCOWN: Mr. Votava.
MR. VOTAVA: By request I am introducing this resolution to
present to the committee. I am reading it now so the members
of the House will know what it is about.
Resolved, That the House of Delegates of the Nebraska State
Bar Association approve Constitutional Amendment Number
603 to be submitted at the forthcoming general election, which will
permit the Legislature to absolve real estate taxes and assessments
delinquent ten years or more.
Be it further resolved that the lawyers of Nebraska are urged
to take the initiative in explaining the measure to the voters to the
end that the electorate can make an intelligent decision on the motion.
HALE McCOWN: The resolution has been seconded. Is there
any discussion? In this connection, may I suggest that resolutions
all be referred to the Committee on Hearings and final action on
them be taken at the time of the report of the Committee on Hearings on Resolutions. I do not wish to shut off any discussion at the
time of introduction, either; therefore I call for any discussion you
may have on the proposed resolution and for such further action
as you may think appropriate.
The chair will entertain a motion that the resolution offered
by Mr. Votava be referred to the Committee on Hearings on Resolutions. Is there such a motion?
MR. SPENCER: I so move.
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: All in favor say "aye."
Opposed, the same sign.
Motion is carried.
MR. KUHNS: Mr. Chairman, on the agenda of the House I
find no place where I am sure this would be appropriate, other
than as a matter of resolution, and simply to preserve the point, I
would like to present a resolution that the by-laws of the Association, which are subject to amendment by a vote of the House, be
amended in certain particulars which I will state very briefly, and
I might say they pertain only to changes in the by-laws to conform
to established practices.
We have, for example, a committee provided for in the by-laws,
a standing committee on procedure. There has not been such a
committee for some time. I think the by-laws should be amended
to eliminate the need for a standing committee on procedure.
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Also the by-laws call for a committee on public relations. For
some time that committee has been designated the Committee on
Public Service, so I would like to propose a resolution that, so
far as I know now, pertains only to Section 1 of Article 3 of the
by-laws, that the by-laws be amended.
I will say there is nothing controversial and, I presume, the
easiest way to bring the matter before the House would be through
the Resolution Committee.
HALE McCOWN: Mr. Kuhns, with the permission of the House
I am going to suggest that I appoint Mr. Kuhns as chairmax and
Mr. Mattson and Mr. Yost to condense and set forth the suggested
changes and to present them to the Committee on Hearings on
Resolutions, to be considered at the time of the report of that committee this afternoon as a definite part of the business.
If you would prefer, they may be offered separately prior to
the report of the Committee on Hearings on Resolutions.
If there is no objection on the part of any member, it will be
so ordered.
Are there any other resolutions for introduction?
HALE McCOWN: If not, such resolutions as the committee
may deem appropriate in its hearings may be adopted as reported
by the committee at the time of its report this afternoon.
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Reports of Committees
The House of Delegates received, considered, and acted upon
the reports of standing and special committees. A full transcript of
the discussion of each report is on file in the office of the Secretary,
as the official record of the proceedings of the House of Delegates.
Printed herein are the reports, and amendments made thereto, of
the several committees as adopted by the House of Delegates.
The report of the Committee on Administrative Agencies was
presented by Bert L. Overcash, Chairman of the Committee. The
report which was approved by the House of Delegates follows:
Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Agencies
This Committee has continued the study of legislation to provide an Administrative Procedure Act for Nebraska. A form of
bill adapting the Model Act (Uniform Laws Annotated 9 A supplement) to existing legislation was drafted and submitted to state
agencies and other interested parties. A copy of this Bill is attached to this report for the information of all members of the
Association.
A variety of suggestions and criticisms with reference to
this Bill have been received. Some suggest that the Bill is too
mild and will accomplish nothing. Others suggest it is much too
broad and sweeping and will hamper the work of administrative
agencies. It is to be observed that the Bill has some similarity
to federal legislation adopted in this field. 5 U. S. C. 1001.
Some of the more important suggestions received with reference to this Bill are the following:
1. That Section 1 make it plain, if it is not already certain,
that this act has no application to the military department of the
state and applies only to civil agencies.
2. That findings of fact and conclusions of law (Section 8)
be required only if requested by the parties.
3. That Section 4 (1) be amended to permit suit in the county
where the claimed act or conduct may be committed.
4. That agencies be authorized in complicated and extensive
hearings to require that direct testimony be reduced to writing
ahead of the hearing and to require advance notice of a desire to
cross-examine witnesses.
That the right of cross-examination be limited to adverse wit-

nesses.
5. That a more definite standard as to rules of evidence be
provided in Section 7 (1).
6. That agencies be authorized to appoint members of the
bar as hearing officers to receive evidence and make recommendations as to findings of facts and conclusions of law.
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7. That the agency be empowered to subpeona witnesses and
records on motion of the agency or at the request of any party.
8. That the agency be authorized to compel testimony under
a guaranty of immunity from prosecution.
9. That the taking and use of depositions by the agency or
parties be authorized by the act.
10. That provision be included in the act for staying by a
district court application of a rule pending determination of its
validity.
11. That a minimum period for notice be stated in Section 6.
12. That a time limit be placed in Section 2 (1) for the adoption of rules.
Section 12 of the Model Act deals with appellate review of
administrative action. The Legislative Council has been considering
proposed legislation to simplify and make uniform the practice in
this regard. This legislation may be incorporated into the Bill reviewed herein if that appears advisable to the Bill Drafter and
the Legislative Council.
It is recommended that this special committee be continued
for the next year in order to further the program of obtaining an
Administrative ProcedureAct for Nebraska.
Bert L. Overcash, Chairman
James N. Ackerman
James H. Anderson
Auburn H. Atkins
Raymond M. Crossman, Jr.
Warren C. Johnson
Joseph L. Leahy
Earl E. Morgan
Edward A. Mullery
T. F. Neighbors
Robert E. Powell
Bernard Spencer
Wayne 0. Stoehr
Hird Stryker, Jr.
Einar Viren
Richard D. Wilson
Legislative Bill AN ACT concerning procedure of state administrative agencies and
to amend section 84-901 Revised Statutes Supplement 1950.
Be it enacted by the people of the State of Nebraska,
Section 1. That Section 84-901, Revised Statutes Supplement,
1950, be amended to read as follows:
(1) "Agency" means each board, commission, department,
officer, division or other administrative office or unit of the state
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government authorized by law to make rules, except the courts and
the Legislature:
(2) "Rule" mcans th.e writte stteen...
"n
a
r.l includes
every regulation, standard or policy. of gene
...-ra;
cato
statement of policy or interpretation of general application and future
effect, issued by an agency, including the amendment or repeal
thereof, whether with or without prior hearing, and designed to implement, interpret or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or governing its organization or procedure, but not
including regulations concerning the internal management of the
agency not affecting private rights or interests or procedures available to the public; Provided, that for the purpose of this act every
rule which shall prescribe a penalty shall be presumed to have
general applicability or to affect private rights and interests.
(3) "Contested case" means a proceeding before an agency in
which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are
required by law or constitutional right to be determined after an
agency hearing.
Section 2. In addition to other rule-making requirements imposed by law:
(1) Each agency shall adopt rules governing the formal and
informal procedures prescribed or authorized by this act. Such
rules shall include rules of practice before the agency, together with
forms and instructions.
(2) To assist interested persons dealing with it, each agency
shall so far as deemed practicable supplement its rules with descriptive statements of its procedures.
(3) Prior to the adoption of any rule authorized by law, or
the amendment or repeal thereof, the adopting agency shall so
far as practicable, publish or otherwise circulate notice of its intended action and afford interested persons opportunity to submit
data or views orally or in writing.
Section 3. Any interested person may petition an agency requesting the promulgation, amendment, or repeal of any rule. Each
agency shall prescribe by rule the form for such petitions and the
procedure for their submission, consideration, and disposition.
Section 4.
(1) The validity of any rule may be determined upon petition
for a declaratory judgment thereon addressed to the District Court
of Lancaster County, when it appears that the rule, or its threatened
application, interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere
with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner.
The agency shall be made a party to the proceeding. The declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has
first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule
in question.
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(2) The court shall declare the rule invalid if it finds that
it violates constitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency or was adopted without compliance with
statutory rule-making procedures.
Section 5. On petition of any interested person, any agency
may issue a declaratory ruling with respect to the applicability to
any person, property, or state of facts of any rule or statute enforceable by it. A declaratory ruling, if issued after argument
and stated to be binding, is binding between the agency and the
petitioner on the state of facts alleged, unless it is altered or set
aside by a court. Such a ruling is subject to review in the manner provided by law for the review of decisions in contested cases.
Each agency shall prescribe by rule the form for such petitions and
the procedure for their submission, consideration, and disposition.
Section 6. In any contested case all parties shall be afforded
an opportunity for hearing after reasonable notice. The notice shall
state the time, place, and issues involved, but if, by reason of the
nature of the proceeding, the issues cannot be fully stated in advance of the hearing, or if subsequent amendment of the issues is
necessary, they shall be fully stated as soon as practicable, and
opportunity shall be afforded all parties to present evidence and
argument with respect thereto. The agency shall prepare an official record, which shall include testimony and exhibits, in each contested case, but it shall not be necessary to transcribe shorthand
notes unless requested for purpose of rehearing or court review.
Informal disposition may also be made of any contested case by
stipulation, agreed settlement, consent order, or default. Each
agency shall adopt appropriate rules of procedure for notice and
hearing in contested cases.
Section 7. In contested cases:
(1) Agencies may admit and give probative effect to evidence
which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably
prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. They shall give effect
to the rules of privilege recognized by law. They may exclude incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence.
(2) All evidence, including records and documents in the possession of the agency of which it desires to avail itself, shall be offered and made a part of the record in the case, and no other factual
information or evidence shall be considered in the determination of
the case. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of
copies or excerpts, or by incorporation by reference.
(3) Every party shall have the right of cross-examination of
witnesses who testify, and shall have the right to submit rebuttal
evidence.
(4) Agencies may take notice of judicially cognizable fact and
in addition may take notice of general, technical, or scientific facts
within their specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified either
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before or during hearing, or by reference in preliminary reports
or otherwise, of the material so noticed,- and they shall be afforded
an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. Agencies may utilize
their experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge
in the evaluation of the evidence presented to them.
Section 8. Every decision and order adverse to a party to the
proceeding, rendered by an agency in a contested case, shall be in
writing or stated in the record and shall be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact shall
consist of a concise statement of the conclusions upon each contested issue of fact. Parties to the proceeding shall be notified
of the decision and order in person or by mail. A copy of the decision and order and accompanying findings and conclusions shall
be delivered or mailed upon request to each party or to his attorney
of record.
Section 9. If any provision of this act or the application thereof
to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity
shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which
can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and
to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable.
Section 10. This act is intended to constitute an independent
act establishing minimum administrative procedure for all agencies
and shall be considered as cumulative to existing laws.
Section 11. That original section 84-901 Revised Statutes Supplement 1950 be repealed.
The report of the Committee on American Citizenship was presented by Frank J. Mattoon, Chairman of the Committee. The
report was amended after discussion by eliminating the recommendation of the Committee that the proposal contained in the report
of this Committee made at the 1955 annual meeting be approved.
After eliminating all reference to the 1955 report, the report of the
Committee was approved by the House of Delegates. The full report of the Committee on American Citizenship follows:
Report of the Committee on American Citizenship
The Committee on American Citizenship submits herewith its
report designed to enable the Nebraska State Bar Association to
establish and activate a concrete program on American Citizenship.
Because any successful program requires the cooperation and
enthusiastic support of individual lawyers, we call attention to the
1955 report which contained basic and fundamental principles for
activation of a sound program on American Citizenship. We submit
that our Bar Association must first consider whether or not an
organized program should be maintained. American Citizenship is a
field in which there must be an organized and forthright program,
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implemented by active participation of the lawyers of Nebraska,
which must go beyond mere annual written reports.
Your Committee feels that the principles of American citizenship in the State of Nebraska should receive renewed emphasis.
The fundamentals of American democracy contained in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States
have been neglected and misrepresented. Information is lacking.
Pride in the fundamental principles of these basic documents has
diminished. Sarcasm, by imposing the brand "flag-waving," has
become popular to a degree that outward expressions of loyalty
have been subjected to ridicule and sarcasm. There is a woeful lack
of real understanding of the basic principles of democracy and
the fundamental differences between that form of government, on
the one hand, and communism and militant dictatorships, on the
other hand. Three specific areas of the American public should
be reached toward the end that principles of Americanism once
more be emphasized and applied to our so-called "modern American society."
These are:
1. Our Nebraska youth
2. Aliens applying for citizenship
3. The general public
We point with pride to the efforts of individual lawyers of
the State of Nebraska in the participation and assistance rendered
to the American Legion in its Boys and Girls State and Boys and
Girls County Government programs. Many of the members of our
association have contributed time and financial support to these
activities. We submit, however, that the Nebraska State Bar Association, through its Committee on American Citizenship, should
coordinate its efforts with the Department of the American Legion
of the State of Nebraska. The Bar Association is in a favorable
position to assist in the preparation of suitable and accurate "mock"
trial procedures; to make available films (i.e., the subject of judicial procedure); to furnish public speakers willing to speak on
Americanism at the functions associated with these activities; and
to cooperate with schools in establishing proper election procedures.
Individual lawyers and local bar associations have indicated
a sincere desire to facilitate the above program. Coordination and
assistance from the state level would be invaluable to your local
lawyers and local committees.
The Nebraska State Bar Association, through publicity and
direct contact with the schools, should encourage a more intensive
study of American history, including a thorough knowledge and
understanding of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States and the background of human relations which culminated in the writing of these documents. We
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recognize that we are not in a position to interfere with the curriculum of our schools. However, assistance to public speaking departments, oratorical contests, and appearances by lawyers at various group and civic class meetings are suggested as helpful ways
to implement programs of Americanism in our schools. In this connection, we do not criticize in any way these programs as they now
exist. We do feel that the lawyers in the communities of Nebraska
could and should offer assistance to the schools and that coordination of this program should be arranged by the American Citizenship Committee of the Nebraska State Bar Association. In this
connection, we recommend that competitive debate, oratory and
forensics be re-established in the high schools of Nebraska; and
that lawyers be encouraged to assist local school boards in this program. Not only would such endeavor assist in the development of
future lawyers, but it would also offer a fertile field for development
of Americanism.
There is a need for assistance to aliens, including displaced
persons arriving in this country since 1946, to enable them to obtain a better understanding of the principles of Americanism and
our American society. We understand that, prior to the actual examination for naturalization, these applicants must obtain information and education concerning the various subjects connected with
the examination. The Nebraska State Bar Association is in a
position to encourage lawyers in the establishment of proper classes
wherein these subjects could be developed on a sound basis. The
Nebraska State Bar Association should contact the various county
and local bar associations, requesting that each county which is
confronted with this situation appoint a local committee to assist
the pre-naturalization program for aliens in the preparation for their
examinations. Specific courses on American history and good
citizenship could be implemented by these local committees. Statistics and information could be obtained by the Nebraska State Bar
Association Committee on American Citizenship from the Immigration and Naturalization Service in Omaha, Nebraska, for dissemination to local committees.
Some of our local bar associations have established speakers
bureaus for the use of the general public. We emphasize that
local lawyers have always afforded leadership in speaking before the
public on all types of subjects. Lancaster County has a fine program in effect, and other counties have instituted similar programs,
but many counties do not have speakers bureaus. The Committee
on American Citizenship could facilitate the organization of such
program on a statewide basis, thereby affording coordination and
assistance which is required by our local lawyers. The speakers
should be encouraged to emphasize good American citizenship whenever the opportunity is presented.
The final recommendation of this report is that individual lawyers should be encouraged to participatein the programs outlined
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above. It should be emphasized that lawyers of the State of Nebraska are natural leaders in the field of education, public speaking
and Americanism generally. However, these lawyers need encouragement. Recognition of their efforts in these fields would supply
this encouragement. Moreover, our Bar Association should keep in
mind that its public relations are of primary importance.
The 1955 Committee on American Citizenship prepared a comprehensive and effective method of accomplishing a greater degree
of enthusiasm and participation of local lawyers in these programs
and a system whereby the relationship of the local lawyers to the
general public could be improved. We recommend reconsideration
of the entire report of the 1955 Committee and the allocation of funds
for the implementation of the entire program on American citizen-

ship.
In conclusion, we recommend the adoption of the above program
by the House of Delegates and its immediate implementation by the
1957 Committee on American Citizenship.
Frank J. Mattoon, Chairman
Thomas J. Gorham
Fred N. Hellner
Lynn D. Hutton, Sr.
John H. Keriakedes
M. Charles McCarthy
Herbert F. Mayer
S. W. Moger
Emmet L. Murphy
Leslie H. Noble
Merle M. Runyan
The report of the Special Committee on Group Life Insurance
was presented by C. C. Fraizer, Chairman of the Committee. After
discussion, it was moved that the report be approved; that the House
of Delegates go on record as approving the broad, general plan of
an effort to make group life insurance available to the members of
the Association; that the president be authorized to appoint a committee to survey the matter further, and that the committee be authorized to draft suitable legislation to authorize the writing of such
group life insurance in this state and to sponsor such legislation
before the Legislature of Nebraska. The report was further amended
to permit the special committee, with the approval of the Executive
Council, to execute such policies of group insurance and do all things
necessary to put such policies in force. The report of the Special
Committee on Group Life Insurance follows:
Report of Special Committee on Group Life Insurance
The right to. issue group life insurance is at present definitely
limited by the Nebraska statutes. Sections 44-1601 to 1606 provide
that no policy of group life insurance shall be delivered in this
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state unless it is issued: (a) to an employer for benefit of employees;
(b) to a creditor to insure debtors; (c) to a labor union; (d) to trustees
of a fund established by employers or labor unions; or (e) to an
association of public employees.
In order to authorize the issuance of group life insurance to
members of the Nebraska State Bar Association, it would be necessary to provide for an additional category.
It is recommended that a statutory amendment be proposed to
cover members of state professional associations which could thus
include also members of the Nebraska State Medical Association
(which has indicated some interest in the subject) and of the Nebraska State Dental Association; or such an amendment could cover
members of any bona fide association formed for purposes other
than procuring insurance.
The American Bar Association now has a group life plan for
its members with a death benefit of $6,000 at age 25 or less, and
reducing to $1,000 at age 55. Plans have been announced to extend
the age limit to 70 years.
The Minnesota State Bar Association is covered by a plan making protection available to all active members who have not attained
their seventieth birthday. The amount of coverage for each eligible
member is $10,000 and continues in that amount to age 65 at which
time it reduces at the rate of ten per cent per year until it is reduced
50 per cent, and then the benefit of $5,000 remains constant thereafter. The annual premium is $42.04 at age 34 and under, increasing
at older ages.
All of the foregoing refers to true group, with the Association
contracting with an insurance company and being the insured
named in the policy, with individual certificates issued to participating members. The Association collects the individual premiums.
A suitable amendment might well be prepared after consultation
with the Nebraska Insurance Department and with interested insurance companies.
C. C. Fraizer, Chairman
John R. Fike
Harold W. Kauffman
HALE McCOWN: The next matter is the report on the Committee on Budget and Finance. Mr. Fraser.
TED FRASER: Mr. Chairman, members of the House of Delegates. Our Committee does not at this time have a written report.
We will file a written report for the record.
As chairman of the Committee, I have examined the audit which
has been previously described by the Secretary, Mr. Turner, as
prepared by Martin and Martin, certified public accountants of Lincoln, and find from that report that as a result of last year's operation an increase of approximately $2000 in surplus has been accumu-
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lated by the Association. And as a part of our report, we recommend
that an additional sum be set aside in the form of investments as
capital, to be maintained by the Association for its further use.
I recommend the adoption 6f the report and the approval of
the recommendations of the Committee.
HALE McCOWN: Mr. Fraser, does that have any reference
with respect to what our funds shall be invested in?
TED FRASER: No, I leave the form of the investment to the
discretion of this House or the Executive Council, which sets aside
the exact amount of money to be invested.
HALE McCOWN: As I understand the motion, the Executive
Council determines the appropriate amount for setting aside a reserve fund to be invested in capital funds as set by the Council.
Is there a second?
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: Is there any discussion?
HERMAN GINSBURG: Mr. Chairman.
HALE McCOWN: Mr. Ginsburg.
HERMAN GINSBURG: As of the present, how much does the
Association have in a reserve fund?
GEORGE TURNER: By direction of the House a year ago, the
sum of $2,000 was invested in United States bonds, so the Association has those bonds in addition to its cash balance.
HERMAN GINSBURG: Does the committee feel that $3,000
is enough cash on hand?
TED FRASER: It appears that is a good working balance to
maintain.
MR. COHEN: Last year the House of Delegates was the one
that directed the amount to be invested?
TED FRASER: Yes, sir.
MR. COHEN: Then I move, Mr. President, that the Committee report be amended by directing that $2,000 of this cash fund
be invested in bonds.
HALE McCOWN: Are you willing to accept that amendment?
TED FRASER: We are pleased to have that amendment.
HERMAN GINSBURG: Well, I don't understand what Mr.
Cohen is getting at. As I understood it, last year the House decided
that there should be a reserve fund of $2,000. I do not know whether
there had been any previous accumulation in previous years. That
is the reason I asked the question I did. I understand now that all
we have in reserve is $2,000 plus the cash balance, which I am informed is adequate for current needs.
I am not opposed to the reserve, but it does seem to me that
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this organization is one that should not accumulate any great
amount in reserve. I cannot see any reason.
As a matter of fact, I think it would be detrimental if this Association would start the habit of accumulating two, three or five
thousand dollars each year for the purpose of building up a fund.
I would be very much opposed to that. I am not going to say I am
opposed to a reasonable addition to the reserve at this time. I think
there is a field of judgment within which we should have some
balance on hand put away for emergencies. I think that there
should be some limit.
HALE McCOWN: A point of clarification. If I might clarify
that, Mr. Ginsburg, the motion as amended which is now before the
House is specific in amount, $2,000 in government bonds. We presently have $2,000 in government bonds in that reserve account.
MR. COHEN: Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, even though
you put this money in reserve, there is no curtailment, no limitation on the amount of reserve for emergencies.
HALE McCOWN: No, this reserve is simply a bookkeeping
situation, as far as expenditures are concerned. In other words it
is merely an investment of funds, and it has in it no limitation nor
specification that it shall or must be kept in reserve or anything
of that sort.
MR. VAN PELT: I make a point of inquiry.
HALE McCOWN: Mr. Van Pelt.
MR. VAN PELT: In connection with the duties of the Executive Council in Section 3A, it is stated that it shall have sole authority to approve the expenditure of funds. I wonder if we have any
right to entertain or pass on a motion dealing with the investment
of $2,000 in Government bonds, whether or not that is not solely
the province of the Executive Council to determine the investment.
HALE McCOWN: It clearly is, Mr. Van Pelt, as to expenditures; as to investment, I do not know.
GEORGE TURNER: I understood that Mr. Fraser's motion was
that the House of Delegates recommend to the Executive Council
that this be done. If it is an expenditure, the Council does have the
sole authority to do that, but as I said in submitting my report,
I differ with the auditors. They treated the purchase of those bonds
as an expense, and I do not. I think it is just as if we had it in the
bank.
Some years ago we had an investment in bonds. Our income was
not sufficient to run us that year, and the Executive Council directed that the bonds be sold and the money used for current expenses. I do not anticipate that that will ever happen again, but if
it is simply a recommendation to the Executive Council, it would
at least express the views of the delegates.
HALE McCOWN: Under the circumstances, and with the permission of the House and Mr. Fraser, is it agreeable that the motion
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be amended by stating that it is recommended to the Executive
Committee that $2,000 be invested in United States bonds?
MR. COHEN: Two thousand dollars of present cash.
HALE McCOWN: All right, is there a second?
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: Is there further discussion?
MR. SPENCER: Question.
HALE McCOWN: Those in favor say "aye."
Opposed the same.
Motion carried.
The Chairman of the Committee on Cooperation with the American Law Institute was not present when the report of that Committee was reached on the calendar of the House of Delegates. On
behalf of the Committee, the secretary of the Association moved the
adoption of the report of the Committee. Upon vote being taken,
the report of the Committee was adopted. The report follows:
Report of the Committee on Cooperation with the
American Law Institute
Membership in the American Law Institute may be had only
upon personal application of the individual together with recommendation of one of its executives. Screening of applicants results
in a high standard of its members. It is an organization of quality
rather than quantity.
Its Thirty-third Annual Meeting was held in Washington on
May 23-26. Approximately 600 lawyers, judges, reporters, and professors were in attendance.
The convention was favored by addresses by Chief Justice Warren, ex-Senator George Wharton Pepper, and the Honorable Dean
Acheson; and the delegates were also tendered a reception by the
French Embassy.
The objects of the meeting were the submission and discussion
of the Federal Income, Estate and Gift Tax statute, Restatement of
the Law Second, and Model Penal Code.
In considering the passage and enactment of laws and amendments thereto, and all phases of the study, practice, and administration of law, the several problems are presented to the body by reporters. Upon completion of a report or recommendation, open
discussions are had, at which all members have an opportunity to be
heard. This system results in the greatest degree of consideration to
the different subjects and in corresponding benefit to the bench
and bar. Many of the subjects have been considered at former
meetings.
It is absolutely impossible to go into detail in reporting on any
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specific item, and for that reason this report will be limited to a
statement of the subjects discussed.
Restatement of Law Second, Conflict of Laws, covers the subjects of Jurisdiction in General, Executive and Legislative, and Jurisdiction of Courts. The reporter handling this title was Willis
L. M. Reese of the Columbia University College of Law.
Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 5, covers the subjects
of Territorial Applicability, Time Limitations, Double Jeopardy,
Liability of Corporations, and Parole and Organization of Correction. Herbert Wechsler of the Columbia University College of Law
presented this subject.
Tentative Draft No. 11 of the Federal Income, Estate and Gift
Tax Statute covers the subjects of Gifts and Estate Tax, Income
Taxation of Trusts and Estate, and Income Taxation of Partnerships.
Conducting the discussion on this subject were Stanley Surrey, Law
School of Harvard University, and William C. Warren, Associate
Chief Reporter of the Columbia University Law School.
The work done by the Institute in the past and that now under
contemplation is invaluable to bench and bar.
Your Committee recommends that we be represented at the
next annual meeting of the Institute, and that the expense of our
delegate be paid by the Association.
Lyle E. Jackson, Chairman
Leslie Boslaugh
John R. Fike
Bernard S. Gradwohl
Harvey M. Johnsen
Barton H. Kuhns
Greydon L. Nichols
Barlow Nye
Franklin L. Pierce
Robert G. Simmons
Daniel Stubbs
John W. Yeager
The report of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention was presented by James F. Brogan, Chairman of the Committee. The report was adopted with amendments proving that the
Association go on record as favoring a statewide probation system
and with the further amendment that the Association, through an
appropriate committee, continue its study of the need for amendments to existing laws relating to sex deviates. The report of the
committee follows:
Report of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention
Your Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention met
at Lincoln on January 21, 1956. The Committee reports as follows
to the Association.

PROCEEDINGS,1956
PAROLE AND PROBATION

The Committee continues to recommend that legislation be enacted to establish a suitable and useful statewide probation system.
A bill for such a system was drafted by this Committee, and was
introduced at the 1955 Legislative session. The bill, which was designated as L. B. 210 by the 1955 Legislature, was killed in committee.
The Committee believes that the system of probation provided by
L. B. 210 is practical and workable, and that a similar bill should
be introduced at the next legislative session. The Committee has
determined that among bench and bar there is a quite uniform feeling that some system of probation will be a greatly needed forward
step in the field of crime and delinquency prevention.
SEX OFFENSES
There has been a considerable amount of agitation recently for
more and better laws to deal with sex offenses. The Committee
believes that the existing laws are adequate to deal with sex offenders and deviates, and that the existing problems, if any, are primarily local problems of law enforcement.
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
The Committee has considered the advisability of the preparation of a pamphlet to be distributed to the bar, providing information on community resources which might be useful in family problems such as divorce, adoptions, non-support, delinquency, etc. We
recommend that the study of the feasibility of this project be continued.
OTHER MATTERS

Other items have been brought before the Committee, on which
no final action has been taken. These include transfer of the Criminal Investigation Division from the Department of Roads and Irrigation to the Department of Justice; the employment of a state
pathologist or medical examiner to assist in the investigation of violent or unexplained deaths; the advisability of amendment or repeal
of the no-fund and insufficient-fund check laws; and the question of
whether the generally prevalent inadequate salary scale for county
attorneys is contrary to the best interests of law enforcement. We
recommend that the Committee continue the study of these matters.
James F. Brogan, Chairman
Phil B. Campbell
Alfred G. Ellick
George W. Haessler
William J. Hotz, Jr.
Frederic C. Kiechel
Robert A. Nelson
Virgil E. Northwall
William B. Rist
Betty Peterson Sharp
John E. Sullivan
Joe T. Vosoba
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The report of the Committee on County Law Libraries was
presented by Lawrence S. Dunmire, Chairman of the Committee.
The report of the Committee, which was adopted by the House of
Delegates, follows:
Report of the Committee on County Law Libraries
From information received during the year, it would appear
that more than one-half of the counties of the state have county
law libraries, and that many of these are excellent.
In the past year, some counties for the first time have established a county law library; some have made substantial additional
purchases of law books; and some have received sizable donations
of law books.
In a few counties there is little, if any, interest in such a library.
Local conditions create various local problems, such as lawyers located in several towns in the county.
It is the opinion of your Committee that the number and quality
of county law libraries is increasing slowly; that as more lawyers
realize the value of a central modern county law library, the increase will be more rapid; that the advantages of such libraries
should be continuously brought to the attention of the members of
this Association.
As there remains a need for the work of such Committee, we
recommend its continuance for another year.
Lawrence Dunmire, Chairman
Edward Asche
John A. Bottorf
J. Howard Davis
Richard A. Dier
Myrl D. Edstrom
William Keeshan
Raymond B. Morrissey
W. W. Norton
Charles B. Paine
Albert T. Reddish
C. Firman Samuelson
Carlos E. Schaper
George A. Skultety
Leon A. Sprague
Joseph T. Votava
The report of the Committee on the Judiciary was presented by
C. Russell Mattson, acting for the Chairman of the Committee. The
report of the Committee, which was adopted by the House of Delegates, follows:
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Report of the Committee on Judiciary
Your Committee on Judiciary submits the following report:
The Judiciary Committee at the annual 1955 meeting of this
Association recommended "that the Bar Association cooperate with
the County Judges' Association in its efforts to raise the standards
of eligibility for county jiudges and in securing compensation for
those occupying this important office, commensurate with its duties
and responsibilities." The Committee's report was approved and
adopted by this Association.
The Legislature of Nebraska has not been in session since our
last annual meeting, and your Committee has not been called upon,
nor had the opportunity to render any service to the County Judges'
Association pursuant to the recommendation of the 1955 Committee.
Since our last annual meeting, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
upheld the constitutionality of the Judges' Retirement Act enacted
by the Legislature of this state in 1955, which was initiated and
sponsored by this Association. By this act, the supreme and district
courts of our state have been greatly strengthened and made more
secure. The personnel of such courts have been provided with more
adequate compensation commensurate with the high responsibility
and services rendered by the judges of such courts and have been
provided with some measure of retirement security so long overdue.
The continued improvement of the judicial machinery and processes for the administration of justice by our courts is absolutely
necessary and essential to the stability and continuance of our
democratic form of government. Nothing less than the most capable
jurists within our power to select are, or should be, acceptable to the
people and bar of this state.
This Association's duties in the effort to take the selection of
judges out of politics by the adoption of the so-called American
Bar Association or Missouri Plan or some other acceptable procedure should no longer be neglected, and our concerted efforts in
this direction should be vigorously pursued.
Your Committee therefore recommends:
(1) That the recommendation of the 1955 Committee be renewed
and carried out as the opportunity presents itself.
(2) That this Association should, in the performance of its duties to
the public and in an effort to further abvance the already high
standing and quality of our courts, renew with vigor and determination the task of taking the selection of the personnel of
our courts out of politics by the adoption of the American Bar
Association plan for the selection of judges at the earliest possible time.
Robert H. Beatty, Chairman
James F. Begley
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Jean B. Cain
George B. Hastings
C. Russell Mattson
James G. Mothersead
Earl J. Moyer
W. E. Mumby
R. Robert Perry
Rodney R. Smith
HALE McCOWN: The next item of business is the report of
the Committee on Hearings, of which Robert Van Pelt is Chairman.
MR. VAN PELT: Gentlemen, two matters came before the
Committee. The report of the Committee as to each is a unamimous
report.
I shall take them up in the inverse order in which they were
presented this morning.
Mr. Kuhns called to your attention Article 3, sub-section 1, and
then certain lettered sub-sections of sub-section 1. Our report is as
follows with reference to the matters he called up this morning.
Be It Resolved, That Article 3, Section 1, sub-section c of the
by-laws of the Association be amended by inserting after the
preposition "on" and immediately prior to the word "continuing"
the words "legal education."
Now, stepping aside from the resolution to tell you what is
being done, the result then will be that the name of the committee
will be the Committee on Legal Education and Continuing Legal
Education. And if you will examine Item 17 of your program, you
will see that the name that this resolution calls for is the identical
name that appears upon your printed program. So we are doing
nothing except to adopt the name that is now being used.
Now, the resolution continues, that Article 3, Section 1, subsection h be amended by striking the word "relations" and inserting
in lieu thereof the word "service."
Again digressing from the resolution, you will observe that in
Item 19, the committee of which Mr. Wilson was the chairman is
known as the Committee on Public Service. So again we are simply
following the practice which has been in vogue for a year or more
in this Association.
And now the final part of the resolution; that Article 3, Section
1, sub-section i, now reading "The Committee on Procedure" be
stricken in its entirety. You heard the president-elect this morning
say that there was no such committee, so why leave the committee
in our by-laws if we don't have such a committee.
I therefore move the adoption of the resolution.
HALE McCOWN: Is there a second?
VOICE: Second.
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HALE McCOWN: Any discussion?
All those in favor of the motion say aye.
Opposed the same.
The resolution is adopted.
MR. VAN PELT: The next resolution we have to present to you
deals with constitutional amendments Number 306 and 307, which
are to be submitted to the voters in Nebraska on November 6th.
The resolution which we propose reads as follows:
"Resolved, That the House of Delegates of the Nebraska
State Bar Association approve constitutional amendment number
306 to be submitted at the forthcoming general election, which
amendment will permit the Legislature to absolve real estate from
taxes and assessments delinquent for a period of time not less than
ten years as the Legislature determines, and be it further resolved
that the lawyers of Nebraska lend their support in explaining the
measure to the voters to the end that the electorate can make an
intelligent decision on the question."
I now move the adoption of this resolution and ask leave to
make a brief comment about it, Mr. Chairman.
VOICE: Second.
MR. VAN PELT: Mr. Walter Huber appeared before the Committee. Seemingly this is a proposal that has the support of the abstracters and likewise has the support, we understand, of the real
estate dealers.
The purpose of it is to create a statute of limitations, so far as
delinquent real estate taxes are concerned. The argument has been
raised that if there is a statute of limitations against federal estate
tax, income tax, and inheritance tax, why should not there be a
similar statute of limitations so far as real property taxes are concerned?
The adoption of the resolution would provide for that, putting
it in the hands of the Legislature to determine whether it be a tenyear statute, a fifteen-year statute, or some other period of time.
The Committee, after hearing the proposal and the arguments
that were advanced, concluded that it would be to the interest of
lawyers in examining titles and passing on such items, and similarly
to the interest of lawyers who were abstracters to have such a provision adopted.
HALE McCOWN: A motion has been made and seconded. Is
there further discussion?
(There was no response.)
HALE McCOWN: Now as many as favor the motion say "aye."
Opposed, the same.
The resolutions are adopted. Thank you very much, Mr. Van
Pelt.

NEBRASKA

STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

MR. VAN PELT: Mr. Chairman, that concludes the matters,
except, I take it, that there is some authority for submitting further
resolutions between now and the time that we adjourn at 4:00
o'clock Friday. So if there are further resolutions, the Committee
will meet to consider them.
HALE McGOWN: That is correct.
The report of the Committee on Legal Aid was presented by
Emory P. Burnett, Chairman of the Committee. In addition to the
formal report of the Committee, Chairman Burnett advised the
House of Delegates that a committee had been appointed by the Bar
of Scotts Bluff County to investigate the necessity of a legal aid program in that county and that the Bar in Dodge County and in
Sarpy County had determined that there was no need for a legal
aid program in those counties. The report of the Committee was
adopted by the House of Delegates and was as follows:
Report of the Committee on Legal Aid
Your Committee has continued its investigation of the status
of legal aid services in Nebraska, and submits the following report:
The Legal Aid Clinics in Omaha, Lincoln, and Cheyenne County
continued to function during the past year with no change from
previous reports of this Committee, and it is the concensus of the
Committee that in each of these localities the Bar is fully performing the legal aid function of providing free legal assistance to those
persons financially unable to pay for legal services which they require.
The Scotts Bluff County Bar Association, during the past year,
initiated a study into the possibility of establishing a Legal Aid
Clinic in that county. Byron M. Johnson was appointed chairman of
the committee to make the study. As of the date of this report, the
study was still in progress and no positive action had been taken.
Your Committee urges that other local bar associations follow
the example set by the Cheyenne County Bar Association by establishing a rotation system among their members to furnish legal
aid services and thus make legal aid services available throughout
the state.
Emory P. Burnett, Chairman
Dixon G. Adams
Eugene F. Fitzgerald
Byron M. Johnson
Melvin K. Kammerlohr
Thomas P. Kelley
Richard A. Knudsen
Elmer M. Scheele
George E. Svoboda
HALE McCOWN: Mr. Ginsburg has some announcements with
respect to the Real Estate Section.
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Would you like to give those at the present time, Mr. Ginsburg?
HERMAN GINSBURG: Mr. Chairman, members of the House.
What I have to submit to you now is somewhat more than an announcement. I was in hopes that the report of the Committee on
Legislation could have been acted on before I brought up this subject, because possibly the action taken on that report might answer
one of the questions the Real Estate Section wants answered.
At any rate, what I have to submit at the present time is the
following.
We have had a Committee on Title Standards which has met
on a number of occasions during the past year and which has prepared a report. Now, in the report, they have analyzed all fortyseven of the presently existing standards, have recommended that
two of the standards themselves be amended, have recommended
a number of changes in the comments to the presently existing
standards, and then in addition thereto have recommended the
adoption of eight new standards.
It is the intent of the Real Estate, Probate and Trust Section
to act upon these, in this report, and to adopt the standards.
However, there is the problem that was brought up about
whether or not the section had any authority to speak on behalf
of the Association or to adopt standards, which would be binding
as the act of the Association, and therefore the Executive Committee
of the section requested that I appear before the House of Delegates and in effect ask for a blank check. I do not know how else
to phrase it. Apparently, in view of the agenda of the meeting, you
have your House of Delegates meeting today; our section will not
meet until tomorrow. I know of no particular procedure in getting
the approval of the Association of the Code of Standards. Therefore
I am going to make a motion, simply for the purpose of bringing it
to the floor, and my motion is as follows:
Resolved That the Real Estate, Probate and Trust Fund Section be authorized to adopt a Code of Title Standards to be recognized as the official act of this Association and to arrange for
the publication thereof at the cost of the Association.
And that brings me to the second thing I want to discuss. As
you all know, in the past the Code of Title Standards, if I may call
it that, has been very poorly put up. It is on mimeographed sheets
numbered one after another with no particular relevancy between
the numbers and so forth. It is our intent to have a permanent committee and keep adding to the standards and amending them, adding,
making new ones and so forth and so on. I have discussed with
Mr. Turner, who has been very helpful to me, the method that
other states have used, and the plan that the Committee proposes
is a loose-leaf compilation; we would have a binder that perhaps
we would ask the members to buy, and publish the sheets with the
holes punched in them, so that they could be added to or taken from.
Also we plan to have the standards set up in chapters, Chapter
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One perhaps relating to corporations, Chapter Two to this and that,
and so forth, and a person will not have to go through fifty-five
or sixty or eventually a hundred or more sections to find the particular subject he is looking for.
That may entail some expense, which again we have no authority to undertake without the permission of the House. Now while
I am at it, I might just as well mention the third thing I was going
to bring up involving the report of the Committee on Legislation.
At the last session of the Legislature, there were some bills
introduced, which at least some of the members of the Real Estate
Section felt were very unwise from the standpoint of titles. We
had no authority to appear for the Association and did not know
to whom to speak for the purpose of entering an appearance.
We had understood that in the matter of proposed legislation
the Association has a Legislative Committee, and that if we have
some bills that we want introduced, if they are sponsored by the
Association, that Committee will act on them, but there are two
objections that we have. One is that there was no one to speak for
the Association, at least for our particular part of the Association
when bills were being considered which were very detrimental to
the matter of titles, and if it had not been for two members of the
Legislature, who happened to be lawyers and who took a very active
part, we would have been in considerable difficulty in a matter of
title examination.
Furthermore, there seems to be a lack of coordination between
the various sections. In other words I am informed that in 1953 the
Taxation Section had a bill passed or sponsored that, with reference to inheritance taxes, completely overlooked the fact that there
was the matter of titles also involved.
The result is that now we are confronted with difficulty in the
interpretation of it. If the two committees or two sections had only
acted together, or had there been any group that could have called
the people together and said, "Now how about this?" Two or three
little words would have taken care of the whole situation; as it is
now, there is considerable tumult over the question of whether
there is a five-year statute applicable to people who died before
September 14, 1953, all of which could have been avoided.
On that subject, the Legislative Committee's report brings up
the question as to their functions and so forth, and perhaps this
third point I have mentioned will be clarified in action that may
be taken on that report.
I move the adoption of the resolutions which I have read for
the purpose of bringing before the House the proposals which we
intend to take concerning the matter of Code of Title Standards.
MR. SPENCER: Mr. Chairman, may I rise to a point of information? At the third session of the House of Delegates on Friday,
Mr. Ginsburg will make a report of the activities of his section.
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Wouldn't the proper procedure be to take whatever action they
care to if they are going to make a recommendation and for Mr.
Ginsburg to include it in his report, and at that time the House of
Delegates will have an opportunity to either approve or reject
the report? A resolution offered by Mr. Ginsburg would be out
of order at this time.
HALE McCOWN: I was going to suggest that, while I certainly
have no objection whatever to the motion as made, the regular
schedule of the agenda, to which I called your attention at the
commencement of the program this morning, is that at 4:00 o'clock
on Friday, the first item that is scheduled is the report of the Section on Real Estate, which is your section, I believe, Mr. Ginsburg.
HERMAN GINSBURG: That is perfectly agreeable to me. It
is our understanding that the third report was merely a formal report to announce the election of officers and announce the program
that was held. If there will ne sufficient opportunity so that we
can pass on that at that time, it is perfectly agreeable to the section if it be taken up at that time.
HALE McCOWN: Again may I repeat that I have no objection
whatever to Mr. Ginsburg's motion, and in view of what happened
last year, I am not too sure about the number that will be here on
Friday afternoon.
With the consent of the House, there is certainly no objection
to considering Mr. Ginsburg's motion as made.
JOSEPH T. VOTAVA: I object to it. I do not like to pass on
something in futura. I would like to see what the report is going
to be, and then we can pass on it when we know what action has
been taken.
MR. SPENCER: And I would suggest now that the members
of the House of Delegates understand that their duties are not
concluded until after the session at 4:00 o'clock on Friday, and it
is perhaps more important that they be here then than probably at
this time.
JOSEPH SVOBODA: And let it be understood that the section on Real Estate, Probate and Trust Law will then make its
recommendation.
HALE McCOWN: Exactly.
MR. CASSEM: Further, Mr. Chairman, I think that brings up
something else. Evidently there is a lack of coordination between
sections of the Bar with respect to legislation. I think the Committee on Legislation of this Association has under its supervision
the most important and signal activity of the Association. And if
somewhere we are defective in integrating the activities of certain
sections and diverting them into the Committee on Legislation as
a clearing house and in coordinating the body, then I would suggest
that we amend our procedure and set up some practice so that the
Committee on Legislation actually is the committee that is in touch
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with everything that is being recommended and suggested by any
and every section of the Association.
HALE McCOWN: In view of that suggestion, Mr. Kuhns' committee, which is considering the drafting of some amendments to
the by-laws, might consider anything that might be involved in
that part. It seems there is some question of authority which might
be properly incorporated in that. Action will therefore be taken
on this matter at 4:00 P.M. Friday.
The report of the Committee on Legislation was presented by
Robert H. Downing, a member of the Committee, acting for the
Chairman. The report of the Committee, which was adopted by the
House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Committee on Legislation
The Legislature not having been in session during 1956, this
Committee had neither opportunity nor occasion to attempt to sponsor or guide any legislation through the Legislature. The Committee
was limited to the consideration of matters brought to its attention
by members of the bar and the American Bar Association. No matters were referred to it by either the Executive Council or Judicial
Council.
There were several matters, however, which were brought to
the attention of this Committee which were given careful consideration.
First, it was brought to the Committee's attention that Nebraska
has no statute defining the venue of the probate of an original will.
We believe that the general practice has been to accept the venue
as provided by statute for intestate estates. In view of this practice,
we recommend that the next Legislature be requested to enact a
law fixing the venue of the probate of an original will to conform
to the present statutes fixing the venue for the administration of
intestate estates.
Second, it was suggested to your committee that Nebraska
should have a stronger law dealing with sex deviates. We have
learned that this matter is presently the subject of study by the
Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention. Upon receiving
a report and recommendation from such Committee, the Committee
on Legislation will take appropriate action.
Third, recommendation has been made to George H. Turner
and by him referred to this Committee with reference to (1) abolishing the necessity of transcripts in appeals, (2) the consolidation of
the clerks of county courts and district courts into one office called
"Clerk of Courts," (3) changing the manner of appeals in compensation matters, and (4) changing the manner of appeals from
other courts to the district court. Since these suggestions involve
many major changes of existing law, we recommend these suggestions be referred to the Section on Practice and Procedurefor detailed study and consideration.
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Fourth, it was suggested by a county attorney that the offense
of adultery as provided in Section 28-902, Revised Statutes of Nebraska for 1943, be changed from a misdemeanor to a felony. This
having been a matter of wide divergence of opinion, it is recommended that the question be submitted to the Committee on Crime
and Delinquency Prevention for more detailed study and recommendation.
Two other matters were submitted for consideration by this
committee: (1) that Nebraska enact a law similar to the one now
in effect in the State of New York with reference to stock gifts to
minors, and (2) that Nebraska adopt the Model Non-Profit Corporation Act prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the
American Bar Association. The Committee, after careful study, has
taken no action on these two suggestions and makes no recommendation with reference thereto.
The committee found itself in doubt and in some disagreement
as to its exact duties and responsibilities. We recommend that future committees be instructed by the House of Delegates as to their
respective functions.
John C. Gewacke, Chairman
W. 0. Baldwin
John M. Brower
Cloyd E. Clark
J. Cedric Conover
John C. Coupland
Robert H. Downing
Dale E. Fahrnbruch
George A. Farman, Jr.
L. Raymond Frerichs
Forrest A. Johnson
Joseph P. O'Gara
Kenneth M. Olds
Harry B. Otis
Edwin Cassem
The report of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice was
presented by A. J. Luebs, Chairman of the Committee. The report,
which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
A complaint was received from the Custer County Bar Association involving a resident of Custer County. He is not a lawyer
but has prepared a vill, delayed birth registration papers and other
instruments of a legal nature for a fee. This has been reported to
the Executive Council and authority requested to present the matter to the attorney general for action.
Formal protest has been made relative to representation by
non-lawyers in the role of an advocate before the Tax Court of the
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United States in cases docketed for Nebraska. All members of the
Committee felt it would be premature for this Committee to take
action on this without further study and consideration of recent
cases and of recent regulations governing such practices. It was
also suggested care should be taken not to take a stand contrary to
agreements worked out by the American Bar Association or which
would be in conflict with studies made or agreements worked out
by other Committees of our Association.
Several complaints of a minor nature have been received which
it appears can be disposed of through letters pointing out the violation and requesting such practices cease.
A. J. Luebs, Chairman
Arthur 0. Auserod
Cecil S. Brubaker
Julius D. Cronin
John W. Delehant, Jr.
Francis S. Gaines
Ralph M. Kryger
Harold B. Long
R. E. Lunner
John W. Newman
Richard E. Person
Clarence M. Pierson
Donald F. Sampson
Elbert H. Smith
The report of the Advisory Committee was presented by
Charles F. Adams, acting for the Chairman of the Committee. The
report of the Committee, which was adopted by the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Advisory Committee for 1956
During the year now ending, the Association has lost by death
two men eminent for their service to the profession in matters relating to ethics, Mr. William M. Ely of Ainsworth and Mr. Clarence
T. Spier of Omaha. Each of them served continuously as Chairman
of the Committee on Inquiry for his District-Mr. Ely in the Fifteenth and Mr. Spier in the Fourth-for more than eighteen years.
Their work was conspicuous because of their fairness, firmness, and
sound judgment. The long term of their service is a tribute to the
confidence reposed in them by the supreme court and by the members of the profession.
There is now pending before a referee appointed by the supreme court one case in which the Advisory Committee conducted
two lengthy hearings attended by all members of the Committee.
The Advisory Committee will soon have a formal hearing on
charges recently referred to it by the Clerk of the Supreme Court
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following a report by the Committee on Inquiry for the Fourth
District.
The Committee reviewed one record which came to it from the
Third District and sustained the action of the Committee on Inquiry in dismissing the charges.
During the year, the Committee formulated nine advisory
opinions on a wide variety of questions submitted by members of
the Association, and, in some cases, by chairmen of local committees.
Each opinion was prepared as the result of consideration given to
the problem and the exchange of views by all members of the Advisory Committee. The members of the Bar may be interested in
knowing the type and character of questions upon which such
opinions were rendered. Briefly, and in general terms, they were as
follows:
Procedure before the Bar Association when local law enforcement officers decline to act in a case involving alleged
criminal conduct by an attorney;
Under what circumstances, if at all, is a lawyer ethically
bound to expend his own funds for briefs and expenses of
litigation for an indigent client to avoid what the lawyer
believes to be a failure of justice;
May a lawyer, employed to prepare a synopsis of laws in a
limited area for distribution by the client to lawyers and
laymen, properly permit such brochure to show his authorship, the fact that he is a lawyer, and the name and address
of his firm;
The extent to which Canon 27 applies to lawyers' professional cards in journals, programs, or other publications of
charitable, educational, or civic groups;
Is it permissible for a judge who is a candidate for reelection to supply regularly for newspaper publication
news reports giving the name of the judge and, in some
cases, a reason for the decision;
What rules apply to the furnishing of appeal, supersedeas,
and similar bonds for a client by or on the credit of the
lawyer;
May an attorney for a purchaser properly accept a fee from
the seller's broker for services performed at the request of
the purchaser in connection with the removal of defects in
the title to the property;
May a disciplinary agency hear charges against a lawyer
based upon non-payment of a debt incurred in a business
transaction not related to the practice of law;
Under what circumstances, if at all, may an agency of the
State Bar Association hear and determine charges against a
lawyer long after he has ceased to be a resident of the state.
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In nine of the eighteen districts no charges were made, no
meetings held, and no matters arepending. These are Districts 1, 5,
6, 8, 10, 13, 14, 15 and 18.
Minor complaints were dismissed for lack of merit in Districts
7 and 9.
In District 2, one case is now pending and should be disposed
of before year-end.
In District 3 (Lincoln), two matters held over were disposed
of without formal hearings. Charges were filed in seven matters,
five of which were disposed of without hearing. One was heard
formally and determined in favor of the respondent, and one case,
in which several hearings have been had, is not yet completed.
In District 4 (Omaha), the Committee held five meetings, and
informally disposed of seven matters by dismissal or adjustment.
Recent charges are under consideration in one case.
In District 11, charges in one case resulted in censure; one matter is pending.
In District 12, investigation in one matter resulted in reference
to the Attorney General.
In District 16, complaints against two lawyers of the district
were received and informally investigated. One resulted in admonition. There were two complaints involving the other lawyer, one of
which was dismissed as being without sufficient foundation, and the
investigation on the other complaint against this lawyer is being
continued awaiting final disposition.
In District 17, two cases were dismissed; one is pending.
Respectfully submitted,
Raymond G. Young, Chairman
Charles F. Adams
Raymond M. Crossman
George B. Hastings
James G. Mothersead
Lloyd L. Pospishil
Frank D. Williams
The report of the Special Committee on Expert Medical Testimony was presented by John L. Barton, Chairman of the Committee.
The report of the Committee, which was adopted by the House of
Delegates, follows:
Report of the Special Committee on Expert Medical Testimony
This Committee has given careful consideration to the subject
assigned to it and has reached its decision.
The subject for review and decision was:
Is there a need for legislation authorizing the District Courts
of the State of Nebraska to appoint medical experts up to three
in number to examine a claimant who has brought suit to re.
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cover money damages for personal injuries and to provide that
the report of such expert or experts be filed with the Clerk of
the District Court, such report to be read to the jury at the trial
of the cause?
This Committee took up where the predecessor committee left
off, and carefully considered the purposes, provisions, and requirements of a bill prepared by the predecessor committee. This bill
is known as L. B. 332. The bill was introduced at the 67th session
of the Nebraska Legislature. On April 21, 1955, the Judiciary Committee of the 67th session of the Nebraska Legislature indefinitely
postponed the enactment with the comment that "more study on the
subject was required."
In the Committee's study, not only was L. B. 332 thoroughly reviewed but there were also reviewed the possible benefits and the
known difficulties inherent in such type of legislation.
Each of the individual members of the Committee reviewed the
matter from his experience in his own community and weighed the
possible benefits against the burdens that this type of legislation
would bring upon the courts, the litigants, and the lawyers, if enacted.
The principal questions arising are enumerated below:
1. Is there a present need for such legislation?
2. Would such legislation tend to bring about better and more
orderly presentation of the medical phase of personal injury litigation?
3. Would such legislation be too complex, and would the cost
thereof be excessive?
4. Since L. B. 332 provided that the reports of the experts
appointed by the court could be read to the jury either by the expert or a party, what would be the effect on the jury?
a. Would there be a tendency to discredit the testimony of
the medical experts called by either party as a witness?
b. Since L. B. 332 restricted the objections to such report
to its relevancy or materiality only, the jury would be permitted
to hear inferences arrived at by the examining physician and
possibly hearsay statements contained in the report to which
the opposing party would not be permitted to raise the proper
objection.
5. In other than metropolitan areas in the state, would such
experts be available?
6. If such experts were not available locally, would the moving
party be required to transport the plaintiff to the locality where
competent experts would be available?
7. Would such legislation increase the work of the courts and
the lawyers unnecessarily, since statutory authority is now available
and in use to accomplish the same purpose? Section 25-1267.40, R. S.
Supp. 1955.

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

8. Would any benefits obtained by such legislation outweigh
the difficulties, trouble, and expenses involved?
9. Is it not the fact that the district courts now have the inherent power and also the statutory authority to accomplish the
required result?
10. L. B. 332, as written, is not entirely specific on who would
bear the cost of one, two, or more experts up to three in number
who could be appointed by the court, and, in the event the costs
of same would be taxed to the loser and if this happened to be the
plaintiff, would the experts go uncompensated?
The Committee is made up of trial lawyers who are exposed to
the problems presented here.
One or two members of the Committee have voiced an opinion
of approval of some of the provisions of L. B. 332, but suggest modifications. At least one member of the Committee expresses full approval of the provisions of L. B. 332. The majority of the Committee
is definitely opposed to any such type of legislation.
Since the majority of the Committee oppose such legislation,the
following recommendation is made to the Association:
There is no present need for such legislation.
John L. Barton, Chairman
Earl M. Cline
H. L. Blackledge
Ivan A. Blevens
Lawrence M. Clinton
Thomas F. Colfer
George L. DeLacy
Frederick M. Deutsch
John E. Dougherty
James J. Fitzgerald, Jr.
Robert G. Fraser
Daniel J. Gross
Lyle C. Holland
Fred R. Irons
Vance E. Leininger
L. F. Otradovsky
The report of the Committee on Legal Education and Continuing Legal Education was presented by E. D. Beech, Chairman of the
Committee. The report of the Committee, which was adopted by
the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Committee on Legal Education and Continuing
Legal Education
The Committee commends the good work of the Association
accomplished by holding institutes during the past year, which included the Federal Tax Institutes held in December, the Family
Law and Old Age and Survivors Insurance Institute held in April,
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and the Real Estate Titles Institute held in June. The president,
Executive Council, and panel members have the thanks of every
member of this Committee.
We recommend subscriptions to "The Practical Lawyer," published eight times each year by the American Law Institute, and
the full use by members of the bar of all publications of the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute collaborating with the American Bar Association.
No complaints regarding the training in the Law Colleges of
our state have been presented to this Committee. The Committee
was asked to consider the advisability of suggesting that all new
members of the bar be required to engage in practice in an established law office for a fixed period of time before their memberships are made permanent, this period of practice to be similar
to the internship of members of the medical profession. Since this
is a controversial matter of great importance and no meeting of the
Committee was held for its discussion, we recommend that the same
be studied and considered by future committees.
E. D. Beech, Chairman
Lansing Anderson
Robert V. Denney
David Dow
James A. Doyle
Robert M. Harris
Frank M. Johnson
Harold R. Jordan
William H. Meier
Milton A. Mills, Jr.
John E. Newton
Clifford H. Phillips
Fay H. Pollock
James I. Shamberg
0. E. Shelburn
Robert Van Pelt
The report of the Special Committee on Oil and Gas Law was
presented by Paul L. Martin, Chairman of the Committee. The report of the Committee, which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Special Committee on Oil and Gas Law
The Special Committee on Oil and Gas Law of the Nebraska
State Bar Association makes the following report and recommendations:
The members of the Special Committee of last year were instrumental in having several bills passed by the 1955 Legislature
of the State of Nebraska which took care of procedural matters
which were not covered by the statutes then in effect. This year
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there has been no session of the Legislature, and the Legislative
Council did not hold hearings on oil and gas problems.
While over the past few years we have been successful in having many matters corrected by Legislative action, there are a substantial number of problems in the oil and gas industry which
should be studied and where considered advisable legislation suggested. Among these problems are the following:
1. A special mechanic's lien law covering oil field operators so
that suppliers of equipment and services, transportation companies,
and employees would have better protection against irresponsible
operators and promoters.
2. Statutory enactment definitely determining oil, gas, and
other minerals in place to be real estate.
3. Broadening of statutes relative to attachments, executions,
and liens upon mineral interests.
4. Clarification of mineral interests of owners of life estates
and remaindermen.
5. Procedure providing for ratification of leases by executors,
administrators, guardians and trustees.
6. Inconsistencies in the statutes covering procedure for forfeiting of oil and gas leases upon non-payment of delay rentals
thereon.
7. This last year has brought to the attention of the oil and
gas industry and to the public more forcibly the necessity of an
oil and gas conservation law to regulate the improvident operator
and to protect the natural resources of the state. A bill will probably be introduced in the next session of the Legislature which
will have the general support of the industry. We should study the
bill carefully in order to make sure such procedural matters are
included to fully protect all parties, such as the manner in which
the law is to be administered, the makeup of a commission, rules
and regulations before the commission, and the manner of appeal
from the orders of the commission.
We recommend that the Special Committee on Oil and Gas Law
be continued and that the members of the Committee extend their
services to the Legislature in order to assist in the preparationof
legislation that will inure to the benefit of all citizens interested in
the oil and gas industry in the State of Nebraska.
Paul L. Martin, Chairman
Robert C. Bosley
George B. Dent, Jr.
Ted R. Frogge
Fred T. Hanson
Elmer J. Jackson
Milton C. Murphy
Daniel E. Owens
William S. Padley
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Perry W. Phillips
William B. Quigley
R. L. Smith
S. E. Torgeson
Ivan Van Steenberg
Archibald J. Weaver
J. W. Weingarten
Floyd E. Wright
The report of the Committee on Public Service was presented
by John J. Wilson, Chairman of the Committee. The report of the
Committee, which was approved by the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Committee on Public Service
The Committee on Public Service makes the following report:
The principal activities of the Committee during this year have
been:
PAMPHLETS
Distribution of all five pamphlets continues. The demand has
been so great that reprinting has been necessary. The ones most
frequently requested are those on "Joint Tenancy," "Wills," and
"Buying and Selling Real Estate," with "Are You Sure You Want
to Sign That?" and "What to Do in Case of an Auto Accident" only
slightly behind the leaders.
The Committee now has in preparation two new pamphlets to
be entitled "Insurance" and "Social Security."
JURORS' MANUAL
The 1955 "Manual for Jurors in Nebraska" was much more attractive in appearance than the one first distributed in 1954. Thedistrict court clerks and jury commissioners have been most cooperative in getting these manuals into the hands of all those called
for jury service. A copy is included with each jury summons. No,
change in either form or content was made in the 1956 manual.
Copies were supplied to all counties during August.
PAMPHLET DISPLAY RACKS

Members have ordered a considerable number of these racks
for use in their own offices or for distribution to banks and public
offices within their cities. Several local bar associations have purchased these in quantities and have undertaken to keep them supplied with pamphlets. The Omaha Bar Association recently purchased 800 copies of each of the five pamphlets presently being distributed and five display racks. They are being installed in public
places. The Box Butte County Bar Association has purchased and
distributed 2,500 pamphlets. They are made available to the public
through all of the local banks and in offices in the court house. The
original order of racks was soon exhausted but has been replenished.
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They are on hand in the Secretary's office, where they may be purchased for $2.00.
NEWSPAPER ARTICLES
The series "You and the Law" is being continued but has not
been as well received by local editors as the Committee had hoped.
These articles deal with legal subjects and are designed to make the
reader aware of the fact that there are legal complications in nearly
every phase of everyday life, but some editors regard them as advertising and reject them for that reason. Since the articles were
commenced in September, 1955, they have appeared in 55 newspapers for a total of 255 insertions. Individual lawyers and local
bar associations are urged to make a greater effort to see that these
articles are carried in their local newspapers.
THE NEBRASKA FARMER SERIES

This has been one of the most successful projects of the Committee on Public Service. Each issue of the NebraskaFarmercarries
a splendid article on a legal subject prepared for publication by
the Committee. With each article, the editors of the Farmer carry
an appropriate credit to the Association for the preparation of the
article and add this caution:
"The purpose of the series is to inform and not to advise. All
information contained in the article is general, and should be applied to specific cases only after consultation with your lawyer."
The editors of the NebraskaFarmerare highly pleased with the
series and have requested the Committee to continue it indefinitely.
TELEVISION PROGRAMS
The bi-weekly programs over KMTV, in Omaha, and the
weekly programs on KHOL-TV, at Axtell, are being continued.
These consist of fifteen-minute interviews of lawyers on legal subjects by station personnel. At each station, the programs are conducted by very capable young ladies. Marianne Peters is in charge
of the KMTV program, and Maurine Eckloff has the one at KHOLTV. Scripts are prepared in advance under the direction of the Committee, and local lawyers are invited to participate.
The Committee would welcome suggestions from members as
to subjects to be included in these programs.
SURVEY OF ACTIVITIES
During April the Executive Council had an analysis of the
public service activities of the Association made by Harry Krusz
and Company, public relations organization, of Lincoln. The report
of that company to the Executive Council commends the work of
the Committee on Public Service and makes suggestions for the
continuance of the work. In conformity with one of the suggestions
made, the Executive Council has decided against the employment of
a full-time public relations director but instead will employ the
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services of public relations counsel for particular phases of the
activities of the Committee.
The Committee was authorized by the Executive Council to
explore the possibility of closer liaison between the Nebraska State
Bar Association and the law schools of Nebraska. The Committee
felt that, through some plan of cooperation, the Bar Association
might aid the students in obtaining a better understanding of the
legal profession and the obligations of a lawyer toward his client,
the courts, and the public, as well as acquainting him with some of
the problems incident to the establishment of a practice. Contact
has been made with the deans of both law schools who look with
favor upon the proposal. No definite program along this line has
as yet been developed.
The Committee, after carefully surveying the field of other
possible activities which might be made a part of the public service
program of the Association, made several suggestions to the Executive Council which the Council thought should not be undertaken.
The Committee feels that its successor should review the recommendations made during this year to the end that, if approved,
they may be resubmitted for the further consideration of the Executive Council.
It is therefore recommended that the present public service
program, including the distribution of pamphlets and jurors' manuals,the furnishing of newspaper columns to the weekly newspapers
and to the Nebraska Farmer, and the production of television programs be continued. It is further recommended that the new Committee on Public Service reconsider all previous recommendations
of this Committee, and that the program of cooperation with law
schools be implemented.
John J. Wilson, Chairman
John B. Cassel
Thomas M. Davies
Richard E. Hunter
Otto Kotouc, Jr.
William H. Lamme
Charles E. McCarl
P. M. Moodie
Joseph C. Tye
David R. Warner
R. R. Wellington
Walter W. White
The report of the Committee on Tort Claims Act was presented
by George A. Healey, Chairman of the Committee. The report of
the Committee was amended to include a recommendation that the
Committee be continued and, as amended, was adopted by the
House of Delegates. The report of the Committee follows:
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Report of the Committee on Tort Claims Act
Since no legislative session was held during the life of this Committee, there was not a great deal of activity in which this Committee could participate.
Although past proposals for a State Tort Claims Act have failed
in the Legislature, it is the feeling of this Committee that the consensus of the legal profession is that the present system of handling
such claims is archaic, and that the claims could better be handled
both more economically and more expeditiously by the courts. Several drafts of proposed legislation to accomplish this purpose are
in the files of the Committee.
It is the recommendation of this Committee that the House of
Delegates again consider the advisability of continuing this activity
and the presentationof a new such proposal to the 1957 Legislature.
George Healey, Chairman
Clarence S. Beck
Thomas J. Dredla, Jr.
Hugh W. Eisenhart
Gerald J. McGinley
George A. Munro
George C. Pardee
Richard C. Peck
Harry S. Salter
Arthur C. Sidner
Seymour L. Smith
The report of the Special Committee on Joint Conference of
Lawyers and Accountants was presented by James W. R. Brown,
Chairman of the Committee. The report of the Committee, which
was adopted by the House of Delegates, follows:
Report of the Special Committee on Joint Conference of
Lawyers and Accountants
It has been the practice of this Committee to have a joint meeting with the accountant members during the month of September
each year for the consideration of any problems involving the relations of the two professions. Since this report is being prepared prior
to the annual meeting of the Joint Conference, it is not possible to
report on the business transacted at that meeting.
The lawyer members have reviewed the decisions of the courts
involving the unauthorized practice of the law in the field of taxation and the developments with respect to practice before the
Treasury Department. They have also given consideration to the
obligations of the lawyer in the tax field.
A supplementary report and recommendations may be appropriate after the forthcoming meeting of the Joint Committee.
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James W. R. Brown, Chairman
Harry B. Cohen
Lowell C. Davis
John C. Mason
Keith Miller
Marvin G. Schmid
Robert G. Simmons, Jr.
Flavel A. Wright
HALE McCOWN: Gentlemen, we have completed the schedule
cf the agenda, with the exception of the matter we were discussing
immediately before the lunch recess, namely, the responsibility,
authority, and division of responsibility with respect to legislation.
It is now open for discussion on that general issue.
Mr. Cassem.
MR. CASSEM: Mr. Chairman, I think there are two things that
Mr. Kuhns mentioned, one, the uncertainty of the authority of the
Executive Council to speak for the Bar Association. If there is that
uncertainty, let's nail it down, get it so nobody can get up in front
of a legislative committee and assert the Executive Council acted
officially but doesn't speak for our Association; secondly, Mr. Ginsburg raised a question of a couple of bills proposed by a section
that they were referred to the Legislative Committee for drafting.
Now then I do not think there ought to be any question about
that. The section ought to draft its own bill. It would take a collection of geniuses on the Legislative Committee to draft bills for
Real Estate Sections, for the Crime Section, and for the Taxation
Section, and so forth. I think that the functions of the Legislative
Committee should be largely as Bob Downing suggested, to act as
a steering committee, to take the finished product, to act as a clearing house within the sections to see that it had the adequate consideration in the various sections or appropriate section rather than
assume its responsibility for preparation to the Legislature.
MR. WILSON: Two years ago this problem came up with reference to the problem of taxation, and sections took care of it before the bills were presented to the Legislature. They had to be
approved by the Executive Council.
HALE McCOWN: Is there any further discussion?
MR. SVOBODA: Do we not have this furor that we always have
to meet around this time of the year? We do not know what is going
to be introduced in the Legislature, and we come up to the Legislature session with the hoppers closed, and miscellaneous lot of
bills that we may want to support or oppose. We do not have anybody at the present time to screen those bills.
I have been before legislative committees, and it seems to me
what we ought to do as you have suggested yourself, Mr. Chairman;
the Legislative Committee should be a steering committee. Un-
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doubtedly it should be an originating committee, but I think more
than that a screening committee, and that the Committee should
be so made up that it represents every one of our districts here, so
that they would then speak with some authority. Pursuant to a
change in the by-laws, so they could say this is what the Bar Association is for or this is what the Bar Association is against.
HALE McCOWN: Thank you, Mr. Svoboda.
I think that brings up a point. There are two things, I think,
you have to consider: one is the question of authority to speak for
the Association; the other is a question of responsibility for initiating certain legislation or opposing it; they are actually, I think, two
distinct things.
We have a question first of how we are going to get the autlioiity of the Bar Association behind any legislative issues or measures
that may be involved, and, secondly, who is to have the responsibility initially for initiating such measures as we ourselves may
want to have proposed or opposed, as the case may be.
Is there any further discussion on this general issue?
MR. DOW: Where does it stand?
HALE McCOWN: There is no motion so far. It is merely in
connection with the recommendation of the Legislative Committee
that the responsibility of the various committees be redefined.
MR. CASSEM: Where is that determined, Mr. Chairman-in
the by-laws?
HALE McCOWN: The by-laws merely set up the committees,
as I understand it; is that correct?
MR. DOWNING: That is correct, sir. It is also correct that there
is a mandate in the rules promulgated by the supreme court that
the by-laws define the jurisdiction of the committee.
MR. VOTAVA: Mr. Chairman.
HALE McCOWN: Mr. Votava.
MR. VOTAVA: Mr. Chairman, I think this is too big a body
to draft the proper allocation of those duties. I think that Mr.
Kuhns is working on something he is to submit before the 4:00
o'clock session next Friday.
I would move that this problem be left to Mr. Kuhns' Committee, and that they draft the proper by-laws to cover the entire
subject, both points that you mentioned.
HALE McCOWN: Mr. Votava, do you want to limit your motion
to modify the by-laws? It might be accomplished without modification.
MR. VOTAVA: Or appropriate resolution. It would be better
by a resolution rather than modifying the by-laws.
HALE McCOWN: I would suggest, if it is agreeable with you,
that the motion be modified or amended in that fashion.
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Is there a second?
MR. VOTAVA: But I do not think we ought to be in a hurry to
draft that motion as to the authority. It is rather important.
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: The motion is before the House that the
matter be referred to Mr. Kuhns' Committee for a report on Friday
afternoon for such appropriate action as the Committee may recommend.
MR. VAN PELT: Mr. Chairman, may I rise to speak to that
portion? While there was something indicating that there might
be a report at 4:00 o'clock Friday, it seems to me it is an undue
burden to throw on the president-elect and chairman of a Committee to come in within forty-eight hours redrafting these by-laws.
We should not expect the Committee to do that at all, if it is submitted in that manner. I would be glad, in deference to this Committee, to give them as much time as they feel is needed to come in
with their report.
MR. VOTAVA: Then leave it to your Committee.
HALE McCOWN: May I suggest that any report of the Committee, unless there is action by Friday, will not be acted on by
the House of Delegates at this meeting.
MR. VAN PELT: Well, I am willing to see the Committee report if it can, but I do not see how it can.
HALE McCOWN: Frankly, I am inclined to agree, and, secondly, if I may again exercise my prerogative here, I question
whether we may need to amend the by-laws, but might merely,
shall we say, recommend additions or recommend certain action by
the president with respect to delegation of responsibilities.
I am not too sure it is going to actually require any amendment
of by-laws, frankly.
Now at the moment, the motion is that it be referred to Mr.
Kuhns' Committee.
MR. VOTAVA: Well, referred to a Committee to draft a resolution to that effect; I will absolve Mr. Kuhns from that.
MR. CASSEM: Well, Mr. Chairman, as long as the Committee
is wondering what its functions are to be, it would be an appropriate
place to determine what that Committee thought its function was
and to draft a resolution accordingly.
HALE McCOWN: Mr. Votava, are you willing to have the
committee to whom this be referred be the Legislative Committee?
MR. SVOBODA: The chairman is not even here. I do not think
we have a functioning committee.
MR. VOTAVA: Yes, it is, all right.
HALE McCOWN: The chairman of that particular committee
is not here.

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

MR. VOTAVA: Is he going to be?
HALE McCOWN: I assume not.
MR. VOTAVA: Who spoke for them today?
MR. DOWNING: I did.
MR. VOTAVA: Well, why not let the spokesman then be designated as the chairman and take it up?
HALE McCOWN: The motion, as I understand it, is that Mr.
Robert Downing be chairman of a committee to consider the proposal covered by Mr. Votava's motion, and that amendment to his
motion has been made and seconded. Is there any further discussion?
I think before you vote I should comment that in the event
that Committee is unable to come in with a specific or complete
report as of Friday, I suggest that all of you be considering the matter yourselves, as to what may be done, because I do feel that some
action needs to be determined upon.
There is, for example, the possibility of a special session of the
House of Delegates at the close of the twentieth legislative day. You
might have a special Legislative Committee appointed to meet at
approximately the same time to consider then all the bills and make
recommendations and then act as the spokesman of this Association.
There are a number of things of that sort that might be done.
So I suggest that each of you therefore be keeping that in mind.
Very well then, all those in favor of the motion say "aye."
Opposed, the same sign.
The motion is carried.
Is there any further unfinished business on the agenda this
afternoon?
If there is no further business on today's meeting, it will be
adjourned until 4:00 p.m. Friday.
And may I again suggest that each of you make every effort to
be here at that time, not only because of the general reports of the
sections which will be made then (but of course you have heard
the reports of the preliminary matters of at least one session, which
I think are important, and will need to be taken care of) but also
because of the matter we have been discussing.
Very well, this House will stand adjourned until 4:00 p.m.
Friday.
(Adjournment at 2:45 o'clock P.M.)
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NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
THURSDAY MORNING SESSION
OCTOBER 18, 1956
The opening session of the fifty-seventh annual meeting of the
Nebraska State Bar Association was called to order at 10:00 o'clock
A.M. at Hotel Paxton, Omaha, Nebraska, by President Wilber S.
Aten.
PRESIDENT WILBER S. ATEN: Gentlemen, if you will come
to order, we will get started on our program.
As you all know, this is the opening of the Fifty-Seventh Annual Meeting of the Nebraska State Bar Association.
At this time the Reverend J. N. Brockmann, Minister of Saint
Martin's Episcopal Church of Omaha, will pronounce the invocation.
(Invocation by The Reverend J. N. Brockmann.)
PRESIDENT ATEN: At this time we will have an address of
welcome by Mr. Oscar T. Doerr, President of the Omaha Bar Association.
OSCAR T. DORR: Mr. President, gentlemen of the Nebraska
Bar Association. I think that the title of the address is probably a
misnomer. I saw this in a column in a newspaper the other day, and
I thought it should serve as a guide to this address.
It has been said that the Declaration of Independence consisted
of three hundred words; the Ten Commandments contained two
hundred ninety-seven words; and the Lord's Prayer but fifty-six
words-so that I think that under the circumstances an address of
welcome should not be attenuated, if that is the proper term.
We are very much honored to be the host city of the Nebraska
State Bar Association convention, and we, the four hundred members of the Omaha Bar Association, heartily welcome you to Omaha.
It seems that a standard welcome to any group of conventioneers
includes some reference to traffic tickets and something to the effect that delegates may hand tickets to someone or other-we must
just pass this point by-I think most of you have read our newspaper and can understand the omission. Just say that instead, since
a very fine program of work and entertainment has been arranged
by the officials of the convention and all of the spare moments
have been taken care of, it probably would be just as well to park
the car in a parking lot.
We hope that you are going to enjoy your stay with us, and
that you will come to Omaha often, even when there is no Bar
convention, and we hope that you will not hurry home after the
convention is over, but that you will spend the week-end here with
us.
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You have a choice of many items of entertainment over the
week-end. If you will stay here Friday night, you will learn who
the new king and queen of Ak-Sar-Ben are going to be, or you may
see Omaha University team of simon-pure amateurs try to extend
their long string of victories when they play that night.
I hope that if you have not seen Boys Town you will take that
in and understand why many thousands of people in the United
States make this a stopping point in order to go through those
premises. There is a beautiful new Student Union building on the
campus of Creighton University, and recently there was dedicated
the Eppley Memorial Library on the Omaha University campus.
Look over these campuses; look over the additions on the campus of
the Nebraska Medical University. You can visit our parks and see
autumn in all of it most colorful glory without going any long distance away.
Drive in any direction, and you will see the explosive growth
of the city of Omaha. Eat some of the Omaha steaks at some of
these famous eating places; go through our stores, and if your wives
are with you, if they have not already done so, see the beautiful
Ak-Sar-Ben displays; and attend our churches on Sunday, and we
hope that you will come back soon.
You are all invited to attend the cocktail hour which precedes
the banquet tonight, and I hope that you will meet many old friends
there and that you will make many new ones. Welcome to Omaha.
PRESIDENT ATEN: I have asked a friend of mine and a person
whom many of you know to make response; Joseph C. Tye of
Kearney, Nebraska.
JOSEPH C. TYE: Mr. President, members of the Omaha Bar
Association, and fellow lawyers. I am a little bit puzzled why Wilber
made the introduction that he did with what appeared to me to
be a smug expression on his face.
True, I live only thirty or thirty-five miles from him, and perhaps ought not to say too much about him. I see that he refrained
from saying anything about me.
I thought you might be interested in one little true incident,
however. This summer some of us outstate lawyers got to wearing
sport shirts, going without neckties in the heat of the Nebraska
summer, and Wilber has been leading the field with beautiful
sport shirts.
This summer he tried a case in the district court in sport shirt,
no necktie, short sleeves. The court for some reason decided the case
against him, and the next day when Wilber saw the judge, he said,
"Judge, perhaps I should apologize for appearing in your court the
way I did this time; and I wonder if my appearance had anything to
do with your decision. I hope you did not decide against me because
I did not have a necktie on and because I was wearing a sport shirt."
But of course the jurist said, "Wilbur, I would not decide against
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your client because of your personal appearance in court-the fact
that you were wearing a sport shirt."
And Wilber said, "I did not think so, but," he said, "it seems to
me that that would have been a much better reason for beating me
than the one you gave."
Now we outstate lawyers have in the last number of years
learned to look upon Omaha as the annual city insofar as the State
Bar Association is concerned.
As you know, some of you older fellows, at least, years ago
there was something of an alternate; we used to go to one city and
then the other, and we even talked about trying to entertain the
state bar outstate.
I have been coming for more years than I like to remember,
but Omaha just means the annual meeting of the state bar to me,
and I know that it does to many outstate lawyers. We of course enjoy your hospitality; we look back every year and reminisce upon
the lovely parties that you Omaha bar members have provided for
us in the last few years. Some of us have been somewhat burdened
with our wives wanting to make it an annual affair, because you
gentlemen and the ladies of the Bar in Omaha have provided these
beautiful programs for them and made shopping so enticing. And
although some of us would like to get away for a bit of relaxation
alone, we are finding that difficult, but there may be some gratification some way or other.
The programs have been most educational; the Omaha lawyers
have been splendid. Whether or not they fix our tickets this year,
we will wait and see about that. I suppose Omaha, moving as rapidly
as it does, will find some other means of taking care of those in
due time.
But I do want to say to the members of the Omaha Bar that we
outstate lawyers sincerely appreciate your hospitality and your
courtesy. You have done everything to make these occasions pleasant and comfortable for us and for our wives and ladies.
I hope that it will not be out of place, but I would like to say
to the officers of this Association that we outstate lawyers, at least,
and I think the Omaha Bar will join in, are grateful for the splendid
programs that have been provided for us in the last few years.
The Bar Association really means something to us. True, we
renew old friendships, we enjoy our felicitations here, but we feel
that the Nebraska State Bar is worth while and is paying off, and
we are grateful to our officials.
This, Mr. President, has been the most pleasant job I have had
in connection with the State Bar. I do say to the members of the
Omaha Bar, thank you.
PRESIDENT ATEN: The only thing that sounded familiar
about that story was the fact that the decision was the wrong way.
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ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT
We are now at the end of another official year for our Association, and this is the fifty-seventh annual meeting. The rules require
an address of the president at the next annual meeting following
his election. Therefore, I appear at this time, not by personal choice,
not by invitation, but in obedience to this mandate of our supreme
court. So far as I am concerned, I prefer informality, so I will visit
with you for a short time. It is believed that probably the court's
intention was for the president to give a report of the activities, affairs, and work of the Association. This I will attempt and ask you
to indulge a few personal comments and observations.
I indeed appreciate the honor of having served as your president. I am and shall always be sincerely grateful for the opportunity of accepting the challenge of the experience. It is distinctly a
challenge because there is much to be done requiring a great amount
of time and effort, an appreciation of the affairs of the Association,
of its problems and its impact in the affairs of life today; also the
situation of the individual members of the Association must be correlated and understood.
Now that I have had these experiences, I agree with the recommendation that has been made by several of my predecessors. I
submit that it is too much to expect a person to acquire all of the
necessary knowledge in the short time available and that few possess
the speed of orientation which is required. A large majority of like
associations avoid this by the designation of a president-elect, who
then has a year in which to participate in the work, make necessary
personal arrangements and become familiar with the organization
and requirements of the association. I recommend this change for
your consideration, understanding that our members have several
times previously disagreed. We elect a House of Delegates and a
Chairman of the House of Delegates, and expect them to handle the
business of the Association at its annual meetings. We elect an
Executive Council and a president, and expect them to carry on all
the other activities and work of the Association, with the limitation
that the president cannot be a present member of the Executive
Council. Therefore, he is not and cannot be too familiar with the
present work of the Association. I understand the reasons for this
provision, but I submit that the organization and complexities of
the work and activities of the Association have become such that
we should be practical and give the president-elect a chance to use
his best capabilities, experiences, and knowledge, that by our present process we are actually putting him at a distinct disadvantage
and not obtaining the best results for the Association, which, after
all, is our primary concern. I say quite candidly that the president
needs all the assistance he can possibly obtain.
While we are on this general subject, there is a related matter
upon which I have acquired very definite ideas. This proposal is not
used, so far as I know, in the form which I am about to propose. It
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is my belief that we do not take advantage of the experiences and
knowledge gained by those who have been president of our Association. At present, our past presidents have no official connection with
our Association. I submit that the Association needs the services,
knowledge, and experience of these men. It is true that the immediate past president is a member of the Executive Council for the
year succeeding his term, but this is not enough. I believe the past
presidents, of which we now have nineteen, and all living in Nebraska and active in the practice or members of the judiciary in
Nebraska, except the Honorable Anon Raymond, who is actively
practicing in Chicago, should be organized into some sort of a board
to which the Executive Council and president could appeal for
counsel and advice. Surely experience is the best teacher in life. I
suggest we take advantage of it.
It seems that the place of our profession in our complex civilization is becoming more important all of the time. It has been said by
the officers and speakers of this Association and many others for
the last several years that we live in a troubled and upset world. I
submit that it is a way of life, that we made it, and that we had just
as well make up our minds to live with it because it is here to stay.
The practice of law has changed very materially in the last thirty
years. The number of cases tried by lawyers in the courts has very
materially decreased in that period, whereas before that time the
work load of the courts was steadily increasing. We wonder as to
the cause of this situation. Probably it is partly because we have
increased our skill in dealing with one another and clients, and
the experiences of the profession have increased. We have become
cognizant that this highly complicated economic system of ours is
dependent on the caprices of human behavior. Our capacity has become more advisory, and we have become more practical.
A few years ago one of our speakers made a comparison between the professional preparation of doctors of medicine and attorneys which was wholly uncomplimentary to the lawyers. This is
a sphere wherein great improvements can be made by our profession, and I believe it is the responsibility of our Association, among
other responsibilities, to undertake this work. This is not the fault
of the law schools; they have all been working toward this goal, but
without the support of the profession. I believe that we all would
admit that a doctor of medicine, when he is admitted to practice, is
much better qualified professionally than an attorney. The doctor
therefore immediately takes his place in the economic world and
commands the respect of his profession and his patients. This is not
true of an attorney. He is not ready to take his place in the trial of
a lawsuit against more experienced counsel or to advise fully on
complicated economic matters or to deal skillfully with clients and
others of the profession. Surely there is some way of remedying this
situation. It is believed that this Association, and all in the profession, should work for a solution of the problem, immediately and
drastically. This and many other developments show that the Asso-
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ciation has not reached the ultimate in activities and work. This is
beyond and outside the realm of the continuing education of those
already members of the profession.
I very definitely do not believe that this has been a year of brilliant accomplishment for the Association, but I do hope and believe
that we have carried on the activities in such a manner that our
members are beginning to receive some of the benefits of activities
previously commenced by the Association. The committees and sections have done a lot of hard work and accomplished a lot. It is interesting to note that we have six sections and eighteen committees.
Many associations have more, some have less. For instance, Florida,
which is an integrated bar, has seventy-two comittees. It is wholly
a question of how complex and detailed it is desired for the work
to be.
It was gratifying to know that everyone who was asked to
perform a task for the Association graciously accepted the responsibility and performed the work with enthusiasm and in a highly
efficient manner. It was appreciated.
INSTITUTES

It was deemed desirable to have institutes this year on subjects
in addition to taxation. Accordingly, an Institute on Fees and Law
Office Management was provided at the Cornhusker Hotel in Lincoln on November 11, 1955, by the Junior Bar Section of our Association in co-operation with the College of Law of the University of
Nebraska. It was quite well attended and probably resulted in the
survey on economic conditions of our profession recently taken by
the Junior Bar Section and which is being reported at the meeting
of that section on Friday afternoon.
Tax institutes were given in December by the Section on Taxation at Scottsbluff on December 12th and 13th, at Kearney on
December 14th and 15th, and at Omaha on December 16th and 17th.
These were ably presented and well received. The attendance was
very good. This was our Thirteenth Annual Tax Institute.
An institute on Family Law, Old Age, and Survivors Insurance
and the new Unemployment Compensation Act was provided at
Omaha in April by the Association in cooperation with the Committee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute collaborating with the American Bar Association. This was
well attended, and it was learned that there is a lot of interest of
our members in these subjects.
An institute was provided on Real Estate Titles at Grand Island
on June 7th, and at Scottsbluff on June 9th by the Section on Real
Estate, Probate, and Trust Law. This is a subject that is of great
interest to most general practitioners, but it was learned that Lincoln and Omaha lawyers will not go to the bother of traveling to
attend our institutes. It was the pleasure of the participants and
your officers to attend the forty-eighth annual meeting of the
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Western Nebraska Bar Association at the close of the institute at
Scottsbluff.
It is believed that one of the important responsibilities of the
Association to its members is to help them keep abreast of all
changes and new developments in the law, both statutory and the
trend of the decisions, thereby serving our responsibility to the public by knowing that the public is getting proper and adequate counsel and advice on its legal problems at all times. It is interesting
to note that all of our institutes are given without the charge of
any registration fee. This is not true of the associations in all the
surrounding states. Some of them are quite costly; for instance, the
Iowa Bar Association has a registration fee of twenty-five dollars
for its annual tax institutes. This policy is a part of our public relations program. It is quite difficult to understand why any alert attorney would fail to take advantage of these institutes.
PUBLIC RELATIONS PROGRAM AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
It was determined this year that the Association should not
have a professional public service director because it was felt that
we were not getting value received for the cost involved. The Executive Council had an analysis made of the public service activities
of the Asociation; the report has been received by the Committee
on Public Service, which in turn made recommendations to the
Executive Council, part of which were approved and part referred
back to the committee for further study. This is one of the items
of unfinished business which must have the attention of the new
administration. The pamphlets on legal subjects for distribution to
laymen are a part of this activity. These pamphlets have attracted
national attention, and they compare very favorably with the work
of other associations; in fact, I believe they surpass most others.
These pamphlets, with those from other associations, are displayed
at all of the regional and annual meetings of the American Bar Association by reason of the activities of our Secretary as Chairman
of the Committee on Coordination of Bar Activities of the American
Bar Association, and our thanks are due to him for this work. Display racks, provided by the Association for use in your offices or
otherwise have helped materially in distribution, and the distribution now numbers in the thousands.
The juror's manual plays an important part in our relationship
with laymen. The Committee on Public Service has been asked to
revise the manual so that it is applicable to federal courts and to
make it available to those courts, subject to the approval of the
federal judges of the District of Nebraska. The series of legal
articles in the Nebraska Farmerhave been very successful, but the
articles for local newspapers have not been because some editors
believe this is providing free advertising for attorneys. The two
television programs on behalf of the Association have received a
great amount of favorable comment. These require the participation
of one attorney for every program, which means once a week at.
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KHOL-TV and its satellite KHPL-TV, and once every two weeks
at KMTV. We are indebted to these participants for their time and
efforts. I certainly recommend the continuation of these programs,
but we will have to be mindful that the program procedures may
have to be changed in the near future because of the limitation on
the numbers of subjects that can be successfully presented and the
lack of available participants. The public service program is wide
and complex. The Association needs the help of all its members in
this work; and after afl, public relations is just what each of us
makes it.
The committees pertaining to legislation have not been too active this year because our Legislature is not in session, but they
have done a splendid job of preparing for the meeting of the Legislature. It is interesting to note that the Special Committee on Expert Medical Testimony has recommended against the support of
legislation authorizing the trial courts of Nebraska to appoint medical experts to make examinations and reports in personal injury
cases. I recommend to every member the reading of the reports of
the committees as presented in the official program of this annual meeting.
PARTICIPATION IN

OTHER ACTIVITIES

At the invitation of United States Attorney General Herbert
Brownell, Jr., it was my pleasure to attend a Conference on Congestion of the Courts in May at Washington, D. C. It was believed
that, at present, we have no problem of congestion in our courts,
with the possible exception of the trial courts of Douglas County,
which appears to be a local condition that will solve itself in due
course, but that this is an over-all problem with which we should
be concerned in order to serve the public properly. These thoughts
were conveyed to the conference. Many ideas and suggestions were
made to the conference. One of the proposals was the handling of
personal injury actions, against which we should be completely
apprehensive, in the manner now provided for workmen's compensation cases. I also had the definite feeling that the matter was
being approached wholly from the standpoint of the judges and the
government, and that the situation of the general trial lawyer was
not being considered. Too much haste can make it very difficult for
the ordinary practitioner with a wide practice in many different
courts.
As part of the duties of president, it is expected that you attend
as many meetings of other bar associations as possible. My wife and
I attended the annual meeting of the Colorado Bar Association, a
voluntary bar, at Colorado Springs in October of last year; the annual meeting of the Bar Association of the State of Kansas, a voluntary bar, at Kansas City, Kansas, in May; the annual meeting of
the Iowa State Bar Association, a voluntary bar, at Des Moines in
May, at which I participated in a panel discussion; the annual meeting of the State Bar of South Dakota, an integrated bar, in Septem-
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ber at Sioux Falls; and the annual meeting of Missouri Bar Integrated, an integrated bar, as the name would indicate, at St. Louis
in October. In other words, we attended the meetings of the associations of all the surrounding states except Wyoming, which proved
to be impossible for me because of a trial in federal court in Illinois.
We were invited to many others, and specifically Minnesota, but
found it impossible to attend. We were courteously entertained, for
which we are deeply appreciative. I believe these contacts are very
much worth while and result in the exchange of many valuable
ideas. The policy has been established of inviting the presidents
and secretaries of the associations of all the surrounding states to
attend our annual meeting, and I have observed this precedent. It
has also become the custom, both on our part and that of our neighbors, that the wives be included. This results in much closer relationships between the associations.
We also attended, accompanied by our Secretary and his wife,
the Deep South Regional Meeting of the American Bar Association
at New Orleans in November and December as individuals.
We also attended the Mid-winter Conference of National Bar
Presidents in Chicago, Illinois, in February, at which I participated
in a panel discussion. We attended the Annual Conference of National Bar Presidents in Dallas, Texas, in August, at the same time
attending the annual meeting of the American Bar Association. I
participated in this conference by appearing in a panel discussion.
We were royally entertained as guests of the Bar Association of
Texas by being flown from Dallas to Austin, where we examined
the new building of the Texas Bar Association. It is a wonderful
headquarters.
We attended the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute at
Boulder, Colorado, in August. This is sponsored by the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, of which our Association is a
member, being represented on the Board of Trustees by Paul L.
Martin of Sidney, who will make a report to the Association. This
phase of the law is becoming increasingly important to us because
of the oil and gas developments in our state.
I have attempted to improve our relationships with other professional associations. In that connection, I participated briefly in
the opening of the Regional Medico-Legal Symposium of the American Medical Association at Omaha in October of last year. At the
request of the Governor, I appointed three representatives for the
Association, being Lawrence S. Dunmire of Hastings, Joseph C. Tye
of Kearney, and Charles S. Paine of Grand Island, to attend the Conference on Education at Grand Island in November of last year.
These men graciously accepted this assignment and participated in
the conference. They reported that the problems considered were
the Nebraska tax structure, buildings, financing, and salaries. Their
criticism was that the development of the child was not considered.
Our Secretary and myself, by correspondence and conferences,
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tried to obtain the recognition of lawyers as representing applicants
by certain ,district managers of the Social Security Administration.
I was invited to the Tax Clinic of the Nebraska Society of
Certified Public Accountants at Lincoln in November of last year
but was unable to attend. In February I participated in the selection of candidates for the Root-Tilden Scholarship at the suggestion
of Honorable Robert G. Simmons. These are residency scholarships
at the New York University School of Law for three years and are
awarded on a regional basis and not in every state. Mr. John C.
Chappell of Minden, Nebraska, was the successful candidate.
I attended the annual meeting of the Nebraska State Medical
Association at Lincoln in May as a representative of the Association. I attended the annual meeting of the Nebraska District Judges
Association in June at Kearney and spoke briefly. As a duty of
the president I appointed Lumir F. Otradovsky of Schuyler, Nebraska, to fill the unexpired term of our late esteemed friend and
Past President (Bob) Robert R. Moodie. On behalf of the Association on Tuesday of this week in the United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska, I participated in the memorial services
for the late Honorable James A. Donohoe, an esteemed friend and
an eminent jurist of this bar. The case of Wilson et al. v. Marsh
in the Supreme Court of Nebraska relative to the constitutionality
of the recently enacted Retirement Act and the status of judges in
Nebraska thereunder was successfully concluded, the act was held
constitutional, and the status of many of our members in the judiciary was determined. This action has been brought by the Association because of the importance of the questions involved to our
judiciary. I have seen fit to call six meetings of the Executive
Council during my term, all being held at Omaha except one, which
was held at Lexington.
During the year it was my pleasure to be invited to and to
attend many of the meetings of district and local bar associations
of the state. I enjoyed these occasions very much. They promote
good will between members of the bar, lead to a better understanding of local conditions and problems, and practically eliminate the
bitterness and antagonism that was so prevalent between local competitors in days gone by. These associations are doing very good
work in the field of public relations, and their programs are thoroughly educational and interesting. Many of them compare very
favorably with our institutes. This, in my opinion, is a sphere for
a lot of work and development for our Association, and I recommend more thorough liaison between our Association and these
organizations and that we assist in better development of their
possibilities. I was very courteously invited to many meetings
which I found impossible to attend. I appreciated all of these opportunities and courtesies.
One of the things that I observed in attending the meetings
of other associations was the matter of title insurance. This is
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going to come in Nebraska and be handled by private corporations,
which might not always prove to be to the best interests of our members, unless we do something about it. As a member of this Association, I have suggested to the section that a study of the subject be
made by the Section on Real Estate, Probate, and Trust Law. Some
foreign organizations are now active in this field in Nebraska;
for instance, the federal government presently requires title insurance in its financing programs. Therefore I respectfully suggest that time is an important element. It is my understanding
that the subject is approached in two ways, a trust fund or actual
title insurance. The trust fund procedure is used in Florida.
As I understand this process, the bar association as a part of its
public relations program provides from its monies a trust fund
for the protection of all clients to whom an attorney issues an
opinion on the title to real estate, and, in the event of mistake or
loss, the client is reimbursed for his actual loss from this fund.
I am not fully familiar with the operations administratively. This
is an integrated bar with some eight thousand members. The
title insurance method is used in Ohio. The bar association
formed a corporation with the common stock owned by the Association, with preferred stock drawing a fixed rate of interest
issued to members who assisted in capitalizing the corporation.
They state that the profits will be one hundred fifty times the
stock in five years. I do not know the size of this bar nor whether
it is an integrated or voluntary organization; also I do not know
how the sale of the title insurance is handled. I submit such a
matter is of increasing importance in the immediate future to
the bar.
Another sphere that has come to my attention is the attempts
of the press, radio, and television industries to be permitted to
take photographs and report a trial during its progress. The entire
subject, together with the Canon of Ethics involved, is under
study by a committee of the American Bar Association. Colorado
has already decided in favor of permitting the same at the discretion and under the direction of the trial court. If we desire
to have a hand in the ultimate decision, we should probably have
a special committee to work on this subject and cooperate with
the committee of the American Bar Association. I suggest this
is worthy of some serious consideration by our Association.
It has become a pleasant custom, which was again approved
by the Executive Council for this meeting, to include our wives
in our social functions and to provide the wives with special entertainment during our sessions. I suggest that you urge your wife
to attend these functions. These matters have been very efficiently handled by a committee, mostly of wives of Omaha attorneys, to whom the Association, and especially Irma and myself, are deeply indebted, and we all appreciate it.
In becoming familiar with bar organizations, another sphere
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has come to my attention. This is the matter of our sections,
which, of course, are an integral part of our organization. I respectfully suggest and urge that a study be made as to the sections
that are needed, and correlation between the sections and the
committees. It would appear that the scopes of some sections
are wholly unrelated, and that we do not have some sections
which we need; also as to the form of organization of the sections,
it would appear that there should be more continuity. In my
opinion, this should also be considered as to the membership of committees. I believe that this general subject was recommended
by President Williams in his address in November, 1953, but that
nothing specific has been accomplished. This, of course, is for
you to consider and decide, because this is your Association, not
an organization belonging to the House of Delegates or Executive
Council. This matter could be handled by a council of six members for each section, elected for three-year terms staggered so
that two were elected each year, or in some such manner. This
would probably tend to increase and broaden the scope of the
work of each section, and would very probably increase the financial burdens of the Association.
CONCLUSION

There are probably many things which I should have mentioned in which I have failed. This report is far from being entirely comprehensive and complete, but I hope you will agree
that the printed reports of the committees and this report give
you some idea of what is happening and of my activities in behalf
of the Association for the past year. For me, it has been a delightful experience, and I appreciate the opportunity and honor.
I should like to remind you that we are deeply indebted to our
friend and your able and efficient Secretary, Mr. George H.
Turner. He and his staff are largely responsible for the editing
of the Nebraska State Bar Journal, which is no small task; they
are entirely responsible for all the preparations and details of the
annual meetings, the institutes, the Executive Council meetings,
and the meetings of committees; he also edits the script and handles
the details of the television programs and does many other things
for our Association. I submit that there is no one in the country
who knows more about the functions, ramifications, organization,
purposes, and work of our organization. His counsel and assistance
to me have been invaluable and have made my work much easier.
I would also like to thank his wife, June, for her help. I am grateful for the assistance, kindnesses, and courtesies extended to Irma
and myself by members and by friends we met through bar activities of other states and the American Bar Association. I made
no call to service which was refused, which certainly is gratifying
and shows the devotion of our members to the profession. I appreciate the help and service of the members of the Executive
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Council, the Secretary and his staff, the House of Delegates, the
Chairman of the House of Delegates, the members of the committees and their chairmen, the section officers, the participants
in the institutes and our programs, and the ladies' entertainment
committee, ably led by Mrs. Barton H. Kuhns as Chairman. I
wish now to publicly thank each and all of them. I know that
next year we will have an able and efficient administration under
the guidance of my successor.
It has been an inspiration to know that so many have been
willing to show their devotion to the profession by giving of their
talents, time, and experience without reward. I know this Association for these reasons will progress in its service to the profession and the public, and will always be an active factor in the
improvement of the administration of justice under law. Thank
you very much.
PRESIDENT ATEN: As the next item of business, we will
have the report of the Secretary-Treasurer, George H. Turner.
GEORGE H. TURNER: Gentlemen, may I preface these reports
by reminding you that the Association luncheon will be held in this
room at noon. We are honored today to have as our speaker at the
luncheon David F. Maxwell, the President of the American Bar
Association. I urge you, for the convenience of the hotel, to get
your tickets as soon as possible so we will know how many to expect.
The books of the Association have been audited by the firm of
Martin and Martin, accountants of Lincoln. Their report shows cash
receipts during the year, $43,269.92; cash disbursements of $41,230.17,
leaving an excess of receipts over disbursements of $2,039.75.
This figure is reflected in the increase in the cash balance from
$3,307.77, September 24, 1955, to $5,347.52 on September 30, 1956.
And in addition, by direction of the House of Delegates, $2,000.00
was invested in United States bonds.
The principal items of cash receipts, of course, are the dues of
members. The dues of active members amounted to $37,630.00 and
of inactive members, $4,960.00.
The major disbursements include salaries and payroll taxes,
$6,253.90; Executive Council meetings, $1,002.65; officers' expense,
$1,186.07; office supplies and expense, $1,316.10; the expense of the
Family Law Institute to which your President has referred is
$1,097.77.
The Institute on Real Estate Titles, $1,243.46.
The publication of the Nebraska Law Review, $4,330.06. I think
most of you know the Association bears one-third of the cost of three
issues and the entire cost of the January issue, which contains the
transcript of proceedings of our annual meeting.
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Postage and express $1,180.93. Expense of the representatives to
the American Bar Association House of Delegates, $1,936.82. The
cost of the test case involving the judicial retirement act, Wilson
vs. Marsh, $1,724.43. The expense of the Public Service Program,
$4,999.72. The expense of the 1955 Annual Meeting, $4,310.05. The
expense of the Tax Institute held last December, $2,461.53.
The auditors conclude their report by saying that "All cash
receipts were deposited in the bank. Receipts for dues were verified
by reconciliation of membership cards issued .
"The bank balances were verified by independent correspondence with banks, and securities were inspected.
"The cash disbursements were verified by an examination of
the cancelled checks when feasible by an inspection of the original
document supporting the disbursements.
"We conclude by saying that in our opinion the funds of the
Association have been properly accounted for during the period
under review."
This report was made to the Executive Council at its meeting
yesterday and was approved.
PRESIDENT ATEN: As you know, our Association is represented in the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association by
Laurens Williams and Clarence A. Davis; my understanding is that
Mr. Davis will give the report, and therefore I now present to you
Clarence A. Davis, who will give the report of the American Bar
Association Delegates of the Bar Association.
Mr. Davis-and the honorable Undersecretary of the Department of Interior.
CLARENCE A. DAVIS: Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen.
It has been my privilege to make this report for the last two or three
years. My friend Laurens Williams has the happy faculty of wishing the job on me, and it is really a pleasure. I enjoy it because
it always gives me a chance to stand here and look over a great lot
of friends that I have not seen perhaps since the meeting a year ago.
Since I usually know almost everyone in the room by his first
name, you can imagine how much real fun it is to have the privilege
of standing here.
Now I could not help reminiscing a little while the President
was giving that report of the tremendous activities of this Association during the last year. It seems to me that it just grows and
grows, and expands and expands into all the fields of law that concern us here in Nebraska to the point where it is rendering a very,
very real service to all of the members of the profession in the state.
And I could not help but be impressed with that tremendous
list of activities that Wilber read.
Now, if you think that the Nebraska Association has a multitude of activities, does a multitude of things during the year, you
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can imagine the complete hopelessness of my trying to report to
you on the activities of the American Bar Association during any
year, because the scope of the American Bar as the voice of the
lawyers of America reaches into all of the fields of the law with
which we are familiar, into a great many fields that do not concern us here in Nebraska, into a great many fields which actually
involve philosophy, involve legal principles of very far-reaching
consequence to all of the people of the United States, things of that
nature which have nothing of the bread-and-butter aspect about
them, but yet which do tend to shape the form of our society in
the future.
When you consider that the American Bar Association includes-I forgot to count them, so I will be inaccurate and subject
to correction by the President later-but, roughly speaking, a dozen
sections and, roughly speaking, twenty-five or thirty standing committees, and I know not how many special committees, which report,
you get some idea of the hopelessness of trying to really report on
the activities of that week.
I do not know whether I have said this to you before or not,
but you realize that the delegates of the American Bar Association
are presented there with a kit of the working papers of the Association. That kit is actually and literally about two inches thick.
It comprises the reports of all the sections, of all of the committees
of the activities of the Association, the officers, and that sort of
thing-utterly impossible, of course, to plow through all of it in
any detail during the time the meeting is in progress.
But nevertheless it makes available to the representatives of
all of the Associations in the United States the activities of that
great organization. Now undertaking to spot just two or three of
the highlights that have concerned the American Bar in the last
year-and remember, there is a mid-year meeting of the House of
Delegates in February as well as the annual meeting which this
year, of course, was in Dallas-it is very difficult to spot the things
in which you might have some interest.
Number one, I suppose, at the head of the list as far as our
actual interest is concerned is the problem of some system or other
which will permit retirement of the lawyer under more favorable
conditions than have existed in the past.
I notice one of the pamphlets out there on the table says that,
in substance, it is a crime to be self-employed, but yet that is about
the type of penalty that the lawyer has been incurring.
But, as you know, the social security aspects have been, for the
moment at least, taken care of, so that is out of the way. The other
proposal which I suspect the President may discuss with you later,
the Jenkins-Keogh bill, providing some sort of retirement potentialities for the lawyer, has attracted, of course, a great deal of attention, because the brutal facts of life are that in this day and age
of present taxation, an independent practitioner with no cushion
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has a very, very difficult time laying aside any very adequate
amount of money.
The second thing that has attracted a good deal of attention in
the American Bar-and perhaps I am unduly interested in it because
of this government job that I happen to be holding at the momentthe subject that the American Bar has spent some considerable
time on under the auspices of a special committee is the problem
of legal services to the government. As I was saying, perhaps it
has affected me a little more than others because of the present
connection that I have with the government, but I would just like
to point out to you here that while it may seem a long ways away
to you, actually it is a very important thing for the bar of the
United States.
You must remember that in spite of all we may do, and even
that Congress may do, these tremendous volumes of federal interpretation of law, these positions which the federal government may
take, are the results of studies and of the positions taken by lawyers
in government, and, therefore, it is vital in my judgment that we
continue to attract and to hold in government, in the legal positions, the very highest type of legal mind that we can get.
It is very easy, you know, for the misfits and the ne'er-do-wells
to drift into the type of government employment that some of these
legal positions offer, and yet they exercise a tremendous influence
on the administrators and ultimately on the position of the government itself. Therefore it is necessary that we maintain a corps of
lawyers in government that-I wonder if I could express it this way
-that are our kind of people, that is, lawyers who have had some
practical experience, who have some conception of what this law
business is all about, who have some conception of human nature
and human frailties, and who are not entirely wedded to the letter
of some regulation, who are not too bookish, who have judgment
enough to temper what they do with a grain of common sense.
Now that is kind of a bold statement, but the other night at a
banquet I listened to Judge Sobilof, who just finished being Solicitor General, and he went even stronger than that in his expression that it was just vital that we get into government service
lawyers who would, as he put it, temper justice with mercy and
the letter of the law with a little bit of common sense.
Well, anyhow, that program is under way with a special committee headed by a lawyer in Washington, Ashley Sellers. It is
implementing, of course, fundamentally the legal recommendations
of the Hoover Report, and while it may look a long way away from
you here, it actually concerns you very much because there come
these unreadable and unintelligible regulations, and all that sort
of thing about which we all complain.
And, incidentally, my fellow delegate Laurens Williams, who,
as you know has been in Washington now for two or three years,
is doing what they tell me is a magnificent job on these Treasury
regulations in the field of taxation in translating them from their
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previous existing state into what we would call a common garden
variety of English. So if Larry succeeds in doing that so that most
of us can read and know what they have said, it will be a monumental achievement.
So the last thing that I will touch on briefly is this drive that
has been going on for the last year or more to establish in the
American Bar Association a separate section on negligence law.
That drive, of course, has grown out of the fact that it is felt that
the plaintiff's side of these negligent cases has not been getting the
support and the help and the exploration that it deserves. Maybe
so. At any rate, as we all know here, that drive has been fostered
in the background by some of these rather spectacular plaintiff
lawyers who put on a most excellent vaudeville show, incidentally,
at a bar association meeting, but who, I understand, sometimes get
defendant's verdicts, just like all the rest of us. Those are the ones
that we do not hear about.
But that has been going on. It has been proposed this year at
the American Bar Association meeting. It served, in my judgment,
a useful purpose in that it shook up the insurance section which
has always had jurisdiction of that field into taking a second look
at itself and the potentialities that it was missing in the plaintiff's
side of these lawsuits.
Well, the official action that was taken was simply for the
House of Delegates to concur in a recommendation of the Board
of Governors that the matter be considered for further study and
later recommendation. In the meantime, the insurance section of
the American Bar is undertaking to change, and has changed, its
name from that of an Insurance Section to a section entitled "Insurance-Negligence and Compensation."
And consequently I would suspect although it is impossible to
say definitely, that that section will be broadened to include these
things on which many men in this room, I know, are primarily dependent for the bread-and-butter aspects of their law business.
There is one other thing about that that I might say. I hope
I am not encroaching on what the President might say later. A
committee has been appointed, of whom the chairman is Richard
Coburn of St. Louis, to give some consideration to these matters,
and you are at liberty to communicate with that committee by addressing letters to the American Bar Center in Chicago, expressing
whatever views you may have about the whole affair.
Well now, gentlemen, that is a rather rambling and perhaps
inconsequential report, but I am not smart enough to give you in
ten or fifteen minutes the proceedings of a week's meeting of the
American Bar Association and of an agenda that has upwards of a
hundred separate items on it. I can only say to you what I think
I say annually and never want to neglect to say: that the drive
towards membership in the American Bar must go forward. We
must get ourselves in a situation where we have a great national
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organization that can speak with authority for the lawyers of the
United States. It is only through that type of organization that we
will preserve from all of these encroachments the right of the
lawyer as officer of the courts to handle the judicial processes of
the United States.
So I always bespeak continued membership, continued support
in the American Bar Association, whether it means anything immediately to your bank account this afternoon or not, on the theory
that it is the least that one can do for the profession which sustains
all of us. Thank you very much.
PRESIDENT ATEN: We will next have the report of the House
of Delegates by Hale McCown, Chairman of the House of Delegates.
Report of the Chairman of the House of Delegates
The House of Delegates of the Nebraska State Bar Association
met on October 17, 1956. The following action was taken by the
House:
The reports of the following committees as published in the
printed program of this meeting were adopted:
Committee on Administrative Agencies-Bert L. Overcash
Committee on Cooperation with American Law InstituteLyle E. Jackson
Committee on County Law Libraries-Lawrence S. Dunmire
Committee on the Judiciary-C. Russell Mattson
Committee on Legal Aid-Emory P. Burnett
Committee on Legislation-Robert Downing
Committee on Expert Medical Testimony-John L. Barton
Committee on Legal Education and Continuing Legal Education
-E. D. Beech
Committee on Oil and Gas Law-Paul L. Martin
Committee on Public Service-John J. Wilson
Committee on State Tort Claims Act-George Healey
Joint Conference of Lawyers and AccountantsJames W. R. Brown
Committee on Unauthorized Practice-A. J. Luebs
The report of the Committee on Budget and Finance, presented
by Theodore J. Fraizer, was approved, with a recommendation to
the Executive Council that the Association invest the sum of
$2,000.00 in government bonds as an additional reserve.
The report of the Committee on Crime and Delinquency Prevention, presented by James F. Brogan, was adopted with the following specific additions: that the House of Delegates go on record
as recommending that a statewide probation system be adopted,
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and that the study of existing and proposed laws with respect to
sex offenses and deviates be continued.
The report of the Advisory Committee presented by Charles
Adams was adopted, and the House directed that the detailed analysis of action of the Committee be published in accordance with

past practice.
The report of the Committee on American Citizenship, presented by Frank Mattoon, was adopted, except for the deletion of
that portion of the report based on the 1955 committee report.
The report of the Secretary-Treasurer on receipts and disbursements, showing a cash balance on hand as of September 30 of
$5,347.52 together with $2,000.00 in government bonds in a reserve
fund, was approved.
Upon the unanimous recommendation of the Committee on
Hearings by Robert Van Pelt, the House adopted a resolution endorsing Constitutional Question providing for the amendment of
Section 4, Article VII of the Nebraska Constitution to give the Legislature power to release or extinguish, or to authorize the releasing
or extinguishing in whole or in part, of tax and assessment charges
against real property remaining delinquent and unpaid for a period
of time as long or longer than that provided by law to authorize
the taking of title to real property by prescription.
The by-laws of the Association were amended by correcting
the title of the Committee on Public Relations to the Committee
on Public Service, The title of the Committee on Legal Education to
the Committee on Legal Education and Continuing Legal Educa-tion, and by deleting the Committee on Procedure to correspond
with the actual practice of the past year or two.
The House adjourned to reconvene Friday, October 19, at 4:00
P.M. to receive the section reports and to conclude any unfinished
business which may be presented.
PRESIDENT ATEN: The report of the Judicial Council will be
given by Mr. McCown, who is Vice-Chairman of the Council.
HALE McCOWlNT: In the absence of Judge Carter, I will read
the report.
Report of the Judicial Council
The Judicial Council has met from time to time during the
past year, and will meet at least once more before the Legislature
convenes in January, 1957. Many procedural matters of importance
to the bar have been under consideration. The Council, with the
approval of the supreme court, will submit four proposals for procedural changes to the incoming Legislature. Briefly described,
the proposed changes are:
1. A provision to be added to Section 25-834.01, R.R.S. 1943,
providing that in the event a motion for a directed verdict or dis-
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missal made by a defendant is sustained, and the defendant has a
counterclaim, the latter shall be docketed as a separate cause and
trial had at a subsequent jury, the same as if it had been filed as
a separate action.
2. A proposal to amend Section 24-610, Cumulative Supplement
for 1955, relating to trusts and trustees, to provide for waiver of
notice of hearing upon petitions by fiduciaries for approval of their
accounts by known beneficiaries who are competent to waive.
3. A proposal to amend Sections 25-1267.43 and 25-1267.44, R.S.
Supp., 1955, to provide for making of application for order to compel answer to written interrogatories and to prescribe sanctions
for failure to answer written interrogatories.
4. A proposal to amend Sections 25-1140.03, 25-1140.04, and
25-1140.09, R.R.S. 1943, pertaining to the service, allowance, and
settlement of a bill of exceptions where there are multiple parties
who are appellants. In substance, the proposal is that such bill of
exceptions shall be filed with the clerk of the district court for
the use of all appellees.
5. A proposal that the supreme court amend Rules 1 and 15
relating to the docketing of causes, dismissals of appeals, and defaults. The purpose of the proposed changes is to provide the procedure for dealing with multiple appeals and the right to dismiss
where more than one party may be interested in the appeal.
The Council has several matters up for consideration which
may or may not receive its approval. Two projects of special interest being studied by the Council are the matter of uniform publication notices in the district court to be submitted to the supreme
court for approval, and the formulation of a simpler method of
preparing, serving, allowing, and settling bills of exceptions.
Plans have been made for publishing the doings of the Judicial
Council in the Nebraska State Bar Journal. We feel, possibly, that
this may generate more interest in the bar in procedural matters
coming before the Council for its consideration. We have no doubt
that many lawyers find many procedural provisions that are in
need of correction or clarification. Our problem has always been
to get the members of the bar to report such matters to the Council.
I would like to take this opportunity once more to urge the practicing lawyers of the state to call our attention to procedural defects or revisions that may be necessary in antiquated statutes dealing with procedure. The bar owes it to our society to lend its collective intelligence to the attainment of as good a procedural system as can be formulated.
The Judicial Council is an official and continuing agency having
for its purpose the seeking of information about the courts, the
weighing of the possibilities of more effective administration by the
courts, and, where found, offering concrete proposals for improvements in the administration of justice.
We reiterate that our judicial procedures in this state are
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basically sound. I do not come before you to say that our system
is inefficient or uneconomical, for it is not so. But if we are to
maintain the confidence of the public in the administration of
justice by courts and lawyers, we must not lag in our efforts to
improve the efficiency of the courts by maintaining a simple and
effective method of accomplishing its purposes. A failure in this
respect can only bring about substitute agencies, with a resulting
loss in public esteem for courts and lawyers. If our lawyers and
judges do not do an effective job, the business will go elsewhere.
As members of the Council, we feel that we have done an effective
job as to matters which have come before us. But we could render
a greater service if members of the bar would assist by advising us
of apparent errors, needed changes, or new situations not dealt
with. The Judicial Council should be a clearing house for all suggestions by the bar relating to procedure.
E. H. Carter
Chairman, Judicial Council
PRESIDENT ATEN: We will now have the report on the result
of the election by our Secretary, Mr. Turner.
GEORGE H. TURNER: Mr. President, gentlemen. As provided
in the constitution, ninety days ahead of the annual meeting, the
Executive Council makes nominations of officers to be chosen for
the ensuing year, with the provision that within thirty days after
the announcement of the nominations, other nominations may be
made by petition.
This year in July the Council met and nominated for President
Barton H. Kuhns of Omaha; for Member at Large of the Executive
Council, C. Russell Mattson of Lincoln; and for delegates to the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, Laurens
Williams and Clarence A. Davis.
No opposing petitions were filed for any of these offices, and
so these gentlemen are therefore automatically your officers for
the next year.
PRESIDENT ATEN: There is one item upon which we will
have a report, and I would like to have Mr. Martin come to the
microphone, if he will.
I remarked that this Association held a membership in the
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation. Ordinarily we would
submit this report to the House of Delegates, but because of its
newness and interest to everyone, I have asked Paul L. Martin,
who is on the board of trustees of the corporation, to make his report to this assembly upon this particular subject.
Report of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute
PAUL L. MARTIN: In the spring of 1955, Mr. C. W. Day, Jr.,
Division Landman for Sohio Petroleum Company, wrote a number
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of attorneys and others in the Rocky Mountain Region, suggesting
the establishment of a Rocky Mountain Legal Institute along the
lines of the Southwest Legal Foundation in Dallas, Texas. Within
a month an informal meeting was held in Denver, and under the
chairmanship of Arthur T. Smith of Denver, with special efforts of
Dean King and Assistant Dean Martz of the Law School of the
University of Colorado, the First Annual Institute was held in
Boulder, Colorado, in July, 1955. Over six hundred registered for
the first meeting. The excellent facilities furnished by the University of Colorado contributed largely to the success of the Institute.
In view of the success of the first institute, the committee decided to establish a permanent organization for the purpose of conducting an institute on mineral law in the Rocky Mountain Region
each summer.
At a meeting in Denver on December 10th, 1955, the organization of a non-profit corporation was completed. Dean Belsheim
represented the College of Law of the University of Nebraska,'
and I attended as a representative of the Nebraska State Bar Association. All state bar associations, mining associations, oil and
gas associations, and law schools in Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming and the Section of Mineral Law of the American Bar Association were invited to membership.
The 1956 Institute was held in Boulder, August 2, 3, 4. It was
equally successful, with a registration of nearly five hundred. The
program was excellent and well received. The Foundation has
accumulated funds in excess of $12,000.00. Any amounts not necessary for the furtherance of the annual meetings will be used for
scholarships and other worthwhile endeavors of the Foundation.
The 1957 meeting will be held in Missoula, Montana, August 1,
2, and 3. The Law School-of the University of Montana will go all
out to show that they have just as fine facilities as the University
of Colorado, and they feel that the reputation of Montana as a vacation land will be a real drawing card for a large attendance.
I think the project is really worth while, and I am very happy
to have the Nebraska State Bar Association an integral part of the
Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation.
PRESIDENT ATEN: I rather believe that your new President
will appear before you later.
We will now have the report of the Committee on Memorials
by Walter Sadilek of Schuyler.
Report of the Committee on Memorials
Another year has passed, and again we meet in fellowship and
remembrance. We join in fellowship with our living companions,
but recall in memory those who, during the year just passed, have
ceased to be with us in the flesh. They are, however, not absent
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from our thoughts. They have long honored our profession with
their candor, personal integrity, fairness, and courage. By their
acts and their way of life they have encouraged our fellow members
to uphold the honor and dignity of our profession. They have shown
us that our highest honor lies in our deserved reputation for fidelity
to our trust and to our duty as lawyers and as citizens.
It is fitting, therefore, that in this business session we pause to
call them to mind, not in sadness nor in mourning, but in a feeling
of affectionate remembrance of all who still speak to us by the
good influence of the lives they have lived. They have engraved
their virtues upon the tables of our memory.
Shall we stand as the roll is read:
George J. Cleary, Omaha
M. 0. Cunningham, Omaha
Al N. Dafoe, Tecumseh
James A. Donohoe, Omaha
Paul W. Eagleton, Tekamah
Roy F. Gilkeson, Lincoln
Harvey Hillman, Nebraska City
Leon L. Hines, Benkelman
Joseph D. Houston, Omaha
James W. Karlovsky, Omaha
L. E. Laflin, Crab Orchard
Harry D. Landis, Seward
Gerald E. LaViolette, Omaha
John A. McKenzie, Omaha
N. H. Mapes, Fremont
John T. Marcell, Omaha
Robert S. Mockett, Lincoln
Robert R. Moodie, West Point
James T. Nelson, Brewster, Wash.
Bernard J. O'Keefe, Kansas City, Mo.
Joseph Rapp, Omaha
A. A. Rezac, Omaha
William Ritchie, Omaha
Albert L. Schnurr, Harrison
Clarence T. Spier, Omaha
LeRoy G. Stohlman, Appleton, Wisc.
Thomas Swearingen, Lincoln
John E. von Dorn, Omaha
Ralph M. West, Carmel, Calif.
William J. McNichols, Dawson Co. and Hollywood, Calif.
We deem it fitting that we stand silent for a moment in their
memory.
PRESIDENT ATEN: Now, gentlemen, I would like to remind
you to look at the display board that is out in the lobby that has been
arranged showing the activities of our Association. I believe that
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it's the first time that that has been done. I think it very effectively
portrays what the Bar Association actually does and the activities
in which it is engaged.
Please give that your attention, and, I think, you will agree that
it's an excellent thing and an excellent job well done.
There again I pay respect to George Turner. I would very
highly recommend your attendance at the sections this afternoon
and tomorrow, and I would like to remind you that there will be
a luncheon in this room by the Association, and that the Honorable
David F. Maxwell, President of the American Bar Association, will
speak at the luncheon immediately following this meeting at noon.
We will now stand adjourned to 4:30 P.M. tomorrow.
Annual Luncheon of the Association
Thursday, October 18, 1956
PRESIDENT ATEN: Ladies and gentlemen, if we can get on
with the program now.
We hoped to have all the chairman on the sections of the Association present here this afternoon. However, we were unable to
do that, but I would like to present to you the chairman who are
here.
(Presentation of Association section chairmen.)
PRESIDENT ATEN: It is my personal privilege to present the
speaker for your luncheon meeting to you. This gentleman is a
practicing attorney in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He has served
on many of the committees of the American Bar Association; he is
a Past Chairman of the House of Delegates of the American Bar
Association; he assumed the Presidency of the American Bar Association at the termination of the Dallas meeting recently; and I
think he would like to talk to you about a contrast of viewpoints
for a few minutes.
It is a privilege to present to you the Honorable David F. Maxwell, President of the American Bar Association.
DAVID F. MAXWELL: President Aten, my fellow members of
the Bar. Thank you very much for that very gracious introduction.
I am always a little wary about introductions. It reminds me of
an experience that the President of the Studebaker Company had
in Philadelphia not too long ago. He was down there addressing
a women's group and he was given a very flowery introduction.
He tried very hard to rise to the occasion and gave what he thought
was his most magnificent address.
And afterward the president of the women's organization was
congratulating him upon what a fine impression he made and how
kind it was for him to come there, and so forth. And at that point
up waddled one of our Philadelphia dowagers-there are none from
anywhere comparable-and said, "Your address was terrible. It
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was too long, and nobody could understand what you were talking
about."
Well, the toastmistress was very much upset, and she said, "Oh,
Mr. President, Mr. President, please do not pay any attention to
her. She's a moron and she only repeats what other people tell her."
I sometimes think that introductions ought to be saved until
after the speech, and then you can gauge how much you ought to
say about the person, but I am delighted to be with you good people
from Nebraska today. I am delighted to be with you because, first
of all, it is like coming home.
I was here in 1953 at your regional meeting, which, as you
will remember, was one of the most successful the American Bar
Association had up until that time. And during my stay at your
fair city at that time I was introduced to such lovely spots as the
Sparetime restaurant.
I enjoyed every minute of the hospitality that you accorded me,
and it is nice to be back again among such friends as George Turner,
whom I have enjoyed working with, and, ladies and gentlemen, do
no underestimate your hard-working Secretary; he is a power in
the American Bar Association, and it is very unusual for a President
to be elected who does not have his support.
Now let me say that I am very happy to be again with my very
good friends Clarence Davis and Laurens Williams, and also Roy
Willy from South Dakota, whom I saw at the South Dakota Bar
not too long ago; and my friend Bart Kuhns, who is your incoming
President, and of course your hard-working President, whose report
I thought was simply terrific this morning, Wilber Aten.
I have not seen Judge Simmons, but I hope before I leave I
will have the pleasure of seeing him, and I really do miss seeing my
old friend Jim Mothersead. Jim was a power in the American Bar
Association for many years, and he was one of the members of
the Board of Governors whom you sent to represent you, and represented you ably.
And, secondly, I am glad to be with you because it is high time
that the American Bar Association through its official family pays
tribute to the Bar of Nebraska for the great contribution you members have made to the progress of the American Bar Association.
About three years ago, you were tapped for contributions for
the American Bar Foundation, and you responded nobly. And last
year you were hit again for memberships in the American Bar
Association, and then again you rose to the occasion with magnificence. And as a result of such efforts as yours, the American
Bar Association has grown into the powerful unit it is today as the
spokesman in the American Bar, where we presently have eightyfive thousand members, where we have the most gorgeous plant
you ever laid your eyes on at the campus of the University of Chicago, worth approximately two million dollars. And if any of you
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ladies and gentlemen happen to be in Chicago and you have not seen
that edifice, it is well worth a visit. And we have an income today
through your generosity and the generosity of the other organized
Bars throughout the country of approximately eight hundred thousand dollars, which makes the American Bar Association big business.
So we do, indeed, owe to you members of the Bar from Nebraska
a great debt of gratitude, which reminds me of the debt of gratitude
that one of our Italian citizens from South Philadelphia thought
that a certain judge named Adrian Benelli owed.
He went to Judge Benelli, who is of Italian extraction; this little
Italian fellow came in to him one day and he said, "Judge, you
wanted to be a magistrate?"
And the judge said, "Yes, I did."
"Well," he said, "I voted for you, I getta my family to vote for
you, I get alla my friends to votta for you, and make you a magistrate," and he said, "No?"
"Yes, Tony, that's true."
"And then," he said, "two years later you want be a judge, and
so I votta for you, I getta my family to votta for you, and I get all
of my friends to votta for you, and now you're a judge."
"Yes, Tony, I'm very grateful for everything you have done for
me, and now, what can I do for you?"
And Tony said, "Judge, I wanta be a citizen."
So we in the American Bar Association recognize our debt of
gratitude to you and we are very anxious to make you good lawyers
citizens to the extent that we can possibly contribute to it.
I recently had the occasion to visit Russia as the visiting member of the delegation from the American Bar Association. There
were six of us: the chairman of our clelegation was Ezra Campbell,
the immediate Past-President of the Association; Bob Story, the
former Past-President of the American Bar Association from Texas,
whom you probably know, was one of our party; Gene Boyd from
Boston, an active member in the Association; Archie Mull, the
Past-President of the California Bar Association; and Harry Watkins, the Past-President of the South Carolina Bar, and myself.
And while we had no official status in the Soviet Republic, we
did go as the representatives of the American Bar Association to
observe the system of law in the Soviet Republic in contrast to our
own system of law here, and as such we were accorded every possible courtesy; we were permitted to go wherever we chose, we
were allowed to interview some of the top jurists and some of the
top lawyers in the Soviet Republic, including Attorney General
Rodenko. We interviewed the Commissar and his cabinet of the
city of Leningrad.
But Russia is an enigma. It has been well likened to an iceberg,
with only a fraction of it visible above the surface of the water, and
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with the rest of it only known to the eleven men in the presidium of
the Soviet Republics.
So we interviewed Ambassador Bolen for about two hours, and
he, though he has been there for many years, says that he does not
begin to know what is going on today in the Kremlin. How much
less, then, we would know or be able to tell you after only twelve
days there. However, for what it is worth, I am very happy to give
you the benefit of my own personal impressions, as fleeting as they
may have been.
What I saw and heard about Russian attitudes toward law and
lawyers revealed to me more than anything else the basic weakness
of the communist society, and just to set aright your mind that I
have been in any way converted to communism, let me say that
the happiest moment of my life was when I was born a citizen of
the United States, and I hope that I will continue to be a loyal,
steadfast citizen of the United States as long as the Lord permits
me to be on this earth. We have heard it said many times that lawyers in America play an indispensable part in protecting our liberties. I believe this firmly, and I am sure you do, but I often think
people generally fail to comprehend the extent to which it is true.
We know, for example, that the lawyers of our country were largely
responsible for the Declaration of Independence and our Constitution and that without courts and lawyers these documents of human
liberty would be mere words on paper. It is the legal profession,
in my humble opinion, the lawyers, who see that the protections of
the law as we know it in this country are made available to people,
who give meaning to those laws and their constitutional foundations.
The lawyers of America are, in short, the country's best bulwark
against communism. Never was this brought home to us more
forcefully than on that recent tour of the principal cities of the
Soviet Union.
There is no place in a communist state for lawyers, believe me.
It was not too many years ago that the communists were circulating
in this country various pamphlets and manuscripts in which they
denounced lawyers; in which they threatened to exterminate all
lawyers; in which they said when they took over this country lawyers would be downgraded. Now that, gentlemen, was no idle
threat, because that is exactly what they have done in Russia.
There is no place in that police state for lawyers. They have
been shorn of every vestige of independent thought and action.
They are nothing more nor less than tools of the state. The lawyers,
for example, in Moscow are members of what they call an Installation, which is what we would call a union, and it is not even a
lawyers' union. It is called the Government Workers' Union, and
that Government Workers' Union is controlled by what is known
as a Presidium, consisting of approximately twelve to fifteen men.
And those twelve or fifteen men are nominated and elected by the
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communist party. Those men hold in thier hands the fate of the
lawyers of Moscow. They fix the fees, they send the bills, and they
distribute the proceeds of a lawyer's labor. Thirty percent of the
fees are retained by the Presidium and distributed as the Presidium
sees fit, to pay the president, for example, to pay the administrative expense of this Government Workers' Union, and the balance
of seventy percent is distributed to the lawyer who handled the
case.
Just think of it, in a city of six or seven million souls in Moscow there are only twelve hundred lawyers engaged in private
practice, and in all of Russia, for two hundred million people, there
are but sixteen thousand lawyers. Contrast that with the two hundred and forty thousand lawyers in the United States as of the end
of 1955, or, in your state of Nebraska, I am told today, that there
are two thousand active practitioners and eleven hundred and fifty
inactive practitioners for a population of approximately one million
three hundred thousand people.
But the answer is simple. There is nothing for the lawyer to do
in Russia. He may not take a case against the government, because
the government, through the Government Workers Installation, is
really his employer. The Government, as you know, owns all the
land, the Government operates every business, even to the shoestring vendor on the public highway-and how they keep the books
is something I will never know. So the only cases he is in a position
to take are the defense of petty criminal actions and perhaps the
handling of petty civil suits which arise in the so-called People's
Court.
And if time would permit, perhaps you would like to hear a
word parenthetically about the People's Court. There are, of course,
no jury trials in Russia. The People's Court is a court which handles
most of the ordinary crimes, short of crimes of treason and murder
and the major crimes, and has jurisdiction over petty squabbles
that arise over the use of a bathroom or kitchen. They are very
short of bathroom space there, and there are five families sharing
the same common bathroom and kitchen facilities.
The People's Court consists of a lawyer who is a permanent
member of the court who is selected upon a permanent basis and
acts as a chairman of the court, and the other two members are lay
persons chosen from a panel of the people in ordinary walks of life,
and those two men on the panel serve for ten days and are not paid
by the government for that service.
They continue to receive whatever wages they were earning
in the factory or in the store or wherever they work in their ordinary everyday line.
The curious part of it is that the lawyer has very little part to
play, even in the People's Court, because there a majority of the
members of the court control the verdict, so that even there the
lawyer cannot as a matter of law, for example, decide the case.
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It must be decided on the basis of the facts as shown in the People's
Court. We attended a trial in the People's Court and saw it through
from start to finish.
I imagine that on the whole a rough kind of justice is done in
the People's Court but it is, so far as we could observe, very rough.
During the regime of Stalin there was in effect in Russia a law
called the Kirov Law under which indictments had to be returned
within ten days from the day the inquiry was begun. The presentment of the indictment for the first time was the day before trial.
The defendant was not entitled to the benefit of counsel at the trial,
and the sentences of the court were executed within forty-eight
hours without giving the defendant the right of further appeal.
Due process? Not as we understand it. This law, we were told, has
been repealed since Stalin's death, but we found nothing in the
present government to indicate that the law could not be reinstated
whenever it suited the purpose of the present rulers.
It was that experience in Russia that impressed me with the
idea that the American Bar Association should this year do all that
it can to strengthen the status of lawyers, in addition, of course, to
our traditional activities in the area of public service. So we have
adopted the slogan "Service for Lawyers." It seems to me that we
do not need -to apologize for that. Bar associations throughout the
country, as is evidenced by the various reports of your committee
submitted at this meeting, are engaged in numerous activities in
the public interest. In fact, the business of a Bar association is the
public's business. Therefore, I say that it is important in the public
interest to maintain a strong organized Bar, a Bar of high economic
standards, a Bar of political independence in which every member
may express himself fully and courageously.
In Russia the average lawyer's income is eleven hundred to
fifteen hundred rubles a month, which, at the current rate of exchange of four to one, is equivalent to approximately three hundred
dollars, which is identical also to the salary of the permanent member of the People's Court.
But I might also add that that four to one does not begin to represent a realistic rate of exchange. Some of us were able, despite
the so-called purity of the Socialist state or communist state, to buy
rubles in the black market at the rate of ten to one.
The Russian lawyer's income is well below that of the average
workman in a factory, who earns approximately two thousand
rubles per month. So you see the extent to which lawyers have
been downgraded in that country, both economically and spiritually. To make certain this does not happen in this country, it is
important to maintain both the economic level and the professional
integrity of our lawyers on a high plane.
With that in view, we have mapped out a program this year
which we hope will benefit every lawyer, no matter where he
lives. Our first aim is to raise economic standards of the lawyer
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throughout the country to the extent that it is within the power of
the American Bar Association to do so. We propose, for instance,
to offer group insurance to every member of the American Bar Association, irrespective of his age. As you all know, we have group
life insurance now at very low rates for members of the bar up to
the age of fifty-five.
William Clark Mason, the Chairman of our Insurance Committee, just before I came away from Philadelphia, advised me that
the plans have now been perfected to exf end that group coverage at
the cheapest rate you ever heard of to members between fifty and
seventy years of age, and that the plan will be presented for the
approval of the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association
at its coming meeting in Chicago on October 26 and 27.
Of still greater importance will be our concerted
effort to secure
the passage of legislation, the, principle of which was embodied in
the Jenkins-Keogh Bill which failed of passage at the last session
of Congress, and to which' Mr. Davis alluded in his address this
morning. When I go around the country, as I have gone in the
last few months, I am amazed at the number of lawyers who have
never heard of the Jenkins-Keogh Bill, in spite of the fact the
American Bar has been actively working for its adoption in the
past ten years, but I am sure that most of you know that the essential purpose of it is to allow professional people, farmers, small
businessmen, and other self-employed people to set aside a certain
portion of their income upon which federal income taxes would be
deferred until they reach the age of retirement or until they take
it down prior to that time. That is no more and no less than is available to practically every business executive and employee and other
employed persons through corporate pension and retirement plans.
In other words, the purpose of this bill would be to put those who
are self-employed upon the same basis as those who are employed
and encourage them to save a reasonable proportion of their income
for old age, or for their families in the case of their death.
We have already organized the whole country, state by state,
on a strictly non-partisan basis to acquaint the members of Congress with the importance of the bill and the benefit it will be to
the public generally. Remember, ladies and gentlemen, this is not
a lawyer's bill. There are ten million persons who will be affected
by this legislation and who would benefit from it in the event of
its adoption. This legislation is to be presented again to the 85th
Congress in January. Many other organizations representing other
professions and groups are joining in the campaign. I met in Chicago just a week ago with the representatives of the medical profession, the dental profession, the realtors, and the accounting profession. We have two hundred and fifty organizations whose members are affected by this bill, and we are acting as a spearhead to
consolidate their sentiment and to make it clear to the Congress
that it is in the interests of the public that the bill be passed.
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In this state we have' two very fine men presently at work with

your congressional nominees, Fred Deutsch of Norfolk, on the Democratic side, and William Spear of Fremont.
We propose to do a11 that we can do to procure the passage of
the reforms recommended by the second Hoover Commission as
implemented by the special Committee on Legal Procedures of the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association.
One phase of this program was touched upon by Clarence Davis
in his remarks this morning. I do not-know how many of you lawyers have had experience in the administrative field. It so happens
that I have had a little, and if you go down to Washington with the
naive idea that you can practice before any federal administrative
tribunal'just by appearing and presenting your credentials as a
member of the Bar, you are sadly mistaken. There are about seventy-two agencies in Washington, and of the seventy-two, at least
thirty have' their own rules and regulations, and they have their
'own rules for practice.
For example, the Internal Revenue Service has special rules requiring a character examination for every applicant, and your ap.plication for admission to the Bar of the Internal Revenue Service
is held up until your' character is investigated. Can you imagine
why a member of the'Bar in good standing of the state of Nebraska
should be obligated to take a character examination? In the Patent
Office you have to take a special scholastic examination. I could
give you a list of similar requirements all down the line of many
of these administrative boards and tribunals. We subscribe to the
idea that if a man is good enough to be a member of the Bar, adrnitted to practice by the supreme court of his state of Nebraska,
he is good enough to practice before any administrative tribunal in
Washington. And we propose to have the Congress adopt a uniform
rule which will admit any lawyer on certificate of the supreme court
of the state in which he is practicing.
The American Bar Association was an important factor in obtaining the description of the Administrative Procedure Act in
1946. That Act accomplished an internal separation of powers
within the various agencies, but it did not investigate the judicial
functions of such agencies in a court entirely divorced from the
agency itself. We think it is important to the maintenance of the
principles upon which our Constitution is based that the judicial
functions of administrative agencies be entirely alienated from the
investigatory and prosecuting functions. And there again, if I may
refer just a second to the rule in Russia. Take, for example, the
trial of that arch terrorist L. B. Beria, and this, ladies and gentlemen, has been since the death of Stalin. Just to show you the lack
of separation of powers in the Soviet Republic, the court which was
appointed by the communist party to try Beria consisted of a representative of military, the commissioner of the military, a chair'nan of the court, the representatives of the communist party,
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the representatives of the trade unions, and, last, way down at the
bottom of the totem pole, was the judiciary.
So that you see that all of the power in the Soviet Union flows
from the base up to the Presidium at the top, a pyramid, and there
is absolutely no division or separation of powers.
And that is what we must avoid having happen in this country,
and that is why it is so important that the recommendations of the
second Hoover Commission providing for the complete alienation
of the judiciary from the other functions of the administrative
agencies should be sought.
It is proposed that these judiciary functions be investigated in
special courts established under Article III of the Constitution. To
these courts would be transferred the judicial functions now being
performed by the Federal Trade Commission, the National Labor
Relations Board, the Tax Court, and such other adjudicatory functions as the Congress may from time to time determine. We are
seeking the cooperation of all the members of the Bar, in this and
other states, in support of this legislation when it is introduced at
the next session of Congress. Time permits me to touch only on
the highlights of the special committee's report in this field. It
recommends many other reforms, many of which were touched
upon by Mr. Davis, in the administrative practice and procedure
which will be of great public benefit.
Next, we are stepping up our public relations program, and I am
happy to note that you have changed the name of your committee
from Committee on Legal Education to Committee on Legal Education and Continuing Legal Education, and I think that is a step
in the right direction. It had not happened to occur to me, but
that is a step in the right direction.
The aim is to make the public more aware of the essential services lawyers perform, and to make lawyers more conscious of their
professional responsibilities and the services they receive from their
national association and their state and local associations. We are
seeking to combat uninformed and inaccurate portrayals of lawyers
and judges and courts, not just in a negative way, but by encouraging the production for television of dramatic and informational
programs which picture lawyers and the courts authentically. At
the moment we are working in cooperation with the American
Medical Association in the production of several films demonstrating the proper roles of judges and lawyers in casualty litigation.
I expect to go to the state of Washington later this month in order
to give a prologue for the introduction of those films, which will
be available for showing soon to bar associations.
Next, we propose to expand the activities of the Unauthorized
Practice of Law Committee. At the Board of Governors meeting in
Dallas in August, the committee's appropriation was increased to
provide for the employment of an Executive Secretary, which
should immeasurably increase the effectiveness of this committee
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in its efforts to eradicate the unauthorized practice of law. In connection with the work of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee, you might be interested in litigation pending in Chicago
resulting from the tendency of certain lawyers specializing in employee liability cases to bring suit in the jurisdiction where the
highest verdicts are likely to be obtained, irrespective of how far
removed from the point where the accident occurred. I do not know
whether any of your accident cases here, in employees liability in
the field, are removed from the state of Iowa to Chicago or Minneapolis or St. Louis or to other cities where large verdicts have been
obtained, but, believe me, it is a prevalent practice in a great many
places in the country. The clients represented by these lawyers
have for the most part been referred by certain labor unions. Because of these activities, action has been brought by the Chicago Bar
Association to restrain them from continuing their present practices. The Board of Governors of the American Bar Association
at its meeting in Dallas authorized its Unauthorized Practice of
Law Committee to intervene in this matter, and a brief will be
prepared and filed. This is just one phase of the work of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee which I thought might be
of particular interest to you.
Next, we propose to do all in our power to improve the lot of
the lawyer in our armed forces. Doctors and dentists have recently
received pay increases and promotions in grade without similar
emoluments having been afforded to lawyers. So we have appointed
a strong committee for the purpose of obtaining comparable professional recognition and benefits for lawyers.
These are only highlights of our all-out program of service for
lawyers, but our activities in this direction will not in any way
detract from or diminish the work which the organized Bar is continuously carrying on in the public interest. Projects of public import are centered, as you know, in the American Bar Foundation.
Your faith in the leadership of the Association as manifested by
your generous contributions to the American Bar Foundation has
made that great institution possible. The Foundation now has in
Chicago a plant worth conservatively two million dollars, and a
substantial income both from foundations and from the contributions of the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation. In addition
we have an excellent staff at headquarters carrying on the various
projects which from time to time are approved by the Foundation's
special Research Committee.
There are at the moment three major projects under way. The
first and most important is the Survey of the Administration of
Criminal Justice, made possible by a gift of the Ford Foundation.
I was in New York just two weeks ago, meeting with the officials
of the Ford Foundation, and we presented to them an application
for further grant of a million three hundred thousand dollars to
carry the survey work of that team into seventeen states of the
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Union. Pilot studies of the manner in which criminal laws are administered have already been completed in the states of Wisconsin
and Kansas, and a similar study has been launched in Michigan.
The second major project presently in progress at the Foundation is a survey of the canons of ethics in the light of modern conditions to which your President alluded in his address this morning,
and I wanted you to know that that is the work of the American
Bar Foundation and not the work of the American Bar Association.
Now some of you may not think that there are ethical problems around the country today, but I can assure you that there are,
in fact. Actually I was attending a meeting of Roy Willey's bar
association in South Dakota a month or so ago, and there the Chairman of the Ethics Committee read from a text a report in which
an ethical problem was recorded; it's cited in 283 Southwest 266.
It involved the trial of an accident case, an ordinary motor vehicular
damage suit, in which the plaintiff had sustained very serious injuries.
The lawyer for the plaintiff and the lawyer for the defendant
were both esteemed and revered members of the Texas community
who have high rating in Martindale-Hubbell. As the trial progressed, the heat developed hotter and hotter, and personalities
began to fly, and finally when the independent witness for the
plaintiff, who was a key witness in the case, got on the stand and
was taken over for cross-examination, the lawyer for the defendant
thought he had her trapped.
So he said to her, "So now you have changed your story." And
in open court the lawyer for the plaintiff immediately got on his
feet, and he shook his fist under the nose of the lawyer for the
defendant.
And he said, "She did no such goddamned thing, and you know
it, you son-of-a-bitch."
And if you don't believe me, that's an exact quote from the
report, and anybody that wants to take it down and look it up, it is
283 Southwest, page 266.
Now what happened as a result of that? The attorney for the
defendant immediately got to his feet and moved for a mistrial.
The judge dismissed the jury to hear argument on the mistrial,
and so then after listening to the argument, the judge fined the
lawyer for the plaintiff twenty-five dollars for contempt of court.
The jury brought in a verdict for the plaintiff in the sum of fifty
thousand one hundred and fifty dollars. And of course the lawyer
for the defendant immediately appealed, and it came up before
the court of last resort of the state of Texas, and the court in its
opinion, and it is a rather interesting opinion to read, allowed as
how since the contempt was committed in the presence of the trial
judge, if the trial judge felt that the contempt had been purged
by a fine of twenty-five dollars, it was quite all right with them,
and they sustained the verdict.
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Another instance of an ethical problem cropped up at the
regional meeting in Spokane recently. There one of the top men
from NACA, and I will not repeat his name (he comes from the
state of California) had the temerity to get up before the regional
meeting and say that he felt that the canons of ethics should be
revised so as to permit a lawyer representing a plaintiff to support
the plaintiff on a weekly basis from the time he got the signature on
the dotted line of a power of attorney until the jury's verdict was
sustained.
/
There have been many developments in the practice of law
which indicate that the time may be ripe for a revision of the
canons, and it is hoped that when this study is completed under
the auspices of a special committee headed by Judge Philbrick
McCoy of Los Angeles, we will have the basis for an intelligent
decision as to whether modification is indicated, and if so, in what
areas, particularly with respect to Canon 35, which we are presently
referred to, which would provide for televising and photographing
of court scenes.
The third project with which the Foundation is concerned at
the moment is the annotation of the Model Corporation Code and
Model Non-Profit Corporation Act with reference to constitutional
and statutory provisions, bibliographies of texts and law review
articles, and discussion of leading cases. The study will embrace
provisions of corporation statutes in the forty-eight states and the
District of Columbia. Funds for this purpose have been raised by
the Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law from among
its members.
There are many other services being rendered by the Foundation to lawyers and to the public. Typical of these is the compilation
of state and local statutes, agreements, and statements of principles
in the field of unauthorized practice, including the preparation of a
compendium of recent complaints, answers, decrees, and opinions
in such cases. Also in preparation is a survey of judicial and administrative procedures in the various states in areas relating to
the mentally ill. The purpose of this study will be to ascertain
whether the rights of life, liberty, and property of the mentally ill
are adequately protected.
Available at the Foundation also is a duplicating service by
which any lawyer engaged in the preparation of a brief on a particular question of law can get at cost copies of any Law Review
article bearing upon the subject. Recently the Foundation has
completed a survey of all the lawyers in the country which indicates that as of the end of 1955 the lawyer population of the United
States is approximately two hundred forty-one thousand. The total
number has been divided geographically, broken down into age
groups, and in other particulars indexed, showing such communities as have an over-abundant supply of lawyers and those requiring
additional services.
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This, in brief, is our program for the ensuing year. It is a program in which, we believe, every lawyer has a vital interest. Its
effectiveness will depend in part upon the continued support and
cooperation of the more than fifteen hundred Bar associations in
the United States, and of individual practitioners. We invite that
cooperation and welcome your suggestions.
It has been a very great privilege for me to have the honor of
being with you today, and I appreciate your attention.
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SECTION PROCEEDINGS
Thursday, October 18, 1956
SECTION ON REAL ESTATE, PROBATE AND TRUST LAW
Herman Ginsburg, Esq.
Chairman
"Improvements in Conveyancing Procedure"...... Paul E. Basye, Esq.
Professor of Law, Hastings College of Law,
Burlingame, Calif.
Title Standardization Committee Report and Proposals as to
Title Standards ................................................ Walter R. Raecke, Esq.
Chairman
IMPROVEMENT OF CONVEYANCING PROCEDURE
Paul E. Basye*
Those of us who may occasionally visit a modern power plant
are inclined to look with pride upon its vast and complicated
equipment, recognizing it as the product of twentieth century technological progress. But if we look critically at one of our legal
systems with which we deal every day, we cannot with the same
pride view its machinery as having kept pace with all the developments of our age. The vital need for improvement of our conveyancing procedure is a subject that merits our reflective consideration. In our very efforts to improve the existing system,
we have discovered that there are certain features in its basic
machinery which render it unable to serve us efficiently either
today or, especially, in the years ahead. For some time now our
method of marketing land has been the subject of mounting dissatisfaction. The public increasingly reacts to its feeling that transfers of real estate are unduly complicated, too time-consuming,
and unnecessarily expensive. At one time many thoughtful persons believed that the universal adoption of the Torrens system
would furnish a solution to this problem; but after more than a
quarter of a century, it has not been widely utilized in this country.
Furthermore it is unlikely that legislatures will be inclined to
adopt such a system any time in the near future. However, since
our present system, with the increased load to which it will be
subjected in the years ahead, cannot live up to public expectations,
it is not unthinkable that some form of governmental control could
:ome to supplant this system. It is my belief, and it is the thesis
*Professor of Law. University of California, Hastings College of Law; member of California and Missouri bars; co-draftsman of Model Probate Code
and of Model Small Estates Act; former Chairman, Model Probate Code
Committee, and present Director of Real Property Division, of Section of
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, American Bar Association; coauthor with Professor Lewis M. Simes of Problems in Probate Law, Including a Model Probate Code; author of Clearing Land Titles.
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of this paper, that the needed improvement and preferred solution
is quite possible within the framework of our existing system, and
that we should do our utmost to make this possibility a reality.
All of us are aware that our method for marketing land is dependent upon two institutions: the Statute of Frauds and the recording system. The former requires written evidence of certain
transactions concerning land. The latter says that even written
transactions may be void or their benefits lost unless placed of
record. If a prospective purchaser B 'wishes to buy a piece of land
from A, he need only take a deed from him and record it. That
deed, if in proper form, will operate as an effective transfer, and
the timely recording of it will preserve for B the interest which
he received by it. But B is not interested merely in receiving from
A an instrument of conveyance. He also wishes to be sure that A
owns the interest which he purports to transfer to him. That interest is what he pays his money for. He wants to know that A is
actually transferring to him an interest in land and that by that
conveyance he will fully succeed to A's former ownership and
thereby become able to market it himself later on. He can ascertain this only by examining the recorded evidence of all transfers
up to and including the one by which A acquired title from his
predecessor. Thus the recording system serves us in two capacities:
(1) it performs a conveyancing function; and (2) it preserves.the
written evidence by which we are enabled to appraise titles.
Our present system, rooted in the American tradition, is predicated upon the assumption that a prospective purchaser can determine whether a seller has a good title by examining its history
from the public records. Actually this is not completely possible,
but the assumption is one upon which we must necessarily rely
if we are to do business at all. Exactly what is a marketable title?
Some courts have said that it is an unbroken chain of title entirely
deducible of record. Others have said that it is one which a reasonably prudent man is willing to accept. Regardless of the precise definition which we may employ for appraising marketability
of title, its functional meaning is very clear. A purchaser of land
wants a title which in all probability will not be contested and,
if contested, can be successfully defended. He also wishes to know'
that the title which he acquires will be readily accepted by a
purchaser from him if he should choose to sell the land in the future.
A title examiner is expected to give forthright answers to these
questions. If the same person examined a given title each time
a transfer took place, doubtless we could expect consistent appraisals. This is not the case, however. Each purchaser employs
his own title examiner who reexamines the same chain of title,
with the result that different examiners do not invariably entertain the same opinion with respect to the same title. Let us consider for a moment the reasons for these variations of opinion.
First, examination of titles back to a government grant is
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customary in many states. In the Eastern states this is impossible.
Even in certain Midwestern and Western states it is impossible
in certain communities, notably in Chicago and San Francisco,
where-fires or other catastrophes have destroyed the public records.
Even where actually possible, a full examination would be unnecessarily expensive and consumptive of time. It is quite common, particularly in the East, for examiners to limit their period
of search. Here again the period of search must depend upon
individual judgments, which may well differ among different
examiners. Any abbreviation of search will entail some risk, but
variations in periods of search may also give rise to different
appraisals by different examiners.
Second, appraisals of title require the making of certain presumptions. An examiner presumes that all deeds properly executed,
acknowledged, and recorded were in fact delivered. This presumption is essential to any kind of appraisal, even though it is
not conclusive. The examiner must also indulge in a presumption
as to the marital status of each grantor in the chain of title, both
in cases where one who purports to be a spouse joins in a deed
and also where the marital status of a grantor does not appear at
all. Evidence outside the record in the form of affidavits may or
may not be acceptable. Authority of corporations to execute deeds
is another illustration. The variety of situations to which different
presumptions may apply is almost endless. The age of particular
instruments may well have a bearing upon the acceptability of
various forms of evidence. Thus we see that different examiners
are likely to observe different standards in passing upon various
situations encountered in common practice.
Third, certain defects are inherent in almost every title. What
is their net effect upon the title? They may be slight or serious
or of any intermediate gradation. Whether they leave an outstanding interest in anyone will depend upon the circumstances
of the individual case and the seriousness of the defect. Whether
statutes of limitations bar the outstanding interest with certaintymay depend upon adverse possession by the owner or owners since
the occurrence which gave rise to the defect. But the fact of adverse possession cannot ordinarily be recorded. The examiner in
such a case must exercise a practical discretion or judgment based,
upon probable adverse possession and the running of the statute.
of limitations, or he must accept the statements of adverse possession contained in an affidavit, if such may be recorded underlocal law. It is not surprising that judgments of successive exam-iners do not fully correspond in every instance.
Fourth, that different examiners may hold varying opinions.
concerning marketability may seem like an anomoly to the layman.
To the lawyer, however, this does not seem so strange, although he,
may nevertheless deplore the resulting conflict. There are several
reasons for this phenomenon. Legal norms are seldom absolute-
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and inflexible. Many are phrased in terms of generality. In the
very nature of things, a title examiner is applying a general standard of marketability to specific, concrete facts. That he does not
always come out with absolute certainty of opinion should not,
upon mature consideration, astound anyone.
In exercising a judgment or discretion in each of these cases,
an examiner cannot lose sight of the fact that another examiner
will ultimately be called upon to review his work and pass judgment upon the same title at a later date. The latter may take a
dimmer view of the title, with the result that the present relation
of confidence and respect which the client of the first examiner has
for him may be impaired. The result is that examiners tend to
construe against titles, demand the correction of every conceivable
defect, and exercise a practical judgment or discretion only as a
last resort. Each appraisal of title tends to err on the side of caution
and conservatism, with the result that trivialities are magnified
and overemphasized. Thus the entire process tends to become
dominated by overabundant caution and ultra-meticulous judgments. "Unlike water, all conveyances seek the highest level" is
the picturesque way one writer describes this legal phenomenon
governing the behavior of title examiners.
From the foregoing, we can see several reasons for the present
inefficiencies in our system of land transfers throughout the nation generally. They may be enumerated as follows: (1) the increased burden of search; (2) the economic waste in repetitive
examinations; (3) the development of overmeticulous title examiners inherent in the system itself; (4) the failure of statutes of
limitations to accomplish their intended purpose; and (5) the lack
of effective legislation to redefine and promote marketability in
reasonable ways. Let us analyze each of these matters individually
and then consider specific proposals by which genuine improvements may be made in our conveyancing system.
(1) The Increased Burden of Search
As ownership of land passes from one person to another, not
only does the period of title search become greater but the number
of instruments and proceedings which constitute the chain of title
also increases. Both factors add progressively to the burden of
search; both factors increase the possibility of error resulting in
unmarketable titles. Each transfer in the chain of title tends to
make the job of the conveyancer more difficult and burdensome.
We see the recording system slowly but inevitably bogging down
of its own weight.
(2) The Economic Waste in Repetitive Examinations
Probably none of the pioneers who had a hand in originating
our recording system envisaged the monumental task that title
examiners would face after the passage of just one century of
transfers. Every time that land is bought and sold, it becomes
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the burdensome task of some examiner to trace the title back to
its origin and pass judgment anew upon each link in the chain.
How much longer can we continue to justify this practice? How
insurmountable will be the complications half a century hence,
or even a quarter of a century hence!
Our recording system from its very beginning contemplated
that a person having a permanent or long-term interest in land
should be able to preserve that interest by merely recording proper
notice of it. In addition to complete ownership, interests of this
kind include easements, leases, mortgages, and also all kinds of
future interests. Purchasers of land normally understand that they
must take subject to these outstanding interests because they appear somewhere in the record history of the title. But we must
not lose sight of the fact that their present existence can only be
determined by a search of the whole title throughout the entire
period of its history. We have previously felt that owners of
interests of this kind should be able to protect themselves by one
recording, especially if the interest is of a nonpossessory kind. Repeated examinations thus become endlessly necessary under our
existing systems.
(3)

The Overmeticulous Title Examiner
Each title examiner owes a duty to his client to advise him
truly and conscientiously as to whether he believes the title which
he intends to buy is a marketable one. On the subject of marketability an individual examiner is likely to advise the purchaser
not only as to what he believes concerning its freedom from attack
as a practical matter but also as to what a future examiner may
say concerning it.
Until a few years ago, no attempt was ever made to set up any
standards to be followed by title examiners. Gradually it was felt
that if certain standards could be laid down in advance, they could
accomplish much to dispel fears that opinions of future examiners
would be at variance with present appraisals. Knowledge as to
how others will treat certain commonly recurring problems will
increase the confidence with which present opinions can be rendered. The resulting certainty with respect to situations frequently
encountered will aid materially in eliminating picayunish objections and in promoting similar or uniform treatment by those
engaged in a common task. Thus far, real estate title standards
have been adopted in twenty-three states on a statewide basis
and in several communities elsewhere on a county or city level.
Inquiries of lawyers in these states bring unhesitating replies of
their value in promoting cooperation and support in following them.
If our conveyancing system is to be maintained at all in the years
ahead, mutual understanding and cooperation are essential.
(4)

Shortcomings of Statutes of Limitations
Many persons honestly believe that adverse possession and
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statutes of limitations will bar all old interests and ancient title
defects. Statutes of limitations were. originally intended to .be
statutes of repose, to quiet titles which had been consistently asserted by possession. Three factors, however, have become obstacles in the complete achievement of this purpose. First, statutes
of limitations do not run as against minors and other persons under
dis ability. Second, they do not apply as against the state and federal governments. Third, they do not operate as to future interests.
Merely because one person has been in possession of land for the
statutory period does not necessarily mean that he has acquired
title by prescription. The possible existence of persons under disability, of an outstanding title in some governmental unit, or of a
future interest may insulate one or more persons from the effects
of the statute and from its purpose in quieting titles.
Nebraska has some very excellent legislation applicable to
two of these traditional exceptions: (1) its Marketable Title Act
operates as to persons under disabilities whose rights arose more
than twenty-two years ago; (2) it applies to some future interests.
(5) Marketable Title Legislation
The orthodox definition of marketable title is one free of all
reasonable doubt, one which does not contain a defect, outstanding
interest, or claim which may conceivably operate to defeat or impair the owner's title. This negative concept of marketability has
become an implied invitation for courts to declare a title unmarketable if an examiner has entertained any doubt whatever in his
mind with respect to it. We have long needed to replace this negative approach by a positive one which will make marketability of
a title depend upon its condition during a recent interval of time
rather than upon absence of technical defects which may have
occurred some forty years or more ago. Not until recently has any
attempt whatever been made to revise our notion of marketability
so as to render outcast these ancient defects and irregularities insofar as marketability is concerned.
The most important single piece of legislation which has given
positive form and a modern meaning to marketability was that
adopted by Michigan in 1945, borrowed by South Dakota and Nebraska in 1947, and by North Dakota in 1951. These acts were part
of comprehensive title legislation enacted in these four states.
They were drawn to accomplish two basic functions: (1) to bar
and extinguish all claims and interests having an origin prior to a
certain date or period of time, and (2) to define the marketability
of an owner's title in terms of his record title during a specified
recent period of time. In one step they constituted drastic statutes
of limitations; in another step they created a new conception of
marketability. The acts in all four states declare that one having
an unbroken chain of title during a certain recent period of time
and being in possession of land shall be deemed to have a marketable
title of record. One very good feature of some of these acts is the
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provision that the fact of possession of property may be shown by
affidavit. We can thus see some far-reaching efforts toward promoting effective marketable title legislation.
Methods of Improving Our Conveyancing System
It is possible to point to numerous but isolated improvements
in our conveyancing system, but much more must be done on a
broader scale if it is to survive. It is my sincere belief that there
can be a genuine modernization of our conveyancing system to
make it function according to twentieth century standards. Casting
aside this foundation of our existing system and starting over
again at this time is almost unthinkable. Our present system can
be made to satisfy public needs, and it is here that we should focus
our greatest attention. Thoroughgoing improvements and revisions
are not only possible but have even attained a substantial measure
of reality in a few states. Steps already taken in certain communities throughout the country are sufficiently beyond the experimental stage to convince the thoughtful observer that our recording
system can be genuinely -overhauled to serve present-day needs
adequately and efficiently. If this is the realistic solution to our
problem, what are the avenues of approach?
In the light of our American experience in transferring ownership or real property, it is very clear that there are four essentials
which an efficient conveyancing system should include: (1) It
should enable an owner of land to make prima facie proof of his
title readily by reference to the public records; (2) it should constantly facilitate the correction and automatic cure of outstanding
defects which arise out of errors and mistakes of conveyancing;
(3) it should eliminate the necessity for repeated examinations of
titles all the way back to their inception; and (4) it should declare
and define marketability of title in such a way as to make it
reasonably simple of application. Specifically, what can be done
to accomplish these objectives most effectively?
(1) Some simple device is needed to preserve testimony which
can be used to explain apparent defects or irregularities. Evidence
as to the identification of parties, marital status, descent, heirship,
family history, and the like should everywhere be made available
in the form of affidavits or recitals in deeds without the necessity
for cumbersome procedure of an action to quiet title. That dangers
and risks are involved in placing reliance upon recitals in deeds
and statements in affidavits is not to be denied. They can, however, be minimized. Further efforts in this direction call for encouragement.
(2) There is great need to facilitate the correction and elimination of outstanding defects and claims which are not real or
substantial. Defective acknowledgments, the lack of a corporate
seal, or a failure to recite the marital status of a grantor in a deed
are typical examples. Curative acts have proved effective to re-
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move such defects. In some instances these acts could be made
more comprehensive and also made progressively effective after
the passage of some specific short period of time. Their periodical
reenactment would then be unnecessary.
(3) If we are to eliminate the necessity of the customary title
search all the way back to a government patent or some other
origin, several kinds of legislative action will be necessary. Most
of these proposals are not new-they are already in existence in
many states.
First, statutes of limitation should be made to extinguish absolutely ancient interests, after some fixed period of time, not
merely bar their enforcement. To do this they must be made to
apply to minors and persons under disability also, with some additional period of time, if thought necessary to satisfy local policy.
More than half the states have already passed legislation limiting
protection to the legally disabled beyond stated periods in gross
ranging up to thirty years. This method of quieting titles and promoting land marketability reduces hardship far more than it
creates hardship. Actual losses should be very rare indeed, for
provisions are universal for the appointment of guardians who can
act to protect the interests of legally disabled persons. Nebraska
has such a provision in its Marketable Title Act.
Second, statutes of limitations must be made to apply even to
the state and lesser units of government. A few states have already taken the initial step in this direction, notably in their Marketable Title Acts.
The problem of nonpossessory interests requires special consideration. One reason for prolonged and repetitive title searches
is the indefinite duration of certain interests in land which, because of their nonpossessory character, are unaffected by traditional
statutes of limitations. Once recorded, we have notice of them
forever or until they expire by their own terms. The nature and
social utility of these interests are so varied, however, that we must
consider each of them separately.
In the first 'category are such interests as judgments and mechanics' liens. They have always been understood to have a duration limited to a very short period in gross. In the same category
should be placed tax liens, interests arising from notices of lis
pendens, recorded contracts of sale, option contracts, and simple
notices of claimed interests.
Mortgages and deeds of trust may justify separate treatment.
Nevertheless, an unreleased ancient mortgage should not be permitted to impair marketability forever. The recent tendency for
persons to finance their purchase of property by means of longterm mortgages is economically and socially desirable. Mortgages
extending beyond twenty years would be exceptional. It would
appear not to be unduly burdensome to require mortgagees to re-
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record notice of their mortgages after twenty years to give them
validity for a longer time.
Easements and profits also are socially useful. They may be
-Nf indefinite duration and therefore require extended search to
ascertain their existence. Easements such as roads, streets, and
utility rights of way present little or no problem, since the use
authorized by each of them is visible and constitutes notice of a
claim of right. Other types may not be apparent and so may justify
a requirement of periodical rerecording.
Long-term leases are another example. Generally they could
not present serious problems. The tenant in possession would be
estopped in his claim of ownership by his payment of rent. His
occupancy would be notice to third parties. Here also rerecording
could be required to insure legal notice for the protection of either
lessors or lessees.
Rights of entry, possibilities of reverter, and covenants restricting the use of lafd form another category. None of these
interests are estates, and none are affected by the rule against
perpetuities. They are not affected by adverse possession prior to
breach, and they may be of indefinite duration. If title searches
are to be kept within reasonable limits, some restrictions must be
imposed upon these interests. Two solutions are available here.
One is to limit the duration of these interests to a period not exceeding the period of record search. This can be and has been done,
though it has been recently held by the Supreme Court of Florida
not to be valid when given a retroactive effect. Another method
of attack is to require rerecording as a condition for their continued
existence. This is done by some of the Marketable Title Acts.
Rights arising out of the marital relationship form still another category. These include dower, curtesy, homestead, and conimunity rights. These rights may be partially justified by the policies supporting them, but in their present form they may continue
for a full generation without being subject to statutes of limitation.
A simple solution here is to require a nonjoining spouse to record,
and to rerecord if necessary, notice of his or her claim to land
transferred by the other spouse alone. This has been done in a
small group of states already.
The last and probably most difficult problem is that produced
by conventional future interests, such as remainders and reversions.
Since the former are nonpossessory, they could continue for the
greater part of a generation, far beyond the period of reasonable
record search, and thereby prevent the realization of our objective.
One possible solution would be to require periodical rerecordings
as is done in the Marketable Title Acts. It has been objected that
this is not entirely satisfactory because undue hardship may be
imposed upon those in whom the interests may ultimately vest,
if contingent interests are involved. If unborn persons are in-
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volved, a doubt exists in the minds of some as to the constitutionality of such a requirement. It is generally believed, however, that
this legislation satisfies the requirement of due process if someone
may record notices on behalf of unknown or unascertained persons.
(4) Legislation should declare and define marketable title
in a way which will make for reasonably simple application and
the elimination of each purchaser's having to make an independent
examination all the way back to the beginning. The Marketable
Title Acts generally may be said to accomplish this most effectively.
The requirements outlined are essential to preserve our existing conveyancing system. They are minimum requirements. None
of their lines of action is entirely novel or untried. Each of the
four methods in whole or in part has already been put into effect
by more than one state, in some instances by many states.
This program cannot be realized automatwially. In the first
place, local Bar Association sections or committees empowered to
deal with such problems as these must be organized wherever they
do not presently exist. Two tasks will require intelligent understanding and execution by these local Bar Association committees.
First, there is need for improvement of conveyancing practices on
a local level and on the basis of existing law. This means, first,
a study of the over-all task of revising legislation to accomplish
as nearly as possible the objectives which have been enumerated.
Second, there must be adoption and constant revision and extension of real estate title standards.
Within the framework of the recording system, the limits
within which individual discretion must operate in the treatment
of specific title problems loom quite large as a factor in the total
effort involved in appraising marketability. Title standards having
official sanction constitute a group point of view which can become
a welcome guide to an individual examiner, for he knows that it
has the backing of group consideration and that a subsequent
examiner may be expected to take the point of view expressed in
those same title standards. On doubtful questions and on problems
which have not been thoroughly considered by the Bar generally
in the light of local decisions, title standards have already become
a tremendous force for uniformity, common understanding, and
a more liberal attitude in applying general rules to specific problems.
Since title standards can perform much useful service in appraising titles, what subject matter do they embody? What is
their coverage? Surveys of standards thus far adopted indicate
at least five areas of application. First, several states have a general standard suggesting attitudes and relationships between examiners and between examiners and the public. For example, the
first standard in Iowa is in the form of a question: "What should
be the attitude of the attorney in examining abstracts of title as
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to the making of objections and requirements?" The standard
reads: "Objections and requirements should be made only when
the irregularities or defects actually impair the title or reasonably can be expected to expose the purchaser or lender to the
hazard of adverse claims or litigation. Many attorneys are overcritical in examining titles and appear to have in mind the making
of every possible objection and requirement. The Committee recommends a more realistic attitude with respect to title defects."
Then follows this comment: "Although the following Standards
have'been in operation for more than ten years, it is still found
necessary to remind attorneys that the system of land conveyancing
by the 'Abstract-Attorney' method is under increasing criticism.
Business interests and persons engaged in real estate transactions
maintain that the expense and delay caused by technical objections
to title requires that some better system be developed. The Committee has made exhaustive studies of the systems of Registered
Titles and Title Insurance, and is convinced that for land transactions in Iowa, the present system is the best, but that better abstracting and more competent Title Examiners are urgently needed
if our system is to continue satisfactorily to serve the public."
Mention has already been made of the part which individual judgment plays in appraising titles. Similar standards of several states
recommend that "When an examiner finds a situation which he
believes creates a question as to marketable title and has knowledge
that another attorney handled the questionable proceeding or has
passed the title as marketable, the examining attorney, before writing an opinion, should communicate, if feasible, with the other
attorney and afford an opportunity for discussion." These recommendations, if followed both in letter and in spirit, can accomplish
much to promote desirable objectives.
A second purpose of title standards concerns a common agreement as to the duration of search. This type of standard has been
adopted in only a few states, notably in those where searches
back to the government are impractical. To make this standard
genuinely effective, there should be some investigation as to the
existence of matters in the history of local titles which would warrant the limitation of search. Generally instruments and other
items which have created future interests or claims which would
extend back of the suggested period of search are known to the
local Bar. Hence this kind of standard usually functions satisfactorily as a practical matter.
A third function of title standards is to declare the effect of
the lapse of time upon formal defects. Certainly an unwitnessed or
defectively acknowledged deed ought not to impair the title indefinitely. Marketability of land is much more important to society than maintenance of an assumed needed protection to a
grantor who has failed or forgotten to observe every minutia of
2onveyancing, especially when his deed has unquestionably dis-
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closed his intention. A very large number of title standards have
concerned themselves with matters of this kind and with highly
beneficial results.
A fourth purpose of title standards is to indicate the presumptions of fact which should ordinarily be applied by examiners.
What presumption shall be applied to the marital status of a
grantor who executed a deed sixty years ago without disclosing
it in the deed? What presumption shall be applied to a corporation
deed executed ten years ago as to authority of its officers to execute
it? These and numerous other presumptions comprise subject matter in many title standards.
Fifth and finally, title standards have reviewed and declared
the law applicable to commonly recurring situations. In many
instances, examiners have given opinions without consulting their
own statutes or decisions and cast the burden upon the seller to
satisfy him on a point of law of which he is not certain. In other
cases, local law has been uncertain. Recent decisions, legislation,
or comprehensive analyses have sometimes clarified a previously
existing doubt. When this has been true, title standards have properly called these matters to the attention of examiners.
It should not be concluded that title standards alone can be
the means of revitalizing our conveyancing system. They have an
important but limited utility. Except in Nebraska, they are not
law and have no binding force or effect. Nevertheless they have
had a salutary effect upon appellate court decisions in several
instances. There is also a danger that focusing attention upon
title standards alone may lead us to overlook the need for broad
statutory reform in certain areas of property law which are most
essential to the preservation of our conveyancing system. So far
the awareness of our need for legislative reform has been most apparent in the same states which have progressed furthest in the
development of title standards. It is well to remember that legislation and title standards are both necessary concomitants of a successful program to preserve our conveyancing system from disintegration.
If this program is to succeed, cooperation and support of local
committees and the legal profession generally is extremely important, for their leadership and support in obtaining adoption
by their legislature will be most essential in bringing about the
improvements which are urgently needed by the public and the
title profession generally. The values to be derived from a streamlined conveyancing procedure are clearly understood; but a specific program should be forthcoming within a relatively short time.
The goal is large, but its successful achievement is vital to the
public welfare generally; and it is unlikely that we overestimate
the benefits to be derived from a comprehensive and carefully
planned program.
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The Section received and discussed the Report of the Standardization Committee. The following amended report was unanimously adopted as the action of the Section:
REPORT OF STANDARDIZATION COMMITTEE OF THE
REAL ESTATE, PROBATE, AND TRUST SECTION OF THE
NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
Since the annual meeting of the Nebraska State Bar Association last October, the Title Standardization Committee has actively
pursued its work. There have been several meetings of the committee as a whole, a number of sub-committee meetings and considerable work by correspondence. Some of the members of the
committee actively participated in the presentation of an Institute
on Real Estate Titles at Grand Island on June 7, 1956, and at Scottsbluff on June 9, 1956. These institutes were well attended, created
a great deal of interest in title matters, and were actively participated in by a large number of those attending.
The committee has carefully reexamined all of the existing
Title Standards and has considered a number of proposed new
standards and considered and discussed quite a number of questions which have been submitted to it with a view to the adoption of additional standards.
There is still a difference of opinion among the members of
the Bar as well as among the members of our committee as to the
wisdom of having caused some of the standards previously adopted
to be enacted into law. It is the opinion of the committee that
new standards which may be adopted, which are not existing
statutory standards, should not be enacted into law. However, it
is also the opinion of the committee that the statutory standards
should not be repealed unless they have become obsolete.
We now submit herewith the following recommendations:
I.
That the existing Title Examination Standards numbered 1 to
47 inclusive, with the exception of Standards 11 and 20, be approved as previously adopted, with certain changes to be made in
the comments to some Standards as hereinafter provided.
II.
Standard No. 1-That the last paragraph of the comment under
Standard No. 1 be revised to read as follows:
That the principle back of the rule or Standard is that reasonable certainty of identity of parties is all that can be required.
III.
Standard No. 2-That the following sentence be added to the
comment on Standard No. 2, to wit:
The use of any other standard abbreviation for words indicating
incorporated status should not require any record proof of identity.
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IV.
Standard No. 11-That Standard No. 11 should be amended
by deleting the words "or release of mortgage."
V.
That a new Standard be adopted to read as follows:
A release of mortgage, mechanics lien, judgment lien, or other
encumbrances executed on behalf of a corporation by the President,
Vice-President or an Assistant Vice-President of the corporation
under corporate seal should be passed without calling for any showing as to the authority of the officer acting for the corporation.

VI.
That a new Standard be adopted to read as follows:
A deed of conveyance to real estate ex-ecuted on behalf of a
corporation under corporate seal by its President should be passed
without calling for any showing as to the authority of the officer
to act for the corporation, unless statutes authorizing the incorporation of the particular type of corporation specifically require prior
approval by the Board of Directors or other governing body before
any conveyance of real estate can be effective.
VII.
Standard No. 20-That Standard No. 20 be amended to read
as follows:
Where no execution has issued on a judgment for five years,
other than a judgment for child support alone, or alimony alone, or
a judgment for child support which is accompanied by a judgment
allowing alimony, or a decree of foreclosure, the judgment ceases
to be a lien and should not be treated as a defect of title.
Comment: See R. S. 1943, Sec. 25-1515; Rich v. Cooper, 136 Neb.
463, 386 N. W. 383; Nowka v. Nowka, 157 Neb. 57, 58 N.W. (2d) 600;
Lippincott v. Lippincott, 152 Neb. 374, 41 N. W. (2d) 232.
Of course the judgment may be revived within ten years under
R. S. 1943, Sec. 25-1420, but the lien of the revived judgment commences only from the date of the order of revivor, Glissmann v.
Happy Hollow Club, 132 Neb. 223, 271 N. W. 431. Thus the abstracter should certify that any dormant judgments appearing on the
records have not been revived.
This Standard has no application to decrees of a foreclosure.
St. Paul Harvester Works v. Hackfeldt, 96 Neb. 552, 148 N. W.

153.
VIII.
That a new Standard be adopted to read as follows:
Foreclosure-No Order of Sale on Decree-Where no order of
sale has issued on a decree for foreclosure of real estate taxes within ten years- from the date of the decree, or within one year from
April 14, 1953, whichever event is later in point of time, the decree
ceases to be a lien and should not be treated as a defect of title.
Comment: Cum. Supp. 1953, Sec. 77-1911. There is no limitation of lien of a decree of foreclosure other than a decree for foreclosure of real estate taxes.
IX.
Standard No. 23-That the first paragraph of the comment on
Standard No. 23 be amended to read as follows:
As used in this standard, the term "conveyance" includes mort-
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gages, leases of land for more than a year, oil, gas or other mineral
leases, and assignments and releases thereof.
That the following two paragraphs be added to the comment on
Standard No. 23:
Real estate includes land, tenements and hereditaments, and
embraces all chattels real except for leases for a term not exceeding
one year. Section 76-201, R.R.S. 1943. It includes "mines, minerals,
quarries, mineral springs and wells, or oil and gas rights, and privileges pertaining thereto." Section 77-103, R.R.S. 1943. An interest
in minerals is an interest in real estate. Fawn Lake Ranch Co. v.
Cumbow, 102 Neb. 288, 167 N.W. 75. The term "deed" embraces
every instrument in writing by which any real estate or interest
therein is created, aliened, mortgaged or assigned, or by which the
title to any real estate may be affected in law or equity, except last
wills and leases for one year or for a less time. It therefore appears
that execution of an oil and gas lease, an assignmentor release thereof must be joined in by the spouse of the owner of the interest being
leased, assigned or released, in the absence of nonresidence. The
same proofs as to nonresidence, and requirements in the case of nonresidence apply, however, as to any conveyances affecting oil, gas
or other mineral interests, and other leases of land for a term exceeding one year as in the case of other conveyances of real estate.
The word "wife" as used in the standard should be treated as
interchangeable with the word "spouse."

X.
Standard No. 26-That Standard No. 26 be referred to the
Legislative Committee of this Section to review and to attempt to
prepare an appropriate curative act to make the items therein considered progressive in dates and that such curative act be submitted
to the Legislature for enactment.

XI.
Standard No. 28-That the .following paragraph be added to
the comment on Standard No. 28, to wit:
Section 25-202, R.R.S. 1943, establishes a period of limitation for
action upon a cause of action for foreclosure. Section 76-239, R.R.S.
1943, provides a notice s~ction for the benefit of subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value. It should be noted that it is
possible to have varying periods of time within which a mortgagee
may bring an action for foreclosure as against a mortgagor, upon
the actual accrual of a cause of action, and the period of time within which the record of a mortgage constitutes notices as to subsequent encumbrancers and purchasers for value. The effect of Sections 25-202 and 76-239 is to accomplish this result. Providing a
specified period of time within which record of a mortgage, where
no maturity date is stated in or ascertainable from the mortgage,
may be deemed notice of its currency, will assist in providing certainty of titles and in simplifying conveyancing.
XII.
That Section 25-202, R. S. 1943, be referred to the Legislative
Committee of the Nebraska State Bar Association for review and
to consider an amendment by which the period of time within
which a cause of action for the foreclosure of a mortgage shall be
deemed to have accrued if no date for any maturity be stated
therein or ascertainable therefrom, from the existing twenty years
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from the date of the mortgage to a term not to exceed ten years
from the date of the mortgage for the -assertion of a cause of action
as against subsequent purchasers and encumbrancers for value.
This would assist certainty of titles and eliminate the discrepancies
between Section 25-202 and Section 76-239.
XIII.
Standard No. 29-That the comment on Standard No. 29 be
amended by striking therefrom the following sentence:
No competent abstracter would omit items showing probate records
involving the land, and no competent attorney would pass the
title without an examination of such records.
That there be added to the comment on Standard No. 29 the
following paragraph:
Likewise,

Section 38-902, R.R.S. 1943, provides for recording

a certified copy of the order of appointment of a conservator in the
office of the Register of Deeds of each county in the State of Nebraska in which the person for whom the conservator is appointed
is possessed of real estate. Such recording in the county in which
the conservator proceedings have been had should not be required,
as the original order is filed in the probate court, and recordation
of the order of appointment in the journal of the probate court
operates as constructive notice, upon the same analysis as in the
case of recording as to copies of wills, certified copies of decrees
of distribution.
XIV.
That a new Standard and comment thereon be adopted as follows:
Grantees-Relationship and Identification-The failure to identify or state the relationship of plural grantees in a conveyance is

not a title defect if such identity or relationship is otherwise satis-

factorily established from subsequently recorded instruments or af-

fidavits in the chain of title.
Comment: The most usual example is found in the case where
John Doe and Mary Doe take title, and, in a subsequent conveyance
in which they are grantors, they are identified as then being hus-

band and wife. In the absence of record evidence to the contrary,
the title examiner is entitled to presume that the grantees in the
first conveyance are identically the same persons as the grantors
in the second conveyance and it is not necessary to furnish an affidavit that at the date of the first conveyance the grantees were then

husband and wife. The principle here is the same as that involved
in the comment to Standard No. 1.
XV.
That a new Standard and comment thereon be adopted as follows:
Marketable Title Act - Quitclaim Deed - An unbroken chain of
title, within the meaning of the Marketable Title Act, may originate
in a quitclaim deed.
Comment: A quitclaim deed is a "conveyance or other title
transaction" which "purports" to create an interest in the grantee
within the contemplation of Sec. 76-289 R.R.S. Neb. 1943. While
originally quitclaim deeds were used to release the interest or claim
of the grantor to one who already had an interest in the land, in
modern times they are commonly used as primary conveyances to
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a stranger to the title. See, H. H. Foster, "Covenants for Title,"
1 Neb. Law Bul., No. 1, P. 50. A quitclaim deed has been held to
be a "conveyance" protected by our recording acts. Schott v. Dosh,
49 Neb. 187, 68 N.W. 346; Bannard v. Duncan, 79 Neb. 189, 112
N.W. 353. See also: 16 Am. Jur. 447, 627, 628; 45 Am. Jur. 518;
44 A.L.R. 1266; 162 A.L.R. 556.
XVI.
That the following proposed new Standard and comment thereon be presented to the Real Estate, Probate and Trust Section of
the Nebraska State Bar Association for discussion and consideration, but without recommendation by the Title Standardization
Committee, to wit:
Certificate as to County Court Records-It shall be proper for
a title examiner to require the certificate of the abstracter to reveal
a search of the records of the County Court of the county in which
the real estate is situated for any proceedings the nature of which
may affect the title to real estate.
Although the county court does not have jurisComment:
diction in civil actions in which title to real estate, or mortgages
or contracts relating thereto are involved (Section 16, Article V,
Constitution of Nebraska; Section 24-502, R.R.S. 1943), it does
have exclusive jurisdiction of the probate of wills, administration
of estates of deceased persons, and guardianship of minors, insane
persons and idiots. (Constitution, Section 16, Article V; Section
24-503, R.R.S. 1943). The county court has jurisdiction to determine the facts, upon which some question of title to real estate may
be dependent, although it does not have jurisdiction over question
of perfecting title to real estate itself. Fischer v. Sklenar, 101 Neb.
553, 163 N.W. 861. For example, the county court can determine the
fact of the validity of a will and the fact of heirship. The title
to real estate is not through the determination of the county court,
hut pursuant to the will or pursuant to the statutes of descent and
distribution. The county court determines the facts upon which
the will and the statutes operate.
Therefore, proceedings in county court for the administration
of estates of deceased persons, probate of wills, and guardianship
of minors, insane persons and idiots, as well as for conservatorship, may determine facts which facts may affect title to real estate.
The only statutory provisions for recording of probate records in the
office of the Register of Deeds are those for the filing of attested
copies of wills and certified copies of decree of distribution in
probate estate, and the filing of an order for appointment of a
conservator. Cf Standard No. 29.
In addition, the county court has jurisdiction to determine inheritance tax, which proceeding may affect the determination of
the existence of a lien upon real estate for inheritance tax. Section
77-2018.01-2018.03. R.R.S. 1943, as amended. There is no statutory provision requiring recording of any of the papers affecting
determination of inheritance tax, excepting a permissive section
authorizing issuance of a receipt from the County Treasurer
which designates on what real property, if any, of which deceased
may have died seized, tax has been paid, and by whom paid, and
whether or not it is in full of said tax, and the recording of the receipt in the Clerk's office of the county. Section 77-2036, R.R.S.
1943.
The title examiner is not justified in demanding more recording
upon the real estate records than the statutes provide. Cf Standard
No. 29.
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XVII.
That the following proposed new Standard and comment
thereon be presented to the Real Estate, Probate and Trust Section
of the Nebraska State Bar Association for discussion and congideration, but without recommendation by the Title Standardization
Committee, to wit:
Unreleased Forfeited Oil and Gas Leases-Where the positive
affidavit of the record owners of the mineral interests in real estate
stating that the delay rentals under an outstanding oil and gas lease
have not been paid and that there has been no development on the
land in accordance with the terms of said lease together with an
affidavit of an executive officer of the depository bank named in
said lease of the nonpayment of said rentals is shown on the abstract, the title examiner is not justified in requiring that proceedings under Chapter 57-202 through 57-204 for the cancellation of
said lease be conducted.
Comment: Your committee believes that it is not necessary to
follow the statutory provisions to eliminate the outstanding oil and
gas lease on making the above showing. A purchaser or encumbrancer for value always acquires property with notice of possessory
rights therein. Ordinary inquiry into these possessory rights should
reveal performance of oil, gas or other mineral lease requirements
as to drilling and operations to keep a lease effective. This investigation coupled with an affidavit of non-performance executed by
the depository bank and by the owner of record of the lands should
be sufficient to establish forfeiture of the lease where there have
been no operations sufficient to continue the lease and the lessee has
defaulted in delay rental payments, thereby forfeiting the lease.
XVIII.
That upon the adoption by the Real Estate, Probate, and Trust
Law Section of any amendments to existing statutory Standards,
the necessary bills be presented to the Legislature for the purpose of
enacting such amendments into law.
XIX.
That the Standards and Comments as approved by the Section
be printed in permanent form, bound in the form of desk book for
lawyers, preferably with a loose-leaf binding, and kept up to date
as Standards or Comments may be amended or revised, or additional Standards and Comments adopted, and with current anno-

tations.
XX.
That the Title Standardization Committee be continued to carry
on the work of reviewing, revising, and preparing Standards and
assisting in the interpretation of title questions, as the development
of statutory or case law may from time to time require.
XXI.
That the Legislative Committee of this Section be requested to
consider the preparation of a bill for presentation to the Legislature
which would provide that where all or part of an adjoining street,
avenue, or alley has been duly vacated with the result under thenapplicable statutes that all or a portion of such vacated way re-
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verted to the owner of the adjoining platted lot, and where a deed
or deeds covering such platted lot have been of record more than
ten years, and where there has been filed of record no instrument
purporting to establish a contrary intent, then when all of the
foregoing three conditions are met, the deed or deeds to the platted
lot without mention of the vacated way shall be irrevocably deemed
to constitute a conveyance of the platted lot together with the reverted vacated way.

XXlI.
That a new Standard and comment thereon be adopted as follows:
Failure to Determine Heirs: When Not Objectionable-In proceedings for the probate of a will, where there has been no determination of the heirs of the deceased testator, if an affidavit appears
of record showing that no child was born to the deceased testator
after the making of the will, or such fact can be determined from
the pleadings in the proceedings for the probate of the will of the
deceased testator and other instruments of record, no determination
of heirship with respect to the deceased testator need be required.
Comment: Under Section 30-225 R.R.S. 1943, it is essential in
each case of probate of a will to determine whether or not any children were born after the making of the will, unless the requirements of that section are otherwise met within the will. See Gillespie v. Truka, 104 Neb. 115, 175 N.W. 883; C B & Q R. Co. v. Wasserman, 22 F 872. In many cases, however, the proceedings for the probate of the will do not disclose whether or not there was any after
born child. In many proceedings for probate of wills, particularly
in years gone by, there has been no determination of heirship.
Determination of the necessary facts appears essential in the
examination of title to real estate. Where, however, there has been
no determination of heirship, but the essential facts can be established through affidavit together with probate and other records
appearing within the chain of title, no further showing that there
were no after born children should be required.
If this fact cannot be established through affidavit and other
records, proceedings for determination of heirship under Sections
30-1709 et seq. would appear proper where there has been probate
of a will, but no determination of heirship.
Respectfully submitted
Walter R. Raecke, Chairman
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LOWELL C. DAVIS: The meeting will come to order. This is
the meeting of the Section on Practice and Procedure.
I am deeply grateful, as chairman of this section, and I am sure
that you will all be after you have heard this program, to the individual members of the Executive Committee of the Section. They
are C. Russell Mattson of Lincoln, Raymond E. McGrath of Omaha,
Fred Deutsch of Norfolk, Bob Hamer of Omaha, and George Healey
of Lincoln, all of whom have worked hard in getting this program
arranged for your enjoyment.
Now, since this program is of necessity quite lengthy, and in
order to permit the fullest coverage possible of the subjects which
will be presented, we will have no program intermission. At the
end of the first part of the program, you will be requested by voice
vote to elect two new members of the Executive Committee. The
following names have been placed in nomination by the Executive
Committee. Lester Danielson of Scottsbluff, Milton, Murphy of
North Platte, Jack Devoe of Lincoln, and Lowell Davis of Sidney.
At this time I wish to present Ray McGrath of the Omaha Bar,
who will introduce the first speaker on the program.
RAYMOND McGRATH: Mr. Chairman and fellow lawyers.
Our speaker is Charles C. Scott of Kansas City, Missouri. He is a
document specialist, an attorney, a law teacher, and a legal author.
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Mr. Scott is the leading authority today on the use of photographs as evidence in courts of law. He is not just a theoretical
expert but a practical man as well, for he himself makes daily use
of pictures in connection with his work as an examiner of questioned
documents. Using large photographic exhibits to illustrate the
reasons for his opinions, Mr. Scott testifies in courts all over the
nation as an expert on the identification of handwriting and typewriting and the detection of forgery. He is one of the very few
nationally acknowledged experts in this fascinating field. Always
interested in photography and an experienced photographer himself, while in law school Mr. Scott noticed that lawyers were not
making sufficient use of photographs as evidence, and often were
unable to determine whether or not a picture was a good reproduction of its subject.
irf. Scott decided that something should be done, and he wrote
many law articles on the subject and gradually developed an extensive knowledge of the why's and wherefore's of photographic
evidence.
In 1942 the Vernon Law Book Company and the West Publishing Company published Mr. Scott's monumental work Photographic
Evidence, a large textbook, moulded from the white heat of experience; the book soon became a standard work on the subject.
Mr. Scott was born in Kansas City, Missouri, on the first of
September, 1911. His father was a native of Tennessee and his
mother of Kentucky. He was graduated from the University of
Kansas City Law School in 1935, and admitted to the Bar in Missouri and the federal courts in that same year.
Mr. Scott was in the Navy in World War I, and he spent over
sixteen months in the Pacific. He is a member of the American
Bar Association, Missouri Bar, Lawyers Association of Kansas City,
and the Kansas City Bar Association. For several years he has
been serving on the Advanced Legal Education Committee of the
Missouri Bar.
It is my genuine pleasure to present to you our very distinguished guest speaker.
CHARLES C. SCOTT: Thank you very much, Mr. McGrath.
Ladies and gentlemen of the Nebraska Bar. First a word about
how we will proceed here during this period, and in order to explain that, just one story.
Old Pat was about to die and his dear wife Mary was sitting
by his bedside. She said, "Well now, Pat, is there anything you
would like to have eat before you die?"
Pat thought for a minute, and he said-he was too weak to talk
-but he said, "Well, Mary, if you don't mind I'd like to have a slice
of that fine Virginia ham that you've got cooking out in the kit-chen."
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"Oh, no you don't, Pat, that's for the wake."
Well, that's the way I begin my introduction about this ap,paratus, that is, after I have become a little acquainted with you.
'Giving an illustrated lecture is about the hardest thing that a man
can attempt to do, because afterwards nobody even knows what
you look like.
So I try to talk for a few minutes extemporaneously before
'urning out the lights, so you can see me and I can see you.
We will discuss many types of photographs during this period
and try to demonstrate how they can be used effectively in lawsuits, and also how you can sometimes detect photographs that are
not as accurate as they should be.
I do not know whether you have thought of it or not, but
photography is actually a type of language, as language is a sign
of an idea, or signs of ideas compose languages. Language started
out originally as pictographs, and then of course in time the alphabet was developed, originally a sort of a picture alphabet, and then
it eventually became very much in the nature of symbols.
Since the invention of photography, there has been a trend in
the other direction, and people today, your jurors, your judges,
the triers of fact, are pictorially minded as they never were before.
The sight of a little seven-year-old boy sitting in front of a
television screen one foot away with his eyes glued to the picture
is the sign of the times. People do not want to listen, they want
to look; and that is just as true in court as it is in any group that
you will meet.
Now a lawyer has three types of language to reach the trier of
fact; he has the written word, he has the spoken word, and he has
the picture, a third type of language. The written word he has, of
course, largely in the sense of documentary evidence. In some jurisdictions it may be instructions. The spoken word is the testimony
of the witnesses and the arguments of counsel, and in some jurisdictions the instructions of the court.
And then the third and the most important type of language,
in my opinion, often may be the picture, because a picture smashes
an image into the brain that cannot be retouched or altered, and
will remain with the jury or the trier of the fact throughout the
remainder of the trial. Today photography is important; tomorrow
it will be essential.
Now our courts often refer to photographs as silent witnesses.
Your Nebraska supreme court has actually referred to photographs
in that language-silent witnesses, virtually personifying them.
And why is this done? Because in many instances we think
of a photograph as itself testifying. Of course we know the rule of
law that a photograph must have its testimonial sponsor, as Dean
Wigmore said many years ago, that there must be some human wit-
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ness who can speak for its accuracy. But there is a tendency to
accept every photograph as absolutely accurate and to think of
photographs as silent witnesses.
Now we are not dealing in the main today with showing fake
photographs. Photographs are easily faked, but fake photographs
are easily detected. And this silent witness, like the human witness, usually is not a downright perjurer. It is relatively rare that
we are dealing with that in human witnesses, and so it is with the
photograph.
But like a human witness, I would like to have you bear in
mind, a photograph may well, shall we say, just try to do a little
better for the side of the case for which it is presented than the
facts warrant. In other words, like a human witness, a photograph
may exaggerate, it may minimize, it may leave things out, it may
add things to, it may turn things around, right to left. And in a
few rare instances it may constitute an optical illusion, that is, it
may have illusions just as a human witness may have illusions.
Now all through this presentation, especially this first part
which deals largely with traffic accident scenes but covers other
types of general photography, we will be noticing those things, the
things that a photograph can do, just as a witness can do, that it
can exaggerate, that it can minimize, that it can leave things out,
that it can add things to, that it can turn things around, and that
it can constitute on optical illusion.
Well, so much for the introduction, now for the demonstration.
(Showing of movie film during the remainder of this talk.)
CHARLES C. SCOTT: A picture may be an optical illusion, as
I have said. This is an extreme example of that which we sometimes run into even with photographs. This is a picture that may be
seen either as a very old woman or as a very young lady, depending
upon what catches your eye the first time.
If you see it as a young lady, she is almost turned around, and
just the tip of her nose and her eyelash show, and her ear is right
here, and she has a band around her neck.
If you see it as an old woman, she has a very large nose, and
what was a band around the young lady's neck is her mouth; she
has a shawl over her head. That's an extreme example of the optical illusion.
This is the illusion of the face, or the facing silhouette. Not quite
as spectacular as the last one, but you can see that you can either
look at that as a face of some kind or you can see two profiles in
a silhouette, depending on how you look at it.
You also have in photographs the illusion of misstatement of
size. B and C are actually exactly the same size, but because B is
adjacent to a much larger circle, it appears to be much larger than
C. That is a very common illusion, even in photography.
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This is another illusion, the illusion of the concentric circles.
Actually that looks like a spiral to anyone, but it is composed of
concentric circles, and no matter where you start, you'll always end
up the same place, showing that we cannot always believe what we
see with our eyes. There's no war to get to the middle of it. The
camera and the human eye are often compared, and possibly that is
the reason why we have the term "the silent witness." Like the
human eye, the camera has a lens, and it forms an inverted image
at the rear of the instrument, just as the camera forms an inverted
image on the film. And like the human eye, the camera lens is
never absolutely perfect, but usually it can be corrected to a degree
impossible with the human vision.
Like the human eye, the camera lens has a diaphragm which
expands and contracts as the operator chooses, and it serves somewhat the same purpose as the diaphragm in a human eye. So there
are reasons for comparison.
The camera lens has several defects; we will not refer to them
at length, but merely mention that they exist. A good camera lens,
the type that should be used in preparing photographic evidence
whenever possible, will have these defects reduced to what the
manufacturers says is the irreducible minimum. Usually those
lenses are called anastigments, and it is the type of lens that should
be used in legal photography.
If a cheap box camera lens is used to make a picture, the result will be a picture, but it will not be accurate. For instance, this
is a document photographed under perfectly ruled glass squares,
but with the cheap box camera lens that was used, there was what
we call "barrelled distortion" at the edges, and there is a falling
off of illumination at the edges, and a loss of definition.
The anastigment lens gives an image that is rectilineir, that is,
sharp all over, and shows no falling off of illumination at the edges
of the field. At the top is your box camera picture, and at the
bottom is the picture made with your good corrected lens.
I would say that a box camera, of course, should never be used
in any type of legal photograph. It should only be used for such
pictures as are obtained accidentally, that is, for instance, by amateurs that happen to be at the scene of an accident or the scene
of a crime.
Now one term that we will have to use a great deal in the next
few minutes in showing how cameras and photographs can exaggerate and minimize distances is the term "focal length," so it will
be necessary to define that term. "Focal length" may be defined
as the distance from the back of the camera to the lens when the
camera is focused on a distant object. When the camera is focused
on a closer object, the lens is extended, and this distance from the
lens to the film is no longer the focal length.
When it is focused on an object that is actually lifesize, the
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camera is extended twice, and so there again that is not the focal
length. But if you measure the distance from the film to the optical center of the lens when it is focused on a distant object, you
have its focal length. And as a rule, for reasons that will be explained in a moment, a photograph should be made with the lens
of what we call normal focal length, and that is the lens that would
have the focal length that would be about equal with the diagonal
of the picture area.
For instance, in a four-by-five press camera, the diagonal of
that area is six inches, and that is the focal length that would be
used with that. With your Argus or with your Leica camera, the
diagonal of the picture area is approximatel two inches, and that's
the normal focal length lens.
Now before going into the discussion of the effect of focal
length, let's go into the discussion first of what can be done or what
to watch for in taking pictures for use in court in a way of avoiding
leaving something out. Usually pictures should be made from several angles, for a picture from only one position may be grossly
misleading.
Here is a church, for instance, damaged by windstorm. Here
is a photograph of the same church. It's easy to see how the first
photograph standing by itself would create an entirely misleading
impression, but of course taken with this one it would give you
the true picture.
Here, another example of the same thing. That red pointer is
pointing to the side of that building, and looking at this picture,
it looks as if the building on the extreme right creates a blind intersection. The lawyer and the investigator should always be familiar
with the scene of an accident, for we see that actually that building
is so constructed that even though it's a tall building, it has a filling
station on the ground floor, and it does not create a blind intersection. That's the error of the photograph which consists of leaving things out, not telling the whole story, the truth and the whole
truth.
Here again, is this an aerial picture of a coast of Alaska, or just
what is it? Actually it is merely an accumulation of dirt on a sidewalk involved in a fall-on-a-sidewalk case. When we see it standing
by itself, that close-up detail might be misleading, not that it would
not be useful if taken together with the lower picture, which gives
us something for scale; the car and the stone fence help to give us
an idea of the size of the objects that we are looking at.
Now what does this represent? At first glance it may appear
to be skid marks, but here too we have left something out, and I
imagine there are at least three-fourths of the people here that
know what that is.
Any volunteers?
VOICE: Shadows.
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CHARLES C. SCOTT: I think I heard it-it's shadows of telephone wires.
But seen standing by itself, especially with a little underexposure so that there was not detail in the shadow, such marks might
be mistaken for skid marks.
Another important reason why some investigator at least should
know the scene from every possible angle. Sometimes it's desirable
to use a comparison object in a picture to give the idea of the scale
or size.
Does this Coke bottle help give you an idea of the size of this
sidewalk defect? Well, you know the Coke bottles come in different
sizes, so you should always be sure that the comparison object is
one that can be identified and brought in court. Actually, that first
picture was made with a miniature Coke bottle not more than two
inches tall.
Generally, a ruler makes the best comparison object; but there
again it should be a ruler that can actually be produced in court,
if necessary.
Now on the subject of perspective or the effect of different distances and focal lengths upon your legal photograph. As a rule
your picture should be made with a normal focal length lens, because that would tend to make the photographer assume the correct position in relation to the subject.
Now in a series of several different types of examples, here we
are going to show how using the improper focal length would cause
the picture to exaggerate or minimize distances.
This is the correct picture, and just for reference, suppose we
have a question of what a witness could see from this window in
the background. An accident has occurred at this intersection.
When the picture was made with a wide-angle lens, the distances are exaggerated, and it appears that the witness would not
have nearly the view of the accident that he might have had from
the actual position.
By the way, here is a good time to say something, I think, worth
remembering. No photograph is to substitute for measurements;
no photograph takes the place of a yardstick, a measuring tape, or
a measuring stick. All measurements should always be made by a
witness who is in a position to verify them.
Now the reverse condition. The telescopic effect is created by
the long photo lens or telephoto lens. Now it appears that our witness from this window is in a very much better position to observe
the accident than he actually was. So here we have had one example
of exaggeration and minimization.
Now take this, for example. Here we have a small bridge, and
an accident occurred on this bridge. Two cars collided midway.
It is important, of course, to give the jury and the trier of the fact
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a correct impression of the size of that bridge, and it can usually
be done taking a picture with a normal lens, normal focal length, as
I have said.
Now let us see what happens in the next picture when we
use a wide-angle lens on this same bridge. Immediately its size has
been enhanced.
It appears to be much bigger and much longer than it actually
is, in fact, because a wide-angle lens tends to make the foreground
objects look too large.
Now we have changed to a telephoto lens, and it does just that;
it telescopes the scene, flattens it out, minimizes the distances between objects. So you see that, contrary to the general impression,
a photographer can almost draw with his camera.
Another example. This is a railroad crossing, and there is only
one warning sign. You will observe that there is no other warning
sign between the crossing and this sign. This picture was made
with a normal-angle lens, let us say, a two-inch lens on a Leica
camera.
Now we have the wide-angle lens which exaggerates the distance between the sign and the crossing and makes it appear that
the warning of the crossing was given far sooner than it was in fact.
There again, no intervening sign; that is the same sign.
Now suppose a telephoto lens is used. The scene has collapsed;
the distances are minimized, and one who has never seen that scene,
the average juror, let us say, obtains an entirely misleading impression of the location of that sign in relation to the crossing.
Or, skid marks, for example. The skid marks that we are concerned with at this time are these marks. This is the normal-angle
picture. When taken with the telephoto lens, the marks will be
extended or appear to be extended longer than they are, in fact.
Of course you should always have measurements of the lengths of
skid marks. And that will help to determine whether or not a
photograph is accurate.
A telephoto lens collapses or telescopes the marks, making them
appear much shorter than they are, in fact.
Or, take a car. When photographed with a normal focal length
lens it will look about like this. Many pictures of this type of course
are used in cars involved in accidents. When a wide-angle lens is
used, the car is, of course, distorted, and this type of distortion
usually is pretty obvious. But it does show what a wide-angle lens
can do.
The telephoto lens, on the other hand, tends to shorten the appearance of the car and make it appear a smaller model than it is
in fact.
In real property photography, again we have an illustration of
perspective, the use of the wrong focal length lens. As a rule, how-
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ever, in real property photography, let us say an actiorn involving
a condemnation action of some kind, it would not exactly be a reai
property action, but it would involve a real property picture, you
would want a picture of the building.
Now a wide-angle lens would make this particular building look
about like this. Actually this normal focal length picture is a better representation of that building.
Frankly, however, usually in large cities it is necessary to use
wide-angle lenses when making real property pictures for the
reason that most buildings are not so located that you can get back
far enough. This particular building was. And we have a rule in
all of our courts that wide-angle pictares can be used when they are
explained and when it is explained that they are necessarily distortions to the extent that they exaggerate size.
Perspective can also be involved in photographs of people,
identification pictures. Do you think that you could identify this
man from his picture?
Well, this picture, I will tell you, was made with a wide-angle
lens from a very close position. Here is the same young man photographed from a greater distance with a normal focal length lens.
The picture on the right is the wide-angle picture, and the lower
view shows how close he was to the camera. That is the reason
that these pictures that the kids have made in the dime store are
such terrible distortions because that booth uses a wide-angle lens.
As a rule, an identification picture should be made from a portrait
lens from a greater distance, as shown on the left.
Now this is the last illustration in the series on perspective,
and there is only one, and I have to tell you something about it
so that you can interpret that picture. Believe it or not, it is necessary to know how to interpret photographs. The University of
Indiana now has a three-hour course on- the interpretation of photographs.
I can tell you, for instance, that these men are standing on top
of a building looking at a parade, that is, these three men. Here
you see the people in the street below, and here is the parade.
Now, how tall is that building upon which they are standing?
We have nothing but this one photograph to base your judgment.
Well, I would have to tell you some additional facts. It was made
with a telephoto lens from a fifteen-story adjacent building.
That tells us something. We know then that it minimizes distances, that it flattened the scene out. Actually, these three men are
on top of a five-story building, and these people are on the ground
five stories beneath them, which shows the extent of flattening that
you can expect in photographs.
Here is an example of another type of picture that frequently
must be made with a wide-angle lens. This is not a series, just one
picture.
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But here you can see that in this narrow hall, unless you used
a wide-angle lens, you could not photograph the body of this victim, and although it exaggerates his height, it does tell the story,
his position, at the time he was found.
Now sometimes it is important that a picture show the view
of a particular witness, let us say, as he approached the scene of an
accident. And when that is true, of course, it is of vital importance
that the picture be taken from the eye level of that witness as he
approached the scene of the accident. Here the camera is set up
to photograph this intersection at about the eye level of the driver
of a car, a particular car involved, at least. And that creates this
impression, which is a proper impression of the view that driver
would have of this particular obstruction.
If the camera were placed near the ground, obviously it would
create what we would call a worm's eye view, and the stone hedge
at the right would appear to be taller than it actually is.
If a cameraman stands upon the ladder, he may obtain the view
of a driver of a Greyhound bus, but he is not going to be able to
obtain the view of a driver of a 1957 Ford, let us say. This, of course,
would be the impression created by such photograph.
Now it has been my experience that this type of, let us say,
manipulation, is the type most frequently encountered in court,
that is, there are instances when the photographer does tend to
place his camera too low or too high.
Here is another illustration of it. A driver runs into a safety
zone, and this would be the normal view of showing these buttons
about as they appear to a driver approaching that zone. But too
often when such pictures are made, the photographer wants to help
out a little bit, and he places the camera on the ground. So you
see, he exaggerates the height of the obstruction. There actually
are pictures in our appellate court record that obviously were taken
from too low a position, but yet apparently no one caught the error.
The top is the view of the driver, and below is the worm's eye
view, as we call it. The too-low position may also make it impossible
to show what is on the street itself. The low position at the top
does not reveal the presence of the speed zone in this particular instance. The lateral position or side-to-side position can also be
important when you are showing what a certain person saw at
the scene of the accident. This picture made from the parking
makes it appear that the boulevard sign obstructs the view of the
stop sign. Actually we see that the stop sign was not obstructed
when the picture was taken from the viewpoint of the driver.
Or, again, can you tell from this picture whether or not the
man is standing in the safety zone? Well, actually, at the time this
view was made, he was standing in the same position as he was
in this picture, but because in the other picture we were trying to
show the thing in perspective or depth, the idea was not correctly
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reproduced. Sometimes it is possible to take a picture of an accident scene by placing the camera in the car an actually, of course,
using a car of the same make and model or the same car involved,
and actually showing what the driver could see from his car.
Usually you will get what you have here, underexposure in the car,
but the view of the street will be more nearly correct.
Now we have a very important subject in photography and in
legal photography which we cannot- spend too much time on, and
that is the subject of filters. In black-and-white photography, as a
rule, photographs should be made on what is known as panchromatic
film, and today that film can be used without any filter. Fortunately
today even the amateurs are using panchromatic film such as this
Verichrome, and we do not have the distortion of color values
caused by the film itself, but little color or filters are available
which will produce different effects upon a photograph.
Now sometimes these filters have a proper use, but at other
times they may produce misleading pictures. The red filter, for
instance, if it were photographing a red brick, would make the
brick appear light or white.
In other words, a filter always makes an object of its same color
appear white. At the other extreme, the blue filter would stop all
of the red rays, and it would make the brick appear black. In other
words, a filter of a complementary color always tends to make the
complementary color appear black.
Now let us see how that might work out in black-and-white
photography at the scene of an accident. Let us observe first what
would happen when we looked at this scene through a red filter,
and observe first the red stop sign and the red no-parking sign.
We can see that the effect of a red filter is the elimination of the
color and the elimination of the reading matter on the stop sign of
a no-parking sign. We see the natural photograph in a minute of
just how that works.
On the other hand let us see what a blue filter would be expected to do, and in doing that, let us observe in particular the railroad sign and the slow sign, and we would expect the reading on
the railroad sign and on the slow sign to disappear.
Now let us see how that works out in an actual case. The top
picture was made on panchromatic film without a filter, and this
sign is red reading matter on a white background. When a red filter
is used over the lens, the reading matter on the sign would completely disappear, or, again, this is a yellow "Careful-Children"
sign. Now the top picture was made through a blue filter. There
is no shadow over that sign; it is merely that the blue filter obstructed the yellow rays and the sign photographed black.
These are illustrations, of course, of improper use of filters,
but sometimes they have a proper purpose. For instance, this is an
accurate photograph, technically speaking, and we will talk a little
bit later about the value of color photographs; this is actually an
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accurate black-and-white picture of some black skid marks on a
red pavement.
But where are the skid marks? They do not show because of
the fact that the red and black happen to photograph exactly the
same shade in black and white. But if a red filter is used over the
lens, it will lighten the color of the bricks, and the skid mark will
become visible. And that is a proper use for the filters.
Even the mere matter of lighting can be of vital importance in
the accuracy of a picture, especially in black-and-white photography. In two-dimensional photography, we need shadows to give
us the idea of a depth of a picture.
Now is this an accumulation of gravel on a street, or is it a
deep rut in the street? With the cloud over the sun, it almost appears to be an accumulation of gravel. A few moments later the
cloud has passed from in front of the sun, and we obtain a far more
accurate representation of the rut in the street. Here, of course,
we are not trying to represent it as it appeared to the driver, but
just trying to show its physical dimensions.
There is another filter of some use called the polarizing filter,
which has nothing to do with the polaroid camera, by the way;
but it cuts down on glare. Now these tire tracks are not skid marks,
but are tracks in the gravel road, somewhat obstructed by the glare,
and quite a little improvement is obtained by the polaroid filter,
which cuts down on the glare and makes the tire tracks more
visible.
Even the matter of the time of year can be important, obviously,
and yet our courts almost uniformly hold that a photograph is admissible in evidence even though it is taken in a different season
of the year.
But let us see how radical that change can be just by practical
experiment. Here we can see a car very plainly behind this shrubbery. But in the summertime from the identical marked spot nothing is visible. It is usually, of course, very desirable to obtain pictures as soon as possible after an accident for this reason.
Now to mention another way in which the witness, the human
witness, or the silent witness, the photograph, can mislead, and that
is by turning things around. Here are two pictures of a skid mark,
and in one of them, of course, the direction is opposite of the other.
It so happens that if a photograph is turned around when it is
printed, of course, right and left will be reversed. And if any of
you are amateur photographers, I am sure that you will agree with
me that it is easy to do this by mistake. Do not always be sure that
somebody is faking something when a reversed photograph is presented, because it is the easiest thing in the world to do through
carelessness.
Now this car appears to have been sideswiped on the side opposite the driver. But merely by turning that around, the opposite
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impression is created, that is, it would look like it was the driver's
side that was obstructed, or that was sideswiped. Another example
of turning things around.
Very important in homicide cases is this matter of turning
things around.
This is actually a case of suicide, and it is of course very important to know the location of the wound; but if through carelessness the picture is reversed in printing, it would make it appear
that it was the left side in which the entry wound was made, and
that of course might mean the difference between life and death
to the defendant.
Now a short series of pictures showing how important it is
always to take more than one view at the scene of an accident.
Here, for example, I can tell you that there is a drop-off in this
road about at this point where the shadow is; but if we merely went
out and took one picture from the viewpoint, let us say, of a driver
approaching it from this direction, we would not see it. Actually
this is the same scene looking up the road the other way.
And now we get an accurate picture of the drop-off. Or, again,
let us take a hole in a country road. In this case, a person on
horseback was injured when the horse stumbled in this hole. Now
this one picture tells us a little bit about it, but it does not tell us
the whole story.
If we place a yardstick beside one of our pictures, we can tell
the approximate distance from the side of the road. A yardstick
with large numerals on it will help us show the width of that hole.
That's the last picture of that series, so I will turn. it around. And
that is the type of turning around, and I say that is easy to do
carelessly.
Now this picture tells us something about the depth of that
hole, something that you could not get from the photograph alone,
and you actually see it as you see it; it is about eighteen inches deep,
and quite a defect in a country road.
Now I will take just about a minute or less to change the magazine, and we will show next a series of pictures involving questioned documents, and then the third series will emphasize the
use of color, although you'll notice that I have been using color
all along. I have not even been saying much about it. I think
that about all you can say is that color should be used. I think it is
a highly desirable type of picture.
We can illustrate by questioned documents how photography
can reach its highest plane in legal work. The photography of accident scenes can never be entirely accurate, because you are reproducing small objects, that is, you are reproducing large scenes upon
a very small scale. But in document photography, for instance, you
may be enlarging the document itself, and a document photograph
an be I "ghly accurate and extremely valuable.
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The questioned documents involve one of the sciences of identication-only one of them-and it will illustrate that the same prin!iples will apply to fingerprints, ballistics, and many others. These
sciences of identification are based upon the fact that every object
in nature is an individual and can be distinguished from every other
thing. The old saying "alike as two peas in a pod" is ridiculous;
no two peas in a pod are alike, if you photograph them and enlarge
%hemenough.
Even the hair on a man's head is different from the hair of all
)ther species. Here are photomicrographs that illustrate that. They
show how that could even be used in court. For instance, the hair
of a man has a smooth appearance because of the arrangement of
its pigment cells. The hair of a dog, when magnified to the same
extent, two hundred and fifty diameters, has an inner portion resembling the bones that every dog likes.
The hair of a rabbit has an inner portion resembling a chain.
The hair of a cat when seen in the photomicrograph has an inner
portion resembling patches of fur. So the hair of these species is as
distinguishable as the actual photographs of the animals themselves.
Not only is each man an individual, but so also is the product of
his hand, his handwriting, for instance. For instance, on the Declaration of Independence, the words "John Hancock" to this day
stand for putting your signature on a document. Some people do
not know that they can be identified by their handwriting. Here
is a bad check, for instance, in which the forger had a certain
amount of bravado, calling himself "Solon Fox," inferring that he
was a very wise and crafty person. Another bad gang of bad-checkwriters boldly call their passers "Oliver Passmore." But despite
this dead giveaway, unwary merchants cashed their checks. To
some people, a document examiner is a Dick Tracy type of character,
who goes around with a miniature camera no larger than a match
box, taking pictures of important documents anyplace.
Actually, in addition to photographic equipment, microscopic
equipment is required, ultraviolet light equipment, and, of course,
special cameras for photographing documents in a large form.
He may use a portable camera, but it is not of the match-box
type. It is an instrument that has built-in lights and can be put directly on a signature to obtain a life-sized picture.
Whenever possible, the documents are sent to the laboratory
"-here they can be photographed accurately with a large document
camera. The negatives are developed under the supervision of the
document examiner, printed under his supervision in the laboratory
in the office, and the final result may be an exhibit such as this,
which shows a questioned signature, which, by the way, was geniine at the top, and the exemplar signatures underneath it.
In other words, the point I want to get across here is that,
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while most of the signatures I am going to show you are forgeries
because they are more interesting, actually we spend a great deal
of our time in testifying as to signatures that we are of the opinion
are genuine.
You will note now that, for ihstance, the exemplar signatures
bear dates close to that of the questioned signatures, the reason
being that the person's signature changes through the years.
As proof, take for example, the signature of George Washington. When he was a lad of twelve he wrote in the old English round
hand; by the time he was seventeen, he had greatly modified his
signature in several respects; by the time he was twenty-five he
adopted, however, a signature which remained his until the -end
of life:
Sometimes the mere knowledge of how to photograph with
visible light can make the difference between presenting a case
in court properly and not doing so. You will also see in a moment
how both infrared and ultraviolet can be used.
Take, for example, however, an erasure on a figure. Here we
have an erasure of the "8" and "9," but this is an ordinary flatlighted picture like you would have in a photostat, and, while you
might be able to see that there is an erasur'e there, it is not obvious.
But when those same figures are photographed by strong side
light, nothing special about it, just light from the side, the light
catches in the little crevices made bY the erasure, and the fact
of erasure is obvious.
It is always desirable, I think, in presenting cases in court
to assume that the man with the best vision on the jury has about
21/100 vision. This shows how we can enlarge signatures, for example, and demonstrate whether or not they are genuine. Here,
for instance, by the marvel of photography, in this room with perhaps two hundred people in it, all of us, if we had time, could study
these two signatures in detail. Actually this top signature is a
very poor tracing, and one of a series of tracings made by a secretary who by this means managed to obtain some thirty thousand
dollars by merely forging her boss's signature on checks.
Here is another one from the same series. And if there were
time to talk on questioned documents themselves, we would point
out the differences, for instance, in what we call the line quality
of this forged signature and of the known genuine signature.
Here is another example. Only by photographic evidence can
this audience or can a court learn to follow the expert line by line,
letter by letter, as he explains the differences between this disputed signature and the genuine signature.
I will not go into great detail, but observe, for instance, how
easily this entire room can see the radical difference in the formation of the "b" in the standard signatures and in the questioned
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signature. Note how readily by means of photographic evidence
you can see that this "t" has a patched-on ending.
And those differences can be pointed out to a jury, just as
easily in court as they are here.
This is the type of document problem that also lends itself to
photographic evidence, proved by photographic evidence. The
anonymous letter, the type of problem that we frequently have.
This particular letter was involved in a murder case and was used
as evidence to show motive, because the man was accused of murdering his wife, and this letter was received by another woman.
Now when the writing of the defendant was placed side by
side with writing taken from that anonymous letter and some
twelve exhibits of this type were used showing many, many words,
it became obvious, I think, that the man might as well have placed
his fingerprints upon that document.
You notice, for instance, this abbreviation, as we call it, of the
letter "n" in "and" and in "stand" and in "husband" and the formation of the "g," the terminal "g" 's and also the matter of using a
printed "s" to form plurals.
Another one from the same series showing another series of
letters, a demonstration that could not be made, of course, without
photography.
This is the type of anonymous-letter problem, however, that*I
never discuss with audiences that are'not legal audiences, because
it might give somebody an idea. This particular individual went to
magazines and newspapers, and different ones, and clipped out
words until she spelled out the message that she wanted to send.
The people that do these things usually are stupid in one step,i at
least, and this particular individual apparently got tired when she
had spelled out her message, and she turned around and addressed
the postal card in her own normal handwriting. I guess experts will
only exist as handwriting experts, document examiners, as long as
the forgers, and so on, are more stupid than we are.
Little things sometimes can mean the difference in photographic
evidence. Now this is a series, and from this distance you will not
see the point for a minute perhaps, but here we have two checks
dated approximately four months apart, and the question is whether
or not there is a possibility that they were actually written on the
same day.
In examining these checks I noticed a very little thing: two
little smudge marks on the back of the February check, and with
any document you always wonder, "What does this mean-what
do these little smudge marks mean?"
I also observed that the man's name, of course, being Anderson,
on the June check, there was a little peculiar hook on the end
which was not found in some two hundred of his genuine signatures.
Why, if he did it, did he place that hook on the end?
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Then I observed by placing them close together and side by
side, and we will see an even closer view by help of photography
in a minute, that on the back of the February check, these smudge
marks actually were made by contact with the June check before
it was dry. So that this smudge mark is actually the smudging of
the end forming this hook, and this little mark is the mark of the "s."
Now by the magic of enlarged photography, we can see that
even closer, and I think that you will observe that this is an offset
of the June check before it was dry, and here is a blot in the "s"
of the June check before it was dry. Just a little thing, but it
helped to prove that those two signatures were actually written
consecutively and at the same time.
Sometimes a photomicrograph will help us to determine
whether or not an ink line is written before or after a paper is
folded. If a line is written before the paper is folded, it will crack
at the fold. After the paper is folded, the line will run out on the
fold.
Now this is a demonstration picture. Here is one from an actual
case, not quite as dramatic, but it demonstrates the point conclusively. This letter "s" was retouched after the paper was folded,
because you will see the running out of the ink on the fold, and
you will see on the lower and upper line that the ink cracked at
the fold.
Now that can actually be demonstrated by such photomicrographs of the print being identified by photography. I do not have
time to go into great detail, but here is an example of how it was
proved that three envelopes were printed at the same time, and
actually we used comparisons of every letter in the printing. Here
you see a defect in the "and" sign in all three of them, and here
you see a little particle of lint, indicating that the type was not
clean between the press lines.
Then let us see how infrared can be used in photographic evidence in document cases. Infrared rays are just like light rays, but
are of slightly longer wave length. Here are some figures that were
raised from 31 to 89, and this is an ordinary photograph.
Now you may say that you can tell that it is a raised figure;
you can see how it was changed from 31 to 89; but, remember, not
everyone on your jury can see that. This is an infrared picture of
the same raised figures, and now we observe that because the forger
was only able to match the color of the ink and not their chemical
composition, the infrared photography showed up the fraud. The
top is the ordinary photograph and the lower one the infrared picture.
Or take, again, checks upon which signatures had been obliterated by bank stamps. It seems that bankers for some unknown reason are always stamping over a signature that is later questioned.
But sometimes that does not stop us, because it so happens that
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bank stamp inks are made with analyn dyes, and they are perfectly
transparent to infrared, and if the signature below it happens to
be made with an ink that is not an analyn dye ink, it will appear
as at the bottom, and the bank stamps will be completely eliminated. Or take, for example, a document charred by fire. Here
is an ordinary photograph that would be very difficult to read,
perhaps impossible. Notice these little cracks, because you will see
the next infrared photograph of this document after it was burned.
By means of infrared we are able sometimes to photograph such
charred documents as if they were not involved in a fire.
At the top is the ordinary photograph, and at the bottom the
infrared picture.
Now ultraviolet rays also can be used in photographic evidence,
and here, for example, is a case in which the amounts on appearance bonds were changed, that is, a person, not the person whose
name appears there but another clerk in this court, defaulted by
obtaining funds and then altering the appearance bonds to satisfy
his purpose.
Now this is an ordinary color picture. Now let us see how this
looks under ultraviolet, and we see that an erasure is immediately
made apparent, that he erased the figures "13-2," and he obtained
some thirty-eight thousand dollars over a period of time in small
amounts.
To show it to you again, here is the ordinary photograph, and
here is the ultraviolet photograph. It shows the erasure. Sometimes two sheets of paper that look alike to the eye will obviously
appear to be different under ultraviolet rays.
This is a will case in Topeka, Kansas, in which it appeared at
first that the will was one long sheet of paper folded at the top.
Actually this ordinary photograph would more or less support that
contention, but an ultraviolet photograph showed the entirely different reflectance of the two sheets of paper, showing that a new
first page had been substituted. Actually there was a difference
in the thickness of those two sheets of paper, and actually a small
difference in the width, and other factors.
Well, when confronted with this evidence, the proponents of
the will withdrew it from probate, and a trial was not necessary.
Now a short series on color photography and how it will become more important in your legal practice. Dealing with the
phenomena of color, either in photographs or witnesses at the
scene of an accident or crime, we should always at least find out
whether or not the witness is color-blind. Women very seldom are
color-blind; but about eight percent of the men or one man out of
twelve, and that of course is a significant figure, is color-blind.
This is a test that you can apply yourself. If you are not colorblind, you should see "29" vaguely in square "A," "45" in square
''B,' "26" in square "D," and nothing in square "C." On the law
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of averages, there should be at least approximately ten people in
this room who are color-blind.
Now the type of color photography that will be used in the
future will involve color negatives like this one. This is a color
negative. That is probably the future type of color pictures, and
you will get used to seeing color negatives.
If you do not believe that there is such a thing as a color negative, stare for a moment at this star. And then I will flash on the
white screen, and if you have been looking intently at that star,
you should then see an image of the American flag in colors.
Now I work on the principle that you probably just barely saw
it that time. Let us try it again, and this time stare intently at this
square. You can blink; for that matter, but look at it intently. Now
that is a demonstration of the principle of color negative.
Another phenomenon that we have to deal with in color, not just
in pictures, but anything where you have to deal with identification of colors-it is nothing derogatory to color photography-and
that is that the apparent color of an object will depend upon its
background. These greenish-blue squares are identical in color;
because they are on backgrounds of different colors, they appear
to be of different hues or shades, rather. And of course we know
that a scene may appear different to a witness or in a photograph,
a color photograph especially, depending on the time of day. Here
we have started with dawn and gone on through the day to sunset.
But the most important thing about the value of color photography is not that it makes a beautiful picture but that it increases
your recognition value. I contend, and I think I am right, that the
most inaccurate color photograph is far more accurate than the
best black-and-white picture. So there should not be much objection to them.
Now in this picture, for instance, there is a red truck that can
be seen about at this point-can anybody in front see it, at least?
I do not know whether by using a different lens we can make
everyone see that or not-you may be able to see the red truck
near the house. Well, that is just a pinpoint. That is why color
photography was used in the war, and that is one illustration of
why it can be important in a legal case.
Or take, for example, the yellow line marking a spot where
you should not pass. A color photograph would show that unmistakably. But let us translate that color photograph to black and
white, and you see we have lost something. By merely using a
monochrome filter we have destroyed about three-fourths of the
evidential value of that picture.
Or take, for example, a railroad crossing with a red light.
Color photography will show that approximately as it would appear
to a driver. Well, let us see what the black-and-white photograph
does to it. It is almost as if we put out the light. We cannot show it.
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In black and white we have decreased the evidential value of the
picture. Incidentally, I would like to give you the citation of the
Nebraska supreme court case holding that color photographs are
admissible in evidence, and it's Beads vs. State, 71 Northwestern
2nd 86. I do not have the Nebraska citation; it may not be out
yet; it is 1955. Beads vs. State, 71 Nebraska 2nd 86. It is a very
interesting case. A very long objection.was made to the use of
color, and it was overruled, and the picture was held admissible.
There is no reason why color photographs should not be used,
because they are more accurate.
I Here is another example. Suppose you have an action against
a fertilizing plant for damages of the property of an adjacent farmer
by the noxious fumes, and you want to show, that in evidence by
photograph. A color photograph will enable you to show at least
the color of those fumes and present that story in a way that no
black-and-white picture ever could.
As you see, when we convert it to black and white or monochronme, the smash of the picture is lost, and it no longer tells the
story.
Or take a car that is involved in more than one accident. By a
color photograph you can see that some of these dents are rusty
and that they actually did not occur at the same time as the others.
In black and white that will be completely lost. Or at a scene of
an explosion, an idea of the general appearance of the'scene is
enhanced by color; in black and white we lose a lot.
The objection that color photography is not absolutely accurate
is certainly ridiculous, when it is far more accurate than the blackand-white pictures that we have been using for years.
There is another value of color photography. Color photographs
are very difficult to fake by the use of filters, and you can be pretty
sure that they are very accurate. Now you know we talked about
how you could use a blue filter on a black-and-white picture to
make that slow sign or a "careful-children" sign appear dark.
Now this is a color picture. Suppose you use a blue filter with
color film in your Leica or Argus camera and place a blue filter
over the lens. This is what you get. And the fact that a blue filter
is used is perfectly obvious. Take, for example, a red stop sign.
We said that a red filter in black-and-white photography would
cut out the reading on the sign. Suppose we take a color picture
and use a red filter over the lens. That is what we come out with.
The fact of the distortion is apparent to everyone, so you have an
added guarantee of accuracy with color pictures.
By means of color photography in a document case, I was able
to enlarge an area of typewriting only about a fifth of an inch
wide to the size of this screen so that it could be used to point
out facts concerning whether or not that is a case of typing over
ink or the case of a signature written over typing.
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Here is another of the same series. Incidentally, for those interested, these were made with a small 35-millimeter camera, and
show the extent to which you can go in color photography today.
Now we have a very short series, and then I want to take about
five minutes to show some large exhibits, and in this series, by the
way, some of the photographs are gruesome, and they are medicallegal pictures, and if any of you are affected by that, you can close
your eyes. They will only last about a minute.
This is a picture of X-ray dermatitis. A dentist was injured
and obtained this burn, and we see how with black-and-white
photography we have very little of value, but in color we can tell
the whole story.
This is the part of the intestines of a man who received fatal
injuries through X-ray diathermy, and there you notice how the
doctor has used a ruler to give an idea of scale.
This is the typical cherry-red discoloration of carbon monoxide
poisoning. It is under the armpit of the victim, and it is a typical
thing which can be shown only, of course, with color photography,
because in black and white we would lose that color differentiation.
This is a hot-water burn on an infant which resulted in a death.
Of course it is graphic evidence of carelessness.
Here is a brain. It would take a long time to explain what this
shows, but it had to do with internal hemorrhages and whether the
fatal injuries were the result of a fight or a previous injury.
And color photographs of this type have been admitted in some
ten states, including Nebraska.
This is the entrance wound of a bullet, and it also can be used
by a doctor to point out other things: for instance, the blacking of
the eye, which is a typical result of the internal explosion of gases
from a closely fired gun.
This is a shotgun wound, virtually in the chest, or upper abdomen, anyway.
This is another shotgun wound in the chest, and here is a chest
wound, the same chest wound from a more distant viewpoint.
And finally a hand mangled in a railroad accident.
Now about five minutes for the large exhibits. It would be
true of any type of photograph, and I will, if I can, leave them here
so that you can look at them for the rest of the afternoon when you
have time; and that is a picture of this type, which is the typical
picture we see in court today and is entirely too small.
Now there are extremes. There are people who are contending
that we ought to go in court with big exhibits, about twelve feet
wide and nine feet tall, and leave them up before the jury to hold
the trial.
I contend that it is an extreme position, but I do think that there
is a happy medium, and I do think when you have exhibits, if they
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are accident scenes or whatever they are, and they are about this
size, in the average jury room you have a photograph that speaks
in a loud clear voice and says something and looks a little bit important. It looks like it was worth working on and worth presenting, whereas this is rather insignificant.
Others of these pictures will show you, for instance, how photography enables us to compare writings close together, side by side,
and the extent to which we can actually make enlargements of
small portions of letters, if we desire.
There was a contention, and it is still sometimes made, that
photographs should not be marked. But I do not always agree with
that. I think that occasionally marks make a photograph virtually
a talking picture. You will notice this exhibit in which there are
ten points in the questioned signature and in the non-genuine signature, all pointed to in each case. And it almost makes that picture speak.
And thought can be given to such presentations that will make
the photographs far more valuable.
This is the recent Missouri case of Hurst vs. Crook, just decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri, and illustrates the signatures in greatly enlarged form. We actually used six of these. We
used one for each two jurors, and we used one for each set of
attorneys-that would make eight-and one for the witness to hold.
That was nine that we used. And that way the point was presented
to that jury so that everyone could see it.
VOICE: Is that genuine (indicating)?
CHARLES C. SCOTT: No; actually of course in the actual case
we would use some ten or twelve exhibits.
Well I think it is a great mistake to make pictures too small.
I think that it is an important item.
This one, for instance, will show you the extent that we can
magnify if necessary to show under the question of whether or not
the same pen was used throughout the document. There are virtually no limits.
Here is a chart that shows us that an attesting clause was added
at a different time, ruled typewriter plate used over it.
Showing of typewriting under ruled squares to determine
whether or not the same typewriter was used. Here a study of
individual letters.
I think that about concludes my presentation. Thank you.
ADDRESS BEFORE SECTION OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE
John W. Yeager, Judge of Supreme Court
In order that as much time as possible shall be made available
for discussion of the subjects presented by the panel, I shall be
as brief as an intelligent presentation will permit.
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Four points have been assigned to me for presentation. The
first is "Time and place for preserving assignments of error." The
second is "Mechanics of appeal-suggestions." The third is "Diversity of appeals in the same case." And the fourth is "Limitation of
evidence in bills of exceptions."
As an introduction to a more extended discussion of these
points, I desire to state that a little time spent in -the examination
of the Rules of the Supreme Court and the statutes and decisions
relating to procedure will furnish clear and definite answers to
the questions inherent in points one, two, and four. The rules are
available without cost to all lawyers. Moreover, the Clerk of the
Supreme Court keeps at hand and current a collection in brief Df
musts relating to mechanics of appeal, the information from which
is always available on request.
In this light I am constrained to say that when a lawyer runs
into a situation whereby upon procedural grounds he is denied
the right to have a case reviewed on its merits, the blame must rest
upon his own inattention.
As to the first of the assigned points, subject to the power
of the Supreme Court to consider plain errors unassigned, the
assignments of error must appear in the brief. This is, however,
the final rather than the basic step in the preservation of error.
There are so many things which may be the basis for assignment of error that only a few may be mentibned here. Attacks
upon pleadings must be made and exceptions to adverse rulings
thereon preserved before or by answer or they are waived, and thus
no error may be predicated. The exception to this is that the pleading
attacked fails to state a cause of action or defense. In both law and
equity actions, error may not be predicated on the the admission
or rejection of evidence not objected to at the time. This is true as
to all claimed errors of law committed at the trial.
In law cases, claimed errors as to legal questions requiring
reference to the evidence for determination must be presented to the
trial court by motion for new trial in order to have a review by
the Supreme Court.
It has been suggested that the opinion in Krepcik v. Interstate
Transit Lines, 151 Neb. 663, 38 N. W. 2d 533, contains language
which amounts to a departure from this rule. Casual reading of
the opinion might so indicate. A careful reading of the opinion,
however, does not lead to any such general conclusion. It is true that
an exception to the general rule is announced. The exception, however, is responsive solely to an act of the Legislature passed in
1947 and to reasons stated for the exception.
In that case there was a review of an order sustaining a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Complaint was made that
the appellant had filed no motion for new trial. The Supreme
Court held that none was necessary.
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Of course a review of the evidence was necessary to a determination of the question involved. The court held a question of
law as distinguished from one fact was presented, and under the
act of 1947 no motion for new trial was necessary. Whether or
not the reason given for the decision was sound may be questioned,
but certainly the decision was sound for at least one other reason.
The appeal could not be regarded as anything more than a resistance to the motion of the opposing party with specifications of
grounds for rendition of judgment notwithstanding the verdict. A
motion for new trial would only have been a negation of the
specifications upon which the judgment was based.
In equity cases the rules are more liberal. They will not be
discussed except to say that under them assignments of errors of
law occurring at the trial are not properly reviewable in the
absence of a motion for new trial.
This much should be sufficient to illustrate the necessity for
careful attention to details in the prepartion and trial of a case
from beginning to end. It should point to the conclusion that
failure in these respects may be disastrous.
The next point is mechanics of appeal. As to this, I do not deem
it advisable to say much in addition to what has already been
said.
There are eight basic steps in presenting an appeal in a civil
case and keeping it alive for ultimate consideration and determination. These are provided in part by statute and in part by court
rule. There are five in criminal cases. It would serve no useful purpose for me to repeat them here. They would not be remembered,
anyway. Further, no careful lawyer will rely entirely on his memory as to these matters. He will check to be sure. However,
I have attached to this statement a condensed outline of these
essentials. A copy has been placed in your hands.
There has been insistence by lawyers who have failed to become
informed of these rules, whose appeals have suffered in consequence, that for their purposes they should be disregarded. Simple
answers for refusal are that the courts no more than any other
phase of organized society may function without rules. These rules
have been established by the Legislature and the Supreme Court,
mainly at the behest of the legal profession itself, to facilitate the
administration of justice. The courts have the right and duty
to proceed on the assumption that they were promulgated to be
enforced and not to be ignored.
If you are going to use this outline instead of the statutes and
rules of court, I urge that you check it regularly against the laws
enacted at each session of the Legislature and the rules and mod:fications of rules as they shall become current.
I shall consider next the fourth point. Seldom have cases come to
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the Supreme Court wherein the bill of exceptions has contained
less than all the evidence adduced at the trial. In most instances,
I think, this has been desirable and perhaps even necessary. There
are areas, however, wherein much expense and time may well be
saved by limitation of the bill. I shall not discuss this further than to
present an illustration.
Quite frequently damage for personal injury cases come to
the Supreme Court wherein there is no question of the amount
of damage in case liability has been established, but only the
question of liability. In all cases which I am able to recall, notwithstanding this, all the evidence descriptive of the injury, together with the medical testimony, has been found in the bill.
This, of course, is useless, and if it is reasonably separable from
the other evidence, it would seem that it should be omitted from
the bill.
The third point deals with diversity of appeals in the same
case. At the present time, the question presents to the lawyer
uncertainties and difficulties. The uncertainties reside in the inability to know what under all circumstances should be done by
common or cross-parties to protect the right to a review on appeal.
The difficulty may be demonstrated by the simplest possible illustration, the case of one party plaintiff and one party defendant.
An action of this kind is tried, and judgment is rendered. The
losing party in due time takes the necessary steps to perfect his
appeal. The opposing party desires to cross-appeal. He, of course,
may take the same steps as the adversary to perfect his appeal, or
he may wait and present his appeal in his brief. The logical thing
to do is to present his cross-appeal by his brief.
Waiting, however, has serious dangers. If the original appellant
withdraws his appeal, the right to present the cross-appeal has been
destroyed. In order to avoid such consequences as are embraced in
this illustration, often numerous appeals are docketed, with the
attendant waste of time and expense. If there are numerous parties,
the number of appeals in a single case are multiplied.
The situation requires correction. A committee of the Supreme
Court is working with the problem, as is also the Judicial Council.
What will come of it I do not know for certain. I apprehend, however, that one result will be that notice of appeal by one party will
preserve the right of all other parties in that case against the present
consequences of dismissal of appeal by the original appellant.
It should not be understood that this will avoid the necessity
of filing a motion for new trial in time in the district court in a
law action in order to have a review of facts or in an equity action
in order to have a review of errors at law committed at the trial.
These brief remarks do not cover in full detail all matters
which deserve attention in becoming informed of Appellate Practice
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And Procedure. They do not even cover everything embraced in
the four points to which attention has been directed.
I hope, however, that enough has been said to make clear that
to the lawyer practicing in the courts an adequate knowledge of
the statutes, rules of law, and rules of court relating to Appellate
Practice and Procedure is at all times imperative.
SUPREME COURT OF NEBRASKA
Procedural Steps
CIVIL CASES
1. File notice of appeal in district court and pay $20 docket fee to
clerk of district court within one month from date of order from
which appeal is taken. (Sec. 25-1912)
2. File transcript in Supreme Court within one month from filing
notice of appeal. (Sec. 25-1912)
3. Cost bond (if judgment not superseded) filed in district court
within one month from overruling of motion for new trial.
(Sec. 25-1914)
4. Supersedeas Bond-File in district court within 20 days after
final order. (Sec. 25-1916)
5. Bill of Exceptions -Prepare within 40 days from filing notice
judge may
of appeal. (Sec. 24-342 and Sec. 25-1140) -Trial
Further time
allow one extension of 40 days for preparationmay be allowed by Supreme Court (Sec. 25-1140.07) upon showing made in conformity with Supreme Court Rule 7c. A bill of
exceptions which has been properly settled within time and has
been filed with the clerk of the district court and his certificate
attached thereto may be filed in Supreme Court at any time before submission of the case (Supreme Court Rule 7d).
6. Brief Day of Appellant- 70 days from filing of notice of appeal
-except compensation and unemployment compensation cases
-in these brief day is 20 days from filing of transcript.
extension if
7. Extension of Appellant's Brief Day -Automatic
time for preparing bill of exceptions is extended -extended to
one month from date to which settlement time has been extended- may also be procured on motion or by stipulation.
8. Brief Day of Appellee-1 month from service and filing of
appellant's brief except compensation and unemployment compersation cases, in which the time is 20 days.
CRIMINAL CASES
1. File petition in error and transcript with Clerk of the Supreme
Court and pay $20 docket fee to Clerk of the Supreme Court
(Sec. 29-2306) within 1 month of final order (Sec. 25-1931) fee
not required to be paid if poverty affidavit filed (Sec. 29-2306).
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2. Transcript must accompany petition in error. (Sec. 25-1905).
3. Application for suspension of sentence should be included in
petition in error (Supreme Court Rule 6b).
4.' Bill of Exceptions- Prepare within 40 days from filing of petition in error (Sec. 24-342) - Subject to same extensions as in
civil cases.
5. Briefs. Plaintiff in error to file within 70 days from docketing
of appeal - State within 1 month from service and filing of
brief of plaintiff in error (Supreme Court Rule 10a3) - Same
,xtensions as in civil cases (Supreme Court Rule 10a3).
ADDRESS BEFORE
SECTION OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Harry A. Spencer, District Judge
I have been assigned four points for discussion, with the suggestion that they be covered in twelve minutes. The points are:
sequestration of witnesses, motions for mistrial, motions for dismissal or directed verdict, and motions for jury to view premises.
It is readily apparent that a full discussion of the subjects would
necessarily require more than the allotted time.
Sequestration of Witnesses
This subject is not statutory in Nebraska, except as to examining magistrates who are given the right by 29-505 of the Revised
Statutes of Nebraska for 1943. Nebraska is in line with most American jurisdictions, which follow the early English rule that sequestration of witnesses is not a matter of right but rather is one of
discretion on the part of the trial court.
In the early case of Binfield v. State, 15 Neb. 484, a prosecution
for murder in the second degree where the request of the defendant
to sequester was denied, we find the following:
Upon this subject the law is thus stated by Greenleaf in his
work on Evidence, sec. 432: "If the'judge deems it essential to the
discovery of truth that the witnesses should bb examined out of the
hearing of each other, he will so order it. This order, upon the motion or suggestion of either party, is rarely withheld; but, by the
weight of authority, the party does not seem entitled to it as a matter of right." In this also agree all of the cases which I have been
able to find, except in the cases where the matter is regulated by
express statute.
In Johns v. State, 88 Neb. 145, a prosecution for burglary and
grand larceny, the district court, over the defendant's objections,
permitted the witnesses to remain in the courtroom during the trial.
The court, holding that the matter was one within the sound discretion of the trial court, found that there was nothing in the record
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to indicate that this discretion was abused but did suggest that it
was their thought that the better course would have been to separate
the witnesses.
In Roberts v. State, 100 Neb. 199, a prosecution for murder, we
find the following:
The separation of the witnesses in a criminal trial is ordinarily
a matter within the discretion of the trial court; but when requested,
especially in a trial for felony, it is seldomly denied. When the witnesses for the prosecution are near relatives or are or have been
recently so associated that it is not improbable that some of them
may be under the influence of another witness who is interested in
the prosecution, it is erroneous to allow such witnesses to be present and hear each other's testimony against the objection of the defendant -'
In Jordan v. State, 101 Neb. 430, where the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, the defendant requested that
witnesses for the state be excluded from the courtroom during the
trial. This request was granted, with the exception of the sheriff,
who was a witness. As to him, the court refused the request unless
the defendant file an affidavit of prejudice. This was not done,
and the court, in the exercise of sound legal discretion, refused to
exclude him, he being an officer of the court. The Supreme Court
held that this was not an abuse of discretion.
Th. question sometimes arises as to the effect of a witness
violating the rule. In Fouse v. State, 83 Neb. 258, where the defendant was convicted of first degree murder, the third syllabus
point reads:
It is within the discretion of the trial court to permit a witness
used by the State on rebuttal to testify, even though all witnesses
were ordered excluded from the courtroom and said witness had
not obeyed the rule.
In Treppish v. State, 126 Neb. 21, the court said that where witnesses, without the court's knowledge, remain in the courtroom
through misunderstanding of the extent of the court's order, they
may be permitted to testify unless the defendant's rights will be
prejudiced thereby.
In Swartz v. State, 121 Neb. 696, the court held that error cannot be predicated on the failure of the trial court to keep witnesses
segregated until all have testified, where no showing of prejudice
to the complaining party appears.
Motions for Mistrial
The cardinal rule on motions for mistrial is to be sure that the
motion is timely. As soon as the event occurs on which the motion
might be predicated, if you feel the jury will not give your client
a fair trial, make a proper objection, and then move for mistrial. Our
court, in re Estate of House, 145 Neb. 670, held that merely making
an objection to the alleged misconduct is not enough. The party
wronged must also move for a mistrial. There are many Nebraska
decisions, such as Long v. Crystal Refrigerator Co., 134 Neb. 44, and
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Millslagle v. State, 138 Neb. 778, which give the rule that it is incumbent upon the party to -make the -objection and then to move for
the mistrial at the happening of the event complained of.
Our court has said many times, as it did in Segebart v. Gregory,
160 Neb. 64, that a party is not permitted to proceed with the trial
without objection and speculate on the outcome of the jury verdict,
and, if unfavorable, contend that a mistrial should have been declared, when he did not ask for the same at the time.
In Dunn v. Omaha C.B. St. R. Co., 139 Neb. 765, where an attorney was guilty of misconduct, the court said:
One may not complain of misconduct of adverse counsel, if,
with knowledge of such misconduct, he does not object thereto and
ask for a mistrial, but consents to take the chances of a favorable
verdict.
Sometimes the question arises as to whether a motion for a
mistrial may be withdrawn. In Pope v. Tapelt, 155 Neb. 10, improper
evidence was adduced by the plaintiff in cross-examination of one
of defendant's witnesses. The defendant moved for mistrial. The
court took the motion under advisement. The plaintiff made no
objection at the time but later sought to join in the motion. The
defendant thereupon withdrew his motion and expressly waived
any error in the reception of the evidence. The trial court permitted the withdrawal and held the plaintiff's motion came too late.
The Supreme Court affirmed this action, holding that a litigant may
withdraw his motion for a mistrial because of the admission of
prejudicial evidence at any time prior to the court's ruling thereon.
Motions for Dismissal or Directed Verdict
On the subject of directed verdicts, since 1947 we have been
controlled by the provisions of 25-1315.01, 25-1315.02 and 25-1315.03
of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska. 25-1315.01 provides:
A party who moves for a directed verdict at the close of the

evidence offered by an opponent may offer evidence in the event
that the motion is not granted, without having reserved the right
to do so and to the same extent as if the motion had not been made.
4 motion for a directed verdict which is not granted is not a waiver
of trial by jury even though all parties to the action have moved
for directed verdicts. A motion for directed verdict shall state the
specific grounds therefor.
25-1315.02 provides:
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of

all the evidence is denied or for any reason is not granted, the
court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject
to a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion.
Within 10 days after the reception of a verdict, a party who has
moved for a directed verdict may move to have the judgment
entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if
a verdict was not returned such party within 10 days after the
jury has been discharged may move for judgment in accordance
with his motion for a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial
may be joined with this motion, or a new trial may be prayed for

in the alternative. If a judgment was returned the court may allow
the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either
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order a new trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested

verdict had been directed. If no verdict was returned the court

may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had

been directed or may order a new trial.
25-1315.03 in substance provides that any order in 25-1315.02
is an appealable order.
In re Estate of Kinsey, 152 Neb. 95, holds that under Section
25-1315.02, a motion for a directed verdict is an absolute prerequisite
to a motion for judgment nothwithstanding the verdict, and the
trial court cannot, either upon its own motion or upon motion for
judgment nothwithstanding the verdict, set aside a verdict and
enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, where no preliminary motion for a directed verdict has been made. If you should be
caught in this situation, don't forget that it is possible, however, to
move for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence or is contrary to law, as provided in
25-1142 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska for 1943.
Pahl v. Sprague, 152 Neb. 681, holds that a party is required
not only to timely make the motion for a directed verdict, but
thereafter to timely file a motion for judgment nothwithstanding
the verdict.
In re Estate of Coons, 154 Neb. 690, holds that whether a judgment will be directed or a new trial granted under the provisions of
Section 25-1315.02 involves a judicial discretion based upon the
record. In other words, it is a judicial discretion and not an absolute
one that is lodged in the court.
In re Estate of Fehrenkamp, 154 Neb. 488, holds that 25-1315.03
vests the power in the Supreme Court on appeal to review the action
taken by the trial court in any action under 25-1315.02 and to enter
the judgment in favor of the party who was entitled to judgment
in the trial court.
In some jurisdictions, in an equity action, the defendant
cannot test the sufficiency of the evidence without either resting
or presenting his own case. In Nebraska, however, the defendant
is entitled to test the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence without
the risk of penalizing himself. This is the rule found in Peterson
v. Massey, 155 Neb. 829. In all of these situations, however, the
rule of construction is found in Corbitt v. Omaha Transit Co., 162
Neb. 598: A motion for dismissal at the close of the plaintiff's evidence or for a directed verdict at the close of all of the evidence
must, for the purposes of decision thereon, be treated as an admission of the truth of all material and relevant evidence submitted
on behalf of the party against whom the motion is directed. And
as was also said in the same case: Where the facts adduced to sustain
an issue are such that reasonable minds can draw but one conclusion therefrom, it is the duty of the court to decide the question,
as a matter of law, rather than submit it to a jury for determination.
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I believe the rule is well stated in Cook Livestock Co., Inc., v.
Reisig, 161 Neb. 640: In every case, before the evidence is submitted
to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the court to decide,
when properly raised, not whether there is literally no evidence,
but whether there is any evidence upon which a jury can properly
proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the
burden of proof is imposed.
It is error, however, for the trial court to direct a verdict for
either of the parties on an issue of fact on which the evidence is
conflicting. Such issue should be submitted to the jury for its
determination. As the court said in Griess v. Borchers, 161 Neb.
217, "In negligence cases the trial court should sustain a motion
for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
only when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
party against whom the motion is directed, fails to establish actionable negligence."
With reference to motions for directed verdicts, there are still
some folks who forget the effect of this motion on a counterclaim. The Nebraska law is stated in Harbert v. Mueller, 156 Neb.
838, in which the defendant pleaded a counterclaim, and, upon
the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, moved for and procured an order of the court directing a verdict for the defendant
upon the plaintiff's cause of action. Our court held that the defendant, by moving for a directed verdict and obtaining a favorable
ruling thereon, waived a hearing on his counterclaim when the
counterclaim was not withdrawn by him before final submission
of the cause, as required by statute.
Motion to View Premises
These motions are covered by 25-1108 of the Revised Statutes
of Nebraska for 1943 in the following language:
Whenever, in the opinion of the court, it is proper for the jury
to have a view of property which is the subject of litigation, or of
the place in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to
be conducted in a body, under charge of an officer, to the place,
which shall be shown to them by some person appointed by the
court for that purpose. While the jury are thus absent, no person
other than the person so appointed shall speak to them on any subject connected with the trial.
However, as our court said in Carter v. Parsons. 136 Neb. 515,
this section is merely confirmatory of power generally recognized
as existing in a trial court apart from any statute.
The question has been raised as to whether or not a trial judge
has the same power to view the premises as a jury, and if so, whether
such inspection is entitled to the same effect in both cases. These
issues were decided in the affirmative in Birdwood IrrigationDistrict v. Brodbeck, 128 Neb. 824. Whether a view shall be permitted
does not depend upon the consent of the parties but is a matter
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solely for the discretion of the trial court. This rule is announced
in Alberts v. Husevetter, 77 Neb. 699, and also in Carter v. Parsons,
136 Neb. 515, where on a trial without a jury the court said that a
judge, in the exercise of his discretion, may view the premises without the consent of the parties. It has also been held that the refusal
of the trial court to permit the jury to view the premises involved
in the litigation is not reversible error in the absence of an abuse
of discretion. (Peake v. Omaha Cold Storage Co., 158 Neb. 676)
While it is ordinarily customary for the jury or the court to
view the premises after the evidence has been adduced, our court,
in Alberts v. Husevetter, 77 Neb. 699, held that the viewing of the
property may, in the discretion of the court, be made before all
the evidence has been adduced.
There has, in some states, been a question as to the effect of
viewing the premises. In Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway
Co. v. Farwill, 59 Neb. 544, our court held that aview of the premises
in this state is evidence and not merely a means of enabling the
jury to construe and apply the evidence adduced in court. Judge
Sullivan in that case said as follows:
Upon the question in controversy judicial opinion is divided,
the greater number of adjudicated cases supporting the theory that
impressions gathered by the jury in making an inspection are not
evidence. This court, we think, is committed by Carroll v. State,
5 Neb. 31, and Omaha & R V R Co. v. Walker, 17 Neb. 432, to the
doctrine that a jury may take into account the result of their
observations at the locus in quo and make it, in connection with
other evidence, the basis of their verdict. This is the rational rule;
by its adoption a fact is recognized and a fiction abolished. In
whatever capacity men act they will not reject the evidence of
their own senses; and it is futile and almost foolish to direct them
to do so.
On the question of appeal, our court, in Peterson v. Thurston,
157 Neb. 833, held that where an inspection of premises is made
by the trial court in relation to issues involved, such inspection
becomes a matter of evidence to be considered by the Supreme
Court on appeal. And also in Carterv. Parsons, 136 Neb. 515, commenting on inspection of the premises, our court said, "Such fact
is entitled to consideration and weight on appeal, although the
record itself must contain competent evidence to support the trial
court's findings."
ADDRESS BEFORE
SECTION OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
John H. Kuns, District Judge
Since the topic of Special Verdicts was assigned to me as a
member of this panel, the latest issue of the Nebraska Law Review
has been distributed, containing a lead article upon the same subject.
In his excellent article, Mr. Gerald Matzke, of the Nebraska Bar,
now practicing at Sidney in my district, has analyzed exhaustively
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the Nebraska statutes and all cases in this state in which the subject
has been treated. He has added comments, conclusions, and recommendations which are cogent and well reasoned. It is not necessary in this discussion to add to the material which he has used.
For this reason, my original manuscript was discarded, and I
shall proceed without specific reference to the statutes or to the
cases. For purposes of study and research, reference should be
made to Mr. Matzke's article. I intend, therefore, to discuss some
aspects of the use of special verdicts based upon my own rather
limited experience.
So there will be no misunderstanding, I wish to make it clear
at the outset that I am not urging discontinuance of the use of
general verdicts. I am not suggesting that there is anything wrong
per se with trials in which a general verdict is returned by the
jury. General verdicts are required in criminal cases, and there
are many civil cases in which such verdicts reflect an intelligent
and adequate set of findings by the jury. I believe that there are
some types of cases and some situations in which special verdicts
can be used to advantage, benefiting both the trial and review of
such cases.
The increasing use of discovery methods and the attempts at
simplification of the issues through pre-trial conference poses
a problem relative to the presentation of the case to the jury. The
attorney naturally is concerned with the extent to which the
jury might appreciate and apply those matters which have become
settled outside the courtroom and which are not covered in the
oral testimony. In his desire to insure that the jury will use such
matters in arriving at their conclusions, trial attorneys often elect
to lengthen the record by the presentation of the proof which is
not actually necessary. When the court can supply the answers
to the issues so settled, much time should be saved both in presentation and argument of the -case without ill effect to either
side.
Lawyers also find that the findings submitted can aid them
in checking their record before resting so that nothing is overlooked. In the same way, the organization of arguments, especially
the opening, is simplified. Each side should be furnished with
a list of the findings which will be submitted as early during the
course of the trial as possible. Usually this can be done at least
in tentative form soon after the opening statements have been
made. Another feature is that special findings serve to define
more precisely the areas of conflict in the testimony, and the
situation is avoided of appearing to try two different lawsuits at
the same time. It is likely that there is a handicap to the trial
technique of attempting to cover weakness by elaborate and cumulative proof of the strong features of the case.
The preparation of special findings and the instructions thereon

PROCEEDINGS, 1956

should be somewhat simpler for the court. It is still necessary
to make the same analysis and statement of the issues, even though
the statement appears in different form. In the remaining instructions, the primary task becomes more a matter of definition
than of expounding the law and of explaining the various ways
in which it may be applied to findings of fact. It is possible to
omit the frequent hypothetical statements, which often cause
general instructions to read like a complicated intelligence test.
Greater clarity can be attained in the placing of the burden of proof
as to each separate issue, and the court would have some leeway
in arranging the order in which various issues will be considered
and determined, irrespective of whether such issues are a part
either of the original cause of action or the defense. Questions
must be framed carefully so as to secure categorical answers settling
the ultimate facts in issue. It seems preferable to phrase questions
so that an affirmative or definite answer will be returned when
the burden of proof has been carried. A negative reply would
then cover both the even balance of the evidence as well as a
finding of untruth of the allegation.
Questions of law often arise during the course of the trial which
are difficult to settle with certainty before the submission of the
case to the jury. When the court is doubtful about the effect or
application of a rule, it becomes possible to reserve the question
for later determination, while securing the necessary finding of
fact. The jury's finding might make later decision unnecessary,
or time becomes available for further briefing and argument by
counsel. In this way, the court has an opportunity to avoid real
or apparent error.
In entering judgment upon the special verdict, the court, with
the aid of counsel, can utilize special training and ability to make
the necessary computations and appropriate applications of the law
to the findings. I am sure that it is simpler to apply the comparative
negligence statute to findings, to ascertain whether a recovery
is justified and, if so, the amount, than to explain satisfactorily
to the jury how the process should be carried out. All mathematical
computations should be more accurate.
It is impossible to learn the exact process by which a jury
reaches a verdict in any case. The use of hidden microphones in
deliberation rooms is frowned upon; later individual interviews
are unsatisfactory. The rating of verdicts usually depends upon
a person's point of view and interest in the particular case, but
while many verdicts appear to be reasonably sound, others leave
us wondering how such a conclusion might have been reached. The
special verdict directs the attention of the jury to the essential
question of "what happened?" rather than to "who wins?" as in
the general verdict. This should tend to minimize the effect of
any prejudice which may have developed. The special verdict
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shows upon its face the systematic and orderly determination of
all the issues in the case. The jury cannot disregard the process
required for a complete determination and simply fill out a general
verdict expressing their sentiment whether supported by reason
or not. In fairness it should be pointed out that confusion on the
part of juries may well be the result of confused presentation or
arise from a justifiable inability to follow intricate but correct
statements of the law in the court's instructions. Jurors return
the best verdicts they are able to formulate because they were
sworn to try the case, but they have an understandable reluctance to report confusion. Accordingly, it seems that sometimes
they fill in a verdict and hope for the best. I am confident that
jurors attempt to be conscientious and fair, and that a deliberate
failure to give proper consideration to the issues occurs only rarely.
From the standpoint of review either in the trial court or upon
appeal, special verdicts seem to offer definite advantages. It is
not necessary to resort to the assumption that each separate issue
was resolved consistently with the general finding. It can be
very important to know precisely whether the jury in a comparative negligence case found negligence against both parties or only
the defendant, and whether damages were mitigated on that account.
Sometimes juries compromise uncertainty about liability by reducing the amount of damages awarded; such verdicts are bad
because they constitute an invasion of a field which should belong
exclusively to the litigants. The Supreme Court can determine
with greater certainty whether errors during trial had a prejudicial
effect. When prejudicial error is found and the case remanded,
the scope of the retrial can be limited accordingly. This can result
in a saving both of time and expense, especially when some witnesses testified only as to special matters, and not generally both
as to liability and damage. Settlement prospects are often not
impaired but may even be improved after a reversal, since each
side can see which features of their case have been shown to be
strong or weak, either as to the evidence or as to the law.
I have attempted to set out some of the more desirable possibilities arising from the use of special verdicts. We should all
be familiar both with the strength and weakness of the general
verdict. The decision to use special verdicts lies entirely within
the discretion of the trial judge; such a decision may depend upon
a large number of considerations, especially the time available for
the preparation of the findings, and the confidence of the judge
in his ability to make clear the issues and the law in general instructions. The use of special verdicts merits consideration, not
as a new, but as a revived, method of securing an intelligent and
complete determination of the issues by the jury. In some cases,
better verdicts might be secured. If the bench and bar can obviate
any of the criticism of the operation of the jury system, we should
try to do so.
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SOME PROBLEMS OF SUBROGATION
IN WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Joseph P. Cashen, Esq.
The discussion of the problems involved in compensation subrogation will have particular reference to the State of Nebraska.

The original concept which gave rise to such legislation, providing for liability of the employer without regard to fault on his
part, did not lose sight of the fact that ultimately, whenever possible, the true wrongdoer or third party should not be relieved of
his liability to the injured employee. This is certainly in conformity with the general theory of law. The liability of the employer is
fixed by statute, but the liability of a wrongdoer or negligent third
party is determined only by the extent of damage assessed by a
court or jury. In view of this disparity as to the amount of liability
between the employer and the negligent third party, many questions arise in connection with civil actions at common law against
third parties either by the injured employee or by the employer.
The modern normal third party subrogation pattern, adopted
by most states, provides for the reimbursement of the employer and
retention of any sums expended in the event of recovery by the
employer with the excess to the employee or his dependents. In
two states no third party statutes prevail; and in these instances, it
has been held that the employee may retain all of the proceeds of
the third party action even though compensation has previously
been paid.
The following is an example of what problems may arise where
there is no statute providing for subrogation, such as in the State
of Ohio.
Assuming a situation where a third party is a supplier of equip-
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ment for an employer's business and as a consequence of defectiveness of the equipment, the employer's employee is injured. The
failure to furnish safe equipment was a breach of the third party's
contract with the employer. If everyone, under this situation in
Ohio, pressed his rights to the utmost, it would result in the employer paying compensation, then recovering from the third party
his added premiums, because of experience rating increasing such,
thereby coming out approximately even. The employee would recover compensation from the employer and then bring an action
and recover from the third party in tort, keeping for himself the
proceeds of both actions, with a consequence that the third party
would be paying once to the employee for tort and once to the employer for a breach of contracts. The statutes of other states, which
have adopted a similar third party action subrogation pattern, have
various clauses, the details varying as to the range of persons who
are third parties, who has the primary right to bring the action,
and times within which such actions may be brought. These various
provisions would entail a rather lengthy discussion even to attempt
to generalize on the various provisions. It will be my intention,
therefore, to confine my remarks as nearly as possible to those cases
interpreting the provisions of Section 48-118 of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Law and other pertinent Sections of the Act.
From the very first Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Law,
passed by the twenty-third session of the Legislature (1913-1914),
the law has provided for subrogation of the employer or his insurance carrier in the event a third person is liable to the employee or
to his dependents for injury or death The original Section 18 of
Chapter 198 of the Laws of 1913 is set forth below:
Where a third person is liable to the employee or to the dependents, for the injury or death, the employer shall be subrogated
te the right of the employee or the dependents against such third
person, and the recovery by such employer shall not be limited
to the amount payable as compensation to such employee or dependents, but such employer may recover any amount which such
employee or his dependents would have been entitled to recover.
Any recovery by the employer against such third person, in excess of the compensation paid by the employer after deducting
expenses and making such recovery, shall be paid forthwith to
the employee or to the dependents, and shall be treated as an
advance payment by the employer, on account of any future
installments of compensation.

It will be noted that the original act gave to the employer the
rights of the employee as against a third party who was liable for
the injuries or death. There appeared to be no right given the employee to bring an action in the event the employer failed to do so.
In Muncaster v. Graham Ice Cream Co., 172 N.W. 52, 103 Neb. 379
(1919), plaintiff, an employee of an ice machine company, was injured by the negligence of a third party while in the course of his
employment. He brought an action against the third party when his
immediate employer, who had settled with him under compensation, refused to bring further proceedings. It was held that the em-
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ployee had a right to bring the action when the employer who had
paid compensation failed and refused to bring the third party action.
The majority opinion seemed to indicate that the right of action
against the third party was a statutory right arising under the
compensation act. The concurring opinion indicated that the right of
action was one not created by statute but a common law right of
action which had been preserved. The view of the concurring opinion was subsequently adopted by the court in Rehn v. Bingaman,
36 N.W.2d 856, 151 Neb. 196 (1949), wherein the court examined the
1929 amendment to Section 48-118 and pointed out that, had the
cause of action been established by statute, it would not survive
the death of the third party, but as a common law right the same
would survive.
Under the original statute, it was held that where an employee
was injured through the wrongful or negligent act or omission of a
third party the employer was subrogated to all the rights of such
employee or those of his dependents against such third person, and
that until the employer neglected or refused to bring the action
against the third party, the employer's right to do so was exclusive.
It was necessary for the employee to allege and prove that his
employer had refused or neglected to bring the action. O'Donnell
v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 114 Neb. 9, 205 N.W. 561 (1925).
In order to dispense with the problems involved in alleging
and proving the refusal of the employer to bring the action, the section was amended in 1929 by Chapter 135 of the Laws of Nebraska
1929, Page 489. The Proviso which was added is set forth below:
Provided, however, that nothing in this section or Act shall be
construed to deny the right of an injured employee or his personal
representative to bring suit against such third person in his own
name orin the name of the personal representative based upon such
liability; but in such event an employee having paid or paying compensation to such employee or his dependents shall be made a party
to the suit for the purpose of reimbursement, under the provided
right of subrogation, of any compensation paid.
The above-quoted amendment is the only change that has been
made in the section since the passage of the original Act in 19131914.
In General
Initially, in the event of injury, a question of fact to be determined is the relationship of the injured party to the person whose
negligence resulted in such injury.
Persons not engaged in the same enterprise or having no connection or contractual agreements with the immediate employer of
the injured employee fall within the class of third persons without
giving rise to many difficulties. Where the relationship between
the party causing the injury and the injured person is that of fellow
employee or when the injured party is engaged in the same enterprise under different employers, questions arise as to whether or
not such persons are third parties within the meaning of the sec-

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

tion. In order to determine this question, standard tests are usually
applied to determine the existence or nonexistence of the relationship of the employer and employee.
Generally speaking, a third person under the Act is one to which
no liability for the injury would attach under the provisions of
Section 2 of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Law. The
term "employer" is defined in Section 48-114 of the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation Law, and in Section 48-115 the "employee"
and "workman" are defined.
One other provision which has been construed on many occasions in connection with actions under Section 118 is Section 48-116,
which is set forth in Sub-section B of Part 2 of the Act. This section
provides:
Employers; evasion of law; what constitutes; exceptions. Any
person, firm or corporation creating or carrying into operation any
scheme, artifice or device to enable him, them or it to execute work
without being responsible to the workmen for the provisions of this
act, shall be included in the term "employer," and with the immediate employer shall be jointly and severally liable to pay the
compensation herein provided for and be subject to all the provisions of this act. This section, however, shall not be construed as
applying to an owner who lets a contract to a contractor in good
faith, or a contractor, who, in good faith, lets to a subcontractor a
portion of his contract, if the owner or principal contractor, as the
case may be, requires the contractor or subcontractor, respectively,
to procure a policy or policies of insurance from an insurance company licensed to make such insurance in this state, which policy or
policies of insurance shall guarantee payment of compensation according to this act to injured workmen.
Where an owner, contractor, or subcontractor fails to insure
the risk under the Compensation Law and liability is imposed under
Section 48-116 upon the remote employer as distinguished from the
immediate employer, the remote employer is said to be a statutory
employer. Similar results are obtained in most states having statutory provisions differing somewhat from those of Nebraska.
This section has been construed to mean that where liability
would not attach if employment was direct, proviso constituting, as
employer, person using scheme, artifice, or device to escape responsibility, does not apply. McConnell v. Johnson, 139 Nebr. 619 298 NW
346 (1941). The test to be applied then to determine whether one
might be termed an employer under the provisions of Section 48-116
is to ascertain whether or not such person would be liable had they
hired the injured person direct. The same tests are applied in this
instance as are applied to determine the relationship of employeremployee under Section 48-114 and 48-115 of the Act. An example
of the extension under Section 48-116 is set out in Sherlock v. Sherlock, 112 Nebr. 797 201 NW 645, wherein it was held that an employee
of a painting contractor engaged in painting a wholesale drug building was an employee of the drug corporation where the immediate
employer had failed to secure insurance. The court contended the
painting of the building housing the wholesale drug corporation to
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be work within the usual course of the trade, business, or profession, as upkeep, maintenance, and repair are a part of the regular
business.
The construction of Section 48-118 in conjunction with Section
48-116 has given rise to several Supreme Court decisions.
Contractor,Subcontractor,and Owner
The first time the Nebraska Supreme Court was called upon to
determine the issue of whether or not a contractor might be liable
to the injured employee of a subcontractor where both the contractor and subcontractor had complied with the requirement of insuring the risk under the Compensation Act was in O'Donnell v. Baker
Ice Machine Co., 203 NW 635 (1925). In this instance, the plaintiff,
an employee of the subcontractor, sued the prime contractor for
injuries sustained as a result of the prime contractor's negligence.
Both the contractor and the subcontractor had secured insurance.
The court held that where both the contractor and the subcontractor
had secured insurance and where the employee had already received
benefits of that insurance and compensation under the schedule provided by the Act, he was not entitled to recover again from the
owner or the original contractor for the same injury. This decision
followed the trend which was then followed and which is currently
followed in many states that all those persons engaged in a "joint
enterprise" or "common employment," that is, the contractors' employees and the subcontractors' employees, are grouped within the
provision of the Compensation Act such that they cannot be third
parties. A rehearing was granted in this case, and the first opinion
was withdrawn. O'Donnell v. Baker Ice Machine Company, 114
Nebr. 9-205 NW 561 (1925). The same problem was again presented the court in Boyd v. Humphreys, 117 Nebr. 799, 223 N.W. 658
(1929). In this instance, an owner entered into a construction contract with another, who in turn sublet a portion thereof. Both the
prime contractor and subcontractor had complied with the Compensation Statutes with reference to insurance. An employee of
the subcontractor was injured in the course of his employment without fault on his part but by and through the actionable negligence
of the prime contractor. It was contended in this instance that the
contractor, subcontractor, and the employees of both should be
grouped as engaged in a "common enterprise" and as such could
not be third parties. The court examined the law and indicated
that it dealt primarily with the immediate employer and his employees and that the statute did not warrant a grouping of all those
interested in the enterprise within the term "employer" to the extent of excluding them as third parties under the statute. The contractor was held liable to the subcontractor'semployee in the Common Law action. When the injured employee's employer is an independent contractor and such employee is injured as the result of
the negligence of the contractor, the court indicated that the contractor did not fall within the definition of the word "employer"
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as used in the statute, and that such does not include an owner who
requires his contractor to take out compensation insurance, and
neither does it include a subcontractor who sublets and requires his
subcontractor to take out insurance. The contractor is not an employer of the subcontractor's employee, and neither is he liable to
them as such. Mathew v. G. A. Crancer Co., 117 Nebr. 805, 223 N.W.
661 (1929).
The court in construing the applicable sections has generally
held that the owner of property, as to the employees of his contractor, is a third person as the term is used within the meaning
of Section 48-118, and that such contractor is, as to the employees
of his subcontractor, a third person within the meaning of said
section. As a consequence of such relationship, the owner is liable
at common law for any and all damages sustained by his contractor's
employees, caused by his actionable negligence, and likewise the
contractor is liable to his subcontractor's employees who sustain
injury as a result of his actionable negligence. In Tralle v. Hartman
Furniture and Carpet Co., 116 Nebr. 418, 217 N.W. 952 (1928), the
proximate cause of the injury was held to be the failure on the part
of the owners and lessors to have provided an overhead guard on
the elevator on which the deceased, a subcontractor's employee,
was working at the time he sustained accidental injury and death.
The lessee of the building, Hartman Furniture and Carpet Co., was
dismissed, as they had secured compensation insurance to cover its
employees, as had the subcontractor. Here the owner was held
liable for injury to subcontractor's employee.
In Sloan v. Harrington (1929), 117 Nebr. 809, 223 N.W. 663
certiorari denied 50 S. Ct. 65, 280 U.S. 516, 74 L. Ed. the City of
Omaha contracted with Keystone Pipe and Construction Co. to construct a sewer. The pipe company in turn sublet a portion to the
defendant, Harrington. Sloan, an employee of the pipe company,
was injured as a result of the negligence of Harrington, the subcontractor, and his employees. The court held that the subcontractor
was a third party and liable to the employee of the contractor. The
contractor alleged that there was a surrender of the rights of the
injured employee to bring an action at Common Law for his injuries. Section 48-111 sets out the effect of electing to be bound
by the limited compensation afforded by the act and states:
Such agreement or the election provided for in section 48-112
shall be a surrender by the parties thereto of their rights to any
other method, form or amount of compensation or determination
thereof than as provided in Sections 48-109 and 48-147, and an acceptance of all the provisions of said sections, and shall bind the
employee himself, and for compensation for his death shall bind
his legal representatives, his widow and next of kin, as well as the
employer, and the legal representatives of a deceased employer,
and those conducting the business of the employer during bankruptcy or insolvency.
The court in this instance held that the surrender under our
compensation statutes of the right to prosecute an action at Com-
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mon Law for damages arising from the actionable negligence of
another applied solely to the contractor and its injured employee,
and that Harrington, in this instance, was a third person and thus
liable at Common Law.
The owner of a building who has contracted for repairs of such
and who fails to require insurance on the part of the contractor
covering the risk of the contractor's employees under the Compensation Act may be held to be an employer in a compensation action,
but will be not held to be liable as a third party. In Sherlock v.
Sherlock (1924), 112 Nebr. 797, 201 N.W. 645, the court construing
Section 48-116 together with other sections, found that the owner of
a building, a drug company, was an employer within the meaning of
48-116. In this instance, an employee of a painting contractor was
injured while painting the exterior of the building. This finding was
on the ground that the employer, the drug company, would have
been liable had the employee of the subcontractor been hired directly by the drug company. It was held that the upkeep, maintenance, and repair of the outer building was a portion of the regular
trade, business, and profession of the drug company, and therefore
the drug company would have been liable had they hired the subcontractor's employee directly. Under Section 48-116, in order that
an owner, contractor, or subcontractor may be held to be an employer, the facts must be examined, and it must be shown that had
the contractor or owner hired the employee directly himself, such
employee would have been an employee of the owner; then liability
will follow under the Compensation Act as a statutory employer.
McConnell v. Johnson, 139 Nebr. 619, 298 N.W. 346 (1941).
In a suit at Common Law by an injured employee as against the
owner of a building, it is necessary to allege and prove that the
Compensation Law does not apply. In Jones v. Rossbach Co., et al.,
264 N.W. 877, 130 Nebr. 302 (1936), a petition was dismissed for
failure to show by the petition that the Compensation Law did not
apply. In this instance, the injured employee of a contractor sued
the coal company, alleging negligence on its part for failing to
comply with a City Ordinance. The court stated that where the
owner of a building used in conducting the owner's business engages
a contractor to make repairs and one of the contractor's employees
is injured, it must be shown that the Compensation Law does not
apply, and in the absence of such an allegation or proof, it will
be presumed that the owner was an employer, as provided by Section 48-116.
By the same token, an owner who lets a contract to a contractor
or a contractor who lets to a subcontractor a portion of a contract
but does not require the contractor or subcontractor respectively
to procure policies of insurance to guarantee payment of compensation according to the Act, is not liable to the employees of such
contractor or subcontractor as third parties but may be held respon-

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

sible only for the amount that such employee would be entitled to
under the Compensation Act.
In line with the above cases, it would appear that where insurance is carried, owners, lessees, contractors, and subcontractors.
may be third parties with respect to negligently caused injuries
of employees or any of the others. Where insurance is not carried
and liability for compensation would attach if the employee were
hired directly, then such owners, lessees, contractors, and subcontractors may be held liable for compensation but not as third
parties.
Co-EmployeesFellow Employees
The court, in Boyd B. Humphreys, supra, answered the contention that all parties engaged in a common enterprise should be
grouped together and stated:
Hence we conclude that under the facts in this case there is
only one employer, and that is Cone (the subcontractor) and the
only ones grouped are Cone and his employees engaged in the
enterprise. The defendants and all others are third parties.
The above-quoted section would seem to indicate that co-employees or fellow workmen could not be considered third persons
under the act. The question was again mentioned in Sloan v. Harrington, (1929), 117 Nebr. 809, 223 N.W. 663, wherein the court
indicated that the question of whether or not the term "third person" could be applied to employees of an immediate employer was
left undetermined in the decision. The question was directly before
the court in Rehn v. Bingaman, et at., 151 Nebr. 196, 36 N.W. 2d, 856
(1949), wherein the court, in discussing the relationship of the deceased defendant, who had been operating a boom which struck a
power line causing injury to the plaintiff, stated that the question
of whether the deceased was an independent contractor or a fellow
employee need not be decided and that
In any event, whether he was one or the other is of no importance because he would be such a third person in any event. Conceivably, an independent contractor would be such a third person,
and it is generally the rule that a fellow employee would also be
such person regardless of the capacity of his employment so long as
he did not occupy the relationship of employer-employee. 57 C.J.S.
Master and Servant S 578, page 348; 35 Am. Jr. Master and Servant,
Sec. 525, page 954, Sec. 526, Page 955; Notation 99 ALR., Page 442;
Hudson B. Moonier, 8 Cir. 94 Fed. 2d 142, ID, 8 Cir., 102 F 2d 96.
The court went on to state further that
When the term "third party" is mentioned in the Workmen's
Compensation Act, it means any person other than the master, or
those whom the Act makes master, and the employee who is seeking compensation under their agreement. The act is careful to preserve the status of a third person by not defining the term; so the
presumption must be that the law as to third persons in every respect stands as it was before the act. Citing Allan v. Trester, 112
Nebr. 515. 199 N.W. 841 and Fonda v. Northwestern Public Service
Co., 134 Neb. 430, 278 N.W. 836, indicating the same conclusion.
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The court felt that to hold otherwise would unjustly confer upon
every employee freedom to neglect his duty toward a fellow employee and thus escape all liability for damages proximately caused
by his negligence.
A further discussion as to the liability of a co-employee or
the responsibility as a third party to the employees of a subcontractor or contractor are set forth In re Estate of Bingaman, 155 Nebr.
24, 50 N.W. 2d 523 (1951), wherein the court stated that a person
in the relationship of a fellow employee to another is not liable for
negligent acts committed under the direction and control of the
employer except for misfeasance or positive wrong. See also Pester
v. Holmes, 109 Neb. 605.
One other question that should be explored and kept in mind is
that of the loaned employee and the ascertaining whether a loaned
employee has become the employee of another or is still considered
to be the employee of the general employer. In this connection see
In re Estate of Bingaman, supra; Koestler v. Rogers Construction
Co., 155 Nebr. 40 and 50 N.W. 2d, 553 (1931); Shamberg v. Shamberg
153 Nebr. 495, 45 N.W. 2d 446 (1950).
Effect of Release to
Third Party
In Hugh Murphy Construction Co. v. Serck, 104 Nebr. 398, 177
N.W. 747 (1920), Serck, the injured employee who was employed by
the Hugh Murphy Construction Co., was injured while driving a
truck which was struck by a negligent third party. A release was
taken from Serck for $75 by the third party. Serck in turn then
filed suit against the construction company for compensation and
recovered for a period of twenty weeks at the rate of $12 per week.
The construction company interposed the release of the negligent
third party as a bar to compensation action by Serck. The lower
court said with reference to the release that Serck did not in any
manner give up, release, or relinquish his rights to compensation.
They felt that he had only given up, released, or relinquished such
right as he or his employer for him might have had to recover something by way of damages from the negligent third party over and
above any amount for which the employer should be liable for or
paid to its employee, the defendant Serck, for compensation for his
injuries in accordance with the terms of the Compensation Law. The
court said that the amount which the employee was entitled to receive from the employer was in a large degree fixed by statute,
that the amount which the employer might in turn recover from
the wrongdoer is in turn determined either by settlement satifactory
to the three parties concerned or by the ordinary processes of litigation in an action for damages. The wrongdoers must take notice
of the rights of all and cannot by a settlement with the injured party
increase the burden of the innocent employer. The parties concerned
are equal in the eyes of the law, and the court will not suffer one
to profit at the expense of either of the others. To allow the work-
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man to settle with the negligent third party for an unfair or inadequate sum would compel the employer to be mulcted to an additional extent; therefore, when the third party settled with the injured workman, it took the risk of having to pay additional damages
to the employer if the settlement was not fair, adequate, and satisfactory. If such a settlement was satisfactory to it, the employer is
entitled to deduct from the amount of compensation money which
the injured workman has already received by way of settlement.
If, however, the settlement was inadequate or obtained by fraud or
mistake, then the employer is compelled to pay a greater sum by
way of compensation. The employer still has his remedy by proceeding against the third party for any damages suffered by the
workman in excess of the amount paid by way of settlement. In
this instance, they allowed the $75 to be applied as first payments
on compensation. This case seems to indicate that if the amount
of settlement is fair and not obtained by fraud or mistake, the
amount of the settlement may be applied as against compensation
payments due by the employer, but in the event the amount of the
settlement is less than the amount of compensation, the employer
may still have an action against the third party, but the employee is
deprived of recovering any amount in excess of the amount to which
he would be entitled under compensation. The language in this
case seems to indicate that the court will not allow the compensation carrier or the employee to settle a subrogation claim or personal injury claim which would be unfair or inadequate as far as
the other interested party is concerned.
A rather novel instance in which the question of the effect of
release on one hand and a lump-sum settlement on the other hand
was presented to the court in Burks v. Packer, 9 N.W. 2d 471, 143
Nebr. 373 (143). In this instance, plaintiff was the administratrix
of the estate of her son who died as a result of an operation which
was alleged to have been negligently performed by defendant doctor. The insurance company was made a party defendant in that
a lump-sum settlement had been entered into between the insurance company and the administratrix after an award had been
issued following the original hearing. The insurance carrier for
answer admitted the allegation in the plaintiff's petition and by
cross-petition alleged that the employee had sustained an accident
and came into the hands of the defendant doctor for treatment
which was negligently rendered, resulting in his death. The separate
answer of the doctor denied the allegation in plaintiff's petition,
and on oral motion plaintiff's action was dismissed as to the defendant doctor without prejudice to the rights of the insurance
carrier under its cross-petition. Defendant doctor's amended answer
to the cross-petition of the insurance carrier admitted the insurance
company to be the carrier and that the deceased had come into his
charge as a result of being referred by the employer's foreman and
for further answer alleged payment to the plaintiff in the sum
of $2,500, in consideration of which the administratrix dismissed her
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cause of action as against the-defendant doctor, with prejudice. The
insurance company filed a motion to require the action to proceed
upon the original petition of the plaintiff and adjust the interests of
the parties after verdict, which motion was overruled. It then
filed a motion to enter judgment in favor of the defendant for
$2,000. This was overruled and the case proceeded to trial, resulting in a dismissal because of insufficient evidence to sustain
a verdict. The doctor asserted that the statute contemplates a determination of liability either by admission or judgment, that the
answer of the defendant doctor denied the liability, and that the
settlement and release indicated that such were no admission of
liability by the defendant doctor or any prejudice to his rights. The
doctor further contended that the lump sum settlement approved
by the district court, in effect, stated the claim did not arise out
of and in the course of the deceased's employment, and therefore,
when the court entered such order, the insurance company was
deprived of its rights to be subrogated to the amounts therein paid.
The settlement entered into by the administratrix reserved all
the rights of the insurance company and agreed to pay the insurance company the first $2,000 out of the gross proceeds of any such
claim or action which was then contemplated to be brought against
the defendant for negligent diagnosis and treatment.
The second syllabus by the court is as follows:
Where an insurance carrier settles a compensation action, conditioned that it be paid first out of the proceeds of an action,
brought by the personal representative of the deceased employee
against another person, the amount of compensation paid by it,
and the latter action is settled, such insurance carrier is entitled to
equitable subrogation in the amount of compensation paid.
The court in its decision stated
Without regard to whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the jury, the circumstances of this
case warrant the application of equitable subrogation. While the
characteristics of statutory subrogation and equitable subrogation
are the same, we do not determine the case under statutory subrogation. See Comp. St. 1929, Sec. 48-118.
In this instance the district court directed that they enter a
judgment for the insurance carrier in the amount of $2,000 and
costs against the defendant doctor.
In view of the holding of Burks v. Packer, supra, it would appear that in any settlement entered into with an administratrix or
other person wherein there is a contemplated third-party action in
the offing, it is suggested that there be included in the lump-sum
-ettlement a reservation of all of the rights of the insurance company and an agreement on behalf of the party with whom the
settlement is made that such insurance company be reimbursed the
amount expended for compensation out of the gross proceeds of any
such claim or contemplated action to be brought against a negligent
third party.
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Right to Participatein Trial and Liability for Costs
Generally speaking, it is the usual procedure for counsel representing an insurance company or employer who has been made a
party defendant for the sole purpose of protecting a statutory right
of subrogation not to participate in the trial of the matter, although
such defendant does have a right to call witnesses and participate
in the trial in an effort to increase the amount of the recovery of
the plaintiff.
In the event counsel does not take part and participate in the
hearing or the calling of witnesses, cross-examining witnesses, or
arguing, there is no liability for costs, but in the event of participation in the hearing such that the defendant employer or insurer
is practically a co-plaintiff so that the defendant is required to defend against both it and the plaintiff in order to escape liability to
either, there is joint liability for costs. Rehn v. Bingaman, 152 Nebr.
170, 40 N.W. 2d 673 (1950).
Attorneys' Fees
In the event the suit is brought by the employer and recovery
is had, costs of such action are deducted from the amount recovered,
and the employer is entitled to full reimbursement. Bronder v. Otis
Elevator Co., et al., 12 Nebr. 581, 237 N.W. 671 (1931). In the event
the suit is brought by the employee, it is generally held that where
the amount recovered is in excess of that which the employer is
entitled to under the subrogation, the employer has a prior lien for
the entire amount to which he is subrogated without the necessity of
having to participate or contribute to plaintiff's attorneys' fees. In
the 1955 session of the Nebraska Legislature a bill was introduced,
the purpose of which was to have the insurance companies or the
employer share the burden of attorneys' fees in cases where actions
were brought by the employee and recovery had. The suggested
amendment was not passed, however.
Parties
Section 118 provides that where the employee or dependents of
a deceased employee bring an action against a third party, the
employer, having paid or paying compensation, shall be made a
party to the suit for purposes of reimbursement. You will note that
the statute provides that only in the event compensation has been
paid or is now being paid is it necessary that the employer be
made a party defendant.
In Denner v. Walters 154 Nebr. 506 48 N.W. 2d 635 (1951), the
question was raised whether or not a defendant who had received
workmen's compensation benefits from his employer should be required to make his employer a party defendant after having counter-claimed for his injuries. Plaintiff claimed defendant counterclaimant was obliged to make his employer a party for the reason
that the employer had paid compensation and for this reason moved
to dismiss the first cause of action alleged in the counter-claim.
The court, in discussing the problem, stated:
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The employer of the defendant is not involved in this court action
for damages, and the only right that could accrue, insofar as
this case is concerned, to the benefit of the employer would
be the right of subrogation for compensation paid by it to its employees as provided for in Section 48-118 RS 1943.
They went on to state that they were not required under the state
of the record to pass upon the question of whether or not the defendant counter-claimant should have made his employer a party
as required to do so under the Act. In this instance, verdict was in
favor of the plaintiff and was affirmed. It was held that the admission of evidence with regard to the payment of compensation to
the defendant by defendant's employer, who was not a party, was
error; but the same as without prejudice, in view of the instructions by the court to the effect that in the event they should find
for the defendant, no deduction for any amount of wages advanced
to the defendant by his employer or any payments of medical
should be made.
It is felt that the employer should be made a party in all
instances where compensation is being paid or has been paid.
The proper party to bring an action in the event of death of the
employee is the administrator, both under Section 25-305, Real
Party in interest section, and under the wrongful death statute,
Section 30-809 R.R.S. 1943 et seq. See also Luckey v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 117 Nebr. 85 219 N.W. 802 (1928). Goeres v. Goeres, 124 Neb.
720, 248 N.W. 75 (1933).
Concurrent or Joint Negligence of Employer as Affecting Right of
Subrogation.
The question of whether a third party may plead the concurrent
negligence of the employer to defeat the recovery under subrogation
has been before the court on several occasions. As early as 1917
it was held that the fact that an employer's negligence concurred
with the negligence of a third person to cause an injury which
entitled the workman to compensation did not bar the employer's
right to subrogation against a third person under the Nebraska
Workmen's Compensation Act. Otis Elevator Co. v. Miller and Paine
240 Fed. 376 153 CCA 302. The court indicated that the liability of
the company is positively fixed by law regardless of the question
of negligence upon its part. The law also provides that company
should be subrogated to the rights of the dependents or the deceased against the negligent third party, providing it was the negligence of the third party that caused the injury or death. They
indicated that to construe this section as not permitting the employer to prosecute the action for the benefit of itself and the dependents of the deceased if the negligence of the employer concur
with that of the joint tortfeasor in causing the death would be to
in effect destroy this section. The feeling is that the action brought
by the employer against the negligent third party must be treated,
insofar as the right to recover is concerned, the same as if such
action had been brought by the administrator of the estate of the
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deceased or the injured workman himself, and to hold otherwise
would defeat such an action and permit one wrongdoer to plead
the fault of a joint wrongdoer in defense and would destroy the
right of subrogation granted in the statute. The liability to compensate an employee imposed by law upon the employer regardless
of negligence is in lieu of his liability for all other reasons. See
also Foster v. City of Lincoln 107 Nebr. 404 186 NW 317 (1922).
Graham v. City of Lincoln, 106 Nebr. 305, 183 NW 569 (1921).
Subrogationin the Event of Death
Section 30-809 Revised Statutes of Nebraska 1943 provides for
an action for wrongful death. The following section, Section 810,
provides that such action shall be brought by and in the name of
the personal representative for the exclusive benefit of the widow or
widower and next of kin and further provides that the avails thereof
shall be paid to and distributed among the widow or widower and
next of kin in the proportion that the pecuniary loss suffered by
each bears to the total pecuniary loss suffered by all of such persons. Section 48-118 provides that the employer shall be subrogated
to "all the right of the employee or to the dependents against such
third person" and the employer shall be entitled to recover "any
amount which such employee or his dependents should have been
entitled to recover." This section has been construed to mean that
the employer is subrogated to the dependents' share of the judgment
accruing from the right of action given the personal representatives
and not the right of action itself. In one instance the decedent,
while working for his employer, was killed through the negligence
of a third party. His employer paid compensation provided for
under the Workmen's Compensation Act. The decedent's executrix
brought suit, joining the employer as defendant, and recovered, the
amount of the recovery being $7,500, which was paid into court to
await distribution. A son of the decedent by previous marriage,
by his guardian, intervened and demanded distribution in the same
proportions as the personal property of an intestate is distributed
under the inheritance laws, or one-fourth to plaintiff, executrix,
and three-fourths to intervenor. The district court directed distribution in accordance with such prayer after first deducting $2,500
in fees for attorneys. This decision was appealed, and the supreme
court found compensation benefits had been paid in an amount in
excess of $4,700 and that the employer had expended $300 in expenses in making the recovery or a total in excess of $5,000. Originally the action had been tried in compensation court, resulting in
a finding that the executrix was also the widow and was the only
dependent of the deceased employee. A lump sum settlement was
consummated, and the payments made by the employer were adjudicated and authorized by the Compensation Law. The intervenor
was not a dependent at the time of his father's death or dependent
upon him in any way for support. The question before the court
was whether the employer by statutory right of subrogation would
be entitled to reimbursement for the payments and expenses in full
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before any part of the money collected under Lord Campbell's Act
can properly be distributed to the heirs of the deceased employee.
The court, in a discussion of Section 48-118, stated:
This section is part of an act imposing upon employers of labor
a liability which did not previously exist. It was competent for the
Legislature to prescribe the terms and conditions under which the
new burdens were imposed. The right of subrogation to provide
the means of reimbursement for compensation allowed and paid
in consequence of a third person's negligence was an important
creation of the Legislature. It was intended to benefit the public,
the employer and employee, as well as the dependents of the latter.
The right to which the employer is subrogated are the rights of
"the employee" or of "the dependents," and these rights apply to
"any compensation paid." The contract of employment was the employee's contract with his employer. The employee agreed to statutory reimbursement for the protection of the employer to the extent of the compensation paid in the event of a recovery from a
third person-the wrongdoer whose negligence caused the loss. The
statute is by construction a part of the contract of employment and
that contract binds alike the employees and the latter's legal representative. City of Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich. 178, 189 N.W.
221.
The court said that the measure of the employer's statutory
right to subrogation under the Workmen's Compensation Law was
reimbursement for the full amount of compensation properly paid
by employer to employee's dependents, with the employer's expenses
for making recovery to that extent from a third person whose negligence caused the death of the employee. The court said in connection with the view expressed as to the variance with the provisions
of Lord Campbell's Act and that of the Compensation Act:
The Workmen's Compensation Law is the later enactment. It
is an independent statute creating the remedies and liabilities and
covering the entire subject of legislation to which it relates. It is
well settled in the law that such a statute may modify inconsistent
provisions of an earlier act without referring to him insofar as disbursements required by Lord Campbell's Act are inconsistent with
disbursements required by the Workmen's Compensation Law, the
provisions of the later Act control the specific instances to which
it applies.
It was held that the employer was entitled to the entire fund
remaining after payment of the attorneys' fees. Bronder v. Otis
Elevator Co., et al., 237 N.W. 671, 121 Nebr. 581 (1931).
The proper party to bring the action is the personal representative, and the Compensation Act merely relates to the distribution
of the proceeds. In one instance where the administratrix, who was
also the widow of the deceased, did not stand to gain by the action
against the third party, she made a contract with the insurance
company and with the employer that in the event there should be
recovery, the entire amount, with the exception of ten per cent,
would go to the employer and to the insurance company. The court
held over objection that the administratrix in this instance was a
proper party to bring the action, which was affirmed. Goeres v.
Goeres, supra.
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Just how the amount recovered in any action by the administratrix shall be divided as between the parties is of no concern of the
defendant. See Otis Elevator v. Miller and Paine, 240 Fed. 376 153
CCH 302 (1917). Instructions to the jury that the amount of compensation received is immaterial and that the jury need not be
concerned with the division of the fruits of the lawsuit, if any, are
proper. Grahamv. City of Lincoln, supra.
Third Party'sAction Over Against Negligent Employer
The question of whether a third party, in action by an employee,
can get contribution or indemnity from the employer when the
employer's negligence caused or contributed to the injury has not
been litigated in the State of Nebraska. The courts of the various
states are more or less evenly divided on this question. It is indeed
one of the most interesting angles of the compensation subrogation
problem. In states where compensation subrogation is allowed, recovery over by way of indemnity has been allowed in certain instances. Such a right may be based on an express contract of indemnity where the employer has given a covenant to the landlord
to hold the landlord harmless in the event of claims (Kaylor v.
Magill [C.C.A. 6th] 181 Fed. 2d 179 [1950]), or it may result from a
separate duty based on the relationship, such as a bailor-bailee
situation (Baugh v. Rogers 24 Cal. 2d 200, 148 Pac. 2d 633; 152 A.L.R.
1043 [1944]) or a separate implied obligation to use care (See Westchester Light Company v. Westchester Small Estates Corporation
278 N.Y. 175; 15 NE 2d 567 [1938]) or duty of primary to secondary
wrongdoer. An example of the later is American DistrictTelegraph
Co. v. Kitteson et al., decided by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1950, 179 Fed. 2d, 946. This was an instance where the defendant, Kittleson, an employee of Armour and Co., was injured
when an employee of the American District Telegraph Co. fell
through a skylight at the Armour Building, landing on Kittleson.
Kittleson received compensation from Armour's and brought an
action against the American District Telegraph Co. for damage. The
American District Telegraph Co. filed a third-party complaint
against Armour and Co., contending that the fall of their workman
through the skylight was due to the negligence of Armour and Co.
The District Court of the Northern District of Iowa gave judgment
to Kittleson and to Armour's and entered an order for dismissal
of the third-party complaint. The American District Telegraph Co.
appealed. The Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment in
the amount of $60,000 in favor of Armour's and Kittleson as against
the American District Telegraph Co. In this case $6,800 had been
paid in compensation benefits. The court further held that Armour
and Co. could be held liable to American for the damages that
American had to pay Armour's employee. Such a finding was based
on the idea that the employee had a right of action as against his
employer, Armour and Co., for compensation, that Armour and Co.
being subrogated could, along with the employee, sue the third
party whose negligence brought about the injuries, Armour's being
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entitled to recover the $6,800 paid out in compensation, and the
employee entitled to receive damages in excess of that to which
he had received in compensation. American, in turn, it was held,
could recover on the ground that the employer's negligence was primary, since it created a dangerous condition; that is, allowing the
skylight to become encrusted with dust, such that the employee
of American could not distinguish it from the roof around it, while
the negligence of American, the third party, was secondary in that
its employee failed to discover the danger. The court indicated there
was an implied promise of indemnity by the primary wrongdoer to
the secondary wrongdoer. The court, in discussing it, indicated that
"indemnity" implies a primary or basic liability in one person,
though a second is also liable with the first to a third, and discharge
of the obligation by a second person leaves him with a right to
secure compensation from one who, as between themselves, is primarily liable. Court said that the difference between "indemnity"
and "contribution," in cases between persons liable for a wrong, is
that in the former the law implies an agreement or obligation and
enforces a duty on the primary or principal wrongdoer to respond
for all the damages, whereas in the latter there is no agreement,
expressed or implied, but a common burden which the parties
stand in equali juri and which in equity and good conscience should
be equally borne. See also Chicago and NW Railroad Co. v. Booten
57 Fed. 2d 786 CCA Nebr. 1932, Union Stockyards Co. of Omaha v.
Chicago B&Q R. Co., 196 U.S. 217, 222, 25 S. Ct. 226, 49 L. Ed. 453 and
2 Ann. Cas. 525. In the latter case, it was said that indemnity is
given to those whose only negligence is failure to discover a condition created by the negligence of another where both are liable to
a third party.
As a result of the above, the attorney representing the employer
under subrogation, when made a party defendant, is faced with a
dilemma. Instinctively he is desirous of securing the maximum recovery on behalf of the plaintiff in order that he may be reimbursed
in the amount for compensation, and at the same time knows that
in the event of a large recovery by the plaintiff, he will be obliged
to defend on the third-party complaint of the third party as against
the employer for indemnity. The writer knows of two actions presently pending where the attorney is faced with such a situation.
It is felt that in the future more third-party complaint actions will
be filed.
LEGAL PROBLEMS IN DISABILITY INSURANCE
J. Edward Day
Associate General Counsel
The Prudential Insurance Company of America
In 1932 Amelia Chard was an instructor in French at the high
school at Beatrice, Nebraska. Eighteen months previously she had
purchased a life insurance policy which provided for monthly total
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disability benefits if "the insured has become totally disabled by
bodily injury or disease so that he is and will be thereby wholly
prevented from performing any work, following any occupation or
engaging in any business for remuneration or profit." The policy
further provided that "if at any time the insured shall become able
to perform any work, follow any occupation, or engage in any business for remuneration or profit, no further income payments shall
be made." In 1932 Miss Chard became seriously ill, had a major
surgical operation, and suffered a nervous and mental breakdown
which resulted in private hospitalization and treatment by physicians and psychiatrists. For a period of ten years the insurance
company paid the monthly total disability benefits.
By 1943 Miss Chard had become a night clerk in the Blackstone
apartment hotel in Omaha working from 11:00 P.M. to 7:00 A.M.
six days a week.
The insurance company discontinued the disability payments,
and litigation followed. The trial court refused to direct a verdict
for the defendant, and the jury awarded a verdict to the plaintiff.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska in 1944 held that the
trial court was correct in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant. (Chard v. New York Life Insurance Co., 16 N.W. 2d 858
[1944])
The total disability clause in this case referred to inability
to perform "any work," yet the court gave considerable attention to
whether the insured was capable of resuming teaching. The court
considered the nature and demands of the night clerk duties being
performed by the insured and gave attention to such factors as
the following:
1. There were few registrations during the insured's hours
of duty.
2. Her work was done in comparative quiet, with lack of
confusion.
3. The job did not require exceptional skill, tact, or great
mental concentration.
4. "She does the work fairly well, but makes many mistakes ordinarily not made by others."
I have summarized this case in order to use it as a text that
I can refer to in discussing legal problems in disability insurance
for the case highlights a number of those problems.
Disability insurance achieved its original prominence as an
adjunct of life insurance, and a considerable amount is still written
in that way. It is that field to which all of us who write disability
insurance in any form today look to for guidance and precedents.
Perhaps I should explain right here at the outset that there
are two fundamental kinds of disability insurance. One is what
might be called the long-term type, providing benefits for total
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and permanent disability. Such benefits may continue to be paid
up to age 60, 65, or, in some cases, even for life. This is the kind of
coverage customarily provided by the disability provisions of life
insurance policies.
The second type or short-term disability coverage is written
by the health and accident or, as some prefer to call it, the sickness
and accident insurers. Thesp contracts have nothing to do with life
insurance but provide, usually, weekly or monthly indemnities
during periods when the insured is unable to work. In recent years
many of the large life insurance companies have begun to write
the separate contract type of sickness and accident insurance so
that, as far as the source of the coverage is concerned, the situation
is a little mixed. However, there is a real difference between the
two kinds of coverage, about which more later.
My company, the Prudential, has been in the individual sickness
and accident field only since 1952. By that I mean that only during
the past four years have we written so-called income protection
policies-not involving life insurance-to pay monthly benefits in
event of inability to work because of sickness or injury.
We in the Prudential have had a great deal of experience with
disability clauses in life policies-as a matter of fact, probably the
first instance of the use of such clauses in the United States was
in the weekly premium policies issued by Prudential eighty years
ago providing for sickness benefits ranging from $3 to $25 a week.
Our experience with that coverage was not good-the English Prudential had previously found it "disastrous" -and it was abandoned
in 1877.1 We did not get seriously into it again until about forty
years ago and there were times in the thirties when we wished we
hadn't. For many reasons it is not an easy form of insurance to
write. While in some respects its legal aspects fall within a rather
specialized area of the law, it is related, in many ways, to fields
such as workmen's compensation with which most lawyers come
in contact at frequent intervals.
The insurance industry, and particularly the life insurance industry, has had a large part in the emphasis placed on economic
security today. We have taught the family head to believe that
the protection of his brood against the hazards of life is among his
highest duties, that he must provide, through insurance, against
the day when he is no longer available to bring home the bacon.
But death is not the only hazard he faces; he may be incapacitated by sickness, injury, or even by advancing years. In many
cases the need in disability is even greater because the one-time
breadwinner, instead of being taken out of the picture, remains as
a nonproductive consumer-and because of his condition a heavy
consumer-of his family's reduced means.
According to Dr. Solomon Huebner, the leading writer-philosI The

Prudential, May and Oursler, pp. 70-71, 74.
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opher on life insurance, a condition of total and permanent disability-which he calls "living death"--is the worst of the three

the other two being
forms of death to the self-supporting individual,
'2
"actual death" and "retirement death."

To provide protection

against "living death," however, presents problems that are unique
and without counterpart in the life insurance field. They spring
from the difficulty of defining the contingency insured against and
the extremely subjective nature of the factors controlling the presentation of claims. In life insurance, for example, there is no
problem of interpretation in judging the quick from the dead; nor
can death be imagined or feigned (except for the rare case where
there is a mysterious disappearance for seven years, and that sort
of thing is normally motivated not by desire to cheat an insurance
company but by desire for a new girl friend).
But total disability depends on what a man can do, and what
he can do is invariably conditioned by what he is willing to do,
and what he is willing to do depends all too frequently on the very
practical consideration: "What's in it for me?" A man who has a
backache usually will not give up a $150 a week job to collect a
$25 weekly indemnity. But if he is out of work anyway, that backache may suddenly become much more painful and debilitating.
It is extremely difficult to take proper account of such factors
in actuarial planning. Disability insurance makes a valiant, and,
on the whole, a remarkably successful attempt to apply the sharp,
sure mathematics of actuarial science to an equation of imprecise
terms, the solution of which depends upon the infinite variety of
human nature.
If I were to ask you to tell me on what conditions disability
benefits should be payable, that is, to state the risk that should be
insured against in disability policies, no doubt you would say that
benefits should be provided when a man is sick or hurt and unable
to work. I would agree with you-that is our objective. And we
would like to define it just that simply, only the facts of life will
not let us-the facts of life being, in part at least, the ingenuity
of lawyers.
A man who's down on his luck and unable to find a job stubs
his toe. Now he is hurt and unable to work. He could collect under
the above definition, and you would help him. But it is not a claim
an insurance company would feel it should pay, because by "sick
or hurt and unable to work" its policy contract really meant to provide benefits only when the sickness or injury was severe enough
to, and did, necessitate cessation of work. Well, then, we have to
say so, and "there's the rub."
You are all familiar with the rule of law that the terms of a
written instrument are construed against the drafter. This is particularly true of insurance policies which are contracts of adhesion,
2 Life Insurance, S. S. Huebner, 4th Ed. pp. 362-3.
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contracts which are offered to the insured on a "take it or leave it"
basis without his having an opportunity to negotiate about any of
the terms or conditions. And when, as in a disability case, the contest presents a picture of appealing human needs, clamoring in vain
against an impersonal financial edifice of untold (but well known)
resources, the application of this rule can become a little exaggerated.
The companies that first wrote disability insurance sought to
secure their position by using an ironclad definition of disability,
which, literally construed, would have provided for the payment
of benefits only to insureds who were flat on their backs and mentally incompetent. These companies intended and followed a more
liberal practice in the payment of claims, but they wanted the discretion in their hands to protect themselves against malingerers.
The contingency insured against was described as Total and
Permanent Disability. "Total" was further defined as "the incapacity, resulting from bodily injury or sickness, to perform any
3
work or engage in any occupation for compensation or profit."
"Permanent" was intended to mean that the disability must be of
such a nature and severity as to continue indefinitely; some companies specifically stated that the disability must be "for life." Let's
see what the courts did with these concepts.
In Federal Life Insurance Co. v. Lewis,4 the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma took the word "permanent" out of its dictionary meanings
and re-defined it for insurance purposes. The policy promised benefits upon receipt of proof that the insured would be "continuously
and wholly prevented for life, from pursuing any and all gainful
occupations." The medical evidence showed that the insured was
suffering from a disease known as ataxia tabes dorsalis, that as a
result he had to some extent lost control of the muscles of the lower
body and walked with great difficulty. However, he was apparently
improving. The company had allowed benefits for a time but discontinued them when it appeared that the insured had sufficiently
recovered. In the court action, the insured's doctor testified that
the prognosis was not good but that he could not state definitely
the insured would never be able to work again. The company sought
to uphold its position on the ground that there was no proof of
permanence.
It was recognized, of course, that the permanence of a condition
of health is a matter of dispute even in medical circles, and the
company expected to resolve doubtful cases in favor of the insured.
In fact, it had done so in this instance. And there was a provision
in the policy for periodic review of claims and cessation of beneifts
in the event of recovery. The court seized upon that as an implied
acknowledgment by the company that "permanent" did not mean
3 Total Disability Provisions in Life Insurance Contracts, Herrick, p. 38.
4 76 Okla. 142, 183 Pac. 975 (1919).
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what it said. The opinion stated that, in the light of recovery clause,
to give "permanent" a literal meaning would make the policy ambiguous and contradictory and meaningless in part. It was concluded that if the policy was to be read as a whole, "permanent"
could mean no more than "probably permanent."
Decisions like this made the evaluation of the probability a
question of fact. Questions of fact are for the jury, and there were
the usual astounding results. Cases are on record in which benefits
for permanent disability have been ordered paid to claimants who
admitted in court that they had fully recovered-on the ground
that, despite the facts, the disability should reasonably have been
looked upon as "probably permanent" at the time of claim.5 The
companies had not charged for benefits for "probably permanent"
disability and never meant to promise them but found that they
had done so in spite of their precautions.
Some of the later cases went even further. In Bahneman v.
6
Prudential,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota classified as permanent any disability "which might reasonably be expected to continue for an indefinite time." A Mississippi court defined "permanent" by antithesis saying, "We construe the word permanent when
used in a policy provision such as this as one used for the proper
purpose, and for the purpose only, of excluding disabilities which
are merely temporary. Although the disability be one which may
or will pass away in a fair period of time, yet if the required period
is longer than that which, reasonably considered, is only temporary,
then it must of necessity fall within the opposite general term 'permanent' because it is not temporary. ' 7 Dr. Arthur Hunter, who developed the first generally accepted tables for disability rates and
reserves, once commented: "Permanent in connection with disability under life contracts has come to have about the same degrees
of literalness as it has in connection with waves in women's hair."
This trend in court decisions created a serious problem. Temporary disability could not be written at rates appropriate for a real
permanent-disability risk. The companies resorted to compromise
and adopted a presumptive clause which provided that disability
would be considered permanent when it had lasted for a stated
period, usually three months or six months. That, frankly, placed
the companies in the temporary-disability business which they had
sought to avoid. The health and accident insurers who wrote disability income coverage under separate contracts were always in
that field and fixed their premium rates accordingly. Permanence
was never a factor nor a problem for them.
New England Mutual v. Durre (Ind. Appl. 1936) 199 N.E. 868.
6 193 Minn. 26, 257 N.W. 514 (1934).
7 155 Miss. 515, 124 So. 485 (Supreme Ct. Miss. 1929).
8
The Life Insurance Contract, First Ed., Home and Mansfield, p. 212.
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As a result of this modification of the concept of permanence,
my company on one occasion found itself under the necessity of
paying so-called total and permanent disability benefits for pregnancy. The lady in question wrote us that, although under the best
medical care, she had had four miscarriages and had been told by
her physicians that the only way she could have a child was by being
completely inactive during the entire period. We furnished claim
forms and, because of the unusual nature of the case, assigned one
of our representatives to investigate it. The representative reported
that while it was a planned period of disability there was no question of its reality. He added, "I was impressed by the sincerity with
which this woman is working at this job of having a baby.... She
has lost other babies by not being inactive. She craves a child and
is bound to have one if possible." The claim was approved. Shortly
after the birth, we received a letter from the lady very courteously
informing us that she was no longer disabled and expressing her appreciation to all the fine gentlemen of the Prudential who had
helped her "the only way they could to have a baby the only way
she could."
The other part of this "permanent and total" concept is defining
what is meant by "total." The definition of the word "total" in this
connection has been the subject of countless judicial pronouncements. In the first place, there is an important difference between
occupational coverage and general or non-occupational coverage,
i.e., the difference between inability to perform "the insured's occupation" and inability to perform "any occupation." Accident and
health insurers wrote occupational coverage because they were in
the temporary-disability business with benefits of limited duration,
and they expected liability to attach whenever the insured was incapacitated to do his job. The insurers writing disability coverage
in life insurance policies were concerned, on the other hand, with
the long term only. They did not undertake to pay lifelong benefits,
for example, to a street-car motorman who had hurt his foot and
had been moved inside to an office job. So the life insurers wrote
general rather than occupational coverage, promising to pay only
when the insured could not work at all. Or at least they thought
that is what they had done.
The courts took a different view. Practically speaking, none
construed the clause as written; each case rewrote it to some extent,
and some courts refused to recognize any distinction whatsoever
between "his occupation" and "any occupation." In Fogelsong v.
Modern Brotherhood,9 a Missouri court said that a clause which included the usual language "inability to carry on any vocation or
calling" "should be construed as meaning, if anything, the vocation
or calling in which he might be following at the time he became
disabled and not any vocation whatsoever he might be able to follow
after he became disabled."
9

121 Mo. App. 548, 97 S.W. 240 (Kans. City Ct. of Appeals 1906).
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The Nebraska Supreme Court has followed this approach
whereby no distinction is recognized between clauses referring to
inability to perform the insured's occupation and clauses referring
to inability to perform any occupation. 0 The Chard case which I
discussed at the outset is a recent example of this line of cases in
Nebraska. The disability clause there involved referred not just
to inability to perform the insured's occupation but to inability to
perform "any occupation." The insured's occupation had been that
of serving as a teacher of French. The opinion doesn't state what
she was receiving in this employment in 1932, but we can asume,
I am sure, that it was not more than $2,500 a year, and probably
less. Later she was serving in a job as an apartment hotel night
clerk at $1,200 a year, which certainly, using the plain language of
the disability provision, involved "performing any work, following
any occupation or engaging in any business for remuneration or
profit." Yet the court considered whether the insured might have
been able to resume teaching and held that the night clerk job
did not prevent her from being entitled to total disability benefits.
In the Chard case, the court quoted with approval from other
leading Nebraska cases to the same effect. One of these was the
case of Miceli v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 293 N.W. 112, rehearing denied 294 N.W. 659 (Nebraska 1940). In that case a laborer
was covered by a permanent disability provision in a group life insurance policy which stated that payments would be made only
if the insured was disabled from performing "any and all gainful
occupation." In the original opinion the court stated:
If an insured's inability to do substantially and practically any
of the material acts necessary for the transaction of his usual business or vocation is affected ... he will be held to be totally dis-

abled.
On request for rehearing, company objected to language "any
of the material acts." Court denied rehearing, saying:
It is not important how many individual acts-whether one or
several-the insured is prevented from performing....

This approach of the Nebraska decisions is sometimes referred
to as the "liberal" rule, sometimes as the "minority" rule, and sometimes as the "majority" rule. The line-up of state supreme courts
on this issue, i.e., whether the words "any occupation" are to be
"construed" as meaning the insured's occupation, has shifted over
the years. For example, in 1943 the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
overruled a line of cases extending over a period of thirty years in
that state which had held that a non-occupational disability clause
was to be construed as though it were an occupational clause referring to the insured's occupation. (Mutual Life Insurance Company
of New York v. Bryant, 177 S.W. 2d 588 [1943]) The court referred
to its previous rule which it was overruling as the "minority" rule
and characterized it as follows:
10 Reinsch v. Travellers, 133 Neb. 249, 274 N.W. 572 (1937).
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The minority rule is generally referred to as the "liberal" rule
of construction, but we think it is so ultra liberal as to surpass all
rules of construction since it changes the meaning of the plain and
unambiguous language.... After due and careful consideration we
have concluded that the "ninority" rule ...is unsound and a misapplication of the law....
An interesting sidelight of this Kentucky decision is that the
court decided that its action in overruling the previous line of cases
was not to be given retroactive effect, so that policies issued in
Kentucky during the long period that the court was adhering to the
"liberal" rule were to be construed as occupational clauses, even
though they related to inability to perform "any occupation." Other
states have likewise changed their minds on this question.
The application of the "liberal" rule has created some situations
which were never anticipated and has resulted in the payment of
claims which seem to many of us quite inequitable because of the
drain they place on the disability reserves that have been set up
for all of our policyholders. Back in 1919 we insured a man down
in one of the southern states under a contract that provided for
waiver of premium and monthly income benefits for total and
permanent disability to carry on any occupation. The insured was
an auditor for the Tax Commission, earning $2,040 a year. He suffered from osteomyelitis, as a result of which his right leg became
stiff. He was forced to leave his job for the better part of a year
but later went back to work in the same department at the same
salary. Prior to his disability, he had done a considerable amount
of travelling, but afterwards he did not. After he returned to work,
we discontinued benefits and were promptly sued. By the time
the case came to trial, the insured had received a promotion and was
making over $3,000 a year. The insured's attorney argued that his
client was no longer able to do his former work, and that if he did not
have the osteomyelitis condition, he would be able to earn much
more than his present salary. There was a judgment for the insured.
The insured has continued to work at his job and has continued
to advance both in position and in salary. We have twice more
attempted to recover the case and have twice been defeated in court.
The last time we were threatened with a countersuit for $2,500 for
harassing the insured by requesting proof of continued disability.
On a check-up in 1951, we found that this insured was then earning
$6,000 a year, but we have had no choice but to continue benefits
and are still paying them.
Some strange situations arise from the application of the rule
followed in certain states, including Nebraska, to the effect that inability to do any work is to be construed as meaning inability to do
substantially and practically any of the material acts necessary
for the transaction of the insured's usual business or vocation. See
Miceli v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, supra. In the Missouri
case of Heald v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 104 S.W. 2d 379
(1937), the insured was a left-handed meat market employee who
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suffered the loss of the thumb on his-right hand. He was thereafter
able to wait on customers, could buy meat for the market and sell
it, and could supervise the work of other employees, but was unable
to cut meat, a principal phase of his duties, because of his inability
to hold or clamp tightly the pieces of meat in cutting or sawing
operations due to the loss of the thumb. A judgment for the insured was affirmed. The unpredictability of decisions in this area
is rather dramatically illustrated by the case of Hood v. Texas Indemnity Insurance Co., 209 S.W. 2d 345, decided in Texas in 1948.
A psychiatrist, a witness for the plaintiff, stated that the plaintiff's
neurosis allegedly caused by injuries to his foot and elbow was,
and I quote:
in part caused by an unconscious desire for compensation and
after termination of this litigation he will begin to improve.
The Supreme Court of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment
for the plaintiff.
The majority view today is that the "any occupation" clause
protects against inability to carry on the insured's own occupation
or such other occupation as he is reasonably fitted for by training
and experience. In other words, it is not to be contended that a
paralyzed ditch-digger should learn to write short stories for a
living, or that a surgeon who loses his eyesight should sell pencils
on a street corner. But a man who suffers an ailment which makes
a certain type of work difficult and who then turns to another in
which he is able to make a living should not be considered totally
and permanently disabled. Again, that is the rule which the companies themselves try to have their claim departments follow, but,
like "probable permanence," it gives rise to fact questions which the
industry, knowing the caprice of juries, never intended to get involved in.
Quite frequently courts have ridiculed arguments in favor of
more literal construction of total disability clauses by saying that
ability to perform a trivial operation, such as selling peanuts or
shoestrings, should not be considered sufficient to bar a claimant
from benefits. See Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York
v. Bryant, supra. Again it is not the contention of the companies
that such an unrealistic view should be followed, and this type of
argument really amounts to erecting a straw man so that it can be
knocked down. As we saw from the Chard case here in Nebraska,
however, there are many instances where the work which the insured is doing and the money he is earning are far from "trivial."
Insurance companies are usually willing to continue payments for
a rehabilitation period until they can be sure that the insured is
actually able to continue the new work, but they don't think they
should be required to continue payments under total and permanent
disability clauses where the insured has settled down to earning
substantial income from work in which he is engaged.
However, the facts of life under the court decisions are often
to the contrary. For example, herein Nebraska a salaried political
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job has been held not to be a gainful occupation within the purview
of the disability provisions of a life insurance policy. In Woods v.
Central States Life Insurance Co.," the insured had a policy of the
type we have been discussing, providing for benefits for total and
permanent disability from carrying on any occupation for profit.
Insured was a registered pharmacist who suffered partial paralysis
from the waist down. He gave up his trade and later was elected
county treasurer. The company sought to terminate benefits on
the ground that the insured was obviously not disabled from carrying on any occupation as specified, but it was held that this was
not such an occupation. The court said his job was a sinecure
"bestowed upon him perhaps because of his infirmities by an inCarolina decision
dulgent people," and cited with approval a South
12
which held that a sheriff's job isn't really work.'
The question of whether a person is totally and permanently
disabled is complicated by the fact that that often involves subjective considerations. In your Omaha newspaper of October 18th
there was a news story with the heading "'Total Disability' Result
of Attitude." It tells about a worker who received minor injuries,
but because of the fact that he interpreted the accident as "a warning of the displeasure of the Lord" and "a form of supernatural
warning or punishment," his claim of total disability was upheld
by the Supreme Court of Florida.
As has been stated, it was never intended to adhere to an unrealistic construction of "total disability" and to require a state of
absolute helplesness as a condition of recovery. The courts early
said it was sufficient if the insured's condition precluded him from
performing the essential parts of his own occupation or such other
occupation as he might be capable of fitting himself for within a
reasonable time. When a salaried employee is laid off from work
indefinitely on a doctor's order, the problem is fairly simple. It is
the professional man and the independent and self-employed business man who worry our claim departments to death. In such cases
you not only have trouble finding out what the man is able to do;
you also can't find out what he is doing. That opens the door to a
lot of questionable claims.
We had an insured whose business was the operation of apartment houses. He had poliomyelitis in his youth and claimed to have
a weakened left leg, although at the time the insurance was issued
he stated that he was in no way handicapped by the residual polio
condition. His policies provided for the payment of $500 a month
for total disability comencing prior to age 60. The provision for
after age 60 benefits was much more limited.
Several years before he reached age 60, he submitted a disability
claim, along with a documented list of some 21 falls occurring from
1942 to 1945. He also claimed that he had to give up his business.
11
12

132 Neb. 261, 271 N.W. 850 (1937).
Dukes v. Jefferson Standard, 172 S.C. 502, 174 S.E. 463 (1934).

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

His attending physician would go no further than to say that the
disability was partial and that he might experience more difficulty
with the leg as he grew older.
Our investigation revealed that instead of giving up his business
he had merely entered into a partnership arrangement to let someone else appear to run it while retaining a substantial interest himself and continuing to direct most of the operations. It became
increasingly evident that the insured was making a determined effort to establish a set of circumstances that would support his retirement on $500 a month. We denied liability, and suit was instituted in the circuit court. The insured handled his own case, but
he was so vigorous in the prosecution of it, jumping from his chair
and running to the jury rail to make a point, parading around with
his exhibits, etc., that the jury, for once, found in favor of the
company.
There have also been theories developed to allow recovery in
cases where the insured persists in working despite his disability
handicap. A Minnesota court said it was enough if his condition
was such that common care and prudence dictated that he should
desist from the transaction of business. 13 A Nebraska court said
that a man whose disability incapacitated him should not be penalized because he continued
to carry on "if he ought not soundly to be
14
making the attempt.'
All of this, as you can see, is a pretty far cry from the original
idea behind the disability clause. It simply reflects the maze you
run into in trying to develop rules which depend, in so large a part,
on predicting and classifying the behavior of the human animal.
One authority has stated that "disability is total if the part of the
duties of his occupation, which the insured is prevented by such disability from performing, is a substantial part, although he may still
be able to perform some considerable part."'1 I defy anybody to
apply that one consistently!
Those are some of the problems that beset Home Office counsel
in trying to define the contingency insured against in disability
insurance. They are formidable but not, we believe, insoluble.
Their solution has been delayed because the experience of the companies writing disability insurance was so disastrous during the depression years that most of them stopped writing it entirely. The
problems of definition played some part in that debacle, but they
were by no means the major cause. When disability insurance first
began to be written on a commercial basis, the only statistics from
which rates could be computed were those based on the experience
of the fraternal orders. Those were closely knit organizations in
which the members had a personal sense of responsibility for the
13 Lobdill v. Laboring Men's Mutual Aid Assn., 69 Minn. 14, 71 N.W. 696
(1897).
14
Miceli v. Equitable, 138 Neb. 367, 293 N.W. 112 (1940).
15 T.A.S.A. Vol. XXVI Part 2, No. 74.
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welfare of each other, and their experience was relatively favorable.
Disability coverage associated with life insurance-which originally was limited largely to waiver of premium-by the 1920's had
become an important sales factor. Competition forced its expansion,
first to payment of the face amount of insurance in instalments and
then to disability income. In the latter '20's, some companies promised disability benefits as high as $15 and $20 per month per thousand of face amount-and most of it based on the inadequate fraternal rates.
When the depression came, disability claims mounted at a rate
which suggested that nothing short of a major epidemic was sweeping the country. As one authority has put it: "Indispositions that
were a mere annoyance in times of full employment and high earnings had a tendency to be completely prostrating when the dinner
pail was empty."1 6 Underwriting had been far too liberal, and many
people found themselves in the '30's with disability protection that
exceeded their earning capacity. Human nature reacted as human
nature does under such spurs. There are those in my company who
can remember when the disability claims were stacked so high you
couldn't see out the Claim Department windows, and across the
street you couldn't see in because of the pile of policy loan applications. The insurance industry showed a heavy net loss on disability
business during all the years from 1930 through 1941.17
It is not intended to suggest by any means that all of these claims
were fraudulent. Many of those whose businesses crumbled were
actually prostrated by the magnitude of their losses and suffered
recognizable mental and physical impairments. But the borderline
cases all fell on one side and some that were not even close were
propped up and pushed over. One of our insureds was a real entrepreneur with the cleverness that is characteristic of the breed.
During the entire '30's he was jumping in and out of business with
the agility of a jack-rabbit. His fortunes were equally kaleidoscopic;
one year he was a millionaire and the next he was broke. He took
the precaution in 1931 to have himself declared incompetent and his
wife appointed his guardian. Although he was the brains behind
many enterprises he went to great lengths to keep his activities
secret. We paid disability benefits from 191 to 1937 before we
discovered the facts. By means of a surveillance we obtained documentary and photographic proof of his multifarious activities. However, the insured carried out his faked insanity to the bitter endat one time coming into the home office and threatening our people
with a loaded pistol. Our negotiations for settlement of the case
were finally completed in 1941, at which time the guardianship was
discharged. By that time the insured was considerably less con16 The Disability Clause-Its Development and Present Status, S. C. Smith,
Jr., Journal of the American Society of C.L.U., Vol. V,p. 129.
17 Total Disability Provisions in Life Insurance Contracts, Herrick, pp.
33-35.
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cerned about his disability benefits, as he had a new factory with
300 employees and Government contracts for a million uniforms.
Since 1932 practically all of the life insurers have reverted to
waiver of premium as the sole long-term disability benefit. Having
been burned once, the industry wants to be pretty sure of its
ground before venturing into disability benefits of indefinite duration again. With waiver of premium, the problems of definition still
remain, but the temptations are much less. People are not going
to give up a job for an imaginary or trifling ailment just to have
their life insurance paid for. They like to eat, too.
A few life insurance companies are going further and offering
disability income under the traditional clauses, although the premium rates are increased and benefits cut down to $5, or, at a maximum, $10 per month per thousand. Insurance actuaries now have
sufficient experience to be able to establish rates for commercial
disability insurance that should meet the cost of the coverage.
Underwriting has become much more conservative, and the dangers
inherent in disability over insurance substantially reduced. But,
by and large, the industry continues to be faced with a subjective
approach to the concept of disability as the contingency insured
against.
The Federal Social Security Law, in providing, in effect, a
waiver of premium element, describes disability pretty much in
the traditional way. To qualify for the so-called "freeze"-the elimination of disability periods from your earnings base-you must
have a disability that (1) has lasted more than six months, (2) is
expected to be of a long-continuing, indefinite duration, or to result
in death, and (3) keeps you from any substantially gainful work.'8
You will note that all of the old problems of permanence, probable
and presumptive permanence, general or occupational coverage,
and inability to work, are present here. The Government will no
doubt become involved in the same claim difficulties that the insurance industry has had. Under the 1956 amendment to the Social
Security Law, you may, if disabled as defined above, start collecting
monthly cash disability benefits after age 50, subject to a waiting
period of six months which cannot begin before January 1, 1957,
nor more than six months before you reach age 50.19
Some in the insurance industry who believe that realistic disability income protection should be provided by the private companies have suggested that the way to do it is through the adoption
of a new approach to the definition of the contingency insured
against, one that will make its existence or non-existence easily
ascertainable, like the fact of death. One suggestion along this line
is to define disability in terms of reduction in earning capacity. This
approach is in use by at least one company.20 This company offers
18 Social Security Act (1954) Sec. 216.
19 Social Security Act (1956) Sec. 223.
20Mutual Benefit Life of Newark, N. J.
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waiver of premium and disability income at $10 per month per thousand up to age 55. Total disability is considered to exist when, due

to sickness or injury, the insured's income drops below one-quarter
of his former earned income and stays there for a period of four
months. 21 Earned income is defined so as to exclude amounts received by way of pension, retirement allowance, or partial salary
continuance during disability.2 There is also pro-rate clause which
provides in effect that disability benefits, together with all other
disability benefits to which the insured may be entitled, shall not
exceed 75% of pre-disability earned income. 23 There are problems

in the administration of a pro-rate clause, but apparently they are
not insuperable. Several other American and Canadian companies
have a pro-rate clause in contracts that have the traditional definition of disability.
The sickness and accident branch of the industry has also come
up with some interesting innovations. That line of insurance was
not so badly hit by the depression because the benefits provided by

those contracts were relatively short-term. In addition, the bulk
of the business was either cancellable or renewable at the option
of the company so that dangerous exposures could be readily elim-

inated. However, in the last ten years, perhaps partly because of
the abandonment of cash disability coverage in most life insurance
policies, there has been a tendency toward benefits of greater duration.
Income protection contracts are on the market today which provide for accident benefits for life and sickness benefits for as long as
ten years. The trend may be back to even longer benefit periods for
sickness, subject to various protective limitations to avoid the abuses
which plagued the companies in the past. Accident benefits for life
may be the source of litigation over whether disability was caused
by sickness or by an accident. As you know, there have been many
cases on this general issue arising out of double indemnity clauses.
The typical case in this category is the insured who, because of illness or disease, is in a weakened condition, faints, and hurts himself
in a fall. Accident or disease?
A company here in Nebraska offers sickness benefits for life,
although they are reduced 50% after the first benefit year.24 An
increasing amount of income protection coverage is being written
on a non-cancellable basis and guaranteed renewable at the option
of the insured to a stated age, usually 65. In consequence, the sickness and accident industry, too, has had to face up to the vagueness
of the concepts in disability insurance and try to do something
about it.
Total Disability Provisions in Life Insurance Contracts, Herrick, p. 132.
The Disability Clause-Its Development and Present Status, S. C. Smith,
Jr., Journal of the American Society of C.L.U., Vol. V, pp. 135-136.
23 Total Disability Provisions in Life Insurance Contracts, Herrick, p. 132,
24 World Insurance Co.-see Time Saver p. 936.
21
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While still adhering to the traditional approach, 'they have
sought to clarify, as well as can be, the distinction between genetal
and occupational coverage. Disability in these contracts is defined
as occupational for the first year (or two years) and thereafter as
general. For example:
(a) "total disability" means the complete inability of the Insured
due to sickness or injury to perform any and every duty pertaining
to his occupation until Monthly Income Benefits have been payable
under the Policy for 24 months during any period of disability; and
(b) after Monthly Income Benefits have been payable under
the policy for 24 months during any period of disability, then for
the remainder of such period, "total disability" means the complete
inability of the Insured due to sickness or injury to engage in any
and every gainful occupation for which he is reasonably fitted by
education, training or experience. ....
11
It will be noted that Part (b) adopts and seeks to codify the
language which the courts included by construction in the old disability clauses. This has a tendency to discourage further judicial
liberalization. This combined definition will also make it difficult
for any court to say that occupational and general coverage are one
and the same.
Another salutory provision added by the sickness and accident
insurers is one which reads: "In no event shall 'total disability'
exist for any purpose of this policy during any period in which the
insured is engaged in his or any other gainful occupation.12 5 It has
always annoyed claim departments to have to pay disability benefits to a person who was working and earning a substantial living
just because a doctor was willing to certify that he ought to take it
easy. (Remember the tax auditor, the county treasurer, and the
sheriff I told you about.) We know, of course, that there may be
instances in which a courageous man will struggle beyond his capacities and to the detriment of his health to keep his business going
for his family's sake. Such cases are deserving and, no doubt, will
continue to be paid. But still, it is not safe to have available disability benefits which can be drawn upon without the insured's
even having to give up other sources of income.
A rather analogous situation presents itself in connection with
coverage on which my company did some pioneering-Income Protection for Women. Women's Income Protection was something the
industry rather shied away from, not because there isn't a need, and
not because the ladies are bad risks, but because the great majority
of them shortly succumb to the blandishments of some eligible male
and retire from the labor market to become housewives. Just about
the only objective thing about disability is the job; it is usually a
lot easier to tell whether a man is working than to tell how he feels.
But when is a housewife disabled? Too frequently, and too long, I
am afraid, if her disability coverage is sufficient to enable her to
25
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hire someone else to do her chores.2 6 If you have issued to her a
non-cancellable and guaranteed renewable disability contract, this
can become quite a nuisance. We have minimized the risk by providing for a 50% reduction in benefits if the insured, at the commencement of disability, is not gainfully employed on a full-time
basis away from her residence. There is no reduction in premium,
so the benefit is pretty expensive after retirement from the labor
market. It is designed for, and serves a valid purpose with, career
women only.
The Sickness and Accident insurers also use a pro-rate clause
to guard against overinsurance. It is one of the optional provisions
under the Uniform Individual Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions Law recommended by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners and provides that if total disability income benefits
receivable exceed the insured's earnings at the time of claim or exceed his average earnings over the preceding two years, whichever
is greater, total benefits shall be proportionately reduced to the
amount of such earnings with a pro rata return of premiums. There
is a further provision that this scaling down shall not go below $200
per month, regardless of earnings. In application, this clause is similar to that used by some of the life insurers, although it is more liberal and permits benefits up to 100% of earnings rather than 75%.
Among its difficulties is the necessity of investigating insurance in
force at the time of claim, which will involve considerable expense
and delay. During the time it has been in use, we have been in a
period of generally increasing earnings, and to date no extensive
experience has been had with it.
Insurance against loss of earning power fills an important need
and is a coverage which should be provided by the insurance industry regardless of the problems involved. Over the years, legal
questions involving disability coverages have given rise to frequent
litigation and hundreds of reported decisions, many of them conflicting. Radically changed economic conditions could bring back
some of the early volume of disability insurance legal problems
and court cases. But much progress has been made in reducing the
area of dispute. There is much yet to be done, but we will continue
to study and to experiment-and to hope that in the years to come
we will develop sounder approaches and more precise concepts, and,
in consequence, a better product.
26

Occupation of housewife is considered by courts a gainful occupation.
Frace v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 151 Pa. Super 354, 30 A(2) 380 (1943).

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

SECTION ON MUNICIPAL AND PUBLIC
CORPORATIONS
Edward F. Fogarty, Esq.
Chairman
"Some Phases of Municipal Bond Law"-....... Winthrop B. Lane, Esq.
"Zoning" ........................................................
Raymond E. McGrath, Esq.
SOME PHASES OF MUNICIPAL BOND LAW
Winthrop B. Lane
When your chairman invited me to address this group, he advised me that the group would be largely composed of overworked
and underpaid municipal attorneys who would like a paper on some
phases of the mechanics of issuing municipal bonds rather than a
so-called learned treatise on one of the many unanswered questions
that arise to plague municipal attorneys. Hence this paper will be
primarily a sketchy outline of how to prepare an acceptable bond
history and will cover some of the essential steps in issuing municipal bonds. I will touch only incidentally on a few questions of substantive law.
Why a bond history? The answer is twofold. First, municipal
bonds are required to be registered with the state auditor to be
valid. As a condition precedent to such registration, you must file
with the state auditor what is termed a bond history. In the second
place, every careful bond buyer demands a legal opinion as to the
validity of the bonds. These opinions are based upon the certified
bond history, the same as a title opinion on real estate is based upon
the abstract of title.
What is the nature of a bond history? A bond history differs
from an abstract of title in that in the main it is a verbatim transcript of all proceedings leading up to the issuance of the bonds. A
transcript is required instead of an abstract because there are no
bonded abstracters of municipal proceedings. An examining attorney would not be justified in relying on a non-bonded abstract
that would have no standing in court. Also, if an investment banker
is buying the bonds for resale, he will demand and is entitled to
have in his possession written evidence, in a form which would be
admissible in court, of all matters necessary to establish the validity of the bonds. In some instances, municipal records have not been
too well preserved. The investment banker should require possession of adequate proof of the essential facts for his own protection.
Thus, our first suggestion is when you are preparing the resolutions, ordinances, minutes, etc., you make at least three complete
copies. This will save you a lot of work later on. The original should
be kept as a part of the city records, and the other two copies can
be used in making up the bond histories. Only the municipality's
original copy need bear the original signatures, but it will do no
harm to have all copies signed. Order at least three copies of each
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proof of publication. Sometimes it is difficult to get extra copies
at a later date. Most publishers make no charge for extra copies.
Also, in the case of an election, be sure to save at least three copies
of the official ballot, as you will need them for your bond histories.
Now, as to the contents of a history. I need not remind this
group that there is no such thing as common law municipal bonds.
A municipality has no implied authority to issue bonds. It must,
in each instance, find an applicable statute and follow the requirements of that particular statute. The contents of each bond history
will thus vary according to the statute involved. However, there
are certain features which apply to all bond histories.
In the first place, the bond examiner wants to know that the
municipality issuing the bonds is legally constituted. In the case of
school districts, Section 79-426, Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943,
provides that after the district has exercised its franchise for a
period of one year, it is presumed to have been legally organized.
Thus, a finding in the resolution calling the election, or in the bond
resolution, setting out that the district is a Class I, II or III district and has been in existence for more than a year is sufficient
proof of this fact. A certificate of the clerk to this effect is usually
acceptable, although a direct finding in the proceedings is better.
If the school district has been recently organized, particularly under
the reorganization statutes, a complete history of all jurisdictional
steps required for the organization must be shown.
Most cities and villages have been in existence for such a long
period of time that their legal organization is presumed, and no
further showing is required. However, it is helpful to the examiner
if the transcript shows whether the issuing city is a city of the first
class, second class, or a village. Some cities are right on the borderline, and the law requires the city to follow the law applicable to
its classification based upon population. Thus, if the population
changes so as to throw the city into a different class, the city has
no choice but to follow the law prescribed for that class of municipality. If the city has adopted the city manager plan under Chapter 19, Article 6, a statement at the beginning of the bond history
to that effect is desirable. Otherwise, the examiner may not be
familiar with this fact and may make requirements which are unnecessary. Also, cities having home-rule charters may by their
charter make certain requirements applicable only to that city.
Hence, it would be very helpful to the examiner if the local attorney would show that the city is operating under a home-rule
charter and furnish a copy of the charter, or at least the pertinent
parts thereof.
The earlier in the bond history that the above matters are
shown, the better, so as to avoid needless requirements by the bond
examiner and additional work by the local attorney.
I should also state that there are certain sections of the statute
which make specific requirements as to the contents of the bond
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history. For example, see Chapter 10, Section 707, which prescribes
seven different items to be included in a school bond history. It
is well, of course, to comply with the statutory requirements, but
in general if the jurisdictional steps referred to in this outline are
included you will not have much trouble with your bond history.
Certain proceedings may be, or are f'equired to be, initiated by
petition signed by a given number of resident owners or electors.
For example, in cities of the second class or in villages, under
Section 17-510, a paving improvement may be initiated by a petition
signed by sixty per cent of the resident owners directly abutting
upon the street or streets to be improved. A word of caution in regard to such petitions is in order. Follow the exact statutory language as far as possible, and do not include more than is required.
For example, under Section 17-510, all that is required in the
petition is a request that a paving or other improvement district
be formed and the description of the street to be improved. If the
petition goes on to recite that the pavement is to be of concrete
and twenty feet wide, this is a limitation on the powers of the city,
and frequently it is found that these limitations are embarrassing.
Sometimes separate petitions are prepared for each block or part
of a street instead of describing the entire street or streets'to be
included in the district. It has been our judgment that separate
petitions cannot be added together to form a single district. The
council must follow the description in the petition and not make
a larger or smaller district. In other words, the ordinance creating
the district must be responsive to the petition and not vary therefrom. Frequently we have found that these petitions have not been
drawn with proper care and are an embarrassment to the city. For
this reason, where a district can be formed by council action without a petition, we have favored such action and treat the petition
as surplusage. Where the council bases its action on a petition, the
council must find that the jurisdictional facts exist. For example,
if a percentage of the resident owners is required, the council shall
find the exact number of resident owners who own property on
the street to be improved and the exact number of such owners
who have signed the petition. A mere finding that the petition is
in proper form and signed by the required number of people is a
conclusion and not a finding of fact. The council probably sits
as a quasi-judicial body in making these findings, and such findings would not be subject to collateral attack. Mere conclusions,
as distinguished from findings of fact, would be subject to collateral
attack and not binding upon the court.
Most statutes provide some criterion for determining the
necessary signers, as for example, in 17-513, the ownership of
the property is determined by the records in the office of the county
clerk or register of deeds at the time of the adoption of the ordinance.
In cases where a percentage of the electors is required, the statute
frequently provides that the number voting at the last general
election is to be taken as the number of electors at the time of the
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filing of the petition. Each statute must be examined to determine
the criterion imposed by law and then appropriate finding should
be included in the ordinance or resolution to show compliance
therewith.
In a number of cases, the statute requires that before issuing
bonds, the proposition of the issuance of the bonds or the improvement of the property, or both, be submitted to the electors at
a general or special election. Here again care should be used to
follow the exact language and not enlarge or deviate therefrom
more than necessary. Our courts have held that the provisions of
the proposition submitted may be a limitation on the powers otherwise granted to the governing body. Thus, even though the statute
would otherwise authorize the issuance of a six per cent twentyyear bond, if the proposition submitted at the election states that
the bonds shall bear three per cent interest and run for ten years,
the city would be limited to three per cent ten-year bonds. Under the
present conditions, where the rate of interest on municipal bonds
has fluctuated widely, it has been a source of embarrassment to
have unnecessary limitations fixed in the proposition.
Some people think it is necessary to include these limitations
to have the election carry. I seriously question if limitations on
interest rates or length of time the bonds are to run have effect on
the outcome of many elections. These matters can usually safely
be left to the governing body. Including certain provisions may
render the bonds unsalable after they have been voted, and you
have thus defeated yourself.
Where a petition is required to initiate the submitting of a
proposition to the electors, care should be used that the petition
and the proposition submitted are identical. Sometimes the petitions
have been drawn by laymen and cannot be followed in the proposition. This necessitates the circulation of a new petition with
the corresponding embarrassment to the original promoter. The
petition, the proposition stated in the ordinance or resolution calling the election, and the ballot must be consistent and should be
identical.
Some statutes required that when bonds are to be issued, "the
proposition of the question must be accompanied by a provision to
levy an annual tax for the payment of interest, if any thereon, and
no vote adopting the question proposed shall be valid unless it
likewise adopts the amount of tax to be levied to meet the liability
incurred." See Sections 23-127 and 10-402. In many cases I believe
a vote in favor of issuance of bonds would carry the implied
authority or instruction to levy a tax for the payment thereof.
However, it is customary and we would recommend that the proposition in every instance include a provision for the levy of a
tax. This is usually done in a separate paragraph which can be
worded about as follows:
Shall the mayor and city council cause to be levied annually a tax
on all the taxable property in the city, in addition to all other
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cipal of said bonds as such interest-and principal become due?
One other point should be noted. Section 10-104 requires the
auditor to detach and cancel all coupons maturing before the first
tax to meet the same has become due. Often the first levy would
not become due until a year after the date of the bonds. Hence,
when interest is payable semi-annually, we put in the proposition
submitted and in the bond form the provision that interest is
"payable one year after date and semi-annually thereafter." This
provision is only necessary in bonds payable out of a tax levy.
Our courts have held that in most instances where notice is
required to be published, the publication in the manner and for
the length of time specified by the statute is jurisdictional and not
a mere irregularity. I do not want to get too deeply into this question of what constitutes proper notice, as the wording of the several
statutes varies considerably, and this would be a subject all to
itself. However, I might mention one or two points.
Even though the statute does not expressly state that the last
publication must be immediately before the election, our court
seems to read into the statute the words "immediately preceding"
the date of the election or meeting as the case may be. See, for
example, Levitt v. Bell, 55 Neb. 57 at page 66; Shannon v. City of
Omaha, 72 Neb. 281; Bancroft Drainage District v. Chicago STPM
& OR Co., 102 Neb. 455 at 459. There are decisions in other states to
the contrary.
Where the statute requires a publication "once each week for
three weeks," our court has held that the publication is complete on
the third issue of the weekly publication. Thus, where this statute
is involved, the election could be held or the council action could
be taken on the sixteenth to the twenty-second day. See Prucka v.
Eastern Sarpy Co. Drainage Dist., 157 Neb. 248. On the other hand,
if the statute provides for notice "for three weeks" or "during three
weeks," the full twenty-one days after the first publication must
elapse, and the action should not be taken before the twentysecond day and must be taken by the twenty-eighth day after the
first publication. The safe rule to follow is that if three weeks'
notice is required, you should publish the notice in four consecutive weekly publications. In computing time you exclude the day of
the first publication and include the day of the last publication. It
is much better to allow an extra day than to run any chance of an
argument as to whether or not the full statutory time has elapsed.
However, the action should be taken before the time of the next
publication.
There seems to be some confusion as to the proper procedure
for establishing sewers in cities of the second class and villages. Let
us stop a moment to examine one or two points that seem to cause
trouble. All sewers in cities of the second class and villages are constructed under the provisions of 17-913 and following. These proceedings are initiated by a resolution of necessity. Section 17-913
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specifies about seven points that usually have to be included in
such a resolution. One of these is a statement of the "outer boundaries of the district or districts." Some persons have interpreted this
to mean that if you have several laterals, for example, you must
set up a separate district for each lateral. I think this is erroneous
and confusing. Under the case of Hutton v. Village of Cairo, 159
Neb. 342, the supreme court held in effect that it is not necessary
to establish separate districts for each lateral or main, but you
may establish one district including the entire project and merely
describe the outer boundaries of the entire district. If you took
any other view of this situation and formed separate districts for
each lateral, to be consistent you would have to follow through and
have a separate resolution of necessity for each district and let a
separate contract for each district and levy special assessments
separately in each district. Such would be very cumbersome and
was not the intent of the law.
Section 17-916 provides that if petitions opposing the resolution signed by the property owners representing a majority of the
front footage which may become subject to assessment for the
cost of any proposed lateral sewer district are filed, "the resolution shall not be passed." This means, for example, that if the property owners on a lateral running from Eighth to Ninth Street do
not want the lateral, this lateral should be eliminated from the
project. On hearing, the resolution can be amended by eliminating
this lateral and then passed without further notice. It should be
noted that only property owners on the laterals have a right to
file a petition objecting to the construction of that sewer. This is
true even though the people along the main may be subject to special assessments. If the people along a main could object, it
might mean that a small number of property owners could prevent
the construction of the entire system, as the main is necessary for
the balance of the system. The question is sometimes asked why
notice is required to be given to everyone when only property
owners along the laterals can file objections. Everyone in the city
may have an interest in the sewer system and have a right to
present their views to the council or village board. The decision,
however, is up to the council or village board and not to the people
at large. Only the property owners along laterals can control the
construction of a particular lateral. For the purposes of such petitions, each lateral must be considered separately.
There is one other point I would like to call to your attention.
Some people, in drafting the proposed resolution of necessity, include in this proposed resolution sections providing for the giving
of notice, the form of notice, the time and place of hearing, etc.
These provisions, in my opinion, should be in a separate resolution
and not in the proposed resolution of necessity. In the first instance,
the resolution of necessity is only "proposed" and not passed. Setting out the date of hearing, etc., has no place in the resolution as
finally adopted. If included in the proposed resolution, the proposed
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resolution should be amended by the elimination of these provisions before it is finally passed. I will say, however, that including
these provisions in the final resolution does not invalidate the resolution or the proceedings but merely makes it cumbersome.
While we are on the question of the boundaries of a district,
let me call your attention to the fact that special assessments can
only be levied on property within the district, regardless of the
fact that property outside the district may also be specially benefited. This is true not only with regard to sewers but also in road'
improvement districts and every other type of improvement
where a district is required. Therefore, in setting up these districts, be sure that you include all property that you later want
to subject to a special assessment.
The mere fact that property is included within a district does
not mean that you ultimately have to levy a special assessment on
all the property within the district. A special assessment can only
be levied against the property within the district which is in fact
specially benefited.
In street improvements we are constantly confronted with the
question as to what streets may be included in a single street improvement district. The engineers like to include all the streets
possible in one district rather than having a number of smaller
districts. This is understandable from the engineer's viewpoint.
However, the law is not geared to the convenience of the engineer.
As regards cities of the second class and villages, Section 17-519
provides a single district "may include two or more connecting or
intersecting streets." We construe this to mean that parallel streets,
although connected by a cross street, cannot be included in a single
district. The intent of the law was to permit the people on each
street to determine whether that particular street should be improved. Thus, the people on Ninth Street should not be able to force
pavement on Tenth Street, even though the two streets may be
connected by a cross street, unless it constituted a continuous highway. The law must mean that the streets must be a continuous highway or a logical unit for improvement to be included in a single district. The next question is, what is the penalty for including two
parallel streets in a single district. It may mean that the city cannot validly levy special assessments on any of the property in the
district. After the pavement is completed and accepted by the
city, the city is probably liable for at least the fair and reasonable
value thereof, even though there are irregularities in setting up the
district.
A word should be said as to the showing required in the
bond history in regard to elections. In the main, the following
instruments should be included: first, the resolution calling the
election and the proof of publication of the notice calling the election; second, a copy of the oath signed by each of the election officials as required by Section 11-101; third, the return of each board.
Attached to this return should be one of the ballots used at the
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election. Fourth, a canvass of the returns. Section 32-902, as amended
in 1953, and Section 17-603 are now consistent in that both require
the canvass to be made on the first Monday after the election. Section 32-902 specifies the hour of 11:00 A.M., and Section 17-603 says
nothing about the hour of the meeting. Canvass in county elections
is governed by Section 32-496. This statute fixes Friday following
the election as the time for making the canvass. Regardless of the
statute applicable, the transcript should show that the canvass was
made by the proper canvassing board and at the time specified
by law.
In school districts, the length of time that the polls must be
kept open is not specified. We have always held that the polls
should be kept open for a reasonable length of time, and what constitutes a reasonable length of time may vary with the size of the
district. In large districts, including cities, the regular hours of
8:00 A.M. to 8:00 P.M. are desirable. In small country districts, we
have held that from 1:00 P.M. to 8:00 P.M. would be a reasonable
length of time. A school meeting and an election are two different
things. We would not approve merely passing out ballots at a school
meeting in Class One and Two school districts. The action taken at
a school meeting does not, in our opinion, meet the requirements
of a vote at an election.
We have now reached the point where the initial proceedings,
either the election or the establishment of the districts, have been
accomplished. In cases where the electors have voted a specific
amount of bonds, as, for example, in school bonds, swimming pool
bonds, auditorium bonds, etc., the next step should be to issue the
bonds by resolution or ordinance. The money in these instances usually has to be in the hands of a school district or city before the
work is undertaken, because there is no provision for the payment of
work, unless there is a fund on which the warrants may be drawn.
Likewise the bond-holder has no legal concern with how the money
is spent after the bonds are sold. On the other hand, in street improvements, sewers, etc., the bonds are not issued until the work has
been completed and accepted. In most of these instances, the governing body has the right to issue progress warrants as the work progresses to be paid out of the special assessments or bonds subsequently issued. Also, in most of the cases, the amount of bonds is
limited to the actual cost of the project or unpaid balance. Hence
the bonds are not issued until the project is completed and accepted,
and in some cases cannot be issued until after the time for payment of special assessments without interest has expired. In these
cases the bond history must, therefore, include all subsequent proceedings. Generally speaking, these subsequent proceedings would
include the letting of the contract, the engineer's report* of
progress, issuance of the progress warrants, the final acceptance
of the work and determination of the cost thereof, and the levy
of the special assessments, if special assessments are levied. I
will not go into the details of these various steps, as in most instances
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the validity of the bond is not dependent upon the regularity of
these interim proceedings. These interim proceedings, however,
are of vital importance to the contractor, in that most contractors
have to sell their progress warrants in order to raise funds to continue the work. Progress warrants are not negotiable instruments
in that the transferee takes free and clear of equity and defenses of
the issuing city or village. If all these interim steps are not legally
and regularly taken, we will not approve the progress warrants.
Being non-negotiable and subject to all defenses, we are more critical of warrants than we are of the ultimate bonds which are negotiable and which presumably the holder thereof takes free of all
irregularities, and only jurisdictional matters can be raised as a
defense.
Again, let me digress a moment to say that the validity of the
bonds is not dependent upon the validity of the special assessments.
In approving a bond issue, we do not certify that the special assessments are valid or collectible. Special assessments are only pledged
as collateral security for the payment of the bonds. The bonds still
remain the general obligation of the city or village, even though the
special assessments are not collectible. I will make the further observation that since the statutes in many instances provide for the
relevy of any special assessment not regularly levied, and since the
supreme court has not permitted collateral attack for mere irregularities, there have been fewer cases of contests on special assessments. From the standpoint of the city, as distinguished from the
bond purchaser, it is important, however, that the interim matters
be carefully handled, as otherwise the city may find itself burdened
with a general obligation without any recourse against its properties
specially benefited by the improvement.
We now come to the issuance of the bonds. This is usually accomplished through the bond resolution or bond ordinance, depending upon the particular circumstances. Although it may involve a
certain amount of repetition, we like to have the bond ordinance
or resolution make specific findings of the jurisdictional facts and
that all the preliminary steps have been duly and regularly taken.
Likewise, in the bond itself, we always include a paragraph to
the effect that all matters required by law for the valid issuance
of said bonds do exist or have been done. The reason for this finding is that municipal bonds are negotiable instruments, and it has
been held that the recitals in the bonds will estop the issuing
municipality to raise these questions if the bond is in the hands of
a bona fide purchaser. We cannot depend entirely upon estoppel
by these recitals. If we could, there would be no real reason for
an examination of the prior proceedings. Recitals, however, are
generally held to be important and should be included in every
bond.
In connection with the sale of bonds, we are frequently asked
as to the necessity or desirability of appointing a so-called fiscal
agent. This is rather a delicate subject for me to speak on for the
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reason that we represent or do a considerable amount of work for
several of the investment bankers who provide fiscal agency services. Therefore nothing which I may say here should be taken as a
recommendation either for or against such agency contracts, but
only as an explanation of possible procedures.
If a fiscal agent is appointed early in the proceedings, they can
be particularly helpful to the city attorney and save him a considerable amount of work. In most instances they will cause to be
prepared and furnish to the city the necessary resolution, ordinances, etc., and usually check each step as the same is taken.
They will help guard against pitfalls, such as limitations in the
proposition submitted to the electors, and can offer helpful advice
in arranging finances, particularly if the city or village has a considerable amount of financing that has to be dovetailed together.
They will advise as to whether certain bonds will be salable and
do the legwork in assisting the city in obtaining proper bids for
the bonds and having them printed, registered, and delivered. Thus
they save the local attorney a lot of work that otherwise falls on
him. The services of a fiscal agent or an experienced bond attorney
are of particular value in revenue bonds, as there is a wide area for
negotiation as to the terms and condition in this class of bonds.
The other method is for each local attorney to assume the full
responsibility of drafting and handling all the steps in the proceedings. In some instances, the local attorneys employ other attorneys to assist in the drafting of the various instruments and advise
as to procedure. If you have your work checked as each step is
taken, it may save some subsequent embarrassment. When the time
has arrived to sell the bonds and before the bond resolution or ordinance is passed, you can send out to the various investment
bankers and local banks a request for bids on the proposed bonds.
Such a request for bids should be specific as to the terms of the
sale but need not contain all the information found in a bond prospectus. If the information is inadequate, you may find that you are
bothered by a lot of phone calls and requests for additional information. The following are some of the things that a prospective bond
buyer would want to know:
(1) The type of bonds, to wit, district paving or intersection paving, swimming pool bonds, etc.
(2) The amount of the proposed issue.
(3)

Any limitation on interest rates.
(4) The schedule of maturities.
(5)

The assessed value of the property within the municipality.

(6)

A statement as to any other bonds which the municipality has outstanding, and the amount accumulated
in the sinking fund, if any, to pay the same.
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(7)

Statement of overlapping debt of the political subdivisions.

(8)

If the bonds are revenue bonds, the amount of income
that has been received over the past several years and
the engineer's estimate of projected income.

(9)

Whether all maturities must bear the same coupon
rate, or whether different coupon rates may be fixed
for different maturities, and also whether split coupons are permissible.
Whether the bond purchaser is to bear the expense of
printing and registering the bonds, or whether the
municipality will furnish the bonds together with an
attorney's approving opinion without cost to the purchaser.

(10)

(11)

The date the bond will bear and the probable date
and place of delivery. These two dates should be as
close together as possible, making due allowance for
time to pass the bond ordinance and print and register
the bonds, say, approximately thirty days.

You can add to this as much so-called sales talk as your desire.
I might state that the cost of printing the bonds and the cost of
the attorney's approving opionion are pretty well established, so
from the standpoint of the city it doesn't make too much difference
whether these items are to be borne by the city or by the purchaser.
If borne by the purchaser, the bid price will be higher to include
those items of expense. It is also customary to require a certified
check with every sealed bid. The check of the successful bidder
will be held and applied upon the ultimate purchase price, and the
other checks are returned when their bids are rejected. There is
no fixed rule as to the amount of the bid check, but in my opinion it should not be so large as to discourage bidders or work an
undue hardship on them.
I should also state that the law does not require a public auction of municipal bonds. A negotiated sale is permissible in most
instances. Sometimes a negotiated sale is the only practical way
of handling the financing. However, I believe in most instances
the public feels better satisfied with a public auction, whether this
is conducted by a fiscal agent or by the municipality direct.
In conclusion, municipal financing is a highly technical field.
This sketchy paper does not begin to cover the many requirements
of the law for a legal municipal financing or the many questions
involved in the practical handling of the same. I trust that no one
will treat this paper as a legal treatise or a bible of procedure, but
only as a collection of scattered suggestions that may or may not be
helpful, depending upon the experience and the immediate problems facing the individual members of this group.
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THE LAWYER AND THE ZONING PROBLEM
Raymond E. McGrath
When a lawyer examines a title to city real estate or is consulted with reference to the construction of a building, one of the
very important things to be determined is whether or not the purpose for which the client is to use the building is in compliance with
the zoning regulations of that particular area of the city.
However, frequently the lawyer has a zoning problem presented
to him after it has become a problem; after the title to real estate
has been acquired; after the building plans have been made; after
the city building department has determined that the proposed use
is not in conformity; and sometimes even after the client has already
started to use the property and the legality of its use has been
questioned.
The lawyer always has the problem presented to him from
the standpoint of his client's best interest, which may or may not
be consistent with the public good.
The planner, on the other hand, works out an over-all plan
for a large area, or even for the entire city, which plan the planner
feels is consistent with the public good and sound progressive overall planning.
In carrying out the provisions of an over-all plan, many unlooked-for situations occur, and sometimes injustices develop.
With the growth of any city, the problems of proper zoning
multiply and at times present situations that are extremely difficult
to resolve equitably. As these problems develop, you as practicing
lawyers may expect to see an increasing number of cases of this
kind.
New concepts in zoning are constantly arising as conditions
change, with the concomitant need of additional or different regulations. For example, expressways with their non-access and minimum speed features affect materially the zoning of the abutting
properties. The idea of the highway builder is to prevent a clustering
of businesses along the way. The property owner may see in--his
site an ideal location for a hamburger stand, pointing out that its
desirability as a residence is lessened by the increase of traffic
on the superhighway. The conflict of his private interest with the
public good demands the best judgment of the city council and
the court.
The increasing height of structures, particularly television antennae, which stretch their needlepoints higher than most skyscrapers, makes problems affecting not alone nearby properties
and traffic on their streets but also the flight patterns of aircraft.
The wide distribution of automobiles and the simple physical
fact that their bulk is disproportionate to the number of their-

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

passengers must be taken into account in zoning any area in which
large numbers of people congregate habitually. Many have given
up in despair trying to solve this question. Automobiles are a
factor, too, in zoning areas where the concentration of population
is more sparse, although there the problem may be easily solved
by prescribing minimum space requirements.
Having started with existing cities which required accommodation of ordinances to antecedent conditions, legislatures and city
councils have been almost always in the position of trying to catch
up. This, of course, results in something less than the ideal in zoning, which could be accomplished only in a city built completely
according to plan. It is not always the fault of the lawmakers. They
have no way of telling in time for desirable planning that a cow
pasture in their environs may be selected by faraway Washington
for a military installation, (x by Western Electric for a $45,000,000
factory.
As cities spill over their limits, even if they have extra-territorial zoning jurisdiction, they find need of cooperative effort. The
growth may exceed the speed of their annexation process, and
totally unplanned and unregulated communities grow up in the
county. It is the rare real estate developer who makes any provision
for any more in the way of improvements than that required to
make his lots marketable. In fact, competition probably prohibits
reservation of any substantial area for parks or even a modest
playground. The answer lies in raising zoning from the merely
municipal level. Growth stems from the central city, so there is a
community of interest in the metropolitan area which is the proper
basis for city zoning extending by legislative act over as wide an
area as necessary to accomplish uniform results. The alternative is
joint city-county zoning or cooperative effort between two or more
counties where an urban area extends over the line into another
county, as is the case in Douglas County, where Harrison Street,
the Omaha city limit, is on the Sarpy County line, and an immense
development has taken place between the city expanding from the
north and the Strategic Air Command, the Allied Chemical and
Dye Corporation, and other plants providing the stimulus from the
south.
Any lawyer who has worked with these problems will tell you
that zoning is one field of the law where the blood pressures of
opposing litigants are usually extremely high and the boiling points
are frequently very low. If a lawyer called into this type of litigation-particularly if it is aggressively contested-has a firm grasp
of a few basic legal principles involved in the matter, of zoning
it will help a great deal in working out the problems of his client,
and possibly in pouring oil on what are often very troubled waters.
The term "zoning" in its broadest, and original and primary,
sense is simply a division of a municipality into districts and the
designation by a board or proper authority of different regulations
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with reference to the use of the real property in those districts, and
with reference to the type, size, and other qualifications as to structures therein.
It has been said that "zoning regulations" are confined to the
structural and use restrictions upon real estate within prescribed
districts or zones.
The power exercised by governmental authority in connection
with zoning laws is generally recognized as the exercise of a police
power, and this power differs considerably from the right of governmental authority to restrict the use of real estate by condemnation under any power of eminent domain. While it is true that
zoning and eminent domain have a great deal in common, one
very important difference is that if property is taken from an individual in the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, a fair and
reasonable compensation is paid to the individual. In the exercise
of the zoning authority, whether the value of the property is reduced or destroyed or increased, no compensation is paid to the
owner of the property.
The courts are uniform in holding that the restricted or prohibited use need not constitute a nuisance in order to authorize
enactment of zoning regulations. The zoning ordinances are far
broader and have a much wider scope than the mere suppression
of a nuisance in connection with the use of property.
Modern zoning laws, as we think of them today, are of fairly recent origin in the law, but with the development of our metropolitan
areas, cities, and villages throughout the country, and with the
terrific increase in our population and in the complication of problems developing in connection with the use of real estate, there
has developed a tremendous number of decisions in both state
and federal courts dealing with such zoning ordinances; and, as
might be expected, there has been conflict and some confusion as a
result.
The power exercised by the municipal authorities in connection
with zoning goes to the very limit of social authority and control
of property. If this nation is to be regarded as a country of liberty
and freedom of action, there is probably no field where this liberty
and freedom of action with reference to individual rights over property is more sharply curtailed. It is the exercise of a social restraint
that was not known to the common law. Under the old common law,
a person could use property for any legal purpose as long as that
use was not a nuisance. The zoning regulations, which are a fairly
recent development in our legal system, go away beyond the controls and powers that were recognized under the common law.
The power to zone is the exercise of a police power and, there*City of Scottsbluff v. Winters Creek Canal Co., 155 N. 723, 58 NW2, 543.
37 Am. Jur. Muni. Corps, § 289, P. 930.
Standard Oil Co. v. City of Kearney 106 N. 558, 18 N.W. 109 18 ALR 95.
**OK as to Nebraska, but see Berman v. Parker, S.C. of U.S. (Em. dom.)
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fore, the aesthetic* cannot be taken into consideration. **How far
does this police power go? We all agree that this police power
permits restraints in matters of health, morals, and safety, but does
it also permit restraint in matters of welfare? This gives rise to
the question as to whose welfare is to be protected-the welfare
of the community, the welfare of the immediate neighbors, or the
welfare of the property owner.
So great are the zoning powers that a corrupt government, in
their exercise, could permit one man to enhance the value of property that he owns and take away from the value of surrounding
property.
Our courts should not hesitate to upset a zoning plan where
it clearly works an injustice on one individual or group to the benefit of another group or individual.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has established, in a long line
of decisions, that what is the public good as it relates to zoning
ordinances affecting the use of property is primarily a matter lying
within the discretion and determination of the municipal body to
which the power and function of zoning is committed, and unless
an abuse of this discretion has been clearly shown, our court has
taken the position that it is not the province of the courts to interfere. This was the court's decision as recently as April 7, 1954, in
the case of Graham v. GraybarElectric, 158 Neb. 527, 63 NW2d 774.
In this case, the plaintiff contended that the zoning ordinance
was illegal because it was "spot zoning." The particular area involved had been zoned first industrial under the ordinance, and
the evidence disclosed that much of the land around the property
was residential in character. Introduced into evidence in this case
was a map of the city of Omaha showing, among other things, that
the property involved was adjacent to the Omaha Beltline Railroad,
and also that throughout a large part of the course of this railroad
through the city, property adjacent to the Omaha Beltline Railroad
was zoned first industrial. I call this case to your attention because
it states so clearly the rule of law above referred to and limits
the area in which the court will inquire, and states that unless
an abuse of discretion has been clearly shown, the courts will not
interfere. In this case the court sustained the action of the Planning
Commission and the City Council.
In another case, however, Davis v. the City of Omaha, 153 Nebr.
460, 45 NW2d 172, decided December 20, 1950, the court held that
the zoning ordinance involved was invalid and that from the record
the ordinance appeared to be unreasonable and arbitrary and overruled the action of the City Council and the Planning Board.
In the syllabus by the court in this same case, most of the basic
principles with reference to zoning are simply and clearly stated:
1. Cities of the metropolitan class are, for the purpose of
promoting the health, safety, morals, or the general welfare of
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the community, empowered to regulate and restrict the height,
number of stories, and size of buildings and other structures; the
percentage of lot that may be occupied; the size of yards, courts,
and other open spaces; the density of population; and the location
and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.
2. Pursuant to this power for any or all of said purposes the
city council may divide the municipality into districts of such
number, shape, and area as may be deemed best suited to carry out
the purposes of regulation. Within such districts it may regulate, restrict, or prohibit the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, or use of buildings, structures, or land. All such regulations
shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout
each district, but the regulations in one district may differ from
those in other districts.
3. Restrictions upon the power are that such regulations shall
be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to
lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic,
and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; to
provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of
land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the
adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools,
parks, and other public requirements; and to promote convenience
of access. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character of the district
and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to
conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the municipality.
4. The zoning of property is permissable under the police power
and its exercise may not be denied on the ground that individual
property rights may be adversely affected.
5. The validity of a zoning ordinance will be presumed in the
absence of clear and satisfactory evidence to the contrary.
6. In zoning what relates to the public good is a question
primarily for determination by the zoning authority and in the
absence of violation of law or unreasonable or arbitrary action its
determination will be allowed to control.
7. The courts will in an appropriate action instituted for that
purpose declare invalid a zoning ordinance where it is made to
appear that such ordinance is unreasonable and arbitrary.
Nearly every city adopts a general or "comprehensive" zoning
ordinance, and frequently the zoning problems that confront the
lawyer involve local departure from these comprehensive zoning
ordinances. One of the terms most frequently used in connection
with any proposed or suggested change in the general zoning plan is
"spot" zoning. This term is generally used when an attempt is
made by the governmental authorities to create a small area within
the limits of a zone in which uses are permitted that are inconsistent
with those permitted in the rest of the area. The city planner of
the city of Omaha, Mr. Alden Aust, has recently defined a zone to
be a "spot zone if it is just a lot or two surrounded by a different
zone; if a business tries to invade a nice residential area so as to
enjoy the amenities created by the residential property owners;
if it is not in keeping with the existing neighborhood land-use
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pattern; if it damages all the adjacent property ownerz while conspicuously benefiting the applicant; or if it does not really promote
the general welfare."
Where there is an existing non-cormforming use of real estate
at the time of the passage of the zoning ordinance or regulation, it
is well settled that this use may be continued. These are called
"grandfather uses." Usually such existing non-conforming structures and uses are specially sanctioned in the ordinance, but these
non-conforming uses usually cannot be expanded in any way and
must be continued pretty much in the same pattern as that established prior to the enactment of the zoning ordinances.
In 1941 the Legislature passed a group of laws, 23-161 through
23-174 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes of 1943, which were designed to promote the health, safety, morals, and general welfare
of the community, giving to county boards in counties where there
is located a federal fort, airport, manufacturing plant, or similar
military establishment the right to set up zoning districts, to establish a zoning board, and to regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, sanitation, and use
of buildings, structures, or land. These statutes specifically provide
"that such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration,
among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar
suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the
value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of
land throughout such district or zoned territory."
Your attention is especially called to Section 23-168, because it
would appear that the statute gives to the court a far broader right
on review of decisions coming under this particular statute than
has previously been the case under the decisions in the State of
Nebraska. After providing for the mechanics of appeal from the
order of the County Board in connection with these zoning matters,
the statute states:
...At the expiration of the time for filing answer, the court
shall proceed to hear and determine the cause without delay and
shall render judgment thereon according to law. If, upon the
hearing, it shall appear to the court that testimony is necessary
for the proper disposition of the matter, it may take evidence or
appoint a referee to take such evidence as it may direct and report
the same to the court with his findings of fact and conclusions of
law, which shall constitute a part of the proceedings upon which
the determination of the court shall be made. THE COURT MAY
REVERSE OR AFFIRM, WHOLLY OR PARTLY, OR MAY MOD-

IFY THE DECISION BROUGHT UP FOR REVIEW. Appeal to the
district court shall not stay proceedings upon the decision appealed
from, but the court may, on application, on notice to the board and
on due cause shown, grant a restraining order....

While I do not think the Nebraska Supreme Court has yet ruled
on this particular phase of this statute, in view of the fact that
the power exercised by municipal authorities goes to the very
limit of social authority and control of property, we think the

PROCEEDINGS, 1956

courts should examine very carefully the acts of the local authorities in these zoning matters, and if there has been an abuse of discretion, the decision of the local board should not be upheld.
We have recently had a case in which there is a complete reversal of a long-held concept, which shows that the law of zoning,
as might be expected in any relatively new field of jurisprudence,
is in a state of flux. It might be more proper to say that the philosophy of the planners has changed, and the case shows that the
court found it possible to accommodate the age-old constitutional
principles to their ideas. The opinion is from the District Court of
Appeal, First District, Division 2, California, in Roney v. Board of
Supervisors of Contra Costa Co., 292 P2, 529. The court found valid
as having proper relation to public health and safety an ordinance
which prohibited the construction of residences in an industrial
zone without a special land-use permit. The ordinance upset the
commonplace theory of zoning which assumes a hierarchy of uses,
in which the residential has long enjoyed the primacy, along with
which has gone the prerogative of being admitted into any zone.
A contrary result was reached by a court divided four to three,
Justice Harry Heher writing the majority opinion, and Justice
William J. Brennan, Jr., the dissenting opinion in Katobimar Realty
Company v. Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 118 A2, 824.
It is true that for some purposes in the techniques of zoning
it may be useful to have a certain order of activities, but when we
drop our preconceived notions, back away, and take a good look
at the situation, can we logically conclude that a beautiful home
ought to be permitted alongside a properly zoned but unlovely
packing house? In our scheme of urban living, does not each have
its place, and why should one have "rights" superior to the other?
We have no difficulty in keeping packing houses out of residential
neighborhoods. It may not be as readily seen why packing houses
should have reciprocal rights, but there are reasons why they
should have them. There are reasons, too, why for the good of their
owners and tenants, residences should be barred from industrial
zones.
A comment by a group of long-time students of the subject
will serve as a conclusion on this point. By their chairman, Fred G.
Stickel III, Counsel for Roseland, New Jersey, in a report to the
National Institute of Municipal Law Officers, the Committee on
Zoning and Planning said:
We predict that the philosophy expressed in the California case
as well as that in the dissenting opinion in the New Jersey case will
be commonly accepted throughout the country before many more
years have passed.
We, as lawyers, must realize that the specific problems of our
clients with reference to zoning matters should be resolved to the
benefit of our clients only if this benefit is consistent with the
common good.
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I wish to thank my good friend and former teacher, Mr. Louis
TePoel, who has served since 1937 as a member of the Omaha
Planning Board, and Mr. Ed Fogarty, the City Attorney of Omaha,
and the chairman of this Municipal Affairs Committee, for their
ideas, suggestions, and very gracious assistance in connection with
the preparation of this paper.
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PROCEDURE IN TAX FRAUD CASES
Joseph T. Votava
Tax cases involving fraud are becoming more numerous and
more serious. They are likely to increase in number and in seriousness. It cannot be otherwise. For 1953, the year last reported,
there were over 53,000,000 income tax returns filed, and of these
over 46,000,000 reported some taxes. About the same number of
returns, and likely more, will be filed every year into the indefinite
future. Tax rates run from approximately 20 percent to 90 percent; we can only expect that under our system of self-assessment,
some of the taxpayers will get into difficulties and that they will
need the services of a lawyer. (In truth, many need a lawyer before
they file their returns.)
Fraudulent tax returns carry with them two severe penalties,
both of which may be imposed, the criminal penalty and the civil
penalty. The criminal penalty law provides that a person who
wilfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any tax or the
payment thereof is subject to a penalty not to exceed five years
in the penitentiary or up to a $10,000 fine or both. A false return
for any individual year is a separate offense. The civil penalty
law provides that if underpayment is due to fraud, a penalty of
50 percent is added to the deficiency; this means the entire deficiency, although only a part of it may be due to the fraud. The
Statute of Limitations on the criminal penalty is six years. The
civil penalty is made more stringent, because there is no Statute
of Limitations as to it, and both taxes and penalties may be assessed for any year if there is fraud in that year's return, no matter
how far back that year may be.
Just now I am concerned with a case where the Revenue Service
is attempting to assess taxes and penalties for all of the years beginning with 1932; and, if fraud is proved, the assessment can be
made, and the 50 percent penalty added.
So the question of fraud in tax returns, both criminally and
civilly, is a very serious matter. If the Government is successful
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in establishing fraud, in addition to the 50 percent penalty, the
Tax Service is likely to impose certain smaller penalties, and then
charge interest at the rate of six percent per annum from the date
when the tax should have been paid. You can appreciate that
such a client may be in danger of losing all of his property and
of spending some time in the penitentiary besides. No wonder
that the taxpayer faced with this problem, if he appreciates the
situation, sweats blood, and he has reason to sweat blood.
One of the dangerous circumstances connected with these cases
is that the taxpayer does not realize what he is up against until
it is too late. Generally he goes to a lawyer asking for a key to
the barn after the horse is stolen. If the taxpayer would only
realize his danger the instant that the Revenue Agent, smiling
and courteous (as they always are), comes in with the intention
of a "routine audit," and seek the help of a lawyer then and
there, the attorney could do considerable for him.
Too often the taxpayer does not go to a lawyer until the audit
Revenue Agent, with the assistance of a special intelligence agent,
has all the necessary evidence to send the client to Leavenworth.
The Government has all the taxpayer's records, a sworn statement
from the taxpayer, given "voluntarily," of course, and often corroborated by the taxpayer's own acountant showing a large deficiency.
Not all tax cases are that gloomy. They run the gamut. Some
taxpayers come in at the beginning of the investigation, the socalled routine audit, and others come in when the Internal Revenue
Service is ready to inflict the coup de grace. What is a lawyer
to do with such cases in such various stages and what can he do?
Naturally you do not expect me, in the limited time allotted,
to give you a treatise on tax fraud law practice. That would take
a book of several hundred pages. Citation and analysis of cases
likewise seems impractical, because every tax case, as Judge Medina
recently said, stands on its own bottom. Every case has different
facets and different issues, and every lawyer, when involved in
one of these cases, necessarily will have to look up the law on the
particular questions in his case. If a tax fraud case runs its full
course clear to the final affirmance by the Supreme Court of a
verdict of guilty, not only tax law but criminal law in all its phases,
trial law, procedural law, and law of evidence are involved.
In addition to knowledge of the law, the lawyer representing
a taxpayer must have a knowledge of the business of his client.
He must be able to check the computations of an accountant intelligently, and personally be able to determine what the tax should
be. He must have trial technique and knowledge of human nature,
and, finally, he will need a good deal of common ordinary sense
and judgment.
My remarks, therefore, will only hit some of the high spots
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that might be of interest and possibly of some value to you. What
then should a lawyer do when a client comes in with a case of
claimed or possible tax fraud? The same as with any other case;
he must first learn what it is "all about." However, it is even more
important in a tax case than in any other, because all of his subsequent strategy will begin there.
Broadly speaking, clients in tax fraud cases fall into two
classes, those who are guilty of tax fraud, and those, strange as
it may seem to the Internal Revenue Agents, who are not guilty.
I might add a third class: those who are guilty but who cannot
be proved guilty because, after all, the Government in a criminal
case must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, a willful attempt to
evade a substantial part of the tax and prove that the attempt was
intentionally made with purposes of tax evasion. To take advantage of a fraud civilly, it is incumbent on the Government, not
the taxpayer, to prove the fraud by clear and convincing evidence.
In these remarks, I shall treat this third class and those whose
guilt is doubtful as falling in the guilty class, because it is always
safe to prepare for the worst and hope for the best.
I shall mention civil fraud only incidentally, because, in substance, civil fraud differs from criminal fraud only in degree.
Furthermore, if criminal tax-evasion prosecution is successful, for
all practical purposes you have lost the civil fraud case for that
particular year.
On the other hand, preparation of defense to criminal prosecution which does not materialize prepares a defense to civil fraud.
The case of a guilty or possibly guilty client must necessarily
be handled differently than that of an innocent taxpayer. The
approach and the entire strategy must be different. Therefore, the
first thing above all others, it is necessary to get all the possible
facts both from the client and from any and all other sources.
You should know your case, both on facts and law, as well as and
better than the Government.
Clients in these cases will generally prove uncooperative. At
least at first they are reluctant to open their breasts to the lawyer.
Most of these clients, outside of their tax difficulties, are respectable
citizens. If they have done anything improper, they are loath and
ashamed to admit these things even to their lawyer, and yet the
lawyer must know what the facts are if he is properly to represent
the client.
It may take some diplomacy to get full cooperation, and "drag
out" all of the facts from the client.
It will help if the client and, naturally, the lawyer know how
the Revenue Agents operate and their means of information. When
this is made clear to the client, he is more likely to "open up" and
assist you to get all the facts. The client and the lawyer must know
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that the Revenue Agents are highly qualified for their jobs. Some
are lawyers, some are-accountants, and all of them are experienced
in their work. Revenue Agents know what it takes to make a case
of fraud. They know what elements must be proved. In addition
to that, every year they receive several days' training on how to
ascertain the facts as to a taxpayer's income. The client must understand that although the Revenue Agent is fair and courteous, he
is an employee of the Government, and that it is his sworn duty to
ascertain the true income of the taxpayer so that all taxes legally
due are paid. The client must know that although there may be
various means of concealing income, the Revenue Agent knows all
these various schemes.
The client should know at the very beginning that although the
Revenue Agent, when he comes in with the avowed purpose of a
routine audit, probably already has information that the tax return
is not what it should be. There are various sources where he may
get such information, and there are various reasons why the Revenue Agent may become suspicious. A short time ago a case came
to my attention where the investigation started because, although
the taxpayer up to now had been living in modest circumstances,
recently he purchased a very expensive home, put in a complete
air conditioner, and bought several thousand dollars worth of furniture. Immediately the Revenue Agent wanted to know "how come."
It may be that the Revenue Agent received a tip-off from an
enemy of the taxpayer or a former employee. I recall a recent
case of a taxpayer who was engaged in the sale of novelties and
who kept very accurate books of purchases, of sales, and of expenses. He did a good deal of traveling, but of course the higher
the expenses, the lower was the net income, so he "imagined" many
trips and many hotel expenditures and made his bookkeeper enter
itemized details of the amounts and the hotels where the employer
presumably stayed on particular dates. These expenditures, however, still did not reduce the taxes low enough, so he decided to give
bonuses at Christmas time, $500 to $1,000 to each employee. So
far, so good! However, one of these employees was subsequently
fired and came in with the story that, although the employees received checks for bonuses, immediately after cashing the checks
they had to return the money in currency to the employer. She
further furnished the information that the various hotel and traveling expenses were fictitious, and the Revenue Agent, inquiring at
the hotels, found that the employer had never stayed at these hotels.
The other employees who received the alleged bonuses confirmed
the story of the discharged employee.
The taxpayer should remember that, although many people will
lie for their own benefit, when it comes to a showdown, they are
not likely to perjure themselves for the benefit of someone else.
Revenue Agents may come across a suspicious tip in the routine
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audits. They may become suspicious because of the taxpayer's expensive mode of life, or because the taxpayer is engaged in activities that undoubtedly produce large incomes but the tax return is
modest; divorce and other court proceedings, public records, former
employees, enemies, ex-wives, former returns, and the like furnish
leads. Besides, the client should know that there are people who
get paid as tax informers. The last report of the Internal Revenue
Bureau shows that something over $600,000 in rewards was paid
during the year to tax informers.
The client should know that his tax returns for several years
back are available to the Agent; and even if the tax returns because of age had been destroyed, the records show the amount of
taxes paid by the taxpayer for many years back. From these payments, he can substantially reconstruct the amount of income which
the taxpayer reported. From these records, he can tell about what
the present worth of the taxpayer should be.
The returns and audits of other taxpayers are available, and
they are likely to disclose large payments to the client.
This reminds me of the case of a former colleague, a United
States Attorney in Illinois, apparently an able lawyer. He was
doing a little law practice on the side, and it happened that one
year he received a fee of upwards of $5,000 from a distillery client.
The United States Attorney "forgot" in his return to include this
particular fee. The client's return was audited, and, to justify its
legal expense, the distillery told all about this fee. Of course the
U.S. Attorney found himself in rather unpleasant difficulties.
Payments of interest and of dividends made by corporations
are available to the Agent. The records in the banks, the ledger
sheets, the deposit slips, and microfilms of checks in many banks,
and the records of insurance companies showing the policies owned
by the taxpayer can be searched by the Agent; records of stockbrokers showing purchases and sales of stocks and of bonds are
also available.
Only recently a client was greatly surprised that the Revenue
Agent knew exactly how many Government and postal bonds the
taxpayer owned and when he purchased them. He forgot that the
Treasury has a record of these. The Revenue Agent carefully investigates the taxpayer's bank borrowings and particularly the
financial statements which the client gave to the bank. Reports
to Dun & Bradstreet are available to the Tax Service. There are
the various public records showing property bought and property
sold. The records of suppliers of raw materials and of wholesalers
of merchandise are also available, and if retailer buys largely from
one company, such as implements, autos, lumber, by adding the
average profit, you and the agent can get a line on a retailer's
income.
I recall the case of a retail liquor dealer in Omaha who, be-
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sides supplying the wants of local customers, also supplied the demands of the thirsty citizens of Kansas and Oklahoma. That taxpayer forgot that there are records, both here in Omaha and in
Lincoln, showing the quantity of liquors purchased at wholesale.
By simply adding up the "markup," it wasn't at all difficult to determine substantially the net income of the taxpayer. In the various
hospitals are records of the patients of any particular physician.
By getting a list of taxpayer's patients and contacting them, returns
have been proved false.
These outside individuals and institutions do not have to furnish
this evidence except upon a summons or subpoena. As a matter
of actual practice, it is hardly ever necessary for the Agents to have
recourse to a subpoena. These institutions and individuals know that
the evidence is procurable, and rather than be summoned, they
voluntarily furnish the information; and if the taxpayer inquires
about it, nine times out of ten they will claim total ignorance about
the matter. These institutions know that it is sometimes very
irksome to remain loyal to their customers and refuse to furnish
the information, except upon a summons or subpoena.
Some years ago a bank about one hundred miles west of here
refused to furnish information to Revenue Agents and even refused
to comply with a summons. We thereupon brought proceedings in
the District Court and obtained an order requiring this bank to
bring its books and records pertaining to this taxpayer to Omaha.
As it turned out, it took a large truck to bring all these records, and
there they were, all spread out on the tables in the south courtroom.
In the meantime, the bank's business was at a standstill. It was
not long before the banker begged the court to permit him to take
his books and records back, promising hereafter to furnish any and
all information that the Revenue Agent asks for, and he did.
All of these sources of information are well known to the
Revenue Agents, and the clients should know that it is next to
impossible to cover up, and that he might as well immediately
disclose everything about his business to the lawyer so that the
lawyer can properly protect him. With the client's assistance, the
attorney should be able to verify the client's story. But the lawyer
should verify it if possible, with or without the client's cooperation.
I recall the case of a very successful farmer who conceived the
"novel idea," as he thought, that it was unnecessary to deposit his
checks from livestock commission companies and from grain elevators, but that he could use them by a simple endorsement in the
payment of some of his large obligations. He reported only the income that went through his bank. Of course he was surprised
when the Revenue Agent produced the figures from the commission companies and the grain dealers, and not only that, but, by
examining the checks, the Revenue Agent could tell the taxpayer
exactly what he did with those checks.
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The giving of an untrue statement when you promised the
Revenue Agent that you are going to give him the facts not only
is highly unethical and dangerous to the success of your particular
case, but the client ought to know that even though he might not
be prosecuted under the taxing statutes, there is another statute
which the Government has available. Section 1001, Title 18 of the
Criminal Code makes punishable by imprisonment up to five years
and a fine of up to $10,000 the giving of any false statements within
the jurisdiction of any Governmental agency.
I have dwelt on the subject of the means as to how the Revenue
Department gets its information and how it can ascertain what the
actual income of the taxpayer is so that these things could be forcibly called to the client's attention in order that the attorney representing him can obtain the necessary evidence, and thus be governed
in his representation of the client. Furthermore, as to any suspicious
information given him by the client, because the client sometimes
feels that what the lawyer doesn't know won't hurt him, the attorney
himself should verify the information received from the client and
be fortified for all contingencies. Besides, following the same methods as the Revenue Agent uses, you may develop a defense which
will prove the innocence of your client, and either prevent prosecution or otherwise win the case.
In recent months we read a good deal about proof of tax fraud
cases by the "net worth" method. Speaking of proof of tax fraud
by any particular method is rather inaccurate and confusing. As I
have already stated, each case must rest on its own bottom.
Under the Criminal Statute, the Government must prove that
there was a deficiency, which, of course, depends on proof that the
taxpayer's income was larger than that reported and that the understatement was wilfully done with the intent to evade the payment
of the required tax. Those are the issues to be proved, and they are
provable by any evidence direct and circumstantial that is admissible, evidence which will convince a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt that the particular issues have been so proved. Those issues
may be proved by the so-called "net worth" method, or they may be
proved by the omission of particular items of income that are not
included in the reported income, or those issues may be proved by
the deposits in the bank and the checks drawn against it. They may
be proved by the large expenditures made by the taxpayer, or those
issues may be proved by the statements and the admissions and the
records of the taxpayer, or they may be proved by a combination of
any or all of them. The ultimate question is-has there been evidence introduced to convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt
that the taxpayer understated his income wilfully and with the
intention of evading the legal tax?
Probably one reason we hear so much nowadays about the net
worth method is because it is a convenient way of proving a tax-
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payer's income. If in 1940 the taxpayer starts with no assets and
in 1950 winds up with a large estate, and if during the intervening
period his tax returns show only a small net income, it is rather
difficult for the taxpayer to show that he was truthful in his returns, unless he can show sources of non-taxable income during
those intervening years. The taxpayer, because nothing happened
during the intervening years, becomes lulled to the belief that all
of his tax returns had "passed the muster." Under these circumstances, the taxpayer is likely to make his case difficult both for
himself and for his attorney.
In all audits, and certainly in all audits where there is the
least suspicious circumstance, at the earliest opportune time, the
Revenue Agent is likely to ask what is probably the most dangerous
question which the Agent can ask of the taxpayer. This question
will come up after the Revenue Agent becomes acquainted with the
taxpayer and after both had been working hard all day and, lighting
their cigarettes, they start to visit. The Revenue Agent compliments the taxpayer on his business and wants to know about when
he started in the business, and soon come the questions, "What did
you start with?" and "What were your assets at such and such a
date?" The uninformed taxpayer, either because he wants to show
how successful a businessman he is or because he wants to be
modest or is generally secretive, nine times out of ten will minimize
the assets and the monies that he had at any particular past time.
If the taxpayer had $50,000 in the bank at that time, he is more
likely to say that he had about $10,000. At the close of the day, the
Revenue Agent writes up a report on his daily activities, and he
puts down the exact words, the exact time, and the exact amount
which the taxpayer said that he had as assets on a certain date. From
then on, the Revenue Service has a starting point on which to build
up their net worth increase proof. When the Revenue Agent gets
that statement from the taxpayer, all he needs to do is to take the
returns for the succeeding years, subtract the amount of taxes that
had to be deducted from the net income, subtract the estimated living and other non-deductible expenses, and he has a fairly close
figure as to what that taxpayer should be worth at the present time.
Then he ascertains from other sources which I have already mentioned what the present assets of the taxpayer are, when he acquired them, and what was the cost of those assets. If there is a
substantial discrepancy, the taxpayer is in hot water. Therefore,
if a taxpayer calls in an attorney at the very beginning of an investigation, the lawyer should by all means caution the taxpayer about
this, in my opinion, the most dangerous question that is likely to
be asked him. It might still be better to caution the taxpayer that
if he does not talk at all, he is not likely to say the wrong thing.
In this connection it may well be remembered that the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution still obtains, and that the taxpayer
(and of course his attorney, also) has the complete right to refuse
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to give any evidence, oral or documentary, including his accountant's
work papers and reports if taxpayer retains possession or ownership,
that might tend to incriminate him. This privilege does not extend
to outsiders or to corporations, but it is in full force and effect as
to individual taxpayers, and there is no reason why a lawyer should
permit his client to be sold down the river on the assumption that
he has to furnish an explanation as to his taxes. Naturally it is
better for the client to be able to say, "I am sorry I can't give you
this explanation or these records, but my lawyer positively prohibited me so doing. He says for you to call him."
This brings me to the controversial subject. Should or should
not the taxpayer and his attorney cooperate with the Internal Revenue Service? As I have already indicated, it all depends on the
facts and circumstances of the case, and that is why a full and
complete investigation of the facts and the law should be made at
the earliest possible time; otherwise, the attorney does not know
which approach to take. In his relations with the Internal Revenue
Agents the word "cooperation" is really a misnomer. From the
standpoint of the Revenue Agents, cooperation is largely a one-way
street. They want the taxpayer and you to lay your cards on the
table face up, but as a rule they never disclose any of the facts
which they have.
I do not mean this by way of criticism. I sat on their side of the
table for too many years. The Revenue Agents have a duty to perform; they have their instructions and directives. They can only go
so far. If the attorney will clearly indicate to the Revenue Agent
why, at least at the inception of the investigation, he cannot furnish
requested information, he will appreciate the attorney's position.
It is the lawyer's duty to protect the interests of his clients, guilty or
not guilty, and they understand it. After the attorney has satisfied
himself whether the case falls into the guilty or not guilty class,
he can then chart his course in his dealings with the Revenue Agent.
If it appears clear or substantially clear that there is no deficiency
in fact, or that if there is a deficiency and it can be established that
the error was not due to wilfulness and with the intent of evading
taxes, of course it is to the interest of the client to produce these
facts for the Agent's consideration. Revenue Agents, either Audit
or Intelligence, are disinterested persons, and they do not want to
recommend prosecutive action if the evidence is not there. On the
other hand, if an Intelligence Agent is investigating the case, it is
with the objective of prosecution, and the Agent is seeking to obtain evidence to convict the client, and certainly no lawyer is justified in furnishing such evidence.
Even though taxpayer's counsel cannot cooperate by furnishing
damaging evidence, it does not mean that his relations with the
Revenue Service should not remain friendly or that he should
abstain from conferences with Revenue Agents. Even though neither
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party will furnish evidence to the other, the conferences will tend
to clarify the issues, the lawyer will learn what are the contentions
of the Service, and on the other hand, it may eliminate a lot of unnecessary investigation on the part of the Revenue Agent as to
issues that will not be disputed.
The main problem, of course, is the doubtful cases, and where
prosecutive action may or may not be recommended. That is where
the knowledge and judgment of the attorney, based on full information, come into play.
Up to now I have emphasized the importance of determining
just what the facts of the case are; by that I do not mean that during
all this period the attorney should not concern himself with the law.
Of course he should. In any event, he should study the appropriate
statutory provisions and also, if nothing else, go through the annotations as found in the U.S. Code Annotated. He should read the
cases that appear appropriate to the issues involved and even such
as are not actually in point. All of these are likely to suggest leads
for investigation and also suggest possible defenses. When the attorney has the facts and is prepared on the law, he must then determine whether he should go all out and stop prosecutive action
before it reaches the indictment.
Let me briefly outline the general course of a tax fraud case
before indictment. Investigation usually starts with the Audit Revenue Agent. It may be a routine audit. It may be an audit with
ulterior motives based upon tips, suspicious circumstances, or other
information that has reached the Internal Revenue Service. When
the Audit Agent makes a preliminary investigation and finds suspicious circumstances that might justify prosecutive action, the
matter is reported to his superiors; the Intelligence Division is then
notified, and a special agent of the Intelligence Division is assigned
to the case. From that time on, the investigation is largely under
the control of the Special Agent, who may continue the work independently or in cooperation with the Audit Agent. When the
Special Agent completes his investigation, he submits his report
and recommendation to the Chief of the Intelligence Division of
the District. He may recommend prosecution. The Chief of the
Intelligence Division, if he disagrees with the Special Agent, disapproves the recommendation, and prosecutive action terminates.
If the Chief of the District Intelligence Division concurs in the
Special Agent's recommendation, the matter is forwarded to the
Intelligence Chief of the region. He again may disapprove, but he
generally concurs with the District Chief. Up to now the case has
been handled by investigators who are primarily interested in determining whether or not the taxpayer is guilty of the violation.
If and when the Chief of the Regional Office of the Intelligence
Division concurs, the case is referred to the Enforcement Attorney
in the Office of Regional Counsel.
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Here it is considered from a somewhat different standpoint.
The attorney has to determine not only whether or not the taxpayer is guilty but also whether he can be proved guilty-whether
there is such evidence as will sustain a prosecution. For that reason
he carefully considers the evidence, the law, and the recommendations, and he may disagree with the recommendation of the Intelligence Division in toto, or he may point out the necessity of
further investigation, before he reaches a final conclusion. If he
agrees with the recommendation of prosecution, the same goes to
the Department of Justice. If he disapproves the recommendation
for prosecution, he has to give in writing his reasons for such disapproval. If the Intelligence Chief concurs in the conclusions of
the Enforcement Attorney, naturally the prosecutive action stops.
If the Intelligence Chief does not agree with the conclusions of the
Enforcement Attorney, he may require additional investigation, or
he may set down his reasons for differing with the Enforcement
Attorney, and the case goes back to the Enforcement Attorney.
If the Enforcement Attorney stands by his conclusions and disapproves prosecution and the Regional Chief of Intelligence likewise
stands by his conclusions that prosecutive action should be instituted, the case is then forwarded to Washington to be resolved
by the two respective branches at the national level; but the general
counsel has the final word. He may stop or recommend prosecutive
action. If he recommends prosecution, the case then goes to the
Department of Justice.
Until recent years, the Department of Justice carefully considered each case before sending it back to the United States District Attorney, recommending submission of the case to the Grand
Jury. In the last few years, I believe the action of the Department
of Justice is more or less routine and perfunctory, and the case
almost automatically goes back to the U.S. Attorney with recommendations for prosecution. The taxpayer and his attorney, if
they know that the case is in the hands of the District Attorney,
have a right to appear before him and present their side in order
to persuade the U.S. Attorney to drop the action. In ninety-nine
times out of one hundred the effort will prove futile, because when
all of the other officials who handled the case before it reached the
U.S. Attorney recommend prosecution. it is very difficult for the
U.S. Attorney to refuse to submit the case. In due course the case
is submitted to the Grand Jury.
The question often arises whether or not the taxpayer should
or should not appear before the Grand Jury to present his side of
the controversy. I think we should understand somewhat the workings ot the Grand Jury. The Grand Jury is a body of not more than
twenty-three nor less than sixteen qualified citizens. Before an
indictment is returned, twelve or more must vote for such an
indictment. They are an independent body, entirely independent
both from the U.S. Attorney and from the Court, and almost a law
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unto themselves. It is sometimes thought that you must have the
permission of the Court or of the U.S. Attorney before a person
whose case is being considered is permitted to appear before the
Grand Jury. This is an erroneous assumption. It is the Grand Jury
itself that has the right and the power to decide that question, and
the request should be made to the foreman of the Grand Jury.
I am now speaking of the theoretical concept of the Grand Jury.
The practical workings in a Grand Jury room are somewhat different. The fact of the matter is that whenever a U.S. Attorney
presents a case to the Grand Jury and he has substantial evidence
of probable cause (and he would be foolish to submit a case if
he did not) and definitely wants an indictment returned, an indictment will be returned. The Grand Jury serves generally for the
full eighteen months allowed. After the U.S. Attorney works with
the Grand Jury for a week or so, they necessarily become friendly.
The Grand Jury is likely to go along with the U.S. Attorney.
I appreciate that almost in every Grand Jury session, the Grand
Jury returns one or two "No Bills," meaning that on one or two
cases so presented by the U.S. Attorney, they refuse to return an
indictment. My experience with Grand Juries for some eighteen
years taught me, however, that these cases where a "No Bill" is
returned are usually, if not always, such as the U.S. Attorney feels
that he must present, either because of pressure from the investigating agency or for other reasons, but believes that the evidence
or the law is such that he cannot obtain a conviction. In such cases
he so indicates to the Grand Jury, and thereupon the Grand Jury
"No Bills" the case, the case is terminated, and everybody is happy.
In a tax case where the Special Agent who investigated the
case recommends prosecution and all those other officials that I
have mentioned recommend prosecution, it is too much to be hoped
for that an appearance by the taxpayer himself will sway enough
votes so that at least twelve of the Grand Jury will not vote for an
indictment. For that reason, I emphatically do not recommend that
a taxpayer appear before a Grand Jury.
When a taxpayer comes before a Grand Jury, he must waive
immunity. He must appear without counsel. His testimony is taken
down in shorthand. It is almost certain that an indictment will
be returned, and then the attorney for the defense is in the dark
as to what the client actually did say in the jury room, and this
certainly handicaps the defense. The taxpayer cannot escape from
his testimony before the Grand Jury, and his testimony may be
used to impeach him at the trial.
While United States Attorney, I never objected to a prospective
defendant coming before a Grand Jury. I felt that if we really
had a case, the prospective defendant's appearance will not prevent an indictment. On the other hand, the prosecution would
then have the defendant's complete statement upon cross-examina-
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tion by the U. S. Attorney and by the jurors. Furthermore, if the
case will not stand up before a Grand Jury, it is too weak to go
to a Trial Jury.
Attorneys for involved taxpayer want to prevent prosecutive
action, if possible. From what I have already said, you will note
that there are two practical times and places when this should be
seriously attempted. If you have a good case, or one sufficiently
doubtful, the taxpayer's side should be given to the Special Agent,
and before he makes his first recommendation to his Chief. On
such a case, the Special Agent is likely to recommend that no
prosecution be instituted, and that the case be referred merely
for civil disposition.
The second practical place and time is when the case reaches
the Enforcement Attorney in the Regional Counsel's office. There
the case is considered independently from the investigating officers.
It is considered from all angles, but primarily "would a prosecution be successful." This attorney does not want to clutter up
the Service and the courts with protracted litigation which eventually will not be successful. Furthermore, under the policy of the
Internal Revenue Bureau, all civil action on the case is stopped
until criminal prosecutive action is terminated. That may delay
the assessments of deficiencies and probable penalties. The Internal
Revenue Service wants to avoid this if there is no likelihood of
successful prosecution. If you fail at either one of those two places,
the chances are about nine out of ten that eventually an indictment will be returned.
I do not mean to say that there is no possibility of stopping
a prosecution at any of the intervening points or with any of the
intervening officials. You can even present your contentions in
the Department of Justice or to the U. S. Attorney, but the likelihood of success is very slim.
If new facts develop at any time, of course, these should be
brought to the attention of the proper officials.
Voluntary disclosures or the fact that prosecutive action may
affect the health of the taxpayer are no longer given any consideration in the question of prosecution, and properly so. But if,
after the case is in the hands of the U. S. Attorney, it should happen
that the defendant, either before or after indictment, is in such
physical or mental health that he cannot properly conduct his
defense, there is a provision for calling the matter to the Court's
attention, and the Court will properly refuse to go on with the
trial. If the defendant's condition is such that it is not likely to
improve, it may even terminate the prosecutive action. Ordinarily,
however, if an indictment is returned, the case goes to trial as any
other criminal case and has to be handled as such.
After an indictment, the defendant is arraigned and asked to
plead guilty or not guilty or nolo contendere. Nolo contendere
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is merely a face-saving plea of guilty and has the same consequences
as a plea of guilty.
The question then arises whether the defendant should stand
trial. The attorney must determine from the facts and the law what
is the proper thing to do and the proper thing to recommend to
his client. If there is a possible defense, the defendant should plead
not guilty and stand trial. By pleading nolo contendere or guilty,
you lose all your rights of appeal, you lose all possible errors in the
trial of the case, and you lose your possible chance of having one man
out of the twelve on the jury refuse to convict. To be safe, the defendant should stand trial. Likewise he should not waive a jury.
It is done in some jurisdictions, but I do not recommend it. After
all, it is for the Government to prove every material issue beyond
a reasonable doubt, and certainly it should be harder to convince
twelve jurors than to convince one judge of the guilt of the defendant.
Furthermore, it is possible that some errors in the trial in the
admission of evidence or in the instructions may creep in if you
try the case to a jury.
On the other hand, I do not mean to say that a defendant
should never plead nolo contendere or guilty. After all, it depends
on the facts, the law, and the circumstances of the case.
This reminds me of a prominent and highly successful and able
attorney in the southern part of the state, now dead. On more than
one occasion I heard him say that he would never, never plead a
defendant guilty.
During the '20's we had, probably not in force, but at least on
the Statute Books, the liquor prohibition law. This attorney was
not in sympathy with that law; so, during the years of prohibition,
he stocked his basement with a large variety and quantity of
liquors, and it was well known that his friends and acquaintances
and clients were always welcome to sample his stock. He never
sold any.
One time he was defending a liquor law violator, and in his
argument to the jury he made the statement that the liquor agents
"had it in" for his client and were not treating everyone alike.
Pointing across the street to his residence he said "they don't dare
to search my basement or to arrest me." This put the liquor agents
in an embarrassing position, and they had no alternative but to
go across the street, raid his basement, and place him under arrest.
The attorney was indicted. He promptly appeared before the judge
and pleaded guilty and received a sentence of ten days imprisonment. So one should hardly ever speak in absolutes. Each case must
be determined on its own facts and merits.
I do not think that a defendant needs to fear that he will lose
any rights by standing trial. In some jurisdictions it is quite customary to be more lenient in the sentence if the defendant does
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not put the Government to the expense of a trial. Some judges
grant some leniency partly to avoid a long trial. We need have no
fear on that score in this jurisdiction. Knowing the attitude of
our judges, I am satisfied that they feel that a man is entitled to
his day in court, and the fact that he stood trial should not justify
a higher penalty than if he pleaded guilty or nolo contendere. But
there may be circumstances where a plea of nolo contendere is
proper. There may be no possible defense. The client wants to
have it "over with," or he may want his civil liabilities determined
as soon as possible, and there may be other valid reasons.
On this occasion, a discussion of a criminal trial is out of quesnon. That involves the law of evidence, technique of trial, and
all of the other elements that go into the trial of a case. I do
want to emphasize, however, that no matter how many tax or
other criminal cases you may defend, never forget to read all the
rules of criminal procedure. They are short, they are simple, and
they will alert you to many things that might escape your attention otherwise. Also let me point out that the defense attorney
should be prepared to know exactly what the Government must
prove in order to sustain its case, and that the attorney should
furnish the court with proposed instructions to the jury. The
court may not adopt them, but it will inform him as to what
should be the charge. You will find that in the "Current Decisions
of the District Courts," in either Prentice-Hall or Commerce Clearing House Service, many of the cases reported contain the charges
to the jury in full. They will prove very helpful.
Even though your case may seem very promising during the
trial, carefully read again the last rules of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure on what to do if and when the verdict goes
against you. You should be prepared for any eventuality. However, let us hope, after you have exhausted all your efforts to forestall prosecution and still the case is submitted to a jury, that when
the jury marches in and lines up and the court asks for the
verdict, the clerk will read "Not guilty."
By way of epilogue: I probably should not thus mar these
"erudite" remarks, but I feel that I ought to make one more practical suggestion. You may know, and if you don't, you will soon
learn, that clients involved in tax matters are money-conscious.
It is important to bear this fact in mind.
A wise lawyer will require a substantial retainer and a definite arrangement for fees. If you do not do this, you may retain
a jaundiced memory of your case. If you pull your client through
unscathed, he will feel that after all he was not guilty of anything,
that he could have had the same results without an attorney, and,
therefore, why should he pay? If you are unlucky and the facts
and the law are against you and the client is "stuck," naturally
the client will feel that he does not owe you anything, because you
have not produced any favorable results. The final outcome will
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be that you wind up with very little money but a lot of very useful
experience. However, useful experience does not pay office rent,
and you cannot buy groceries with it.
BARTON H. KUHNS: At the Dallas meeting of the American
Bar Association, I was visiting with Laury about matters pertaining to the Tax Section of this Association and the Tax Institute
which will be held in December as usual, and invited Laury to
appear on this program this afternoon, and he very graciously consented to do so.
As you all know, Laury's title is that of the Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury. If any of you take the Federal Register,
you read several times a week that the proposed regulations are
still coming out but rapidly drawing to a conclusion. Laury's title
as he told me in Dallas was "Your Future Income Taxes." I take
it he is going to tell us what our future income is and thereby
compute our taxes for us.
YOUR FUTURE INCOME TAXES
Laurens Williams
LAURENS WILLIAMS: Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen.
I hope you will permit me in a word to say how wonderful it is
to be back home. I have not felt so good for a long time as I have
the last day or two here in Nebraska, and I would like to take
some of this weather back with me.
It is an honor to be asked to speak to you today. I am, as the
title implies, sort of going to take off into the wild blue yonder
this afternoon instead of talking with you on technical subjects,
because it seemed to me that what I am going to say is a bit longwinded, but in order to cover in detail what is in effect the thesis
of this paper, it is necessary to give you the sort of general information that lawyers generally in America ought to have. So I want
to visit with you this afternoon about the amount of taxes and
the kind of taxes which we Americans currently are paying to our
federal government.
I am going to say also that at least currently the Treasury
Department is fully aware of the important part which the lawyers
of America play in the collection of the revenue of our federal
government. After all, our system of taxation is almost entirely one
of voluntary self-assessment.
Our laws today are complicated. People must turn to professional people for help, and they do turn increasingly to lawyers.
And the Treasury Department is fully aware, therefore, of the importance of lawyers in the administration and collection of our
revenue and is always glad to participate in any popular institute
for the continuing education, so to speak, of the professional people
of America.
However, what I am going to say this afternoon is not, and
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this is not said because I have to say it, because I do not have to
say it, but it just happens that what I am going to say this afternoon represents my own personal views, collected out of a little
over twenty-three years in the practice of law here and now a
little over twenty-three months in the Treasury Department. And
what I am going to say is nonpartisan; it is not political. I want to
speak to you only as an ordinary American lawyer who happens to
have had an opportunity to observe a little bit about our taxing
system.
As a preface and with proper modesty, I want to say that I
think I am as keenly aware as at least are most Americans of the
imperfections in our taxing system. However, I have been quite
deeply disturbed by the potential implications of some of the
comments and some of the statements which have been appearing
in the press about our American revenue system. And what I want
to say will relate directly, it will be responsive to these comments
that you are reading currently in some of the national magazines
and some of the press.
You see, recently voices have been raised in America saying
that our present taxing system should be abolished or at least
parts of it should be abolished, that our taxing system is too complicated, that it is discriminatory, and that it is confiscatory.
Now that kind of statement sounds good; it has a natural appeal.
That is the sort of thing that is attractive to all of us. It is the sort
of thing that we all thoughtlessly like to hear and to say, particularly when we know how high and how heavy taxes are, and
when we know there are complications, and we know that there
are instances of some discrimination in our tax laws. Nobody likes
taxes; after all, it is sort of an American right, American privilege,
something like Monday morning quarterbacking, to gripe about
taxes.
Now, however, this is going farther than merely griping about
taxes. And so, frankly, I have decided to raise my own small
voice to suggest that before we conclude that this present taxing
system of ours should be scrapped, that we ought to take a look
at the other side of the coin, take a careful look at this taxing system of ours, and see how it is working, see what the causes are,
what the things about it are that we do not like, and consider what
the alternatives are.
Now I profess no special competence to foresee the future, but
I do want to talk with you this afternoon about two basic subjects and look into the future in respect to each.
First, I want to talk to you about the amount of taxes which
Americans will be required to pay to the federal government in
the foreseeable future, and, secondly, I want to talk about the
kind of taxes which I believe will be levied to raise the huge
sums which I think our federal government is going to require.
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I would like, of course, to foretell large reductions in the
amount of taxes we are going to pay; and I would like very much
to foretell vast simplification of the systems of taxation under
which we are going to pay those taxes. But realism and candor
forbid both such predictions.
The 1957 federal budget, that is, the budget for the current fiscal
year which commenced July 1, 1956 and runs through next June
30th, calls for expenditures by the federal government of 69.1 billion dollars. That is a sum so vast, so huge, so great that, frankly,
I do not think there is a man in this room, including myself, that
actually can grasp the enormity of that amount of money, and
contemporaneously during that same twelve-month period the federal government will be collecting from the American people largely
from taxes slightly more than 69.1 billion dollars.
Now what are these manner of expenditures, and when, realistically can we expect the federal government under any administration to materially reduce the amount of its expenditures?
Well, personally, I have reached the conclusion that the present
state of the world has produced an international situation in which
there is no hope for large tax reductions in the foreseeable future.
In fiscal '57, the federal budget allots $42,968,000,000 or 62 percent of the total federal budget, to the Department of Defense
and to other major national security programs, 62 percent of the
total expenditures, 43 billion dollars, rounding it out.
And yet, as huge as that sum is, it already represents a reduction of 14 billion dollars from the estimates submitted in January
of 1953 for the fiscal year of 1954. I think that until our impelling
need to be militarily strong is past, no one wisely can predict proportionately large decreases in our expenditures for national security. If you keep in mind the terrific cost today of these jet planes
you see making vapor trails over Omaha and Lincoln daily, the
cost of nuclear submarines, the cost of guided missiles, the cost
of all these modern electronic, atomic instruments of warfare, how
much do you expect Congress will reduce the 36 billion dollars
which currently is budgeted directly to the Department of Defense?
Let us be realistic about this thing. Just a few months ago the
Congress voted 500 million dollars more to the Department of
Defense than the Department itself and the military itself asked for.
How much do you think Congress is going to reduce the two and a
half billion dollars which currently is budgeted for the military
phase of our mutual security program, which, incidentally, is already reduced three billion dollars from the January, 1953 budget
estimate?
Can anyone realistically expect that there will be a material
reduction in the little less than two billion dollars which currently
is budgeted to the Atomic Energy Commi~sion? Or will Congress
eliminate or materially reduce the four tenths of one billion dol-
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lars which currently is budgeted for stockpiling and increasing our
national defense production capacity? And yet these items that I
have mentioned amount in the aggregate to 43 billion dollars,
63 percent of the total federal budget.
I am not condemning and I am not supporting any of those
expenditures; I am simply trying to speak to you as a realist, trying
to face the facts of life in America today and in this world today.
And I submit that no one can expect substantially large reductions
in our defense expenditures until the day comes, as it must some
day come, when the international situation has changed enormously.
Now, if we cannot expect a big cut in military expenditures,
how about the other 38 percent of the federal budget, that which
calls for civilian and non-military purposes? Can we expect a
reduction in taxes or a reduction in expenditures there? Well, over
ten percent of that remaining 38 percent, a little more than ten
percent of the total federal expenditures, will go simply to pay
interest on the national debt. And I assume that we would all agree
that there will not be any substantial reduction in that expenditure
until the time comes, if it ever does, when we substantially cut our
national debts off.
Well, that leaves us 28 percent of the total federal budget at
which to look on the expenditure side to see if we can realistically
expect the federal government to cut down expenditures. That
is about 19 billion dollars, again so much money that I do not have
any idea how much it really is, and I doubt if you do. What about
it?
Well, 11 or 12 billion of that 19 billion dollars, over 17 percent
of the total federal budget, consists of such things as grants and aids
to states, the veterans' expenses, the cost of the agricultural program, unemployment compensation, federal employees retirement
pay, the cost of running the Congress and the Courts, and other
things of that nature; either well entrenched, well established, now
almost traditional type of federal functions, or else essential federal government functions.
Now who is going to expect veterans' benefits to be cut off if
you are realistic, or expect the farm program to be terminated overnight, or expect unemployment compensation to terminate, or do
you think that we are going to close Congress and the Courts? And
yet those are the things which currently costs about 11 to 12 of the
remaining 19 billion that we have not previously looked at.
Well, that leaves seven or eight billion dollars of federal expenditures, about 11 percent of the total, to which you can look
to see if you are realistically going to get any reduction in your
taxes through reduction in expenditures.
I suggest that that remaining 11 percent is not controllable,
that is, readily controllable, at least, as a practical matter, because
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that happens to be the costs largely of operating all the various
departments and agencies of the government.
And, moreover, if you are thinking about this federal government of ours materially reducing its expenditures, I suggest that
you have got to take into consideration the question of how much
money the federal government will spend in the future on new
and additional things resulting from new and additional demands
and needs, for new and additional services, from the government of
a civilian nature, civil benefits for the nation as a whole.
How about highways, schools, housing, and all of these other
things in respect to which terrific demands are constantly appearing before the Congress with concomitant demands for huge additional new appropriations of money?
Well, in the belief that I do this realistically, I am simply facing
the facts of life. I suggest to you that the only hope for a ten to
twenty billion dollar reduction in federal expenditures, and that
is the only thing that can possibly cause a substantial reduction in
taxes, by a reduction of expenditures, lies in the hope for substantial change in this international situation and resulting in substantial reduction of the costs of our mutual and national security
programs.
Well now, if that analysis of the expenditure side of the budget
is correct, then there may not be much hope for reduction in taxes
or reduction of federal expenditures for some time to come. Actual
expenditures of the federal government only three years ago, in
1953, fiscal '53, were 74.3 billion dollars. For fiscal '56 they were 66.3
billion dollars, a reduction of eight billion dollars.
However, in 1954, we had a tax cut of 7.4 billion dollars, which
at current income levels would amount to over eight billion dollars. Thus, the eight billion dollar reduction in these expenditures
that has been effected in the last three years has already been
matched by an offset in tax cut.
Now we have a balanced budget; that is due to the increased
production of wealth and the increased level of income, and certainly as far as I am concerned any hope for reduction of the magnitude of the reduction that we got in '54 seems to turn wholly on
this world situation.
In other words, I think that the federal government is destined
to spend around 70 billion dollars in the immediate foreseeable
future. You see, simultaneously then, we are going to do one of two
things. We are either going to tax ourselves enough to raise the
money we are spending and pay as we go, or else we are going to
tax ourselves only part of that money, and we are going to borrow
the balance, which, of course, ultimately means increasing the
national debt, which means abandoning the balanced budget, current fiscal policy. It means inflation, which of course is the cruelest
type of an indirect tax.
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There, I think, the choice is clear, and personally I think we are
going to have to find a predictable fiscal and monetary climate
where business can continue to increase as it has been, to expand,
to increase our production of wealth, and so forth, that we have got
to have a sound reliable predictable policy, which means a balanced
budget, which means taxing ourselves enough to pay for these large
expenditures, which, in turn, I think, means that for the immediate
future any tax reductions of any kind will have to come from one
of two sources, neither of which is large.
First, such increased revenue to the government as comes
through the projected annual constant yearly growth in our population and the increase in our production of wealth, which, stated
simply, means more people making more money with which to pay
taxes. And then, secondly, such additional economies in government
itself as continued vigilance on the part of all may make it possible.
Again being realistic, I say that the amount of such reduction and
expenditures through further economies in government, I suspect,
are very, very small.
In other words, I think we face a very heavy burden of taxation ahead. It is a burden that I expect sometimes is too heavy to
be borne permanently without affecting the well-being of America.
Certainly, taxes are too high. Certainly, we must somehow get to
the day when they can be reduced.
But until that day comes, with this heavy burden of taxation on us, we have got to raise this money somehow. So let us
take a look and see what are the taxes that currently are raising this
money that the federal government takes in annually. What is this
federal taxing system?
Well, in the current fiscal year, the budget calls for collection

of revenues of 69.8 billion dollars. That is 700 million dollars more
than the budget expenditures, and it is only 200 million dollars less

than 70 billion dollars.
Now where will that money come from? Well, it comes from
seven sources, broadly speaking. One of these is a nontax source.
Nontax sources will produce approximately 3.2 billion of the 69.8

billion.
Now what are these nontax sources? Briefly, they include sale
of surplus government property, rents, fines, recoveries, penalties,
gifts to the government, and that type of receipt by the government.

But the rest of this 69.8 billion, or 66.6 billion, will come from six
kinds of taxes.
Now three of these tax sources are so minor that they are relatively insignificant; net employment taxes produced about 300
million dollars a year for the general budget. It is a lot of money,
but when you are talking about 69.8 billion dollars, then 300 million dollars is not a very big bite in it.
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Now can we look to employment taxes to replace some other
kind of tax which currently is under attack? Well, I think that most
Americans would agree that we do not want employment taxes
increased, at least, not substantially. The present law already
schedules a rise in employment taxes from 2.25 percent to 3.75 percent on every employer, and also on every employee in 1960. That
means a total tax on gross payroll of 5.5 percent.
The federal government currently collects 7.5 billion dollars
in payroll taxes; but 7.2 billion of that is transferred into the social
security, and so forth, trust fund for the purpose of paying the
social security benefits, and the excess of the 300 million stays in
the general budget.
I think it is perfectly silly to expect employment taxes to be a
replacement for any other current tax.
The next minor tax source is customs and tariffs. They produce
about seven-tenths of a billion a year. I do not suppose the majority
of Americans would want to increase tariffs, customs duties, very
materially, and, as a matter of fact, I do not think any increases
of substantial amount in our tariffs would produce substantial
additional revenue to the government in any event. At the present
time they only produce seven-tenths of one billion dollars. So,
there again, without going into detail there is not a likely source
for large additional revenues to replace any other taxes.
Now the third source, estate and gift taxes. In combination, they
only produce 1.2 billion dollars a year for the federal government,
that is all. Now is there a chance of the federal government to get
large additional revenues from that source? I think it quite obvious
that there is no way of increasing rates so substantially that the
federal government would get substantially more money.
At the present time as you know you reach the 30 percent
bracket in a taxable estate of a hundred thousand dollars; at a million dollars you are at 39 percent; at three million dollars you are
at 56 percent; at six million dollars you are at 70 percent; and everything over ten million dollars is taxed at 77 percent now.
But then, we look at these things and see if the federal government could get some more money by increasing these rates. If,
instead of these already confiscatory rates, the government said,
"We are going to take 100 percent of everything over half a million
dollars of everything that every American leaves behind when he
dies, and, in addition, we are going to collect out of that first halfmillion dollars what we currently collect," the government would
only raise about an additional one billion dollars a year, that is
all. And if you are going to be realistic, obviously government
would not raise that, because rather than leave their money to the
government would not most wealthy Americans do what they are
already doing-put their estates in accepted foundations of their
own charity? Or are we going to say that we are going to tax all
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charitable gifts and bequests in America at 100 per cent? I suggest that Americans, at least, yet, would not stand for that kind
of a tax, and even if it did, nobody realistically believes that state
and gift taxes would raise enough money if we confiscated everything over some reasonable figure instead of taxing as we now did,
enough money to substantially supplant any other taxes.
Well now, to summarize for a moment, to see the three minor
tax sources, customs, unemployment taxes and estate and gift taxes
produce only 2.2 billion dollars at the present time; but with no
realistic prospect that they can or will be increased or changed in
such way as to provide enough money to supplant or replace any
other form of tax.
These three things in combination plus non-revenue sources,
non-taxables, only produce 5.4 billion dollars, which is only eight
percent of the total federal revenue, which leaves 92 percent, or
64.4 billion dollars, to be raised by other tax sources.
Those other, tax sources are really only two in number, but I
want to break them into three for discussion purposes. The three
mainstays of the present taxing system are, first, excise taxes,
which will provide about 9.2 billion dollars a year this year; corporate income taxes, which will produce net about 21.2 billion dollars a year, and individual income taxes, which under the August
estimate will produce about 34.1 billion dollars this current year.
You see thus excise taxes produce about 13 percent of the total
federal revenue; income taxes about 79 percent; and all of the
others in combination only eight percent.
Now as realists, as people who want to be factual about this
problem, I put to you the problem of where government would
turn to produce the 55 billion dollars in revenue which now is
being produced for the federal government by income taxes. Let
us first take a little quick look at excise taxes. They are the most
productive of all federal taxes except income taxes. However, it
is a form of tax for which many Americans have little funds, because it is a tax on consumption, but it is a real revenue producer,
over nine billion dollars a year. Now how much more realistically
would rate increases in excise taxes add to federal revenue? Well,
about 4.7 billion of this, a little over nine billion dollars, of excise
tax revenue comes from alcohol and tobacco taxes. The current
liquor tax is $10.50 on a gallon on a product that costs the industry
between one and two dollars a gallon to make, to put in bond, and
in charred kegs; to keep in warehouse storage up to eight years,
and then bottle ready to put on a distributor's shelves.
The current tobacco tax is eight cents on a package of twenty
cigarettes, obviously exceeding the cost of production and manufacture. I suggest that there is very little room for large amounts
of additional revenue for the government in these areas. Somewhere, you see, government would reach the break-through point,
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the point of diminishing returns, where -we are getting back to
bootlegging again, and that kind of problem.
As a matter of fact, a great many honorable people in the
alcohol industry today sincerely believe that we already have
reached that point.
Well, without exploring it in detail, let us suppose that Congress did just double all excise taxes currently levied. Suppose
they doubled the ten percent tax now imposed on automobiles, the
tax on refrigerators, household appliances; doubled the tax on transportation, on communications, on admissions to movies; doubled
all stamp taxes, the taxes on alcohol and tobacco, and everything
else that is now subject to excise taxes.
And then make another assumption, which I am afraid will be
a little foolish, but let us make it; that doubling excise taxes somehow or other did not reduce the volume of sales and of services
now subject to excise tax, so that the government's revenue from
these sources was doubled. Suppose in addition we changed our
estate tax laws and confiscated 100 -percenit of all estates over
half a million dollars, and took what we currently take from the
first half-million dollars.:

Well, we would still bi, 45 billion dollars short of replacing
the revenue currently raised by the income tax. And, incidentally,
the hue and cry for reduction of excise taxes, at least in Washington, is much more intense, gentlemen, than is the hue and cry
for reduction of income taxes. Just sit there and take the pressure

for a while and you will come to that conclusion, at least so far as
the effective representation of industry in the halls of Congress
is concerned.

Well, not -only are income taxes currently our main source
of revenue, but I think they are destined to be for some time to

come. Viewed realistically, I think it has to be that way. Now
it may be that government leans too heavily on income taxes.

Seventy-nine percent of your revenue is an awful lot of money to
get from that type of source, but that is a debatable problem, in-

cidentally.
But certainly we ought to go a little slow in substituting a
sales tax or anything the equivalent of a sales tax for an income
tax. What would a sales tax that is large enough to replace the
income tax do to this country? What would it do to business?
What would it do to our economy? What would it do to our people?
How many jobs would be destroyed, would be just wiped out
overnight?
I am talking off the record. These are not published figures.
It will be all right to publish them in January, but I do not want
them out now, because I do not want any political or election implications in what I have to say, because it is not intended.
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But, you know, it would take a retail sales tax of over 26
percent on every retail sale of everything in America except food
and government purchases to raise the money now raised by the
income tax. Remember that a lot of these things are already taxed
at ten percent or more, and that the 26 percent figure I have given
you contemplates continuous retention of all current excise taxes.
I suggest to you that with the exceptions that the Congress
certainly would grant, it would take at least a 40 percent break
to raise the money currently raised by the income tax.
Well now, if instead of replacing the income tax with a retail
sales tax, suppose we used a manufacturer's and producer's tax,
so you taxed the farmer on the sale of his product. It would take
a rate of 36 percent on top of current excise taxes, even if nothing
was exempt except food and government purchases.
Take another look at a different approach. If we taxed all
retail sales except food and government purchases, and in addition we taxed every consumer expenditure for services, taxed
lawyer services, doctor's services, every service rendered in America, and we kept our present excise taxes in effect, the rate would
have to be 16 percent. That would mean a direct tax of 16 percent on every paycheck in America, from withholding. And how
unrealistic! Can you imagine Congress taxing medicine, drugs,
medical and hospital care, sale of homes, rents, all clothing, adding
16 percent to the current payroll tax? It gets down to how silly
can you get?
Well, obviously current income taxes in the case of individuals
are too high, extremely high, perhaps much too high. They are so
high now that even after the '54 reduction, the government could
not raise much more money by increasing current income tax rates.
For example, if, instead of taxing at the present rates, the government confiscated 100 percent of all surtax of net incomes of individuals over $40,000 per year on joint returns, or over $20,000 a year
on a single return, the total additional revenue that the government
would get by taking 100 percent instead of what they currently take
is only 1.9 billion dollars.
That is substantially less than the loss of revenue involved in a
$100 increase in a personal exemption; 1.9 billion dollars, that is all,
that current rates leave large taxpayers in America under your
current income tax practice in respect to their ordinary income.
That is how close we already are to confiscation of large incomes
under current rates.
Here is another interesting fact. Suppose we stopped the individual surtax, at the top tax bracket, at 50 percent instead of letting
it climb up to 91 percent as it currently does. The government's
revenue loss would only be about three-quarters of a billion dollars
a year. In other words the surtax rates above 50 percent today only
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produce about three-quarters of a billion dollars a year. And remember, you have reached the 50 percent bracket at $16,000.
If the surtax brackets were stopped at 75 percent instead of
going up to 91 percent, the revenue loss to government would be only
about 80 million dollars a year. Now 80 million dollars is a lot of
money, but when you are talking about $69,800,000,000, then 80
million dollars is not so big.
If the top surtax bracket was stopped at 30 percent, the revenue
loss would only be 2.9 billion dollars a year. In fact, the total surtax bracket system produces only a little over 5% million dollars
a year.
So put it the other way; the 20 percent bracket, the bottom
bracket, produces all but 5% billion dollars of the money raised by
the individual income taxes. In other words, the 20 percent bracket
produces 84 percent of the amount raised by the individual income
taxes, and the surtax bracket structure only produces 16 percent.
Well now, so much for the surtax bracket and the problem of
surtax rates. I want to take a look at another facet of this problem.
Let us take a look at this income tax structure, the system itself,
and ask ourselves whether it is wholly bad, whether the things
that are said to be wrong with it have as their source some evil
un-American thing. The charges are that the income tax law is
terribly complicated, it is so complicated that only a professional
can understand it; that it is discriminatory, that it is inequitable,
and that it is confiscatory. And now what I have said about surtax
rates and estate tax rates does relate to the charge that they are
confiscatory, but that is a matter of opinion. Those rates, however,
in combination with the special treatment that we give to capital
gains are, in my judgment, the direct cause of the immense drive to
convert ordinary income into capital gain, to defer realization of
income, and to split income, so to speak, into different tax returns,
and all of the other techniques for minimization or deferment of
over-all income tax liability, which, in turn, I want to explain a little
more in a moment, is one of the major causes of the law's complexity
and of some of the alleged inequities.
But now, what about the charge that the tax law is so complicated that only the professional expert can understand it.
Well, obviously, there is a great deal of truth in that charge;
it is complicated. However, there are many worthwhile things in
America today that are complicated and which not everybody can
understand. Frankly, I do not understand how a radio works, how
television works, how an automobile works-most of the things
which we Americans use in our daily living are complicated, and
they require experts to maintain and repair them.
As a matter of fact, a vast number of the essential things in
American life today can be operated only by experts. There are
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a lot of things in life today that are too complicated for everybody to understand fully; so I suggest that it is clear, is it not, that
the mere fact that something is complicated does not ipso facto,
of itself, indict it. You see, business itself is pretty complicated;
our whole life is pretty complicated; and there are good American
reasons for these complications in American life today, and there
are good American reasons for the complications in the income
tax law.
Here we are, 169 million free Americans, free to live our own
lives, free to do things the way we want to do them. We are free
to travel, to live here, to move there; we are free to work, we are
free to quit. We are free to select the times and the places, the
terms and the conditions under which we are going to work.
We are free to build, to renovate and change, and to tear down.
We can organize businesses, we can reorganize them, and we can
liquidate them; and we are free in America to select the ways of
doing all these things. We can select an infinite variety of ways,
means, terms, conditions, provisions, and the times and places
when and where we are going to produce income.
We are pretty ingenious people in America, a very vigorous,
dynamic people. We have a lot of ingenuity, and, by the way,
we have a lot of motivation to make our personal affairs, our personal transactions, and to make our business transactions very
complicated. You see, we have the right in America, and we
zealously assert it. That is one of the things that we demand and
never surrender.
We have the right as free men to determine the form and
the substance and the timing of our personal and our business
transactions.
Now, any income tax law, to be fair, has to reach everybody;
any tax law, to be fair, to be equitable, to be as little discriminatory as possible, has to reach all incomes wherever and whenever realized and it has to tax it to the right person.
Now, there is this constant hue and cry for a simple income tax
law. Well, we can have a simple income tax law any time we
want it. It would not be difficult to draft. The three of us here
on the rostrum have all the technical ability it would take to produce a simple income tax law in a two-day session at the maximum. The trouble is you would not stand for that law, you
would not want it. Americans would not tolerate any simple
income tax law. Why? Well, the reason is simple. Any simple
income tax law has to take a meat-ax approach; it would be outrageously discriminatory; it would create intolerable competitive advantages and disadvantages.
In its application to some taxpayers, it would be extremely
partial and unjust; it would discriminate in favor of some and
against others. You see, simplicity and fairness simply do not
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go together in a tax law. They are both desirable goals, but
they will not fit; you can not have both in a free and complicated
society, where you want your tax law to reach all income whenever and wherever realized and tax it to the right person.
Why is our law complicated? Is it because Congress is inept,
or the Treasury, and Congressional staffs are deliberately trying
to be complicated, just writing for the experts to understand, or
maybe too naive to know the effect of what they are doing? Is
it because Congress is weak and succumbs to lobbying pressure?
Well, I do not think so; I think the major causes of complications in our tax law today are two in number, and both of them
arise out of the same essential basic American principle. These
things are, first, the impelling need that all Americans naturally
have in them for justice, for fairness; the impelling need to make
our tax laws as little inequitable, as little discriminatory, and
as neutral in their impact on our fellow Americans as we can.
And, secondly-and this is just as important, in fact, it is more
important, from the standpoint of creating competition-there
is this dominant overriding necessity of preventing avoidance of
income tax by the sophisticated and erudite well advised taxpayer;
of trying to make sure that every American bears his fair share of
the total tax burden.
You see, one of our basic principles in America which has been
something pretty sacred for most of us, is that ours is a government
of law, not government by a man. We are pretty dedicated to that
concept, and I think we have grown great in America partly because
of that concept. We want no vesting of broad discretionary authorities in tax administrators to decide how much tax we individually
are going to pay, or who is going to pay tax. We want our tax
liabilities determined under laws applicable to all'men. As free men
living under law, we claim the right to shape our affairs the way
we see fit, and when tax rates are as high as they are today, some
of us are pretty ingenious in shaping our affairs, but that is our lawful right, and you will fight for that right too, will you not?
Well, what does that mean? That means that any law, to be
as fair as we can make it to prevent avoidance, has to be complicated
to prevent particular taxpayers from shaping their affairs in such
fashion as to avoid what is really their fair share of the total national tax burden, and at the same time leave us free in America
to shape our own affairs the way we want to shape them, and the
way we are going to shape them.
No, a simple tax law will not work. It would do one of two
things: it would either make it impossible for some Americans to
do business the way they want to do business and conduct their
affairs the way they want to conduct them, or it would enable
others to avoid their fair share of the total burden. It is a beautiful
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dream to have a simple tax law, but I am afraid that it is just a
dream. I do not think life in America is like that.
You see, the price you would have to pay for a simple income
tax law that would work and that would leave you free to shape
your own affairs the way you are going to demand the right to
shape them, well, the price would be to vest in the tax collector
almost unlimited discretionary authority to determine the amount,
the character, the ownership, and the time of taxability of income.
And that means abandonment of our basic principle of freedom
under law, of government by law, not government by man. That
simply is not the American way.
Well, what then are the causes of these complications? I am
not going to try to explore them all. I do not have the time; but I
am going to assert that with a very few exceptions, the complications in the tax laws today have their origin in and owe their continuing existence to one or more of the following things, each of
which I say to you is inherent in greater or lesser degree in any
income tax system containing surtax brackets, dividing ordinary
income and capital gain, and so forth, that it is going to operate in
a free society such as ours, which itself is complex, and if you are
going to have government by law, not government by man.
And I want to give you some illustrations to document briefly
each of these points. First, as I mentioned, the necessity of preventing tax avoidance. Take a look at the throw-back rules and the
taxation of an income of trusts and estates. There are few things
in life more complicated than that. Look at the horrible problem
in net operating loss, in carry-backs and carry-overs, in corporate
reorganization, in collapsible corporations, in 306 stocks, in collapsible partnerships, personal holding companies, and I could go on
listing that sort of thing almost endlessly. Every one of those complicated provisions is caused by the necessity of preventing tax
avoidance, the conversion of ordinary income into capital gains,
a big lot of income at capital gain rates, and that sort of thing.
Those complications represent the necessity of being fair, of
preventing avoidance by erudite taxpayers through the use of clever
form arrangements, and there are very few areas of the income tax
law that are free from the potential of "gimmicking." We are pretty
clever people. A lot of us lawyers can be pretty ingenious in finding
new ways to avoid; so, to be fair, the tax law must try to prevent
each of us from gaining an unfair advantage over our fellow Americans. Therefore, in any fair tax law, we have to have it complicated
to prevent avoidance of the provisions if we are going to continue
to have government by law and not government by man, and be
left free to shape our own affairs, and at the same time prevent the
erudite from escaping his share of the tax burden. It is that simple.
Now, second, the minimization of competitive advantage and
disadvantage; that is a motive for complication. Take a look at the
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complications and the rules relating to prohibited transactions of
exempt organizations. What brought that into the law? Just one
simple thing; they came into the law to prevent charities and other
exempt organizations from engaging in unfair competition with
private business, nothing else.
Third, the elimination of what otherwise would be a very unfair
discrimination. Well, look at the new sick-pay provisions with all
their horrible complications. These provisions were adopted solely
to eliminate a discrimination. What was that discrimination? Well,
under the old law if I were an employee, my employer bought an
insurance policy which paid me benefits when I was sick. There
was no tax on my benefits. They were tax-exempt. But if my
employer put in his own sick pay plan and paid me sick benefits
with his own money instead of providing like benefits through an
insurance policy, then my benefits were fully taxed. Well that was
deemed to be a pretty unfair discrimination; so into the law came
these new sick-pay complications with all their god-awful complications.
Take a look at the new retirement income credit; it takes a
half a page on Form 1040 to try to boil it down. It is so terribly
complicated that one tax service recently said, quote: "One trouble
is that it involves complications which might baffle the tax practitioner who can take a tax free reorganization in his stride."
Well, what brought that into the law? The elimination of unfair discrimination, nothing else. What was that discrimination?
Well, if you have social security benefits, they weren't taxable, but
if you saved your own money and built up your own retirement
fund and received income from your own investments when you
retired, that was taxable.
So, to stop this discrimination, to level it off between the nontaxable income of the social security fund and the self-employed
fellow who built up his own little retirement fund, into the law
came the retirement income trick, with all its complications.
Well, the fourth cause of complication, relief from inequitable
or harsh result. Look at Section 303, which deals with the redemption of stock to pay death taxes. Take a look at this recent legislation of the last session of Congress dealing with the problem of
distribution by corporation of property in kind with the stockholders, where the property exceeds in value the claims and profits
of the corporation.
Take a look at our whole system of foreign tax credits which
can get horribly complicated. All of those things, and I could go
on again listing endlessly, all of those things came as relief from
an inequitable and harsh result that would follow in the absence
of such provision.
Well, there is a fifth general area of complication; there are a
good many instances in which something has been done in the tax
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laws to encourage a particular public purpose. Take a look at depletion and the intangible write-off. How are they justified? The
answer is, in the main, done for a public purpose, to encourage the
exploration and development for minerals in the country.
Take a look at the emergency amortization of defense facilities.
Take a look at the emergency amortization of grain and storage facilities. Why did that come in? To encourage the construction of
grain storage facilities by private capital, because if private capital
did not do it, government was going to have to do it. Public purpose.
Take a look at Section 175, on water conservation. What brought
it into the line of a public purpose? To encourage soil and water
conservation.
Take a look at the Western Hemisphere Trade Corporation situation. It is terribly complicated and contains all kinds of problems.
They came in for the same reason. Again, I can give you a long
list. A lot of things have come into our tax law because in the
judgment of Congress it was wise to use the tax laws to encourage
a particular public purpose.
I want to say that I personally do not like that doctrine; I disapprove of it. I think it is the wrong way to use the tax laws, but
that has been a cause of the complications, and I suspect, whatever
your politics, and almost under any administration you are going to
have an occasional use of tax laws for a non-revenue purpose. And
whatever kind of a tax you have, whether it is income tax or anything else, it is one of the facts of American life today.
Now the final point on this thing. I think it is obvious too that
wiser administration at times in the past, sometimes perhaps a
more far-seeing litigation policy on the part of the Treasury and
Internal Revenue, more thoughtful consideration and better understanding of the long range of the thing by the courts, or a little
wiser action by Congress in the first instance, could have spared
us the need for some of the Congressional action which has added
a lot of complications to our income tax laws.
Take a look at what has been done in the whole area of intangible write-off, and there is another instance of flipping and
flopping back and forth, and every time they won, they found out
that they won the battle and lost the war, so they had to take a
new position, and that has been going on for fifteen years.
So that type of situation contributes to complications. But,
after all, how critical should we be of the fact that sometimes the
Administration has not been as wise as it should have been or sometimes revenue is litigated when it should not have been litigated as
it now turns out. Or it turns out that Congress should have been
a little smarter in the first place, or it turns out that the courts
should have been more far-seeing and should have been wiser in
their decisions.
What does that prove? We are not going to have too much
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improvement, I suppose, in administration, handling of things in
revenue, of handling things in our courts. Are we going to have
much wiser judges? Is Congress going to be much wiser?
I suggest to you that that is one of the prices that we pay for
our system of freedom under law. As a matter of fact, that is one
of the reasons, is it not, for the principle of government by law, not
government by man.
And if these things I have just mentioned have been a cause of
complication, then what would be the effect of instituting a system
in which you vest in men the authority to determine when and how
much taxes you are going to pay, which is the alternative, in my
judgment, to a somewhat complicated law?
Well, of course our tax laws are not perfect. They are far
from perfect. Nobody knows it better than those who have had a
little experience in the Treasury Department; on the contrary, I
say to you with all earnestness that all of the people in government
who have any official responsibility or connection with our income
tax laws know that our tax laws are imperfect. We in the Treasury,
the Committee on Ways and Means, the Committee on Finance in
the Senate, and their professional staffs, a lot of great professional
organizations like the American Bar Association, in its Section on
Taxation, the American Law Institute, American Institute of Accountants, and a lot of other professional organizations are working
constantly on improvement of our present tax laws.
Personally, I am glad that these voices have been raised, challenging the fairness and the propriety of our income tax laws, because I think it will help to stimulate more and, I hope, better
thinking by all of us about our income tax laws, and that is all
to the good.
Clearly there is a lot that can and should be done to improve,
to clarify, and to simplify this total income tax structure, to make
it less imperfect, to make it more fair and just. Certainly in many
instances the complications are not worth it. Perhaps in a few
instances, sometimes with Treasury urging, I hope not, it has not
happened recently, Congress has introduced complications so extreme, that what they have really done is burned down the barn
in order to kill one or two wrecks. But I hope that you will agree
with me that there is another side to the story, and that blind
repudiation of the income tax based on half learning, without looking to see how it is working and without looking to see what you
could turn to to see what you could substitute for it, will not add
much to the construction of American life. After all, the whole
American scene in kaleidoscopic; change is the order of the day.
Experience constantly brings to light the need of further change
to meet the nation's changing needs.
I think that constant vigilance, earnest and sincere effort, and
all the while adherence to fundamental American principle will
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keep our income tax laws relatively fair, but they will not be fair
and also truly simple, not unless and until the day comes when
either our society and our economy are simple or, God forbid, some
of our precious freedom is gone from our land.
As to these complications, I suggest that with the continuing
education of the professional tax people of America and the people
generally in America, and with the continued efforts that are now
being made, they are in progress for simplification and improvement, particularly now that these voices have challenged people to
redouble their effort to simplify and improve and clarify, I think we
will continue to have a taxing system which is one that the people
of this country ought to think about pretty long and soberly before
they discard it.
I submit that the remedy is improvement, constantly working
with it, simplifying and improving, and not to destroy it.
And one final thing, and I say this out of experience, and out
of a fairly considerable experience. We now have in this country
a taxing system which is so much fairer, it is so much more equitable, and it is so much more like America than the taxing system
of any other nation on the face of this earth that any comparison
of our taxing system with that of any other civilized nation on this
earth will leave you with a very great and very deep appreciation of
the over-all fairness and the over-all good of the system we do have
in America.
Thanks very much for listening. I think it was too long, but you
seemed to hang on, so I kept on. Thank you very much.
BARTON KUHNS: We have one other item of business, but,
first, Laury, I want to thank you very much indeed for your very
informative and very inspiring paper, and I really think that this
section on taxation of this State Bar Association is very fortunate
to have two such papers as we have heard this afternoon, and I
think it will be a credit to any tax meeting anywhere in the country.
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JUNIOR BAR SECTION
Ray C. Simmons, Esq.
Chairman
"Analysis of Tabulation of Economic Survey"
Panel Discussion
Panel Members
Ray C. Simmons, Esq.
Chairman of the Section
Donald Boyd, Esq.
Dewayne Wolf, Esq.
Edmund McEachen, Esq.
William Stewart, Jr., Esq.
Albert Schatz, Esq.
The Junior Bar Section received and discussed the analysis of
the economic survey of the bar which follows and adopted a resolution which is made a part of the proceedings of the section.
FINANCIAL SURVEY OF NEBRASKA LAWYERS
The income of Nebraska lawyers is the fourth lowest in the
United States outside the South, according to a 1950 U. S. Census
report. And, between 1929 and 1949, total incomes in the United
States increased 141 percent during rising costs of living, while
those of non-salaried lawyers increased by only about 73 percent,
according to a 1954 U. S. Department of Commerce survey.
Seeking to learn the financial facts of life of the Nebraska
lawyer, the Nebraska Junior Bar, working with the Nebraska Bar
Association, carried out a financial survey of Nebraska lawyers
in April 1956. Confidential survey forms were sent to 2,200 Nebraska lawyers. Eight hundred and fifty-three of these forms were
completed and returned by the lawyers. This was a 39 percent
response, which compares favorably with surveys of other states,
which report percentage returns as follows: Iowa 42 percent and
Ohio 41 percent.
The 853 returns were tabulated by the University of Nebraska
Department of Business Research, under the direction of Dr. Edgar
Z. Palmer. The department found that 251 of the returns were
checked by the lawyers as indicating they were not in private practice or were in part-time practice. There was insufficient number
of the part-time-lawyer returns for it to be practicable to tabulate
them. Accordingly, the 251 were set aside. Only the remaining 602
returns completed by lawyers who indicated they spent 80 percent
or more of their time in law practice, were used in the tabulations.
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Following are those tabulations which we believe will be of the
most interest to Nebraska lawyers. Again, these tabulations in-

volve only lawyers who indicated they spent 80 percent or more
of their time in private law practice.
AGE, BY SIZE OF CITY
Size of City
Age in
Years

All
Cities

All ages
602
(percent
29%
answering')
Under 25
25 to 29
30 to 34
35 to 39
40 to 44
45 to 49
50 to 54
55 to 59
60 to 64
65 to 69
70 to 74
75 and over
Not given

2
47
77
84
78
73
72
56
45
40
11
9
8

Average age 46.8

10,000
to
50,000

5,000
to
10,000

2,000
to
5,000

1,000
to
2.000

Under
1,000

Omaha

Lincoln

179
23%

71
19%

101
45%

61
50%

89
33%

73
36%

28
24%

1
18
21
25
18
22
22
19
14
9
5
4
1

0
9
10
16
4
4
6
3
9
5
1
0
4

0
5
15
14
14
11
10
14
7
8
1
2
0

1
5
12
2
10
9
8
3
3
5
1
1
1

0
4
7
15
18
10
14
4
6
8
2
1
0

0
5
11
9
11
12
5
9
5
2
1
1
2

0
1
1
3
3
5
7
4
1
3
0
0
0

46.9

44.7

47.6

45.8

47.7

45.7

50.0

IThis percentage is the number of full-time lawyers who answered
the survey compared to the number of lawyers listed in MartindaleHubbell. As noted earlier, survey returns from non-full-time
lawyers were not tabulated.
Looking at the first horizontal figures and the percentage figures under them, we see that the survey returns are fairly well
scattered through the various sizes of Nebraska cities. And the
first vertical figures show the returns to be fairly well distributed
age-wise. One limitation to the graphs is that the tabulator reports
that the 28 returns for cities under 1,000 contain some with population unspecified. This limitation as to cities under 1,000 applies
to all graphs in this survey.
The "average age" of lawyers is shown to be about the same
for all sizes of Nebraska communities, which disproves the belief
that younger lawyers gravitate to the larger cities. Although
lawyers under 30 seem to be particularly heavy in Omaha and
Lincoln, lawyers in the 30-to-45 bracket appear to be well distributed through all sizes of Nebraska cities.
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IMPORTANCE OF VARIOUS FIELDS OF LEGAL WORK,
BY SIZE OF CITY
0

4

03

100

;: C30

Perceniage importance

ALL CITIES-.............. 25.0

20.8

14.0

Omaha
Lincoln
10000-50000
5000-10000
2000- 5000
1000- 2000
Less than 1000.

21.0
19.8
20.7
20.8
21.1
20.4
21.9

15.2
16.7
18.6
13.4
12.3
8.1
6.1

19.7
19.6
24.5
28.4
28.5
32.4
33.1

9.5

8.7

7.4 7.6
3.4 7.5
6.3
8.5
11.6 10.3
11.3
8.5
17.3 10.6
17.0 10.6

8.1

5.8

4.6

3.5

14.3 7.0 4.7
13.2 9.5 4.8
8.6 6.0 3.9
4.5 3.6 3.4
2.7 5.9 5.9
1.7 2.9 4.1
.6 2.3 4.2

3.2
5.4
2.9
4.1
3.8
2.5
4.2

Lawyers were asked to list in order of importance five fields
from which their income came. Points were assigned these fields
by the tabulator as follows: first mention, 5 points, second mention,
4 points, etc. The above figures show the relative importance of
the fields, though they do not necessarily correspond to the percentage of income from that field.
The table shows probate work to be the most important incomewise, and, as expected, that this importance increases as the size of
city decreases. In Omaha and Lincoln, office practice is slightly
more important than probate. Office practice is about equally important for all sizes of Nebraska cities.
Iowa's 1955 survey showed probate by far the most important
field, income-wise, half of Iowa's lawyers rating it such. Next in
order came damage cases, office practice, income tax practice, corporations, title examination, auto claim investigation, collections,
domestic relations, and criminal law. Iowa's tabulation showed
probate work to be most important for 71 percent of the lawyers
in cities under 5,000 population, and that this percentage steadily
and sharply dropped as population increased, so that less than 26
percent rated it as most important in cities over 50,000 population.
An Ohio 1953 survey showed various fields to bring the following percentage of income:
Corporate practice
Probate and Trust
Damage actions
Real estate
Office work
Domestic relations
Tax
Collections, insolv.
Others

19%
15
15
11
11
9
6
4
10
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SIZE OF CITY AS AFFECTING INCOME
Size of
City

All Cities
Omaha
Lincoln
10,000-50,000
5,000-10,000
2,000- 5,000
1,000- 2,000
Under 1,000

Av. Gross
Receipts

Average
Expenses

Expenses
Percent of
G. Receipts

Average
Net
Income'

Average
Net 2
Income

$13,464

$4,355

32.4%

$ 9,109

$ 9,178

15,082
16,714
14,905
11,905
12,542
9,840
8,977

4,735
6,282
4,077
3,860
4,234
3,531
2,672

10,347
10,432
10,828
8,047
8,308
6,309
6,305

10,680
9,641
10,796
7,812
8,181
6,263
6,376

31.4
37.6
27.4
32.4
33.8
35.9
29.8

'Includes returns giving gross receipts, expenses and net income, a
total of 483 returns.
-Includes also returns giving net income only, a total of 592 returns.

In the upper right-hand corner is a figure in which Nebraska
lawyers will be interested: The average net income of the fulltime Nebraska lawyer is tabulated as $9,178. This may raise a
few lawyer eyebrows, particularly in view of a 1951 federal survey which showed the average net income of Nebraska lawyers
to be $6,333 and a 1949 U.S. Census Bureau report which showed
it to be $5,446.
One important limitation to the $9,178 figure should be noted,
however, This figure is the average income of lawyers spending
80 percent or more of their time in law practice--"full-time" lawyers. More accurately it is the income of the "successful" lawyer.
The survival-of-the-fittest law has removed a sizable number of
lawyers from the full-time category, leaving only the more successful lawyers to whom the $9,178 figure applies.
Iowa's 1955 survey showed its lawyers' average income to be
$8,643. However, Iowa included in its figures the income of parttime lawyers, so it is difficult to compare the Nebraska and Iowa
figures. Ohio's 1952 survey, covering only full-time lawyers and
thus on the same basis as Nebraska's tabulation, showed an average
income of $11,700.
Nebraska's survey shows, as expected, that a lawyer's income
is higher in the larger cities. However, the tally shows the lawyer
in the 10,000 to 50,000 population city to have the highest average

income of all.
A federal survey a few yeats ago showed lawyers in cities
between 100,000 and 250,000 population to earn an average income
twice that of lawyers in towns under 1,000 population. Ohio's 1952
survey indicated lawyers in cities of 200,000 to 500,000 population
averaged $11,000, and those in cities under 5,000, only $7,100. Iowa's
1955 survey showed lawyers in cities over 50,000 earning about
$10,500, and those in towns under 1,000 about $4,500.
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As for office expenses, the above table shows Lincoln with
by far the highest average expense. Otherwise expenses generally
decrease as the size of city diminishes.
Iowa's 1955 survey results are similar, average expenses dropping rather steadily from about $5,500 for cities over 50,000 to about
$2,500 for towns less than 1,000. Secretarial expense was by far
the largest item in Iowa, averaging about 67 percent of total expense, and rent the second largest at about 18 percent. As city
population increased, secretarial expense became a smaller proportion of total expense and rent became proportionately larger.
However, for all sizes of city the cost of secretaries plus rent
totaled about 85 percent of expenses. All other expenses combined
thus totaled only 15 percent.
Minnesota's 1952 survey showed that the average salary paid
seGretaries was about $205 in the three largest cities and about
$157 in cities under 10,000 population. Annual rent was $887 and
$445, respectively, for the two categories. The Minnesota bar committee, however, concluded that the small-town lawyer's expenses
for law library, insurance, supplies, etc., nearly offset his advantage
as to secretary and rent expense. Minnesota apparently did not
ask lawyers to list total expenses. The latter item was asked for
in Nebraska's survey, and shows the small-town lawyer to have
a decided advantage expense-wise, contrary to the Minnesota committee's conclusion.
AGE AS AFFECTING AVERAGE INCOME AND EXPENSES
Age in
Years

Expenses,
Percent of
Gross Receipts

All Ages

32.4%

Under 25
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70-74
75 and over

-----32.2
33.1
33.1
33.2
30.3
33.7
31.2
29.5
29.7
27.0
34.5

_

Average
Net Income

$ 9,178
1,887
4,686
6,473
8,764
9,182
9,094
11,797
12,145
10,952
9,481
10,103
7,108

The right column shows the average net income of the Nebraska lawyer to reach its peak at age 55-59 and to be about two
and one half times the income at age 25-29.
A U.S. 1951 survey gave 50-54 as the peak age for lawyers'
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income for the country generally, and indicated lawyers at that
age earned more than twice as much as lawyers in the 25-29 bracket.
Iowa's 1955 survey showed the years 55-64 to be most lucrative,
with a top income of $10,981. The average income for lawyers under
34 was $5,463. Ohio's 1952 survey showed lawyers to hit their
maximum at age 55-65, when they averaged $16,400, compared with
$4,200 at age 24-29.
NUMBER OF LAWYERS IN OFFICE AS AFFECTING
INCOME AND EXPENSES
Number in
Office

All returns
1
2
3
4
More than 4

Average
Gross
Receipts

$13,464
11,105
12,380
14,159
18,328
20,291

Average
Expenses

Expenses,
Percent of
Gr. Receipts

Average
Net
Incomel

$4,355

32.4%

$ 9,109

4,128
3,784
4,225
5,461
6,165

37.2
30.6
29.9
29.8
31.0

6,977
8,596
9,934
12,867
14,126

'This is the average net income of the 483 returns in which gross receipts, expenses, and net income were all included and excluding returns
listing only net income.
A 1951 survey for all the United States showed that the average
lawyer practicing alone earned $6,334; in a two-man firm, $8,833;
in a three-man firm, $14,103; and in a four-man firm, $18,275.
This survey is submitted to Nebraska lawyers without recommendations at this time, to be studied and discussed by them.
Junior Bar Section
Ray C. Simmons, Chairman
RESOLUTION
Be it resolved by the Junior Bar Section, Nebraska State Bar
Association, that the result of the financial survey of the Nebraska
lawyers be submitted to the Executive Committee of the Nebraska
State Bar Association with a preface showing present-day economic
conditions generally, and
1. Request that the survey results be published in the State
Bar Journal, and
2. Request that a committee be appointed for preparation and
promulgation of a minimum-fee schedule for the State of Nebraska, and
3. That the Executive Committee of the Nebraska State Bar
Association take such other action to carry out the various suggestions obtained from lawyers throughout the state.
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House of Delegates
Friday, October 19, 1956
HALE McCOWN: The report of the Section on Real Estate,
Probate, and Trust Law, Herman Ginsburg, Chairman.
HERMAN GINSBURG: Mr. Chairman and members of the
House, the Real Estate, Probate, and Trust Law Section reports
that we had our session yesterday at the time set in the program.
We had a very large attendance. The new members elected to
the Executive Committee of the section were Floyd E. Wright of
Scottsbluff and Fred H. Richards of Fremont.
Now the next item that I have to report, and I am a little bit
embarrassed thereby, is that our Executive Committee did not
have too much to do, apparently, and they decided that they would
re-elect the same officers that we had last year, so Herman Ginsburg is going to serve as the chairman and Lynn Heth as the secretary.
The main items of business of the section were a very interesting speech by Professor Basye on "Improvements in Conveyancing
Procedure," and then we had the report of our Title Standardization Committee, which I want to briefly summarize.
The report of the committee was adopted unanimously with
a few minor amendments. In a general way, the report of the
committee calls for amendment to two of the presently existing
standards, Standards 11 and 20, which will require acts of the
Legislature, because they are standards which have already been
enacted into legislation.
And then the report of the committee as adopted provides
for eight new standards which have been accepted by our section.
Then there are some other matters in the committee's report
which were adopted by the section which I feel I should specifically
call to the attention of the House, as follows.
That upon the adoption by the section of the amendments to
the existing statutory standards, necessary bills be presented to
the Legislature for the purpose of enacting such amendments
into law.
Next, that the standards and comments as approved by the
section be printed in permanent form, bound in the form of a desk
book for lawyers, preferably with a loose-leaf binding, and kept
up to date as standards or comments may be amended or revised,
or additional standards or comments adopted in current annotations.
Parenthetically, I might say that that, of course, will entail
some expense.
That the Title Standardization Committee be continued to
carry on the work of renewing, revising, and preparing the standards
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and assisting in the interpretation of legal questions as the development of statutory or case law may from time to time require.
And, finally, that the Legislative Committee of this section
be requested to prepare a bill for the presentation to the Legislature. I will not go into the whole thing, but it refers to the matter
of vacated streets, alleys and highways and public ways, and so
forth, which through inadvertence in previous years have not
been formally conveyed, at least, by the description in the deed
of conveyance.
As I previously mentioned, the report of the committee has
been approved unanimously by the section, and at this time I move
that this House approve the action of the section in that regard;
That the amendments to existing standards be approved and the
proposed new standards be adopted.
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: It has been moved and seconded.
May I suggest, Mr. Ginsburg, that it also carries as a part of
the recommendation that this House recommends the Executive
Council's expenditure of funds required for publication, as shown
by the report.
If there is no objection, all those in favor of the motion will
say aye.
Opposed, the same sign. The motion is carried.
The next item of business is the report of the Section on Insurance Law, James Ackerman.
JAMES N. ACKERMAN: Mr. Chairman, the Insurance Section
met this morning and have had two excellent papers, one by Joseph
P. Cashen on "Some Problems of Subrogation in Workmen's Compensation" and the second on "The Disability Clause" by J. Edward Day.
As items of business, the section elected Joseph C. Tye and
Harold Kaufman as members of the Executive Committee, and
the newly organized Executive Committee elected as its chairman
for the coming year Floyd Wright, and as secretary Joseph Tye.
HALE McCOWN: Is there a motion that the report be approved, Jim?
JAMES N. ACKERM N: I move that it be adopted.
VOICE: Sacond.
HALE McCOWN: Those -f you in favor of the motion, say aye.
Opposed, the same sign. The motion is carried.
The next item of business is the report of the Section on Taxation, Barton Kuhnms.
BARTON KUHNS: Mr. Chairman, the Section on Taxation
met this afternoon, and there were two excellent papers, one en-
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titled "Procedure in Tax Fraud Cases" by Joseph T. Votava, and
the other "Your Future Income Taxes" by Laurens Williams.
The members of the Executive Committee of the section met
immediately following the adjournment and elected as their officers
Tom Davies of Lincoln as chairman; Keith Miller of Omaha as
vice-chairman, and John Mason of Lincoln as secretary. The only
other announcement is that plans are under way for the usual
December Tax Institute, of which notice will be sent to the members
of the Association in due course and in ample time. Dan Stubbs
and John Mason were elected to the Executive Committee.
I move the approval of the report.
HALE McCOWN: Is there a second?
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: Any discussion?
(There was no response.)
HALE McCOWN: All those in favor of the motion say aye.
Opposed, the same. The motion is carried.
HALE McCOWN: The next report is the report of the Section
on Practice and Procedure by Lowell Davis.
LOWELL C. DAVIS: The Executive Committee of the Section
on Practice and Procedure held two meetings in Lincoln to formulate the program for the meeting which was held here yesterday.
The program consisted of an address by Charles C. Scott of
Kansas City, Missouri, who talked on "The Preparation and Presentation of Photographic Evidence."
The second part of the program consisted of a panel discussion
in connection with "Trial Procedure from Judicial Standpoint."
Members of the panel were Judges Yeager, Spencer, Nuss, and Kuns.
The program was well attended and well received. Your Executive Committee of this section hopes the program has made
practical and worth-while contribution to the Association's activities.
It is further the opinion of this committee that the scope of
the section activities could profitably be extended to include a
statewide institute sponsored by the Association, and to include
practical discussion of the matters pertaining to the practice and
procedure in the state of Nebraska.
A subcommittee of this section has met and had preliminary
discussions with the Committee of the Nebraska Hospital Association to consider problems of mutual interest regarding the procurement and use of hospital records, patient interviews, and so
forth.
It is recommended that this discussion be continued to explore
the possibility of joint action and in resolving such mutual problems.
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Following the section program on October 18, 1956, the following were elected to the section's Executive Committee for threeyear terms: Jack Devoe and Lowell C. Davis.
The Executive Committee then elected the following officers
for the ensuing year: George Healey, chairman; Raymond McGrath,
vice-chairman; Jack Devoe, secretary.
I move that the report be adopted.
HALE McCOWN: Is there a second?
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: Any discussion?
(There was no response.)
HALE McCOWN: All those in favor of the motion say aye.
Opposed, the same sign. The motion is carried.
The next item of business is the report of the Section on
Municipal and Public Corporations by Edward Fogarty.
EDWARD FOGARTY: Mr. Chairman and ladies and gentlemen. We held our meeting this morning. We had a paper on
"Zoning" by Raymond E. McGrath, who gave us a review of recent
legislation and recent cases affecting both city and county zoning.
We had a paper read by Winthrop B. Lane on the subject of
"Bond Histories," which I recommend to you. We disclaim any
credit for it as being a bible for your use, but I think it could be
dignified by being called a "Handbook," and when it is published
I think you will want to use it occasionally.
The new members of the section's Executive Committee are
Winthrop B. Lane and Barlow Nye.
The Executive Committee of the section elected as their officers for the ensuing year Jack Pace, chairman; Harold Rice, vicechairman; and Albert Reddish, secretary.
I move the adoption of the report.
HALE McCOWN: Is there a second?
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: Any discussion?
(There was no response.)
HALE McCOWN: As many as favor the motion, say aye.
Opposed, the same. The motion is carried.
HALE McCOWN: Next will be the report of the Junior Bar
Section by Ray Simmons.
RAY SIMMONS: The new members of the Junior Bar Executive Committee are Robert Berkshire of Lincoln and Edward A.
Cook III of Lexington. The new officers of the Junior Bar are
Edmund McEachen of Omaha, chairman; Dewayne Wolf of Kearney, vice-chairman; and Robert Berkshire of Lincoln, secretary.
We discussed at our meeting a financial survey which the
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Junior Bar took this last year together with the Senior Bar, and
we have mimeographed forms of that available to give out to any
of you who are interested. We recommend a uniform minimum
fee schedule.
HARRY SPENCER: I move the report be approved.
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: All in favor say aye.
Opposed, the same. The motion is carried.
We have one item of unfinished business which we were discussing, mainly, the responsibility of committees with respect to
legislation in similar matters. I am going to ask Bob Downing
if he has a report to make at this time.
ROBERT DOWNING: I do.
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Committee on Legislation, I
present the following resolution.
Be it resolved, first, that the President, with the advice and
consent of the Executive Council, determine the jurisdiction and
prescribe the duties of the Committee on Legislation, and the jurisdiction and duties of all other committees and all other sections
with regard to legislation be sponsored, supported, or opposed by
the Association.
That all chairmen and members of committees be informed
and instructed as to such jurisdiction and duties at the time that
they are notified of their appointment, or as soon thereafter as
possible, and from time to time thereafter as circumstances require.
And, second, that the chairman of the House of Delegates
arrange for the submission to the House not later than the next
annual meeting of one or more proposed amendments to the bylaws of the Association designed to conform to the by-laws to
Article 6 of the rules controlling and regulating the Association.
Mr. Chairman, I move the adoption of the resolution.
HALE McCOWN: Mr. Downing, as I understand it, this is
primarily with the idea that we should be somewhat slow about
the actual amendment of our by-laws, but in order to permit an
efficient functioning of this session of the Legislature, it was
deemed advisable to present this resolution, giving the President
the authority to do that coordinating for the present time, with
the idea that the next meeting of the House will be, of course,
next fall, and at that time we will have a definite presentation of
of any concrete suggestions for by-law amendments. This, I believe,
essentially is the proposal.
Is there a second to that motion?
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: Is there any discussion?
(There was no response.)
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HALE McCOWN: As many as favor the motion will say aye.
Opposed, the same. The resolution is adopted.
May I now suggest one of the appropriate items of business
here, and you may either drop it or you may go ahead, as you see
fit, as the final order of business; at the moment our by-laws, articles, and rules, of which we have none at the moment, do not
provide anything for a quorum of this House. Consequently, rules
of order govern, which means a majority. There is a possibility
you may wish to provide that one-third of the members of this
House shall constitute a quorum for transaction of business as a
rule of this house, which under the by-laws we have the right to
adopt the rules for our own governing.
The chair will entertain such a motion if anyone has such a
desire.
HARRY SPENCER: Mr. Chairman, the suggestion was made
that possibly the President may feel it desirable to call a meeting
of the House of Delegates for some purpose. It seems to me that
the majority might be too high a quorum in that situation, and
I therefore move that one-third of the membership of the House
of Delegates shall constitute a quorum.
HALE McCOWN: It has been moved; is there a second?
VOICE: Second.
HALE McCOWN: I might say, very frankly, that the object
in mind was that in the event the President should determine it
appropriate to have actual House action to back legislation, either
presented or opposed by this Bar Association, it might be advisable
to call a special meeting of this House, and in that event, in January, at the end of the twentieth legislative day, it might be difficult to get a majority, and in order to be able to speak for the
Association, it was deemed certainly within the province of this
House to adopt this rule to that effect.
Is there further discussion?
(There was no response.)
HALE McCOWN: Now as many as favor the motion will say
aye.
Opposed, the same.
Rule One of this House of Delegates has been adopted and will
be designated Rule No. 1.
So far as I know there is no other scheduled business on the
agenda.
Is there any unfinished business to come before this House?
(There was no response.)
HALE McCOWN: If not, may I express to each of you my
personal appreciation for your attendance, and particularly for
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your attendance today. We definitely have a quorum, I might
tell you, and when we counted, the quorum was here, and I appreciate it that you fellows did come back today.
If there is no further business to come before this House, the
motion to adjourn is in order.
MR. CASSEM: Mr. Chairman, let's not depart without taking
the occasion to express, as it should be annually expressed, I think,
the appreciation of this legislative body for the quietly efficient
way in which Brother Turner continually promotes the affairs of
this Association.
I move that we express our gratitude to him.
GEORGE H. TURNER: It is contrary to the rules of this Association to express any commendation to any officer.
HALE McCOWN: The motion has been made and seconded,
and, off the record, has been unanimously adopted.
A motion to adjourn is in order.
VOICE: I so move.
VOICE: Second.
MR. McCOWN: All in favor say aye, and, fortunately, it is not
debatable; and, thank you very much.
(The House of Delegates adjourned.)
.

PRESIDENT ATEN: Gentlemen, we will have a general session
of the Association for about two minutes. If you will come to order,
we will get it over with very shortly.
I think everyone will agree with me that that is a very efficient
way of presiding.
I would rather believe that Roberts Rules of Order had probably been amended this afternoon. Anyway, I would like to offer
my personal congratulations to Hale on a job very well and efficiently done, and to assure him that the Association as a whole
appreciates his handling of the affairs of the House of Delegates.
Mr. Secretary, is there any unfinished business?
GEORGE H. TURNER: Not to my knowledge, Mr. President.
PRESIDENT ATEN: There being no unfinished business, I
would like to now call to the chair Barton H. Kuhns, your President-elect.
I might say we did this last night and we are not going to repeat
it, and all I am going to do is tell you that it is now a pleasure to
turn over to my successor, Barton H. Kuhns, of Omaha, the administration of your affairs of your Association as President, and I
understand he will speak for approximately an hour.
PRESIDENT-ELECT KUHNS: I thought it should be two
hours. Thank you, Wilber.
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I expressed last evening my sincere appreciation of the honor
of being chosen as President of this Association; and all that I wish
to say now is to repeat that same expression of appreciation, and
I think, Wilber, that the record of this 57th Annual Meeting will
be a permanent memorial and tribute to the fine work which you
have done as President of the Association since the last annual
meeting.
I do want to say that I would appreciate it very much, and I
may be inviting trouble, but I do so knowingly, that if any of you
have any suggestions, criticisms, or comments upon the activities
of the Association, this meeting, ways in which we can improve the
conduct of meetings in the future, anything that pertains to a
proper function of this Association, I wish you would write me
about it.
I assure you that it will receive very serious consideration and
thought, and we will either adopt the suggestion or have some
reasons for not doing so.
Just a minute Mr. Turner has handed me a note, I thinkGeorge tells me that there were 831 members of the Association
registered at this annual meeting. I believe that is one of the largest,
if not the largest-the largest meeting that the Nebraska State Bar
Association has ever held.
I will make committee appointments promptly. I think the
very first task is going to be the matter of delineating these legislative assignments and getting ready for the legislative program
of the Association.
A good many of you will be hearing from me in that connection
in the very near future.
Is there any unfinished business to come before the assembly?
(There was no response.)
PRESIDENT-ELECT KUHNS: If not, the chair will entertain a
motion to adjourn.
HARRY SPENCER: I move we adjourn.
VOICE: Second.
PRESIDENT-ELECT KUHNS: It has been moved and seconded that we adjourn.
All those in favor signify by saying aye.
Those opposed-the meeting is adjourned.
(Thereupon, at 4:55 o'clock P.M., the 57th Annual Meeting of
the Nebraska State Bar Association was concluded.)
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NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
STATEMENT OF CASH RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS
SEPTEMBER 25, 1955 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1956
Receipts:
Active Members Dues ...............................
Inactive Members Dues ............................
Dues Received in Advance-1957 ............

$37,630.00
4,960.00
5.00

Reinstatements:
1955 .................................................... $45.00
1954 ..............................................
35.00
1953
12.00
1952
12.00
1951
10.00
1950 ................................................
8.00
1949 .........................
6.00
.....
...
...
..
1OAfl
6.00
1938-1947 .........................................
1.00

135.00

...........

6.00

Miscellaneous .............

Statute Books, Etc. Sold .................
Less: Remittance to State Library
Overpayments ............
Refunds ............

.

1.75
1.75
52.50
52.50

Reimbursement-Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Institute ................ 114.25
Expenses to be Reimbursed ............ 113.75
Reimbursement of Prior Year's
Football Tickets ....................................

105.00

Reimbursements of Prior Year's ABA
Regional Meeting Expenses ........................

428.42

Expenses:

Salaries and Payroll Taxes .......................
Executive Council Meetings ....................
Miscellaneous ........
...............
Audit ...............................
..............
Officers' Expense .......
...........
Aid to Local Bars ...
.........................
Office Supplies and Expense ................

6,253.90
1,002.65
25.55
175.00
1,186.07
168.18
1,316.10

$43,269.92
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Telephone and Telegraph -- -......
Junior Bar Institute ...................-...

320.84
267.28

Institute on Fees and Office Management

59.25

Contributions ---....---------...............
Insurance ...........................................

50.00
87.02

Family Law Institute ...............................
nstitute on Real Estate Titles ...............
Social Security Poll .-..........................
Nebraska Law Review ...........................
Directory ................................................

1,097.77
1,243.46
84.35
4,330.06
934.65

Committee Expenses:
Advisory .

.

........

260.20

American Citizenship .................
Inquiry ..............................

9.05
621.86

Joint Conference Lawyers
and Accountants ...................... 170.80
Judiciary

................................

Co-operation with American
Law Institute ..........................

12.54

272.84

Judicial Council.........

1,347.29
42.40

Junior Bar-Economic Survey .............177.46
Section on Practice and Procedure -------- 50.00
Postage and Express ...................................
1,180.93
American Bar and House of
Delegates Meeting ..................................

1,936.82

Nebraska State Bar Association
v. Feehan ......................................
......
353.40
Wilson v. Marsh ....................................
1,724.43
Bates Case
-...................
..
435.40

Nebraska State Bar Association
v. Richards ..............................

U. S. Government Bonds Purchased ........
Equipment Purchased

218.08

2,000.00
638.20

....

Trustee's Expense-Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Foundation

................-

-

53.50

Nebraska State Bar Association
Journal .................
1,275.83
Less: Advertising .................... 930.50

345.33

Public Service ............................ 5,337.82
Less: Reimbursements ................. 338.10

4,999.72

Nebraska State Bar Association
Annual Meeting ........................ 6,508.55

Less: Food Cost Reimbursed
and Display ..............

2,198.50

4,310.05
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Football Tickets ----------------------------105.00
Reimbursements -------------------.----------24.50
80.50
Certificates --------------------------2.00
Reimbursements -------...---..........-------

2.00

Fee Schedules ---------------------------...
15.00
Reimbursements -------------------------------1 0.00
5.00
Tax Institute -.-.............---------------

2,478.11

16.58
2,461.53
Reimbursements -------------------------American Bar Association
Regional Meeting ........................ 293.60
Reimbursements ----------...--------------25.60

268.00

41,230.17

Excess Receipts Over Disbursements --------------------------------

2,039.75

Cash Balance September 25,
1955 ---------------------------------------------3,307.77
Excess of Receipts Over
Disbursements ----------------------------2,039.75
Cash Balance September 30,
1956 ......................................................

5,347.52

Represented By:
First National Bank -----------------------2,418.35
Continental National Bank ............ 2,929.17
5,347.52
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1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1908
1910
1911
1912
1913
1914
1915
1916
1917
1918
1919
1920
1921
1922
1923
1924
1925
1926
1927
1928

ROLL OF PRESIDENTS
*Eleazer Wakely............ Omaha
1929 Anan Raymond .................... Omaha
*William D. McHugh ........... Omaha
1930 *J. L. Cleary ............ Grand Island
*Samuel P. Davidson._Tecumseh
1931 *Fred Shepherd ............... Lincoln
*John L. Webster...........Omaha
1932 =Ben S. Baker .................... Omaha
C. B. Letton ........................ Fairbury
1933 *J. J. Thomas .................... Seward
*Ralph W. Breckenridge....Omaha
1934 *John J. Ledwith................. Lincoln
*E. C. Calkins .................... Kearney
1935 *L. B. Day..............
Omaha
*T. J. Mahoney ...................... Omaha
1936 J. G. Mothersead....... Scottsbluff
1937 1C. J. Campbell ...........
*C. C. Flansburg ...............Lincoln
Lincoln
*Francis A. Brogan ............ Omaha
1938 Harvey M. Johnsen ............ Omaha
1939 James M. Lanigan........ Greeley
*Charles G. Ryan....Grand Island
1940 E. B. Chappell ............
Lincoln
*Benjamin F. Good-....... .Lincoln
*Villiam A. Redick. ............ Omaha
1941 Raymond G. Young..........Omaha
*John J. Halligan....North Platte
1942 Paul E. Boslaugh ........... Hastings
1943 *Robert R. Moodie.
*H. H. Wilson .
West Point
...... Lincoln
*C. J. Smyth-............... Omaha
1944 George L. DeLacy ............... Omaha
*John N. Dryden........
earney
1945 Virgil Falloon ................... Falls City
*F. M. Hall ............................ Lincoln
1946 Paul F. Good ..........
Lincoln
*Arthur C. Wakely ......
Omaha
1947 Joseph T. Votava
........ Omaha
*R. E. Evans .
...... Dakota City
1948 Robert H. Beatty....North Platte
*W. M. Morning ............
Lincoln
1949 Abel V. Shotwell .................. Omaha
*A. G. Elick.................... Omaha
1950 Earl J. Moyer .................... Madison
1951 Clarence A. Davis........... Lincoln
*George F. Corcoran.......... York
1952 George B. Hastings.............. Grant
*Edward P. Holmes.........Lincoln
*Fred A. Wright ........... Omaha
1953 Laurens Williams ............ Omaha
*Paul Jessen....... .Nebraska City
1954 J. D. Cronin....................... O'Neill
1955 John J. Wilson .................. Lincoln
*E. E. Good.
...........
%Vahoo
1956 Wilber S. Aten................ Holdrege
*F. S. Berry .
........ W..
Wayne
Robert IV. Devoe.........Lincoln

1900-06
1907-08
1909
1910-19

Roscoe
Geo. P.
W. G.
A. G.

ROLL OF SECRETARIES
Pound ....... _Lincoln
5. 1920-27 Anan Raymond ........
Omaha
6. 1928-36 Harvey Johnsen. ............ Omaha
Costigan, Jr.._.Lincoln
Hastings.........Lincoln
7. 1937George H. Turner .Lincoln
Ellick_._ ..Omaha

ROLL OF TREASURERS
6 1914-16 Chas. G. McDonald......Omaha
1900
Samuel F. Davidson
7. 1917-22 Raymond M. Crossman
101 -1............................Tecumseh
. Omaha
m........................
..................
1g1
S. L. Geisthardt ........... Lincoln
8. 1923-37 Virgil J. Haggard......... Omaha
1902-03 Charles A. Goss........ Omaha
1904-05 Roscoe Pound ......... .Lincoln
9. 1938George H. Turner.Lincoln
1906-13 A. G. Ellick- .....
_.........
Omaha

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34

ROLL OF EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
R. W. Breckenridge..Omaha
1912-26 E. E. Good ....................... %Vahoo
Andrew J. Sawyer.-.-Lincoln
192 4-26 Robert W. Devoe........Lincoln
Edmund H. Hinshaw..Fairbury
19224-24 Fred A. Wright..........Omaha
1915-28 Paul Jessen...-.Nebraska City
W. H. Kelligar ........... Auburn
Omaha
John N. Dryden ........ Kearney
1915-27 Clinton Brome .........
19227-29 Charles E. Matson.....Lincoln
F. A. Brogan. ................
Omaha
191.7-28 Fred S. Berry.
_
Wayne
S. P. Davidson. .......... Tecumseh
W. T. Wilcox......North Platte
192 8-29 Robert V. Devoe--..... .Lincoln
-...Omaha
19 0-30 T. J. McGuire..
R. W. Breckenridge.__Omaha
192 8-34 Harvey Johnsen...._......Omaha
Frank H. Woods.__--_Lincoln
Charles G. Ryan
19 29-31 E. A. CoufaL...... .David City
............................... Grand Island
19129-29 Anan Raymond........Omaha
1910-19 Alfred G. EIick.--...... Omaha
193 0-32 Paul E. Boslaugh......Hastings
1911-13 John A. Ehrhardt....Stanton
19330-30 J. L. Cleary ..... Grand Island
1911-11 Benjamin F. Good...._.Lincoln
193 1-33 W. C. Dorsey...........Omaha
1912-15 C. J. Smyth. ........... .Omaha
193 1-31 Fred Shepherd. ......... Lincoln
1912-12 William A. Redick......Omaha
193 2-34 Richard Stout.......
-Lincoln
1913-15
V. M. Morning ..........Lincoln
19331-32 Ben S. Baker...............Omaha
1913-16 J. J. Halligan.-..North Platte
191 3-35 Barlow F. Nye......
K earney
1914-14 H. H. Wilson ....... _
-___Lincoln
1913-33 J. J. Thomas .......... Seward
1915-17 Edwin E. Squires
19194-36 Chas. F. McLaughlin ...Omaha
21.
..-.----Broken Bow
19334-34 John J. Ledwith.....Lincoln
-..--Omaha
1916-16 John N. Dryden...... Kearney
193 5-35 L. B. Day.
1916-17 Frederick Shepherd...Lincoln
19335-37 James M. Lanigan..-Greeley
1917-17 Frank MVL HalL
-. Lincoln
5-38
H.
J.
Requartte....._.Lincoln
193
1917-18 Anan Raymond
..... Omaha
Raymond
M. Crossman
193 5-38
.. .... .......-.
-.-.-----.--.---............ ... O m ahia
1918-18 A. C. Wakeley......
Omaha
1918-22 Fred A. Wright ..........Omaha
Stanton
193 5-40 F. H. Pollock.........
1919-19 R. E. Evans ........... Dakota City
19335-41 T. J. Keenan ............. Geneva
1919-22 Geo. F. Corcoran. .........
York
19335-39 Walter D. James.........McCook
1919-20 L. A. Flansburg......iLincoln
193 5-37 Roland V. Rodman... Kimball
1920-20 W. M. Morning..........Lincoln
19316-36 J. G. Mothersead..Scottsbluff
1920-27 Anan Raymond ........... Omaha
193 6-36 James L. Brown. .... .. Lincoln
1921-21 Alfred G. EUick.....
Omaha
193 7-39 David A. Fitch..........Omaha
1921-23 Guy C. Chambers.... _Lincoln
1937-39 Raymond G. Young__Omaha
1922-24 James R. Rodman...Iimball
193 7-41 M. M. Maupin....North Platte
1900-04
1900-08
1900-02
1903-06
1904-07
1905-05
1907-10
1908-09
1909-11
1910-12
1910-10

*Deceased.

NEBRASKA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

1937-41
1938-42
1938-42
1940-46
1940-42
1940-42
1941-43
1941-43
1941-47
1937-37
1938-38
1939-39
1940-40
1942-45
1941-41
1942-48
1942-42
1942-45
1942-49
1943-45
1941-45
1943-46
1944-49
1945-50
1945-48
1944-46
1945-47
1945-49
1946-48

Golden P. Kratz._.Sldney
Sterling F. Mutz..........Lincoin
Don W. Stewart.....Lincoln
George N. Mecham .
Omaha
Abel V. ShotwelL......Omaha
Frank M. Colfer ........... McCook
Virgil Falloon ..........Falls City
Joseph C. Tye ............Kearney
Earl J. Moyer .......... Madison
C. J. Campbell .............. Lincoln
Harvey Johnson .............. Omaha
James M. Lanigan....... Greeley
E. B. Chappell ............ Lincoln
Fred J. Cassidy........... Lincoln
Raymond G. Young......Omaha
Max G. Towle ........... Lincoln
Paul E. Boslaugh ..
Hastings
John E. Dougherty........York
Yale C. Holland. ........... Omaha
Robert R. Moodie....West Point
B. F. Butler ............. Cambridge
Frank M. Johnson....Lexington
Floyd E. Wright._.-Scottsbluff
John J. Wilson ............ Lincoln
Robert B. Waring ....... Geneva
George L. DeLacy ....... Omaha
Virgil Falloon......_Falls City
Leon Samuelson ......... Franklin
Harry W. Shackelford
..............
Omdha

99. 1946-48 Paul F. Good ................Lincoln
100. 1947-48 Joseph T. Votava..
Omaha
101. 1947-48 John E. Dougherty.....Yorc

1947-55 Lyle E. Jackson ............ . Ieligh
1948-49 Robert H. Beatty
..............................
............. North Platte
1947-50 Frank D. Williams.Lincoln
1947-50 Thomas J. Keenan....Geneva
1948-51 Laurens Williams ........ Omaha
1949-51 Joseph H. McGroarty
1949-54 Wilber S. A-en .......... [oldrege
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1948-50
1949-55
1949-55
1949-51
19501950-56
19501950-52
1951-55
19521951-52
1952-53
1953-54
19541954-56
195519551955195519551954-55
195519561956-

Abel V. Shotwell ........ Omaha
Paul L. Martin ..... Sidney
Joseph C. Tye............ Kearney
Earl J. Moyer .......... Madison
Harry A. Spencer .
Lincoln
Paul P. Chaney.
Falls City
Paul Bek .......................... Seward
Clarence A. Davis...._Lincoln
Barton H. Kuhns.
Omaha
Thomas C. Quinlan....Omaha
George B. Hastings .. Grant
Laurens Williams.
Omaha
J. D. Cronin .................... O'Neill
Norris ChadderdonHoldrege
John J. Wilson ..... ....Lincoln
Wilber S. Aten ...
Holdrege
F. M. Deutsch ............. Norfolk
Clarence E. Haley Hartington
R. R. Wellington....-Crawford
Alfred G. Ellick ...... Omaha
Jean B. Cain ........ Falls City
Hale McGown ............ Beatrice
C. Russell Mattson....Lincoln
Barton H. Kuhns........ Omaha

